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Companies often invest a substantial amount of time and resources in building and maintaining 
business relationships with key stakeholders. Although, these efforts usually result in 
strengthening relations between partners, it is not enough to ensure continuous relationship 
functionality and desirability. Recently, researchers and managers alike have begun to realise 
that reducing the impact of negative (or dark side) elements inherent to business relationships 
can have a significant effect on relationship success and performance. Despite the growth of 
studies investigating the dark side of business relationships over the last decade, little insight 
has been offered in terms of how and why dark side behaviour surfaces. Hence, this study 
focuses on exploring the onset of dark side behaviour in business-to-business relationships by 
investigating identified antecedents (i.e. trust, shared values, opportunistic behaviour, and 
uncertainty), behavioural outcomes (i.e. conflict, power, dependence, and commitment), and 
symptoms (relational myopia, complacency, vulnerability, and suspicion). 
To test the conceptual model, data was collected from key account managers and other top-
level executives who possess knowledge and experience regarding their company’s business 
relationships with other partnering organisations. A survey of the target population yielded a 
realised sample of N=212, and the data was analysed using SPSS and PLS-SEM in order to 
generate descriptive and inferential statistics, respectively. 
The findings suggest that some antecedents of dark side behaviour (especially trust, shared 
values and opportunistic behaviour) can lead to certain negative behavioural outcomes. While 
the data  showed no relationship between dysfunctional conflict and any of the symptoms 
associated with the dark side of business relationships, significant relationships were found 
between the identified behavioural outcomes (i.e. functional conflict, non-coercive power, 
coercive power, dependence, and commitment) and symptoms of dark side behevaiour. This 
study can, thus, explain the onset of dark side behaviour in business relationships to some extent 
– even though it possesses some research limitations. These limitations, along with future 
research recommendations, refer to the sampling procedure, the need to explore alternative 
conceptual models, the possibility of conducting longitudinal research, and the opportunity to 
assess additional moderating and mediating variables. 
This study aspires to contribute to current literature by broadening the understanding of dark 
side behaviour in business relationships. Practical implications, on the other hand, include 
providing managers and executives with the knowledge and insight to identify and accordingly 
reduce dark side behaviour in their business relationships. The originality of the current study 
resides in the examination of novel relationships between known relational variables, as well 
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as the investigation of underexplored variables (i.e. symptoms) indicating that a business 
relationship may not be as functional as it once was. 
 
Keywords: Business-to-business management, dark side relationship behaviour, relationship 
marketing, shared values, trust, opportunistic behaviour, uncertainty, conflict, power, 



































Maatskappye belê dikwels 'n aansienlike hoeveelheid tyd en hulpbronne in die vestiging en 
instandhouding van sakeverhoudings met sleutel belanghebbendes. Alhoewel hierdie pogings 
gewoonlik lei tot die versterking van verhoudings tussen firmas, is dit egter nie genoeg om 
deurlopende verhouding funksionaliteit en wenslikheid te verseker nie. Beide 
besigheidsbestuurnavorsers en maatskappybestuurders het onlangs begin besef dat die 
vermindering van die impak van negatiewe (of donker) elemente in verhoudings 'n aansienlike 
uitwerking op verhoudingsukses en -prestasie kan hê. Ten spyte van die toename in studies wat 
die donkerkant van sakeverhoudinge ondersoek, is daar nog min insig gegenereer in terme van 
hoe en waarom donkerkant gedrag ontstaan. Hierdie studie fokus dus daarop om die aanvang 
van donkerkant gedrag in sakeverhoudings te verduidelik deur geïdentifiseerde bronne 
(vertroue, gemeenskaplike waardes, opportunistiese gedrag en onsekerheid), gedragsuitkomste 
(konflik, mag, afhanklikheid en toewyding) en simptome (verhoudingskortsigtigheid, 
alvoldaanheid, kwesbaarheid en verdagsaamheid) te ondersoek. 
Om die konseptuele model te toets, is data ingesamel van rekeningbestuurders, asook ander 
topvlak werknemendes wat kennis en ervaring het aangaande hul maatskappy se 
besigheidsverhoudings met ander organisasies. Die data is ingesamel van die teikenbevolking 
deur middel van 'n vraelys. 'n Werkende steekproef van N=212 is verkry en die data is 
geanaliseer deur middel van SPSS en PLS-SEM om beskrywende en inferentiële statistiek te 
genereer. 
Die resultate dui daarop dat sommige bronne van donkerkant gedrag (veral vertroue, 
gemeenskaplike waardes en opportunistiese gedrag) tot sekere negatiewe gedragsuitkomste kan 
lei. Terwyl die data aandui dat geen verhouding is tussen disfunksionele konflik en enige van 
die donkerkant simptome nie, dui die resultate wel aan dat daar beduidende verhoudings is 
tussen meeste van die geïdentifiseerde gedragsuitkomste (d.w.s. funksionele konflik, nie-
koerierkrag, koeratiewe krag, afhanklikheid en toewyding) en simptome van donkerkant 
gedrag. Hierdie studie kan dus die aanvang van donkerkant gedrag in sakeverhoudinge tot 'n 
mate verduidelik – alhoewel dit oor navorsingsbeperkings beskik. Hierdie beperkings hou 
verband met die steekprosedure, die ondersoek van alternatiewe konseptuele modelle, die 
moontlikheid om longitudinale navorsing te doen, asook die geleentheid om addisionele 
modererende en bemiddelde veranderlikes te bestudeer. 
Hierdie studie streef daarna om tot huidige literatuur by te dra deur die begrip van donkerkant 
gedrag in sakeverhoudings te verbreed. Praktiese implikasies, aan die ander kant, sluit die 
voorsiening van kennis en insig aan bestuurders in om sodoende donkerkant gedrag in hul 
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sakeverhoudings te kan identifiseer en op ‘n gepasde wyse te kan verminder. Die 
oorspronklikheid van hierdie studie is ten vonde in die ondersoek van nuwe verhoudings tussen 
bekende verhoudingsveranderlikes, asook die bestudering van onderverkende veranderlikes 
(d.w.s. simptome) wat aandui dat 'n besigheidsverhouding dalk nie meer so funksioneel is soos 
dit eens was nie. 
 
Sleutelwoorde: Besigheid-tot-besigheid bestuur, donkerkant verhoudingsgedrag, 
verhoudingsbemarking, gemeenskaplike waardes, vertroue, opportunistiese gedrag, 
onsekerheid, konflik, mag, afhanklikheid, toewyding, verhoudingskortsigtigheid, 
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That is the best of all things we can do for one another: Make the dark small.” 
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For decades, business relationships between firms have been compared to personal 
relationships. Just like personal relationships (i.e. marriages), business partnerships do not only 
comprise of positive elements, but they also have a negative side. To illustrate the complexity 
of interfirm relations, the marriage metaphor has been widely used to describe business-to-
business relationships throughout literature (e.g. Celuch, Bantham & Kasouf, 2006; Dywer, 
Schurr & Oh, 1987; Tynan, 1997). The marriage analogy has continued to be used throughout 
several studies over the years (e.g. Doherty & Alexander , 2004; Grönroos, 2004; Haenlein & 
Kaplan, 2010; Morgan & Hunt, 1994; O’Malley & Prothero, 2004; O’Malley & Tynan, 2000; 
Palmer, 2000; Sheth & Paratiyar, 1995; Watson & Johnson, 2010). Not suggesting that the 
institution of marriage only entail negative aspects, the metaphor particularly emphasises that 
business relationships also experience difficult times, and that the behaviour of involved parties 
can sometimes have detrimental consequences for the relationship.  
Abosag, Yen and Barns (2016) claim that companies often invest a substantial amount of time 
and resources into building and maintaining relationships with desirable business partners. 
These efforts usually have a positive impact in terms of increased trust, greater commitment 
and effective collaboration (Chung, Wang, Huang & Yang, 2016). However, several authors 
(e.g. Anderson & Jap, 2005; Hibbard, Kumar & Stern, 2001; Villena, Revilla & Choi, 2011) 
acknowledge that only investing in the positive aspects of business relationships is not enough 
to ensure the achievement of desired goals. Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer and Vohs 
(2001) suggest that reducing the impact of negative elements in business relationships may have 
a greater influence on relationship success and performance than investing solely in positive 
aspects. With a growing interest in the darker side of business relationships, many authors have 
started to examine negative relational elements in order to determine why typically good-
functioning relationships often become inefficient, unfunctional and, ultimately, undesirable 
(Abosag et al., 2016). The term “dark side” has gained popularity in management sciences 
when referring to the negative aspects of a phenomenon and for the purpose of this study it is 
employed purely as a collective name – without referring to any degree or severity of a situation. 
However, despite increased research attention, only a few studies have devoted research purely 
to exploring the manifestation of dark side behaviour in business relationships (Abosag et al., 
2016). Therefore, the current study aspires to contribute to the growing body of knowledge 
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concerning this dark side phenomenon by investigating identified antecedents, behavioural 
outcomes and symptoms of the dark side of business relationships.  
The first chapter serves primarily as an overview of this study and it only includes pivotal 
information concerning the relevant literature and research design. A more thorough discussion 
of each section is included in the proceeding chapters.  
 
1.2 BACKGROUND TO STUDY 
 
Kenichi Ohmae once said that, “Companies are beginning to learn what nations have always 
known: in a complex, uncertain world filled with dangerous opponents, it is best not to go it 
alone” (Williams, Han & Qualls, 1998:135). There are numerous reasons why interfirm 
partnerships are considered important in today’s business world, many of which involve 
financial and operational benefits. Webster (1992) predicted that business relationships would 
become increasingly perceived as a strategic resource, much like other resources (i.e. products 
and technology), ultimately resulting in increased profits because of competitive advantages 
acquired through interfirm cooperation. Business relationships can help firms to maneouvre 
better through competitive landscapes, as well as enhance their financial and non-financial 
performance. However, the establishment and development of a partnership between firms is 
often considered complex as it requires individual parties to contribute time, effort and 
resources. Thus, business partnerships, and the dynamic between partners, must be 
continuously monitored and managed in order to ensure the relationship remains prosperous 
and desirable (Abosag et al., 2016).  
According to Lin, Lee and Lee (2005), the forming of strong business relationships 
characterised by trust and commitment, can result in informational, transactional and strategic 
benefits for the parties involved. For example, Ulaga (2003) suggests that strong business 
relationships between a company and its partners (i.e. suppliers, buyers, service providers, 
collarborators, etc.) can enhance internal operations and, ultimately, profitability. Other authors 
(e.g. Payan, Padín & Ferro, 2019; Soosay, Hyland & Ferrer, 2008; Zuzel & Zabkar, 2006) 
emphasise that cooperation and collaboration in a partnership can result in the development of 
dynamic capabilities that can enhance the performance of firms within a market. Although it is 
evident that there are numourous benefits associated with interfirm relationships, Turnball, 
Ford and Cunningham (1996:58) maintain that “there are no nice neat stages” in relationship 
evolution and that detrimental elements can emerge if the partnership is not managed correctly. 
Abosag et al. (2016) suggest that the notion of dark side behaviour is often associated with 
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these negative relationship attributes and can relate to “problems”, “challenges”, “difficulties” 
and “drawbacks” with regard to structural issues that exist in business relationships. Anderson 
and Jap (2005) broadly define this dark side of business relationships as a phenomenon in which 
potentially dangerous forces reside beneath the surface of seemingly well-functioning business 
relationships that, if given the conditions to manifest, can damage the partnership. In order to 
explore the manifestation of dark side behaviour, this study identifies and investigates relevant 
antecedents, behavioural outcomes and symptoms regarding the dark side of business 
relationships. Drawing from Morgan and Hunt’s (1994) Commitment-Trust Theory, as well as 
other pivotal studies by Johnsen and Lacoste (2016) and Ting et al. (2007), potential 
antecedents (i.e., trust, shared values, opportunistic behaviour, and uncertainty) and behavioural 
outcomes (conflict, power, dependence, and commitment) were identified and adopted. 
Additionally, based on Baker’s (2009) conceptual model that investigates the dark side of close 
business partnerships, relevant symptoms of dark side behaviour (i.e., relational myopia, 
complacency, vulnerability, and suspicion) were selected and examined in the current study. 
These variables are briefly discussed in the proceeding section. 
 
1.2.1 Antecedents of dark side behaviour 
 
Abosag et al. (2016) claim that it is important for firms to understand the root cause of dark 
side behaviour in order to effectively reduce and manage its appearance in business 
relationships. Drawing from existing literature, the current study identified trust, shared values, 
opportunistic behaviour and uncertainty as possible antecedents of dark side behaviour. These 
aforementioned elements all entail particular qualities that can possibly result in the outcome 
of certain behaviours and attitudes that might, consequently, cause the relationship to fall victim 




Trust is one of the most frequently cited concepts in business relationship literature and has 
been defined as a firm’s belief that the other party within the relationship will perform actions 
that will result in positive outcomes, and that the other party will also not take unexpected 
actions that would lead to negative consequences for the firm (Anderson & Narus, 1990; 
Tomkins, 2001). Trust is usually described as something beneficial to all concerned – 
something that is inherently good (Skinner, Dietz & Weibel, 2014). Several authors (e.g. 
Anderson & Narus, 1990; Dowell, Morrison & Heffernan, 2015; Huang & Wilkinson, 2013; 
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Jiang, Henneberg & Naudé, 2011; Morgan & Hunt, 1994) maintain that trust is a key dimension 
in business relationships which can influence parties’ behaviour and attitudes. As trust can 
influence how a partner is perceived by another, as well as how they ultimately behave within 
a relationship, this study identifies trust as a potential antecedent. In other words, trust can 
influence the behaviour of parties within a partnership (Morgan & Hunt, 1994), which can, in 
turn, affect the functionality of the relationship. 
Trust has also been defined as a complex multi-dimensional construct (Brashear, Boles, 
Bellenger & Brooks, 2003; Johnson & Grayson, 2005; Miyamoto & Rexha, 2004) and is often 
conceptualized as having three dimensions, namely cognitive, affective and behavioural. While 
cognitive (performance-based) trust addresses contractual and competence aspects, the 
affective dimension is more emotion-driven and emphasises aspects pertaining to goodwill 
(Sako, 1992). In this study, cognitive and affective trust is defined in a manner that is consistent 
with the basic notions of cognition and affect as stipulated in relationship marketing literature 
(Johnson & Grayson, 2005). The third component of trust, behavioural trust, constitutes actions 
that flow from a state of cognitive and affective trust (Lewis & Weigert, 1985), and is therefore 
treated implicitly as the consequence of cognitive and affective trust (Johnson & Grayson, 
2005).  
 
Shared values  
 
Throughout various disciplines, from psychology to organisational behaviour, shared values 
have been linked to the concept of culture (Baker, 2009). In the area of marketing management, 
Deshpande and Webster (1989) define organisational culture as “the pattern of shared values 
and beliefs that helps people understand organisational functioning and thus provides norms 
for appropriate organisational behaviour”. Molla and Bhalla (2006) explain that organisations 
impose different values and beliefs (also known as culture) on their business partners – which 
defines both expected and accepted behaviour modes, working relationships and 
communication patterns. Schein (1990) suggests that shared values and beliefs are fundamental 
in defining organisational culture and can reflect the cultural orientation of firms and their 
relationships. Because shared values provides what many believe to be the best measure of 
organisational fit in business relationships (Caldwell & O'Reilly, 1990; Chatman, 1991), it has 
become a variable of great interest to organizational research, especially concerning trust and 
commitment (Chatman, 1991). In their commitment-trust theory of relationship marketing, 
Morgan and Hunt (1994) posited shared values as the only concept that is a direct precursor of 
both relationship commitment and trust. Similar to Molla and Bhalla’s (2006) inference about 
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values and beliefs, Morgan and Hunt (1994:25) define shared values as “the extent to which 
partners have beliefs in common about what behaviours, goals, and policies are important or 
unimportant, appropriate or inappropriate, and right or wrong”. Hence, it is likely that shared 
values can contribute to the development of commitment and trust between business partners 
(Dwyer et al., 1987). In this study, shared values is adopted as a possible antecedent of dark 
side behaviour due to its capacity to influence the organisational fit between business partners 




Opportunism often involves the pursuit of self-interest with guile – with guile referring to 
“lying, stealing, cheating and calculated efforts to mislead, distort, disguise, obfuscate or 
otherwise confuse” (Williamson, 1975:6). In a business-to-business context, several authors 
(e.g. Abosag et al., 2016; Das & Rahman, 2015; Wathne & Heide, 2000) maintain that there 
are two main theories of firm governance from which opportunism emerges, namely the 
transaction cost economics (TCE) and social exchange theory (SET).  
Drawing from the TCE theory, two assumptions are made which delineate that (1) parties are 
naturally inclined to act opportunistically and (2) firms are usually subject to bounded 
rationality (i.e. the limitation of knowledge) (Das & Rahman, 2015; Williamson, 1981). 
Williamson (1981) suggests that when parties are not in possession of all the facts and 
information, they are more prone to making lesser rational decisions. Thus, as all partnership 
agreements developed between firms are usually incomplete and cannot specify every 
contingency, opportunities for renegotiations might emerge in the future – along with 
alternative options (Provan & Skinner, 1989; Williamson, 1981). The lack of rational decision-
making and the availability of alterative opportunities can consequently result in detrimental 
behaviours and attitudes which, in turn, might lead to the emergence of dark side behaviour in 
business relationships. The second theory that underlines the concept of opportunism is the 
social exchange theory (SET), which has been used as a basis to explain the relationship 
marketing theory and interfirm relationships (e.g. Das & Rahman, 2015; Dwyer et al., 1987; 
Kingshott, 2006; Luo, 2002). SET suggests that there is an alternative and more efficient form 
of governance for relationships, and therefore it rejects the assumption of opportunism 
(Rahman, 2015). Heide and John (1992) argue that business parties involved in an exchange 
relationship tend to rely more on trust, commitment, cooperation, satisfaction, and other 
relational norms, than strictly on contractual agreements. According to SET, an exchange can 
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be viewed as a social behaviour that may result in both economic and social outcomes 
(Emerson, 1976). Thus, when a relationship produces positive social outcomes that enhances 
its government and performance, opportunistic behaviour might be less likely to occur. Luo 
(2006) argues that opportunism may affect the development of relational norms as well as 
decrease the level of trust and commitment within a relationship. Because of the ability of 
opportunism to result in detrimental behaviours and attitudes that can damage the continuity 
and efficiency of a relationship, opportunistic behaviour is identified as a potential antecedent 




Abosag et al. (2016) claim that, once dark side behaviour begins to surface within business 
relationships, uncertainty can be considered a possible reason to explain its emergence. The 
negative impact of uncertainty has been well documented throughout the literature (e.g. 
Geyskens, Steenkamp & Kumar, 1998) and can be defined as the inability to attach probability 
to different states of the nature of outcomes (Ting et al., 2007). The current study adopts 
Eriksson and Sharma’s (2003) definition of uncertainty which defines it as the gap between 
expected and actual future outcomes, 6haracteriz how limited information amongst parties can 
affect their ability to make decisions. Furthermore, uncertainty is also considered to be either 
subjective or objective (Eriksson & Sharma, 2003). It is, however, difficult to treat uncertainty 
with complete objectivity (March & Shapira, 1987) and because of this, the current study 
explores uncertainty according to the perceptions of parties within a business relationship 
(Eriksson & Sharma, 2003).  
The arguments that delineate uncertainty as an element of dark side behaviour are drawn from 
a structural model presented by Eriksson and Sharma (2003), in which they distinguish between 
contextual uncertainty, relationship uncertainty and decision-making uncertainty. Although 
popular relationship marketing research focuses primarily on relationship uncertainty, it is 
suggested that the influence of contextual uncertainty and decision-making uncertainty should 
also be considered (Eriksson & Sharma, 2003). Relationship uncertainty is affected by both 
contextual uncertainty and decision-making uncertainty due to the unpredictability and 
complexity of external environments and decisions regarding organizational operations 
(Eriksson & Sharma, 2003). This study proposes that if a business relationship is 6haracterized 
by uncertainty, dark side behaviour could eventually arise (Abosag et al., 2016) and damage 
typically good-functioning relationships. 
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1.2.2 Dark side behavioural outcomes  
 
The Oxford English Dictionary defines behaviour as “the way in which one acts or conducts 
oneself, especially towards others” (Oxford English Dictionary, 2005:40). When firms exhibit 
certain behaviours and attitudes (i.e. antecedents), consequential behavioural outcomes might 
occur that may influence the degree of dark side within a partnership (Abosag et al., 2016). The 
abovementioned antecedents (i.e. trust, shared values, opportunistic behaviour and uncertainty) 
were identified as constructs that can potentially influence and shape the actions and reactions 
of parties that, in turn, can affect the direction and dynamism of the relationship. Based on the 
literature, this study identities conflict (functional and dysfunctional), power (non-coercive and 
coercive), dependence and commitment as potentially behavioural outcomes of dark side 
behaviour. Several authors (e.g. Abosag et al., 2015; Abosag et al., 2016; Anderson & Jap, 
2005; Baker, 2009; Lund et al., 2015) maintain that these behavioural outcomes can result in 




Conflict is commonly described as tension that exists between social entities due to real or 
perceived differences (Raven & Kruglanski, 1970) and it is generally considered an inevitable 
part of relationships (Stern & El-Ansary, 1992). In terms of business relationships, IMP 
literature defines conflict as “a measure of differences between partners over the direction of 
the relationship or involving their respective contributions and benefits” (Johnsen & Lacoste, 
2016:78). Several authors (e.g. Frazier, 1999; Skarmeas, 2006; Thomas, 1992) recognise 
conflict as one of the major constructs used in describing channel relationships since it 
addresses the incompatibility of activities between parties. However, Skarmeas (2006) and 
Zhou et al. (2007) suggest that conflict can be perceived as either a positive or a negative 
relational force depending on (1) the particular relationship under scrutiny, (2) the distribution 
of power among parties, and (3) whether the conflict classifies as functional or dysfunctional.  
Functional conflict usually refers to differences in opinions regarding tasks, procedures, 
strategy, business ideas and other business-related issues that tend to be openly discussed and 
resolved, and as result facilitates the strengthening of the relationship (Pfajfar, Shoham, 
Brencic, Koufopoulos, Katsikeas & Mitrega, 2017; Skarmeas, 2006). In contrast, dysfunctional 
conflict refers to strong disagreements, underlying emotions, and negative actions (e.g. attacks, 
clashes and sarcasm) that create frustration and hostility among parties (Pfajfar et al., 2017). 
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 This study includes functional and dysfunctional conflict in its investigation of the dark side 
of business relationships in order to obtain a comprehensive understanding of how conflict 




Power within the area of relationship marketing literature has received irregular and contrasting 
treatment from various researchers (e.g. Hingley, 2005; Meehan & Wright, 2012; Wang, Huo, 
Tian & Hua, 2015). Among those who recognise the concept of power as “alien” to the effective 
workings of business relationships, Hingley (2005) identifies power as negating in terms of co-
operation in situations where success is determined through principles of co-operation and trust. 
However, the negative view surrounding power is not deemed universal. An opposing 
perspective comes from a number of authors (e.g. Earp, Harrison & Hunter, 1999; Kalafatis, 
2000; Svensson, 2001) who emphasise that not all business relationships result in mutual 
benefit as they are not necessarily characterised by an equal distribution of power, nor do they 
always have to be. This study investigates the role of power, especially the imbalance of power, 
in the onset of the dark side of business relationships and accordingly adopts Emerson’s 
(1962:32) definition which defines power as “the ability of an actor to influence another to act 
in the manner that they would not have otherwise”.  
Furthermore, Heide and John (1988) recognise power as a two-way interaction between parties 
engaged in a relationship. This countervailing bi-directional dynamic is considered central to 
all power analyses (Meehan & Wright, 2012). Several authors (e.g. French, Raven & 
Cartwright, 1959; Maloni & Benton, 2000; Zhao, Huo, Flynn & Yeung, 2008) identify two 
dimensions of power, namely non-coercive power and coercive power. Whereas non-coercive 
power is a mechanism that references or mediates positive consequences for compliance, 
coercive power can be defined as a mechanism for gaining party compliance that references 
and mediates negative consequences for noncompliance (Gundlach & Cadotte, 1994). The 
current study identifies coercive and non-coercive power as potential behavioural outcomes 
that occur due to antecedents that influence relationship dynamics. Both these dimensions are 
explored in a business-to-business context in order to determine how power can result in the 









The notion of power as the obverse of dependence can be traced back to the works of Emerson 
(1962) and Blau (1964). Gaski (1984) elaborates on the relation between power and dependence 
by identifying them as conceptually inseparable. Several authors, however, oppose Gaski’s 
work by differentiating between these concepts. They argue that power emphasises a firm’s 
resource control, as well as its behavioural influence over a counterparty (Caniëls & Roeleveld, 
2009; Kumar, 2005; Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003), whereas dependence focuses on the importance 
for a party to achieve their desired goals that could be deemed superior to alternative options 
(Buchanan, 1992; Emerson, 1962; Schmitz, Schweiger & Daft, 2016). This study thus perceives 
power and dependence as separate concepts, adopting Frazier’s (1983) definition which defines 
dependence within business relationships as an organization’s need to maintain a relationship 
in order to achieve desired goals.  
Anderson and Narus (1990) link the presence of dependence to relationship configurations in 
which one party is more superior and the potential relationship outcomes more representative 
of the independent party’s goals. The understanding of dependence can be explained by two 
streams of thought, namely the transaction cost approach and resources dependency theory. 
Firstly, the transaction cost approach argues that increased switching costs can create a bonding 
effect between parties (Rindfleisch & Heide, 1997). Secondly, the resource dependency theory 
emphasises an organization’s need to rely on other parties in order to achieve their desired goals 
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003). Hence, if a business relationship is characterised by asymmetric 
dependence, where one party needs to rely on a counterparty’s contribution in order to pursue 
its own goals, opportunistic behaviour can potentially manifest (Schmitz et al., 2016). For 
instance, if parties are not mutually dependent, a superior party driven by self-interest can 
influence an inferior party to pursue goals that are not mutually beneficial. 
The literature regarding sources that lead to dependence have attracted attention in the past due 
to its foothold in the transaction cost approach and resource dependency theory (Hillman, 
Withers & Collins, 2009). Schmitz et al. (2016) identify and group sources that lead to 
dependence as relational sources, partner-inherent sources and market-related sources. 
Relational sources refer to reasons underlying the partnership between parties within a business 
relationship (Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005; Laaksonen, Pajunen & Kulmala, 2008). Partner-
inherent dependence sources comprise of particular capabilities, or knowledge, along with 
access to resources linked to a specific party (Laaksonen et al., 2008).  Lastly, market-related 
sources refer to the lack of alternative options or sources within the market to replace incumbent 
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parties (Handley & Benton, 2012; Harrison, Beatty, Reynolds & Noble, 2012). Because of the 
nature of these sources – especially relational sources – and the impact it has on the functionality 
of business relationships, the current study adopts dependence as a behavioural outcome that 





Rylander, Strutton and Pelton (1997) define commitment as the enduring desire to develop and 
maintain relationships characterised by implicit and explicit pledges and sacrifices for the long-
term benefit of all parties involved. In other words, commitment can be perceived as a party’s 
intention to continue a relationship (Anderson & Weitz, 1992).  
Commitment often plays an important role in cooperative partnerships (Morgan & Hunt, 1994), 
as well as the achievement of relationship objectives (Hofenk, Schipper, Semeijn & Gelderman, 
2011). Several studies (e.g. Cox, Sanderson & Watson, 2001; Jokela & Soderman, 2017; 
Morgan & Hunt, 1994) have found that commitment can influence relationship efficiency and 
desirability in terms of favourable cost savings, flexibility and risk-sharing. Business 
relationships characterised by commitment can often experience beneficial outcomes such as 
cooperation (Mazzola, Bruccoleri & Perrone, 2015), along with the creation of new sources of 
value and growth (Brady, Davies & Gann, 2005; Mouzas, 2006). Anderson and Narus (1990) 
initially identified commitment as a positive relationship driver as it is considered a critical 
bonding mechanism that contributes to the potential longevity of a relationship. However, 
Baker (2009) argues that excessive levels of commitment can also cause partners to “blindly” 
invest in the development and maintenance of a relationship – regardless of its desirability and 
efficiency. Business partners may over time become increasingly focused on the “good 
feelings” associated with commitment and, as result, neglect critically assessing their 
relationships (Baker, 2009). Thus, the current study identifies commitment as a possible 
behavioural outcome of dark side behaviour that develops due to particular factors inherent to 
relationships and which can subsequently affect the dynamics of a partnership.  
 
1.2.3 Symptoms of dark side behaviour 
 
Baker (2009) suggests that several “symptoms” of dark side behaviour may appear in business 
relationships, indicating that the partnership between firms have become characterised by 
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intolerable levels of detrimental elements (i.e. behavioural outcomes). The current study 
explores relational myopia, complacency, suspicion and vulnerability as symptoms of dark side 
behaviour, as these constructs have the capacity to negatively affect the functionality of 
business partnerships (Baker, 2009). Not only could these symptoms damage business 
operations and vital relational bonds between partnering firms, but they also serve as indicators 
that the relationship is no longer as efficient and desirable as it once was.  
Relational myopia 
 
The term myopia, also known as near-sightedness or short-sightedness, was initially used in the 
field of ophthalmology to describe an eye condition in which visual images come into focus in 
front of the retina (Saw, Katz, Schein, Chew & Chan, 1996). The focusing of light in front of 
retina, instead of on it, causes defective vision by making distant objects appear blurry and 
closer ones normal (Saw et al., 1996). “Myopia” and “myopic” however are used beyond the 
boundaries of ophthalmology in a variety of disciplines ranging from business management to 
psychology. These terms have appeared in several studies (e.g. Baker, 2009; Laverty, 2004; 
Leavitt, 1960; Johnston, 2009; Richard, Womack & Allaway, 1992) as metaphorical devices in 
order to explain cognitive thinking and decision making that is narrow in scope, or lacking 
foresight in terms of wider interests and long-term consequences. In other words, “myopia” is 
often used to describe decisions that may be beneficial in the present, but detrimental in the 
future, as well as viewpoints that fail to consider anything outside a narrow and limited range 
(Levinthal & March, 1993). As this study focuses on the dark side of business partnerships, 
myopia will be addressed as a dark side symptom that influences the efficiency and desirability 
of a relationship. Baker (2009) explains that relational myopia occurs when focal parties 
embrace a too narrow perspective regarding their relationship, its dynamics and how it should 
be governed as it manoeuvres through the business environment. It is implied that parties 
possessing different perspectives regarding the relationship, and the environment in which it 
operates, are in a better position to identify critical problems and opportunities within and 
outside the relationship (Baker, 2009). However, as no business relationship is the same, the 
manner in which relational myopia manifests can differ from scenario to scenario and therefore 
it is important to consider the impact of various types. The current study suggests that the 
combination of time orientation and relationship conformity, as possible dimensions of 
relational myopia, can assist in the identification of four potential scenarios or types of 
relational myopia, namely: classic myopia, competitive myopia, efficiency myopia and the non-
myopic relationship.  
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Complacency   
 
Andy Grove, the renowned Hungarian-American businessman and founder of Intel once said: 
“Success breeds complacency. Complacency breeds failure. Only the paranoid survive” 
(Grove, 1996). Complacency has received little research attention in the field of business 
relationship management, mostly due to it being such a difficult negative relational construct 
to observe in comparison to others such as unfairness, conflict and opportunism (Lund, 
Kozlenkova & Palmatier, 2015). Friend and Johnson (2017) claim that the complexity 
pertaining to complacency is grounded within it being “a mental state of being” that, by 
definition, possesses the potential to “blind” parties from detecting threatening situations and 
behaviour. Firms often don’t realise they have become complacent in their relationship until, 
as a result, detrimental issues arise (e.g. one party intentionally, or unintentionally, takes 
advantage of its partner due to a misperception of what is acceptable behaviour in their 
relationship) (Lund et al., 2015). Therefore, complacency can be considered a threat to all 
interpersonal and business relationships due to its ability to produce misguided perceptions and 
intentions (Chowdhury & Lang, 1996; Friend & Johnson, 2017; Lund et al., 2015). 
One of the most problematic aspects of complacency for business relationships is that it usually 
occurs in strong relationships, where strong feelings of trust, commitment and satisfaction often 
result in parties becoming too comfortable in their partnership, as well as overconfident in one 
another’s competence and behaviours (Lund et al., 2015). It is exactly these positive feelings 
that allow complacency to manifest over time (Haytko, 2004), and why complacent behaviour 
can be threaten to good-functioning relationships (Baker, 2009). In the current study, 
complacency is defined as the satisfaction or self-satisfaction accompanied by the unawareness 
of dangers and deficiencies (Chowdhury & Lang, 1996). Complacency may include feelings of 
satisfaction and the unwillingness, or inability, to recognise the need for change in business 
relationships (Baker, 2009). Theoretical justification for the onset of complacency can be drawn 
from the behavioural theory of the firm (Baker, 2009), which argues that a firm’s success often 
results in “programmed” and structured responses (Lund et al., 2015). This standardised 
reaction firms might have is consistent with Cyert and March’s (1963) generalisations that 
imply parties incorporate specific biases in their assessment of their relationships that favour 
past successes. Additionally, Lund et al. (2015) justify the association between complacency 
and the behavioural theory of the firm by inferring that complacency may arise due to a number 
of interpersonal and organisational factors that dictate how parties act and react in their 
relationships. Baker (2009), consequently, argues that complacency should be considered a 
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symptom of dark side behaviour as it reduces the desirability of business relationships over 
time. Hence, when a relationship becomes characterised by a complacent culture and 
standardised systems, it is conceivable that parties might begin to explore alternatives to 





When business partners allow themselves to become committed to one another as their 
relationship progresses, a situation may occur in which these parties might experience increased 
vulnerability (Baker, 2009). Svensson (2004) defines vulnerability as the gap between a party’s 
perceived dependence and perceived trust with regards to their business partner. The first part 
of this definition emphasises that perceived dependence can affect a party’s perception of 
vulnerability (Svensson, 2004). For example, Baker (2009) suggests that when a relationship is 
characterised by high levels of dependence, the extent to which involved parties feel vulnerable 
is most likely to be elevated as well. The second part of Svensson’s (2004) definition implies 
that the level of perceived trust in a relationship can also influence the degree of vulnerability, 
as trust has the capacity to affect the strength of a partnership. In other words, the gap between 
perceived dependence and perceived trust is often assumed to have an impact on the perceived 
vulnerability in business-to-business relationships. 
To conceptualise vulnerability as a symptom of dark side behaviour in business partnerships, 
the current study adopts Svensson’s (2004) definition, along with that of Attridge, Berscheid 
and Sprecher (1998) in referring to vulnerability as a party’s concerns regarding the continuance 
of a relationship and its partner’s future provision of need satisfaction. When a firm feels 
vulnerable to opportunistic behaviour from its business partner, relationship uncertainty usually 
increases and trust decreases (Baker, 2009; Svensson, 2004). These consequences associated 
with vulnerability can lead to negative behaviours and attitudes regarding the relationship and 
its partners – which, in turn, may ultimately result in ending the relationship or reducing the 




Atkinson and Butcher (2003) commented that competing perspectives and personal motivation 
can conspire to render even the most innocent of acts subject to scrutiny. In no realm is this 
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more applicable than in the context of business relationships where even the passive or 
innocuous actions of one party might ignite the first sparks of suspicion in another (Hunter, 
Gassenheimer & Siguaw, 2011).  
Relationship marketing literature often characterises interfirm relationships as ubiquitously 
opportunistic (Wathne & Heide, 2000), suggesting that suspicion is and will always be 
interwoven in the fabric of business relationships. Even though only a  limited amount of studies 
focus on the phenomenon of suspicion within business relationships, an underlying and 
recurring theme has been identified, indicating that “the mere suspicion of opportunism is 
sufficient to damage, even destroy, a relationship regardless of whether the suspicion is 
factually justified” (Jap, 2001:25). In a business-to-business context, Hunter et al. (2011) refer 
to suspicion as a dynamic, cognitively effortful state in which one organisation, because of 
uncertainty as to whether another party may be concealing harmful or opportunistic intentions, 
engages in active and thoughtful consideration of these motives and plausible explanations 
potentially underlying the other organisation’s behaviour.  
Based on the aforementioned definition, it is conceivable to delineate suspicion as derived from 
two key relationship marketing constructs, namely opportunism and trust (Hunter et al., 2011). 
Firstly, suspicion, rather than being a motive or a behaviour as found with opportunism, exists 
as a state in which the perceiver entertains the notion that its business partner may be behaving 
opportunistically (Hunter et al., 2011). It is this potential association between suspicion and 
negative opportunism that characterises suspicion as a symptom of dark side behaviour (Baker, 
2009). Secondly, several authors suggest that trust is linked to suspicion (Hunter et al., 2011; 
Morgan & Hunt, 1994; Narayandas & Rangan, 2004; Baker, 2009). Fein (1996) argues that 
suspicion does not necessarily generate an overly cynical mindset, but rather a mindset 
characterised by neither trust nor distrust. In other words, when partners are suspicious of one 
another, there is usually increased uncertainty as to the motivations underlying the behaviour 
of involved parties (Hunter et al., 2011). Suspicion is thus identified as a potential symptom of 
dark side behaviour because of its capacity to influence the dynamics of a relationship, as well 
as its perceived desirability, functionality and efficiency. 
 
1.3 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
 
Organisations often invest a substantial amount of time and resources in building and 
maintaining a business relationship with key stakeholders (Abosag, Yen & Barnes, 2016). 
These efforts usually have a positive impact in terms of increased trust, greater commitment 
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and effective collaboration (Chung, Wang, Huang & Yang, 2016). However, investing only in 
the positive components of a partnership is not enough to ensure the achievement of desired 
goals (Anderson & Jap, 2005; Hibbard, Kumar & Stern, 2001; Villena, Revilla & Choi, 2011). 
Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer and Vohs (2001) suggest that reducing the impact of 
negative (dark side) elements inherent to business relationships can have a greater effect on 
relationship success and performance – even more so than investing in positive aspects. 
Over the past decade, the term “dark side” in reference to business relationships has been 
increasingly used in academic discourse. Despite the growth of studies investigating dark side 
behaviour in business management literature, certain avenues remain unexplored. Several 
authors (e.g. Abosag et al., 2016; Chowdhury, Gruber & Zolkiewski, 2016; Frow et al., 2011; 
Schmitz et al., 2016; Oliveira & Lumineau, 2019; Leszczyński & Zieliński, 2019; Abosag et 
al., 2020; Nguyen, Jaber & Simkin, 2020; Villena, Choi & Revilla, E, 2020) maintain that 
relatively little critique have been offered regarding the antecedents of dark side behaviour and 
its manifestation (i.e. outcomes) in business relationships. Thus, a theoretical gap persists in 
literature pertaining the factors that play a role in the darkening of seemingly well-functioning 
relationships. Although, several studies (e.g. Abosag et al., 2016; Baker, 2009; Villena et al., 
2011) examine the onset of dark side behaviour in interfirm relationships, a gap in the literature 
remains as a holistic model, which includes various relationship drivers, has yet to researched.  
Abosag et al. (2016) argue that, managing the dark side of business relationships effectively, 
can potentially have a greater effect on achieving inter-organizational success than focusing on 
the positive side of business relationships. In other words, by identifying what causes dark side 
behaviour to surface within a partnership, managers and executives can implement 
precautionary measures to ensure the proper management and reduction of detrimental attitudes 
and behaviours in order to prevent intolerable levels of negative relational elements. However, 
in order to manage this dark side of business relationships accurately, contributing factors must 
first be identified. More spesifically, it is important to understand (1) what can potentially 
trigger the onset of dark side behaviour, (2) how it manifests, and (3) what is the consequential 
impact on the relationship. The identification of what causes dark side behaviour, as well as 
how it forms and impacts the relationship, can equip managers with insights and competence 
to manage their business relations in such a way that it minimises the dark side (Oliveira & 
Lumineau, 2019; Abosag et al., 2020; Schmitz et al., 2016). The current study, therefore, 
explores the onset of dark side behaviour in business-to-business relationships by identifying 
possible antecedents (i.e. trust, shared values, opportunistic behaviour and uncertainty), 
behavioural outcomes (i.e. conflict, power, dependence and commitment) and symptoms (i.e. 
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relational myopia, complacency, vulnerability and suspicion), as well as the potential 
associations between them. Correspondingly, the current study strives to provide answers to the 
following research question: 
 
RQ: How does typically good-functioning business relationships to become characterised by 
dark side business behaviour? 
 
 The proposed theoretical framework (see Figure 1.1) aspires to explain the onset of dark side 
behaviour in business partnerships. 
 
1.4 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
 
Present literature on dark side behaviour in business-to-business relationships expresses a lack 
of research attention regarding the onset of the phenomenon, how it manifests as well as the 
consequences associated with the dark side of business partnerships (Baker, 2009; Villena et 
al., 2011; Chowdhury et al., 2016; Schmitz et al., 2016; Abosag et al. 2016; Abosag et al., 2020; 
Nguyen et al., 2020). The current study investigates the relationship between selected 
antecedents (i.e. trust, shared values, opportunistic behaviour and uncertainty), behavioural 
outcomes (i.e. conflict, power, dependence and commitment) and dark side symptoms (i.e. 
relational myopia, complacency, suspicion and vulnerability). Accordingly, the primary 
research objectives include the following: 
§ To investigate the relationship between certain antecedents (i.e. trust, shared values, 
opportunistic behaviour and uncertainty) and behavioural outcomes (i.e. conflict, power, 
dependence and commitment) of the dark side of business relationships. 
§ To investigate the relationship between the abovementioned behavioural outcomes and 
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Source: Adapted from Baker (2009); Morgan & Hunt (1994); Johnsen & Lacoste (2016); Ting 
et al. (2007) 
 
1.5 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
In this section a brief overview of the research methodology for the current study is provided. 
Chapter 7 offers a more comprehensive discussion on the various facets of the research 
methodology employed to collect data and test the conceptual model. However, for the purpose 
of this chapter, only important key aspects concerning sampling, measurement development 









According to Hair, Babin and Anderson (2010), during the process of conducting primary 
research, attention must be paid to the sampling design. Wiid and Diggines (2009) explain that 
the researcher must identify the individuals (respondents) participating in the study, select the 
most appropriate sampling methods, as well as calculate the sample size. 
 
Population and sample frame 
 
The population for this study comprises of individuals or groups in managerial positions, who 
are responsible for managing a firm’s relationships with business partners such as suppliers, 
customers and buyers, service providers, collaborators, or any other organisation with whom 
they might do business. The population can thus be described as all business-to-business 
partnerships in the economy. Accordingly, the sample frame primarily includes key account 
managers as they are directly involved in the development and maintenance of business 
relationships with partner organisations. As the current study investigates the onset of dark side 
behaviour in business-to-business relationships, the sample comprises of respondents who 
understand, and possess relevant expertise and experience to answer questions regarding the 
dynamics pertaining to problematic business relationships. All respondents came from 
organisations located in South Africa, and no specific industry was examined. As the population 
of business-to-business research usually restricts the sample (Hair et al., 2019), geographically 
convenient and no-industry-specific respondents were selected to participate in this study in 
order to ensure maximum accessibility.  
 
Sampling method  
 
Non-probability sampling methods were employed in the current study as it less expensive and 
increases the availability and accessibility of respondents (Zikmund et al., 2013). Three non-
probability sampling techniques were used to collect data from respondents, namely 
convenience sampling, judgement sampling and snowball sampling. Firstly, convenience 
sampling was employed with respondents who were selected based on their availability and 
willingness to take part in the research (Creswell & Creswell, 2018). Secondly, judgement 
sampling was used as this study required the researcher to use judgement to select who to ask 
to participate (Honigmann, 2003). For example, previously identified, or acquainted, key 
account managers or business executives were contacted and asked specifically to take part in 
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the research. Lastly, snowball sampling, commonly used in social sciences when investigating 
hard-to-reach groups, was adopted and respondents were asked to further nominate other 




The sample size was calculated using an online A-priori sample size calculator for structural 
equation models (Soper, 2015). This calculator uses the number of observed and latent variables 
in a model, the anticipated effect size, and the desired probability and statistical power to 
determine the sample size required for a study that employs structural equation modelling 
(Soper, 2015). As result, the calculator generates both the minimum sample size required to 
detect the specific effect, as well as the minimum sample size required given the structural 
complexity of the model (Soper, 2015). After calculation, three results where produced: a 
minimum sample size of 2219 to detect the specific effect; a minimum sample size for model 
structure of 114; and a recommended minimum sample size of 2219.  
However, it would have been difficult to obtain this number of respondents due to the 
systematic limitations of the research, the personal limitations of the researcher, and the 
restrictive nature of the target population. Therefore, Tabachnick and Fidell’s (1996) rule of 
thumb, which suggests that business-to-business research should entail a more realistic sample 
size of 200 to 400 respondents, was adopted for the current study. 
 
1.5.2 Measurement development 
 
The following section discusses the measurement instrument used to collect data, the 
development of measurement items, as well as the method of distribution of the instrument. For 
this study, paper-based questionnaires (see Appendix A) were used to gather data from 




In survey research, questionnaires are regarded as the main instrument for collecting data and 
thus the current study used questionnaires to gather data from the target population. Several 
authors (e.g. Flowerdew & Martin, 2005; Trobia, 2016; Zikmund et al., 2013) claim that 
questionnaires can be inexpensive, practical and simple to administrate, and can reach a large 
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sample – which is especially beneficial in business-to-business research where the nature of the 
population often restricts the sample. Zikmund et al. (2013) also infer that questionnaires are 
often relatively easy and straight-forward to analyse due to the quantitative nature of survey 
research.  
Furthermore, the questionnaire used in this study included two types of questions, namely open-
ended and close-ended questions. The measurement items were formulated as statements to 
which respondents indicated their level of agreement based on a 7-point Likert scale (Trobia, 
2016; Zikmund et al., 2013). This aforementioned scale was anchored at 1 = strongly disagree, 




The measurement items used in the current study were adopted from existing literature. Firstly, 
most questions pertaining to demographic information were adopted from a study by Zaefarian 
et al. (2017), which focuses on firm and respondent characteristics. Respondents were also 
asked to think of a particular business relationship that has been problematic in the past, or is 
currently problematic, and to answer relevant questions. Secondly, scale items regarding model 
constructs were selected based on the results obtained in their respective studies, with the 
primary focus on exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis, as well as values pertaining to 
Cronbach’s alpha and composite reliability. The majority of scale items included in the 
questionnaire obtained satisfactory scores concerning Cronbach’s alpha and composite 
reliability. Thus, items with the highest reported scores were selected (see Chapter 7). 
 
Method of distribution 
 
For the purpose of the current study, it was decided that only paper-based questionnaires would 
be used to collect data. This decision to only distribute paper-based questionnaires was based 
on the nature of the target population and their preferred manner of response. Ebert, Huibers, 
Christensen and Christensen (2018) support the usage of paper-based questionnaires as their 
research suggested that, even though web-based questionnaires are more cost-effective, paper-
based questionnaires (in some cases) still obtain higher response rates, and also contain less 
missing values.  
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1.5.3 Data analysis 
 
The data analysis plan for the current study comprises of three phases, namely data capture, 
data cleaning and data analysis. First, upon the retrieval of questionnaires, responses were 
captured on a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet. Demographic information that entailed open-ended 
questions regarding firm and respondent characteristics were re-coded in order to transform the 
data into numeric values. Once the capturing of data was complete, the accuracy of the recoding 
was checked by a third party, and no errors were found.  
Secondly, data was cleaned in Microsoft Excel. Data cleaning refers to the process of deleting 
and correcting (or removing) corrupt or inaccurate records form a record set, table or database 
(Dasu & Johnson, 2003). In other words, data cleaning usually entails the identification of 
incomplete, incorrect, inaccurate or irrelevant parts of data, which is then replaced, modified or 
deleted (Dasu & Johnson, 2003). In this phase, the dataset was screened for missing values and 
errors, and unsatisfactory responses were consequently removed or modified.  
Lastly, after the dataset was captured and cleaned, the error-free data was imported to selected 
software platforms for data analysis. Descriptive statistics were obtained through the use of 
statistical package for the social science (SPSS) software (see IBM, 2009), while PLS-SEM 
software (see Hair et al., 2019) was employed to conduct inferential analysis. 
 
1.6 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
 
The current research is classified as a low to medium risk study due to the nature of the 
respective measurement instrument and the identified population. This level of risk is assigned 
due to the nature of the questionnaires that were distributed to account managers and executives, 
which may have contained items that could cause slight discomfort among respondents. 
Account managers and executives were expected to answer questions regarding their business 
relationships and the dynamism between them and partnering firms. These questions covered 
various aspects of problematic business partnerships. However, in order to minimalise, or 
remove, any discomfort for respondents during their participation in this research, certain 
precautions were taken. Firstly, respondents were provided with an overview of the current 
study which emphasised what is expected of them. It also stated that they can withdraw from 
the research at any time without any repercussions. Secondly, each respondent was given a 
consent form which they had to sign if they agreed to participate in this study. Lastly, risks were 
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also minimised by assuring respondents that all contributions are deemed anonymous, 
confidential and used solely for research purposes.  
This study was also subjected to Stellenbosch University’s ethical procedure and was reviewed 
by the Research Ethics Committee: Social Behavioural and Education Research (REC: SBE) 
in order to ensure that the dignity, rights, safety and well-being of respondents are safeguarded 
at all time during their participation in this research. To obtain ethical clearance for this study, 
the Research Ethics application process commenced within the Business Management 
department via the respective Departmental Ethics Screening Committee (DESC). The 
application was screened by DESC to determine the level of risk and was subsequently referred 
to the REC: SBE for final review at a convened meeting. The Research Ethics application for 
the current study was successful (project ID: 9965), allowing the data collection process to start.  
 
1.7 ORGANISATION OF THE DISSERTATION 
 
Chapter 1: Overview 
 
Chapter 1 serves as an overview of the current study. In this chapter, only the important key 
aspects concerning the various facets of research is addressed – namely the literature study, 
problem statement and objectives, and research methodology. 
 
Chapter 2: Defining the dark side of business relationships 
 
Chapter 2 focuses on conceptualising the phenomenon of dark side behaviour in business 
relationships. In this chapter, dark side behaviour is defined in a business-to-business context 
and various conceptualisations are discussed in order to provide a clear definition of this dark 
side phenomenon. Additionally, types of dark side behaviour (i.e. traps and secrets) as well as 
a proposed spectrum of darkness, which distinguishes between the tolerable and intolerable 
dark side, are discussed. 
 
Chapter 3: Antecedents of dark side behaviour 
 
Chapter 3 addresses the literature on potential antecedents of dark side behaviour, namely trust, 
shared values, opportunistic behaviour and uncertainty. In this chapter, these constructs are 
examined and defined in a business-to-business context. 
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Chapter 4: Behavioural outcomes of dark side behaviour 
 
In Chapter 4, the behavioural outcomes that might result due to identified antecedents of dark 
side behaviour are discussed. These behavioural outcomes include conflict, power, dependence 
and commitment – which can possibly result in even more severe behaviours and attitudes that 
can, in turn, damage relational bonds between parties. 
 
Chapter 5: Symptoms of dark side behaviour 
 
Chapter 5 explores the symptoms of dark side behaviour that ultimately result due to the 
selected behavioural outcomes. Based on Baker’s (2009) recommendations, relational myopia, 
complacency, vulnerability and suspicion were selected as the symptoms that might indicate a 
that a relationship is no longer as desirable, functional or efficient as it once was. This chapter 
examines existing literature regarding each of these constructs.  
 
Chapter 6: Theoretical framework of dark side behaviour in business relationships 
 
In this chapter, the current study’s theoretical framework for the dark side of business-to-
business relationships is presented. Drawing from literature, it examines the associations 
between antecedents and behavioural outcomes, as well as the relationships between these 
outcomes and the symptoms of dark side behaviour. In addition, this chapter also includes the 
hypotheses derived from the theoretical model.  
 
Chapter 7: Research methodology 
 
Chapter 7 focuses on the research method followed in order to test the conceptual framework. 
This chapter addresses various aspects such as sampling, measurement instrument 
development, as well as the data analysis plan. 
 
Chapter 8: Results 
 
In Chapter 8, the empirical results are reported after the data analysis. This chapter continues 
with a discussion of the descriptive statistics and inferential statistics.   
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Chapter 9: Conclusions and implications 
 
The final chapter focuses on discussing the results by drawing from literature and making 
inferences about the linkages between antecedents, behavioural outcomes and symptoms of the 
dark side of business relationships. Chapter 9 addresses the acceptance or rejection of 
hypotheses, and it also discusses the theoretical implications of each relationship in the 





The use of the term ‘dark side’ in business management literature has been emphasised over 
the past decade due to the emergence of negative behaviour in business relationships (Abosag 
et al., 2016). However, despite the growth of studies on dark side behaviour in a business-to-
business context, little critique has been offered throughout literature (Abosag et al., 2016). The 
current study therefore explores the relationship between dark side antecedents and possible 
behavioural outcomes of the negative side of business partnerships, as well as the association 
between these outcomes and symptoms of dark side behaviour. To investigate the relationships 
between constructs, survey research was employed to collect data from the target population. 
Questionnaires were distributed to managers and executives from South African organizations 
– who are in charge of managing relationships with partnering organisations (e.g. supplier, 
buyer or customer, service provider, collaborator, etc.) – across various industries. Upon 
retrieval of the questionnaires, data was cleaned, captured and analysed using SPSS and PLS-
SEM. More specifically, descriptive statistics were generated through SPSS, while PLS-SEM 
was employed to generate inferential statistics, as well as to test the conceptual framework.  
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In the same way that particular behaviours and attitudes can make or break interpersonal 
relationships such as a marriage, theoretical and empirical research from different business 
management studies suggest that business relationships may also entail mechanisms that can 
either improve or severely damage partnerships (Lund et al., 2015). Firms often spend a 
significant amount of time and effort to build and maintain business relationships that offer 
valuable relational benefits. These efforts usually generate positive outcomes through increased 
trust, greater commitment and enhanced relationship cooperation (Abosag et al., 2016). 
Subsequently, these positive outcomes often encourage business partners to develop reciprocal 
norms that improve relationship value creation through continuous learning, interaction, as well 
as the promotion of psychological closeness and reciprocity (Abosag et al., 2016; De Wulf, 
Odekerke-Schroder & Iacobucci, 2001). It is because of this positive perception of inter-
organisational partnerships that current management literature predominantly focuses on the 
“bright side” of business-to-business relationships. 
However, a number of authors (e.g. Abosag et al., 2016; Anderson & Jap, 2005; Barners, Naude 
& Michell, 2005; Blois, 2010; Fang, Chang & Peng, 2011; Hibbard, Kumar & Stern, 2001; 
Villena, Revilla & Choi, 2011) maintain that, in order ensure relationship success, it is not 
enough to only invest in positive relational elements – parties must also safeguard themselves 
against negative perceptions, actions and behaviours. Baumeister et al. (2001) suggest that the 
conscious reduction of negative impacts pertaining to the dark side can have a greater influence 
on business relations than merely focusing on the development of positive relationship drivers. 
Negative elements of business relationships have encouraged researchers in recent years to 
probe even further into the phenomenon of dark side behaviour. This increased attention to 
detrimental effects provide a valuable understanding for firms regarding the nature of business 
relationships and how they can proceed to successfully manage the dark side. The current study 
thus aspires to contribute to this growing body of knowledge concerning the dark side of 
business relationships by investigating the antecedents, behavioural outcomes and symptoms 
related to the phenomenon.  
In this chapter, existing literature is examined to define the dark side of business-to-business 
relationships and explore how this phenomenon manifests in such relationships. However, in 
order to fully comprehend the impact of dark side behaviour, it is important to consider the 
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types of detrimental behaviour, as well as the extent to which it is present in relationships. 
Therefore, this chapter will address “traps” and “secrets” as types of dark side, explaining the 
different ways in which dark side behaviour can appear within business relationships. In 
addition, Abosag, Yen and Barnes’ (2016) spectrum of increased darkness is also examined in 
order to identify when the ever-present (unavoidable) dark side of business relationships 
transform into something intolerable and destructive. By understanding how and when the dark 
side manifests, firms can successfully manage and reduce negative relational elements. 
 
2.2 DEFINING THE DARK SIDE: WHAT IS DARK? 
 
Relationship marketing (RM) has received a considerable amount of research attention in both 
academic and business circles in recent years – especially in a business-to-business context 
(Palmatier, Dant, Grewal & Evans, 2006; Srinivasan & Moorman, 2005). This growing body 
of knowledge pertaining to business relationship management is warranted by the growing 
research attention to linkage between the adoption of an appropriate RM strategy and positive 
relationship outcomes. Several authors (e.g. Cannon & Homburg, 2001; Palmatier, Dant & 
Grewal, 2007; Rindfleisch & Moorman, 2001) have recognised the role of successful business-
to-business relationships as an important contributor to a firm’s financial performance, as well 
as increased efficiencies, expanded markets, reduced costs and greater innovation (Cannon & 
Homburg, 2001; Palmatier et al., 2007). Successful partnerships also offer other relational 
benefits such as increased commitment (Verhoef, Franses & Hoekstra, 2002), greater 
cooperation (Palmatier et al., 2007), reduced opportunism (Ganesan, 1994) and greater 
satisfaction (Geykens, Steenkamp & Kumar, 1999). Hence, given these advantages associated 
with successful relationships, the growing academic and managerial interest regarding the 
establishment and maintenance of business relationships certainly seems merited. However, 
regardless of the “bright side” of interfirm relationships, there is an emerging body of literature 
that suggests RM is not without a “dark side” (e.g. Grayson & Ambler, 1999; Hibbard, Kumar 
& Stern, 2001; Pressey & Tzokas, 2004), and that it may even possess “the seeds to its own 
destruction” (Nasir, 2015:49). Dark side business behaviour can, for example, include the 
deterioration of relationship strength over time (Moorman et al., 1992), relationship decline 
(Bennett, 1996) and unprofitability due to relational inertia, or relationship inefficiency 
(Haytko, 2004). 
Despite the recent widespread use of the term “dark side” in business relationships, very little 
critique of the literature seems to be offered. Abosag et al. (2016) suggest that the notion of 
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“dark side” is often associated with “problems”, “challenges”, “difficulties” and “drawbacks” 
related to structural issues that exist in business relationships – such size differences, the 
imbalance of power, processes within business (e.g. creativity issues, capability development, 
changes in market dynamics, etc.), as well as outputs (e.g. performance, competitiveness and 
satisfaction). The term “dark side” first emerged in business management literature in the 1990s 
and several authors have contributed substantially to the theme well into the new century (e.g. 
Anderson & Jap, 2005; Barnes et al., 2005; Grayson & Ambler, 1999; Hakansson & Snehota, 
1995). Earlier studies did not use the term “dark side”, but rather referred to this phenomenon 
as a “negative side” that focused on related constructs (e.g. Gaski, 1984; Moorman et al., 1992). 
Other terms that have been used in literature to explain dark side business behaviour include: 
relationship unrest (Good & Evans, 1998), relationship burdens (Hakansson & Snehota, 1998), 
relationship stress (Holmlund-Rytkonen & Strandvik, 2005), relational misconduct (Hawkins, 
Wittman & Beyerlein, 2008), the adverse side of business relationships (Strandvik & 
Holmlund, 2008) and detrimental intentions (Liu, Liu & Li, 2014). Regardless of the term used, 
Anderson and Jap (2005) describe this “dark” phenomenon as potentially dangerous forces 
residing beneath the surface of seemingly stable business relationships which, if given the 
conditions to manifest, can affect and contradict typically good functioning relationships. 
Of the limited number of relationship marketing studies that have attempted to investigate the 
onset of dark side business relationship behaviour, few are more cited than Moorman et al. 
(1992). In their research, these authors utilized a sample of market research users and marketing 
research providers for an empirical investigation of the role of trust between these knowledge 
users and knowledge providers (Moorman et al., 1992). The results of Moorman, Zaltman and 
Desphande’s (1992) study showed that trust and perceived quality of interaction significantly 
contribute to research utilization, with trust having indirect effects through other relationship 
processes. Commitment and involvement, on the contrary, were found not to have much of an 
impact on the use of research provided by the research provider. It is suggested that business 
partners engaged in a long-term relationship may lose their ability to be objective of the 
partnership due to the blinding influence of trust (Moorman et al., 1992). Thus, these authors 
argue that opportunistic behaviour can arise as a result of increased commitment and 
involvement. Even though Moorman et al. (1992) do not specifically address these behaviours 
and attitudes towards business relationships as a “dark side”, related literature (see Abosag et 
al., 2016) has referred to this phenomenon, and specifically these behaviours and attitudes, as 
the dark side of business relationships. 
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Despite of their investigation of the value of trust in business relationships, Moorman et al. 
(1992) did not empirically examine the manifestation of dark side explicitly. Grayson and 
Ambler (1999) were essentially the first authors to provide an empirical piece of research 
regarding the dark side of business relationships. In their study of the dark side, these authors 
focused on the potential hazards pertaining to the implementation of a relationship marketing 
strategy, using Moorman, Zaltman and Desphande’s (1992) work as an appropriate foundation 
for their research. Grayson and Ambler (1999) continued to investigate the onset of dark side 
behaviour in business relationships by using propositions included in the work of Moorman et 
al. (1992) in order to empirically investigate the link between relational constructs (e.g. trust 
and commitment) and the usage of market knowledge provided by the knowledge provider. It 
is suggested by Moorman et al. (1992) that firms become unable to objectively evaluate their 
exchange partners which, in turn, can result in the inability to detect dark side behaviours. 
Although Grayson and Ambler (1999) found evidence that suggest the effects of trust are 
reduced over time, they could not empirically prove the mediating effect of dark side constructs 
such as perceived opportunism, perceived loss of objectivity and increased expectations 
(Moorman et al., 1992), on the relationship between trust and advertising rise.  
In 2001, Hibbard, Brunel, Dant and Iacobucci further explored the phenomenon of dark side 
behaviour in business relationships by empirically researching the association between the 
relational constructs (e.g. trust, commitment, communication, shared values and mutual 
dependence) and relationship performance over time. Although these authors do not offer an 
explicit definition of the dark side of business relationships, they do ultimately address the 
phenomenon by emphasising that, over time, the relationship between relationship performance 
and certain relational variables will weaken (Hibbard et al., 2001). These results found by 
Hibbard et al. (2001) were similar to that of Grayson and Ambler (1999), emphasising that 
business relationships do have a dark side. However, even though Hibbard, Brunel, Dant and 
Iacobucci’s (2001) work conceptually broadened the limited understanding of dark side 
behaviour in business relationships by linking it to several relational constructs, it fails to 
operationalise any of the theoretical reasons for the manifestation of dark side elements and 
symptoms. 
Pressey and Tzokas (2004) contribute to the limited body of research on the dark side of 
business relationships by exploring the dark side of long-term relationships using a cross 
industry sample of UK exporters engaged in business relations with a principal foreign 
customer. Consistent with previous studies on dark side behaviour (e.g Grayson & Ambler, 
1999; Hibbard et al., 2001; Moorman et al., 1992), Pressey and Tzokas (2004) describe 
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symptoms of dark side as “the loss of objectivity over time due to the high level of experience 
produced through extended and close business-to-business relationships”. Pressey and Tzokas 
(2004) identified a weakening effect over time concerning export relations in terms of the level 
of commitment between parties. However, similar to Hibbard et al. (2001), Pressey and Tzokas 
(2004) neglected to operationalise the reasons for the emergence of dark side behaviour directly 
in business relationships. 
Anderson and Jap (2005) used the case study approach in order to examine, define and explain 
the dark side of business partnerships. They describe the dark side of long-term relationships 
between business partners as something that subtly undermine relationships in which parties 
are confident and optimistic about their collaboration and where both parties are receiving 
ongoing benefits (Anderson & Jap, 2005). According to these authors, the dark side 
phenomenon is different to business relationships that have gone “sour” and, subsequently, 
became dysfunctional. In other words, the term “dark side” can refer to forces undermining 
business relationships that are perceived by involved parties as well-functioning and desirable 
(Baker, 2009). 
This study acknowledges that variables that often promote desirable business relations (e.g. 
trust, commitment, satisfaction, etc.) can also be considered as the variables that eventually 
undermine the relationship (Anderson & Jap, 2005; Pressey & Tzokas, 2004). Baker (2009) 
suggests that the notion pertaining the dark side of business relationships should be expanded 
as a firm’s adoption of a relationship marketing strategy that can potentially lead to the onset 
of dark side elements such as conflict, uncertainty and an imbalance of power and dependence.  
In an attempt to identify dark side antecedents, elements and symptoms, the current study 
adopts Baker’s (2009) interpretation of the dark side as the decrease in a firm’s ability to obtain 
organisational goals resulting from the investment in business-to-business relationships. These 
goals can be either financial or non-financial (relational) by nature and can directly influence 
the desirability and efficiency of a relationship. Hence, by launching an investigation into the 
manifestation of the dark side of business relationships, this research aspires to explicitly 
address a gap in literature by providing reasons for the emergence of this dark phenomenon. 
 
2.3 TYPES OF DARK SIDE BEHAVIOUR: TRAPS AND SECRETS  
 
Several relationship marketing studies (e.g. Dwyer, Schurr & Oh, 1987; Hakansson, Ford, 
Gadde, Snehota & Waluszewski, 2009; Rigby & Ledingham, 2004) tend to emphasise the 
bright side of cooperative business relationships along the supply chain, and often neglect the 
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dark side. However, in an imperfect and dynamic world, it goes without saying that problems 
and conflicts will arise between two partners throughout the course of a cooperative relationship 
(Wilkinson, Young & Freytag, 2005). Hakansson et al. (2009) maintain that the more two 
companies work together, the more conflicting issues will be discovered, as collaborating firms 
cannot entirely escape relationship problems and conflicts. Dark side behaviour in the context 
of cooperative relationships is often associated with opportunistic behaviour in which one 
partner inflicts damage onto the other (Grandinetti, 2017). This coexistence of cooperation and 
opportunism can cause the relationship to become volatile and result in the rise of suspicions, 
tensions and conflicts on the damaged partner’s account. Grandinetti (2017) delineate two types 
of dark side behaviour in business relationships: “traps” and “secrets”, hence reciting a 
metaphor that has been amply utilized in relationship marketing literature in which business 
relationships are compared to marriages. Similar to how keeping secrets and being trapped in a 
relationship can damage an individual psychologically, business relationships can become 
destructive due to the rise of information asymmetry and a considerable imbalance of power 
and dependence. Consequently, dark side business behaviour can potentially lead to business 
parties becoming “trapped” in a relationship or feeling left in the dark because of their 




Anderson and Jap (2005) place emphasis on the dark side of business relationships by 
identifying an unstable factor underlying the surface of seemingly “good” partnerships. 
Opportunistic behaviour, whereby one party damages its partner by pursuing self-interest, is 
often considered the root of all evil when investigating dark side behaviour in business 
relationships (Abosag, Yen & Tynan, 2015; Abosag et al., 2016; Anderson & Jap, 2005). After 
conducting a series of studies on the relationships between manufacturers and distributors, 
Anderson and Jap (2003) detected that opportunistic behaviour can surface subsequent to the 
establishment of business relations among partnering firms. In their analysis of how apparently 
good relationships can turn dark, they noted that the “victimised” party is often aware of its 
partner’s opportunistic behaviour, but still chooses to react passively. This inaction in response 
to opportunism can be driven by idiosyncratic investments (Grandinetti, 2017; Brown, Crosno 
& Tong, 2019, Fenik, Noble & Lehnert, 2020), or several other factors that involve dark side 
elements such as uncertainty and conflict, as well as imbalances concerning power and 
dependence. When parties start to act opportunistically, and in a manner that is not mutually 
beneficial, conflict can arise due to the abandonment of relational agreements and a decline in 
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positive relationship mediators (e.g. commitment, trust, reciprocal norms and gratitude) (Baker, 
2009; Lund et al., 2015, Fenik et al., 2020). In addition to conflict, business relationships can 
also become characterised by uncertainty. This uncertainty usually stems from the 
unpredictability that often accompanies opportunistic behaviour as a result of weak or declining 
trust and transparency between parties (Abosag et al., 2015; Williamson, 1985). In other words, 
opportunism can increase perceived risk among parties, and also lower levels of trust, which 
can result in parties feeling insecure and uncertain of how their partners will act. Anderson and 
Jap (2005) argue that the reason why most parties tolerate opportunistic behaviour lies in an 
asymmetric balance of power. As partners often become dependent on one another, it also 
means that tolerating opportunistic behaviours becomes unavoidable (Grandinetti, 2017; Brown 
et al., 2019; Crick, 2019; Feenik et al., 2020).  
This study acknowledges the work of Grandinetti (2017) in which the author explains why 
certain organisations become trapped in cooperative relationships characterised by dark side 
behaviour. It also suggests that parties become trapped, and respond passively to opportunism, 
in order to minimise the impact of negative relational elements (e.g. conflict, uncertainty and 
an imbalance of power and dependence) in their partnerships. Therefore, the first type of dark 
side behaviour infers that partnering firms can become trapped in a business relationship by 
reacting passively to opportunism in order to prevent it from resulting in more dangerous and 
more relationship damaging elements such as conflict, uncertainty and imbalances of power 
and dependence. Grandinetti (2017) offers a model in order to assist in identifying the profile 
of the first type of dark side. Figure 2.1 depicts the situation in which Partner A behaves 
opportunistically and can potentially harm its counterparty. However, the disadvantaged party 
is aware of the manifestation of opportunism in the relationship but, nevertheless, does not 
terminate the undesirable relationship immediately (Grandinetti, 2017; Crick, 2019; Low & Li, 
2019; fenik et al., 2020). Johnsen and Lacoste (2016) claim that when a party is able to behave 
opportunistically and its partner is aware of this and does nothing about it, an imbalance of 
power and dependence can arise in the relationship. Thus, if one firm is more dependent on its 
partner, the resulting net-positive dependence on the partner is the source of the partner’s power 
and vice versa (Gulati & Sytch, 2007).  
The imbalance of dependence and power in a relationship can create a relational trap in which 
the weaker party has no choice but to endure the opportunism that leads to the darkening of the 
relationship (Grandinetti, 2017; Low & Li, 2019). The power and dependence advantage 
appears to be one of the most cited antecedents of opportunism in relationship marketing 
literature (Hawkins et al., 2008; Tangpong, Michalisin, Traub & Melcher, 2015; Wang & Yang, 
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2013). According to several authors, opportunism can emerge because of unilateral 
idiosyncratic investments (Heide & John, 1990), the control of critical resources (Olsen, 
Prenkert, Hoholm & Harrison, 2014), or “the small number” condition often discussed by 
Williamson (1973), in which the imbalance of power and dependence arise due to partners 
differing in terms of organisational size. Hence, when a business relationship becomes 
characterised by power and dependence imbalances, the weaker party will often have no other 
choice but to remain trapped in the relationship as it may be dependent on its partner to operate 
efficiently. For example, in some business relationships, partners develop or acquire 
technologies, or other relationship-specific assets (Das & Rahman, 2010) that may result in 
parties becoming dependent because of investing in these assets (Grandinetti, 2017). In other 
words, when a business relationship becomes characterised by a heavy imbalance of power and 
dependence, the business partner in possession of more power may act opportunistically 
(Grandinett, 2017; Lonsdale, 2001; Crick, 2019; Fenik et al., 2020). 
 
Figure 2.1 The first type of dark side in cooperative business relationships 
 
Source: Grandinetti (2017) 
 
Figure 2.1 depicts the variables that influence opportunism in business relationships and how 
parties become “trapped” due to emerging dark side behaviour. In addition to power-
dependence and its antecedents, Grandinetti (2017) acknowledges the moderating role of 
temporal orientation on the relationship between power-dependence asymmetry and 
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opportunism. In a cooperative relationship, partners may also possess different positions 
regarding future orientation. For example, if a company that posesses greater power desires 
immediate results, the probability that it will use its advantage in the relationship 
opportunistically, is likely to increase. However, at the same time, the tolerance of the long-
term orientated partner in terms of its counterparty’s opportunistic behaviour may also 
potentially increase due to it being more dependent on the relationship. Therefore, the temporal 
orientation of each party in terms of relationship objectives and whether they perceive the 
relationship as temporary, or continuous, influences the extent to which opportunism is allowed 
and tolerated. 
  
2.3.2 Secrets  
 
In their analysis of the dark side of buyer-seller relationships, Villena et al. (2011) apply the 
concept of social capital as developed by Nahapiet and Ghosal (1998) and its three dimensions 
in order to explain the manifestation of dark side business behaviour between parties. These 
three facets of social capital consist of the structural dimension (the impersonal configuration 
of relationships between people or organisations), the cognitive dimension (shared 
representations, interpretations and systems of meaning among parties) and the relational 
dimension (aspects such as trust, friendship, respect and reciprocity) (Nahapiet & Ghosal, 
1998). Each of these dimensions of social capital can be associated with a problem, or an 
inverted curvilinear relationship between a given dimension and relationship performance – for 
example, the extent to which one party’s operations have improved due to cooperation between 
business partners (Nahapiet & Ghosal, 1998; Villena et al., 2011). Grandinetti (2017) 
specifically chose to focus on the relational dimension of social capital because of the 
underlying dark side that resides beneath the growth of relational capital. When a relationship 
becomes characterised by high levels of certain relational elements (e.g. trust, respect, 
friendship and reciprocity), parties’ efforts regarding monitoring, evaluating and safeguarding 
regarding their relationships, tend to decrease. This lack of vigilance can give rise to 
opportunistic behaviour, as well as information asymmetry among parties (Grandinetti, 2017; 
Brown et al., 2019). Several studies, ranging from Moorman, Zaltman and Deshpande’s (1992) 
pionering contribution to more recent research by Heirati, O’Cass, Schoefer and Siahtiri (2016) 
on business-to-business cooperative relationships, support the notion that high levels of 
cooperation and interaction can create an imbalance of power and dependence, as well as result 
in the opportunistic use of information. These studies regarding the relationship between 
cooperation and opportunism (i.e. dark side behaviour) can all be traced to Granovetter’s 
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(1985:491) work regarding embeddedness, according to which, “the more complete the trust, 
the greater the potential gain from malfeasance”. 
Figure 2.2 delineates the second type of dark side behaviour (i.e. secrets) that can emerge in 
cooperative business relationships – which refers to situations in which one party behaves 
opportunistically due to an advantage brought on by information asymmetry. Secrets, as a type 
of dark side, can appear even in the absence of other typical determinants of opportunism such 
as idiosyncratic investments (Grandinetti, 2017; Low & Li, 2019; Fenik et al., 2020). Unlike 
with dark side traps, the business party at a disadvantage is usually unaware of the damage they 
are suffering during the course of their relationship (Grandinetti, 2017; Brown et al., 2019; 
Crick, 2019). In interfirm partnerships, the emergence of dark side behaviour linked to secrets 
can be explained by the occurrence in which one party lacks the technical knowledge to evaluate 
the effort invested by its counterparty, or the desirability of the relationship in general. 
Alternatively, Day, Fawcett, Fawcett and Magnan (2013) claim that even though one party may 
actually possess the necessary knowledge, an excess of trust can lead them to take a “leap of 
faith” with regards to their partner’s behaviour, as well as deactivate monitoring mechanisms.  
 
Figure 2.2 The second type of dark side in cooperative business relationships 
Source: Grandinetti (2017) 
 
Furthermore, Figure 2.2 also depicts two variations of dark side behaviour in terms of the 
information asymmetry and opportunism coupling, referred to as “deep” and “pale” information 
asymmetry (Grandinetti, 2017; Crick, 2019; Brown et al., 2019; Fenik et al., 2020). In the case 
of “pale” information asymmetry, the resulting consequences are reversible. However, 
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excessive trust and commitment may cause parties to lower their guard which can trigger the 
onset of opportunistic behaviour within the relationship. On the other hand, the effects of 
“deep” information asymmetry cannot be reversed, and asymmetry may even arise in the 
presence of high levels of control (Grandinetti, 2017; Brown et al., 2019; Low & Li, 2019). 
Sharma (1997) uses the term “knowledge asymmetry” to express the severity pertaining the 
condition of “deep” information asymmetry – which can emerge when knowledge is tacit (e.g. 
personal and context-specific knowledge) and, therefore, difficult to formalize and 
communicate. Although cooperation between parties is the best way to ensure the transfer of 
tacit knowledge and prevention of information asymmetry (Cavusgil, Calantone & Zhao, 2003), 
this positive condition cannot exist if partners have no intention of transferring it (Grandinetti, 
2017; Low & Li, 2019). Besides knowledge tacedness, Grandinetti (2017) suggests that there 
are two more determinants of information asymmetry: the presence of a knowledge gap 
(Kastberg, 2011) and cognitive distance (Nooteboom, 2000). 
 
2.4 THE SPECTRUM OF INCREASED DARKNESS 
 
Just as personal relationships experience stages of emotional turmoil, business relationships are 
often neither perceived as bright nor dark, but rather a combination of advantages and 
drawbacks (Abosag, Yen & Barnes, 2016; Grayson & Ambler, 1999). It has long been 
recognised in literature that, when dealing with relationships, the dark side is inspirable 
(Hakansson & Snehota, 1998) and even valuable partnerships may possess some aspects of 
negativity (Hakansson & Snehota, 1995). According to Hakansson and Snehota (1998) the dark 
side can never be disregarded as it is the systematic consequence of the development of 
relationships. Hence, the dark side represents a natural component of business relationships 
that, despite being unavoidable, can be successfully managed (Abosag et al., 2016).  
In recognition of the importance to understanding the dark side of business relationships, 
Abosag et al. (2016) offer a spectrum of increased darkness to outline the degree of dark side 
behaviour in business-to-business relationships. Several authors (Abosag et al., 2016; Chung, 
Wang, Huang & Yang, 2016; Noordhoff, Kyriakopoulos, Moorman, Pauwels & Dellaert, 2011) 
acknowledge that when dark side behaviour initially emerges in business relationships, its 
appearance may be valuable if focal parties are capable of effective learning. However, failure 
to learn and adapt within business relationships can amplify dark side behaviour to such an 
extent that it becomes intolerable and irritating (Ford, 1980). Thus, being able to distinguish 
between the tolerable and intolerable dark side, can equip organisations with the competence 
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to effectively identify and monitor dark side behaviour (Hakansson & Snehota, 1995), as well 
as assist them with managing the “darkness” (Abosag et al., 2016).  
Figure 2.3 depicts the spectrum of increased darkness by specifically addressing the tolerable 
and intolerable dark side (Abosag et al., 2016). The notions that reflect different degrees of 
darkness are shown above the spectrum, whereas reactive behavioural traits to increased 
darkness are found below the spectrum (Abosag et al., 2016). 
 
2.4.1 The tolerable dark side 
 
Abosag et al. (2016) infer that, even though every business relationship has a dark side, 
darkness in its stages of tolerability can be useful. Accordingly, Hakansson and Snehota (1995) 
acknowledge that, if managed correctly, dark side behaviour in its early appearance can 
potentially contribute to better relationship performance in the future. Thus, not all is dark 
regarding the dark side of business relationships. Figure 2.3 depicts the tolerable dark side as 
comprising of low uncertainty and notions that reflect degrees of darkness such as learning, 
routine conflict and tension (Abosag et al., 2016). 
 
Figure 2.3 The spectrum of increased darkness 
 
Source: Abosag et al. (2016) 
 
The emergence of uncertainty can be perceived as an indication that the level of darkness within 
a business relationship has increased. Several authors (e.g. Geykens, Steenkamp & Kumar, 
1998; Gundlach, Achrol & Mentzer, 1995; Ting, Chen & Bartholomew, 2007) claim that 
uncertainty can have an undesirable impact on business relationships as it can be the outcome 
of negative interactions, engagement and communications. (Abosag et al., 2016). Eriksson and 
Sharma (2003) describe uncertainty as the “gap” between expected and actual future outcomes 
which emphasize how limited information amongst parties in business relationships can affect 
their ability to make decisions. In other words, the unpredictability and complexity of the 
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dynamic environments in which organisations operate can influence their decision-making 
competence due to the lack of information that often accompany the emergence of relationship 
uncertainty. Therefore, when the dark side initially makes its appearance in business 
relationships, it leads to low levels of uncertainty which, in turn, can be reduced through 
effective information sharing and flexibility in terms of adaption (Abosag et al., 2016). 
Noodeweir, John and Nevin (1990) maintain, however, that if parties fail to exchange 
information and are unwilling to adapt, uncertainty increases and prevent them from identifying 
unanticipated changes in circumstances regarding the relationship.  
The tolerable dark side is also often characterised by routine and expected conflict which 
emerge due to contradicting views regarding relational issues such as differing goals and 
expectations, as well as clashing of cultural norms (Abosag et al., 2016; Araujo & Mouzas, 
1997). However, if the way parties conduct business are remedied, modified or changed, routine 
and expected conflict can be useful to enhance the value of business relationships (Wang, Siu 
& Barnes, 2008). Furthermore, a few authors assert that the effective management of conflict 
as part of the tolerable dark side can lead to a variety of benefits such as increased productivity 
(Anderson & Narus, 1990), improved creativity (Gadde & Hakansson, 2010) and further 
relationship perks (Vaaland & Hakansson, 2003). But if conflict is left unresolved, it can disrupt 
learning and impede on the sharing of information (Chang & Gotcher, 2007), which can in turn 
increase emotional distance and tension between parties (Abosag et al., 2016). Hence, if 
increased dark side behaviour is not dealt with effectively, severe conflicts can arise and fuel 
further relational tensions. 
The dark side of business relationships can lead to tensions between parties as it often causes 
stress and discomfort (Proença & de Castro, 2005), weakens the quality of relational ties (Good 
& Evans, 2001), as well as provoke relationship unrest (Dwyer, Schurr & Oh, 1987). Several 
authors (e.g. Abosag et al., 2015; Abosag et al., 2016; Fang, Chang & Peng, 2011) note that 
relational tensions often emphasise two key factors in business relationships namely, the end 
of harmonization and the weakening of previously strong bonds between parties. Fang et al. 
(2011) argue that tension in business relationships manifest due to imbalances, or asymmetry, 
regarding contradicting goals and power distribution among parties which can lead to 
dangerous levels of conflict, weak cooperation and opportunistic behaviour. Thus, if these 
relational tensions are not resolved upon the emergence of increased dark side behaviour, it can 
become intolerable and irritating (Abosag et al., 2016).  
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2.4.2 Intolerable and irritating dark side 
 
The intolerable and irritating dark side of business relationships can appear if organisations fail 
to successfully manage elements of tolerable darkness. Abosag et al. (2016) claim that the 
intolerable dark side of business relationships are often characterised by high levels of 
uncertainty, severe conflict, opportunistic behaviour as well as a deterioration in trust and 
commitment. The IMP Group’s interactive framework suggests that if organisations fail to 
adapt and manage dark side behaviour, these negative constructs can potentially make initially 
good functioning business relationships undesirable (Turnbull & Valla, 1985). According to 
Abosag et al. (2015), conflict, uncertainty and opportunistic behaviour have the ability to 
change relationship dynamics, inter-organisational interaction, relational distance, as well as 
the context and type of relationship – which, in turn, can influence the desirability and relevance 
of business-to-business relationships.  
Uncertainty in business relationships makes it difficult for parties to predict each other’s 
demands and requirements, as well as foreseeing future outcomes (Kohli, 1989). Abosag et al. 
(2015) maintain that when a relationship is characterised by low uncertainty, it is more 
predictable and results in higher trust. Hence, commitment and cooperative attitude may 
increase when parties are able to foresee future relationship performance and outcomes (Lai, 
Cheng & Yeung, 2005). However, if uncertainty is not reduced during the appearance of the 
tolerable dark side, it can lead to higher and intolerable levels of uncertainty in relationships 
(Abosag et al., 2015). Several authors (e.g. Abosag et al., 2016; Achrol & Stern, 1988; Kohli, 
1989) recognise that uncertainty can be reduced through the effective sharing of information 
and flexibility in terms of relationship adaption. In other words, failure to exchange information 
and unwillingness to adapt can increase the level of uncertainty in business relationships which, 
in turn can damage relational ties (Noordeweir et al., 1990). Heide (1994) suggests that high 
levels of uncertainty can negatively affect the development of trust, commitment and long-term 
orientation, and it can also result in opportunistic behaviour. Hence, high levels of uncertainty 
can result in dark side behaviour and cause good-functioning business relationships to become 
undesirable and inefficient.   
In addition, Plank and Newell (2007) argue that high uncertainty, along with less joint decision-
making, can result due to severe levels of conflict in business relationships. Severe conflict can 
be seen as a clear manifestation of intolerable dark side behaviour as it diminishes loyalty 
among parties (Abosag et al., 2016), increases transaction cost (Williamson, 1975), as well as 
reduces productivity, cooperation and performance (Finch, Zhang & Geiger, 2013; Massey & 
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Dawes, 2007; Skarmeas, 2006). Routine and expected conflict should, therefore, be managed 
during stages of tolerable darkness, as failure to do so can lead to severe conflict among parties, 
potentially creating unwanted stress in relationships (Jehn, 1994; Shaw, Shaw & Enke, 2003). 
Abosag et al. (2016) also infer that severe conflict, as a part of the intolerable and irritating side, 
can profoundly increase dark side effects such as the likelihood of misbehaviour and 
opportunism. 
Several authors (e.g. Abosag et al., 2016; Crosno & Dahlstrom, 2008; Wang & Yang, 2013) 
claim that opportunism is one of the true dark forces that negatively influence business 
relationships. Opportunism is often motivated by the desire to independently exploit a 
relationship for self-interest and tends to result in dark side behaviour which can potentially 
violate existing agreements between parties (Das & Rahman, 2010; Liu, Liu & Li, 2014). 
Grandinetti (2017) infers that opportunistic behaviour can destabilize a relationship as strong 
forms of opportunism can breach contractual norms and damage relational ties. Therefore, if 
constructs such as conflict and other relational tensions are not reduced and managed during 
the initial appearance of dark side behaviour, opportunism can manifest and potentially lead to 
relationship dissolution (Abosag et al., 2016; Halinen & Tahtinen, 2002; Wang, Kayande & 
Jap; 2010). 
 
2.5 CONCLUSION  
 
In conclusion, it is clear that business relationships are often neither bright nor dark, but that 
they rather represent a combination of the two characteristics (Abosag et al., 2016).  It has long 
been recognized throughout literature that the dark side represents a natural component of 
relationships and that dark side elements can never be ruled out as they are the systematic 
consequence of relationship development (Hakansson & Snehota, 1998). However, by 
understanding how the dark side manifest, what potentially causes the onset of darkness, and 
when the tolerable dark side becomes intolerable, firms can equip themselves with the necessary 
skills and competence to manage and reduce the detrimental effects of business relationships. 
Through the identification of possible sources of dark side behaviour, managers retain the 
ability to craft a strategy especially designed to resolve the complex and multi-dimensional 
issues that can potentially cause a business relationship to become undesirable, or ineffective. 
In the next chapter, the dark side of business relationships will be explored by investigating 
inherent relationship attributes which can be deemed as potential antecedents of dark side 
behaviour (i.e. trust, shared values, opportunistic behaviour and uncertainty). 
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Close relationships do not necessarily equate with “good” relationships (Anderson & Jap, 
2005). Business-to-business literature suggest that interfirm partnerships often comprise of 
positive, as well as inherently negative elements that are influenced by various factors in 
internal and external environments (Johnsen & Lacoste, 2016). For example, as a relationship 
develops over time, partners usually draw closer together and, subsequently, establish a sense 
of trust and shared values (Fang, Chang & Peng, 2011). However, positive relational drivers 
such as trust and shared values can also result in various behavioural outcomes that may later 
cause damage to the partnership (Abosag et al., 2016; Baker, 2009). Parallel to the 
aforementioned example, Villena et al. (2011) found that value creation in business 
relationships can be damaged by either a lack, or excessive levels of social capital. In this case, 
business relationships may naturally possess certain components that, if not managed correctly, 
can harm relational ties between partners (Villena et al., 2011). Therefore, dark side behaviour 
can surface in business relationships due to the close proximity and level of intimacy between 
parties (Johnsen & Lacoste, 2016; Wuyts & Geykens, 2005). In addition to the identification of 
positive relationship drivers as potential antecedents of dark side behaviour, Johnsen and 
Lacoste (2016) argue that detrimental behaviours can also be caused by negative elements (i.e. 
opportunism and uncertainty).  
The focus of the current chapter is to explore potential antecedents of dark side behaviour. 
Abosag et al. (2016) maintain that it is important for a firm to understand the “root cause” of 
dark side behaviour in order to effectively reduce and manage its appearance in business 
relationships. Drawing from existing literature, the current study identified trust, shared values, 
opportunistic behaviour and uncertainty as possible antecedents of dark side behaviour. These 
elements all possess particular qualities that could result in certain behaviours which might 
consequently cause the relationship to become characterised by intolerable dark side tendencies 
(Abosag et al., 2016). First, trust and shared values are discussed as antecedents of dark side 
behaviour as many authors (e.g. Baker, 2009; Friman et al., 2002; Moorman et al., 1993; 
Morgan & Hunt, 1994) identify these constructs as fundamental “building blocks” to any 
relationships. Because trust and shared values are considered such pivotal relationship drivers, 
the current study aims to examine the effect thereof on the onset of certain behaviours which 
might ultimately lead the manifestation of intolerable dark relationships. Secondly, 
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opportunistic behaviour is also adopted as a potential antecedent of dark side behaviour as it is 
often referred to in literature as a negative relationship driver (e.g. Brown et al., 2000; Wathne 
& Heide, 2000; Williamson, 1975) that usually results in detrimental outcomes (Das & 
Rahman, 2015). This chapter covers the concept of opportunism and its dimensions as 
suggested by Wathne and Heide (2000). Lastly, the final antecedent of dark side behaviour to 
be examined in this chapter is uncertainty. Drawing from research by Abosag et al. (2016), 
uncertainty can affect the extent to which a partner has sufficient information to make key 
decisions, is able to foresee the consequences of these decisions, and has confidence in them. 
Hence, as uncertainty as a construct plays an influential role regarding the decision-making of 
business partners, it may affect the relationship dynamics between firms, as well as cause 




Trust is usually described as something beneficial to all concerned – something that is 
inherently good (Skinner, Dietz & Weibel, 2013). Several authors (e.g. Anderson & Narus, 
1990; Dowell, Morrison & Heffernan, 2015; Huang & Wilkinson, 2013; Morgan & Hunt, 1994; 
Jiang, Henneberg & Naudé, 2011) maintain that trust is a key dimension in business 
relationships and can influence parties’ behaviour in a business relationship. For example, 
Abosag et al. (2016) argue that low levels of trust in a business relationship can potentially 
result in behavioural outcomes that might damage relational bonds. Therefore, as the level of 
trust between business partners can influence the dynamics of a partnership, the current study 
identifies trust as important antecedent of dark side behaviour.  
 
3.2.1 Concept of trust 
 
The conceptualisation of trust across a variety of disciplines, including philosophy, economics, 
sociology and management, has significantly increased over the past decade. These discussions 
have become linked to the developing interest of relationship management – especially in the 
context of business-to-business relationships (Blois, 1999). Berry (1995:242) commented that 
“relationship marketing is built on the foundation of trust”. However, the concept of trust 
literature in relevance to business relationship management is complex and a great diversity of 
views exists as to what the concept entails. Table 3.1 provides some frequently used definitions 
of trust throughout literature. 
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Table 3.1 Definitions of trust 
Definition Source 
Trust is the belief that a party’s word or promise is reliable and that 
they will fulfil obligations in an exchange relationship. 
Schurr & Ozanne, 
1985:940 
Mutual trust is the degree to which a channel member perceives that 
its relationship with a partner is based on mutual trust and, thus, 
willing to accept short-term dislocation because they are confident 
that such a dislocation will balance out in the long run. 
Anderson, Lodish & 
Weitz, 1987 
Trust refers to a party’s belief that its needs will be fulfilled in the 
future by actions undertaken by another party. 
Anderson & Weitz, 
1989:312 
Trust is the firm’s belief that another organisation will perform 
actions that will result in positive outcomes for the firm, as well as 
not take unexpected actions that can result in negative outcomes for 
the firm. 
Anderson & Narus, 
1990:45 
Trust is defined as “a willingness to rely on an exchange partner in 
whom one has confidence”.  
Moorman, Zultman 
& Desphande, 1992; 
Ganesan, 1994 
Trust can be conceptualized as existing when one party has 
confidence in an exchange partner’s reliability and integrity. 
Morgan & Hunt, 
1994 
Trust refers to the perceived credibility, as well as the benevolence, 
of a target of trust. 
Doney & Cannon, 
1997:36 
 
Most of the authors included in Table 3.1 refer to the study by Schurr and Ozanne (1985) who 
based their views of trust on previous research by Blau (1964), Rotter (1967) and Pruitt (1981). 
Although most definitions stated above have elements in common (such as trust being a belief), 
each of these definitions differ in one way or another. This dissertation, however, 
conceptualises trust as a party’s confidence in an exchange partner’s reliability and integrity 
(Morgan & Hunt, 1994), which which runs parallel to Moorman, Deshpande and Zaltman’s 
(1993:82) definition: “Trust is defined as a willingness to rely on an exchange partner in whom 
one has confidence”. Both of these definitions emphasise the importance of confidence in 
business relationships and draw specifically on Rotter’s (1967) classic view that describes trust 
as the generalized expectancy held by a firm regarding the extent to which they can rely on 
their partner’s word. Literature on trust suggests that confidence in business relationships can 
develop due to parties’ belief that their partners are reliable and possess high levels of integrity 
(Morgan & Hunt, 1994). This view concerning trust is often associated with qualities such as 
consistency, competence, honesty, fairness, responsibility, helpfulness and benevolence 
(Altman & Taylor, 1973; Dywer & LaGace, 1986; Morgan & Hunt, 1994; Rotter, 1971). 
Anderson and Narus (1990) focus on the perceived outcomes of trust and define the term as 
“the firm’s belief that another company will perform actions that will result in positive 
outcomes for the firm, as well as not take unexpected actions that might result in negative 
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outcomes”. Business partners are therefore more likely to rely with confidence on one another 
if their actions and decisions reflect integrity, and relationship outcomes are positive. 
Furthermore, Wilson (1995) maintains that “trust is a fundamental relationship model building 
block and as such is included in most relationship models”. This statement regarding the 
importance of trust in business relationships is supported by Morgan and Hunt (1994) as they 
emphasise trust to be a key mediating variable that is central to relational exchanges. The 
inherent belief that trust is often associated with successful business relationships is best 
summarised by Sullivan and Peterson (1982) who claim that, when parties have adequate trust 
in one another, issues pertaining dark side behaviour are more likely to be resolved. However, 
when the trust between partners turn salient, the relationship can become characterised by a 
degree of uncertainty and perceived risk, which as result can influence the manner in which 
one, or both parties operate (Skinner et al., 2013). Hence, although trust is typically portrayed 
as an advantageous element in business relationships, Mollering (2007) suggests that the 
inherent ambiguity in trusting situations is an important factor to consider when investigating 
the dark side of trust. 
 
3.2.2 Stages of trust 
 
Several authors also argue that trust is not just a psychological state (e.g. Kramer, 1999; 
Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt & Camerer, 1998), or a cognitive orientation towards risk, but rather a 
process that comprises of three stages (McEvily et al., 2003; Sanders, Schyns, Dietz & Den 
Hartog, 2006). The first stage entails a set of beliefs regarding the other party’s trustworthiness, 
regularly used to comprise assessments of their ability, benevolence and integrity (Mayer, 
Davis & Schoorman, 1995). The second stage is captured by Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt and 
Camerer’s (1998) definition of trust as “a psychological state comprising of the intention to 
accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the intentions or behaviour of another”. 
Giddens (1990) and Nicholson et al. (2001) refer to this acceptance of vulnerability as a “leap 
of faith”. In contrast, if distrust surfaces in the second stage, the trustor may have confident 
negative expectations regarding its partner’s actions and might therefore not accept 
vulnerability (Lewicki, McAllister & Bies, 1998). Lastly, the third stage of trust – based on the 
decision made in the previous stage – comprises of risk-taking actions undertaken in order to 
demonstrate a party’s trust. Hence, the final stage is often considered the defining stage as 
related risk-taking actions could potentially result in increased collaboration and reliance, the 
sharing of valuable resources and information, as well as the reduction of deliberate monitoring. 
Skinner et al. (2013) emphasise that it is this risk-taking element pertaining to trust that can 
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lead to the appearance of certain dark side behaviours in business relationships (e.g. power and 
dependence issues).   
 
3.2.3 Dimensions of trust 
 
Trust has been defined as a complex multi-dimensional construct (Brashear, Boles, Bellenger 
& Brooks, 2003; Johnson & Grayson, 2005; Miyamoto & Rexha, 2004; Rodriguez & Wilson, 
1995) and is often conceptualized as having three dimensions, namely cognitive, affective and 
behavioural. This section focuses on defining cognitive trust and affective trust in a manner that 
is consistent with the basic notions of cognition and affect as stipulated in relationship 
marketing literature. The third component of trust, behavioural trust, which constitutes actions 
that flow from a state of cognitive and affective trust (Lewis & Weigert, 1985), is treated 
implicitly as the consequence of cognitive and affective trust (Johnson & Grayson, 2005). The 
current study, as suggested by Abosag et al. (2015), focuses primarily on the cognitive 
(competence, customisation, reliability/dependability and promptness) and affective (caring, 




Cognitive, or performance-based, trust is defined as the confidence, willingness or intention of 
a party to rely on a counterparty’s competence, reliability and promptness in meeting their 
obligations (Anderson & Weitz, 1989; Moorman, Zaltman & Deshpande, 1992; Rempel, 
Holmes & Zanna, 1985). Zaheer, McEvily and Perrone (1998) infer that cognitive trust 
emergences from accumulated knowledge that allows a party to make predictions, with some 
level of confidence, regarding their partner’s future actions and decisions to fulfil promises. 
Cognitive trust is therefore often considered synonymous with “predictability” (Rempel et al., 
1985) and “reliableness” (Johnson-George & Swap, 1982). These predictions that stem from 
cognitive trust are based on knowledge gained through interactions between parties (Harris & 
Dibben, 1999), observations made regarding partner behaviour, as well as a party’s reputation 
in other relationships (Johnson & Grayson, 2005). When reputation effects are strong, initial 
interactions can provide parties with confirmation (or disconfirmation) in terms of prior 
perceptions, while also allowing cognitive trust to become definitive in one or more interactions 
(Johnson & Grayson, 2005). In other words, when a business relationship develops over time, 
both parties increase their cognitive, or performance-based, trust of each other based on 
successful past collaboration (Abosag et al., 2015). However, Barnes et al. (2005) argue that 
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cognitive trust does not always increase due to past success and, as a practical example reveals, 
during the mid-term of most business relationships (between 2-5 years in length) between UK 
multinational enterprises (MNEs), cognitive trust actually decreased. Therefore, cognitive trust 
is often regarded as an expectation rather than a conviction regarding a partner’s future 
behaviour, as well as a reflection of the level of uncertainty pertaining the anticipation of this 
behaviour (Zaheer et al., 1998). Abosag et al. (2015) suggest that the cognitive dimension of 
trust can also provide parties with a degree of freedom to disappoint expectations, which 
emphasises the importance of the matter of trust expectation management in business 
relationships. 
Furthermore, even though cognitive trust is knowledge-driven, the need to trust presumes a 
state of incomplete trust (Johnson & Grayson, 2005). However, a state of complete certainty 
regarding partners’ actions implies that risk is eliminated, and trust is redundant – which in 
most business relationships is hardly ever the case (Abosag et al., 2015; Johnson & Grayson, 
2005). Williamson (1993) elaborates on this perspective by explaining that, although 
uncertainty and opportunistic behaviour can be minimised through due diligence and 
contractual safeguard, business relationships often comprise of more than just the contractual 
component of trust. Three components of inter-organisational trust have been identified in order 
to achieve relationship success, namely contractual trust (expectations that one’s business 
partner keeps its promises), competence trust (confidence in one’s business partner’s 
competence or professional standard in carrying out specific tasks) and goodwill trust 
(confidence in one’s business partner’s open commitment to supporting and continuing the 
relationship) (Sako, 1992). Hence, there is an irrational sphere to trust that speaks to complex 
relational drivers (e.g. respect, friendship and reciprocity) which involves less contractual and 
calculative trust, and more of a “leap of faith” feature pertaining business relationships.  
In addition to the complex nature of trust, Barnes et al. (2005) argue that the reduction of 
cognitive trust is particularly likely at inter-organisational level as trust needs to be specifically 
reactivated in situations where partners take on new transactional tasks that have not previously 
been part of relational operations. Hence, this reactivation of cognitive trust is important in 
order to prevent unpleasant surprises from arising due to changes in tasks (Huemer, 2004) that 
could, if left unmanaged, potentially result in perilous negative relationship behaviour. 
Although future scenarios pertaining a party’s actions and behaviours imply some degree of 
risk, the dark side of trust can be minimised through knowledge gained from prior 
collaborations (Eriksson & Sharma, 2003). In other words, expectations concerning 
competence and responsibility can be considered central to cognitive trust (Abosag et al., 2015) 
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and if these contractual and competence spheres regarding trust are not satisfied in terms of 




Where cognitive or performance-based trust addresses the contractual and competence aspects 
of trust, the affective dimension is more emotion-driven and emphasises aspects pertaining to 
goodwill (Sako, 1992). Rempel et al. (1985) refer to affective trust as the confidence a party 
places in its business partner based on the feelings and emotions generated by the caring, 
empathy, politeness, similarity and concern demonstrated during interactions. Affective trust is 
characterised by “feelings of security and perceived strength of the relationship” (Johnson & 
Grayson, 2005), interpersonal liking (Nicholson, Compeau & Sethi, 2001), and a “leap of faith” 
that surpasses the rationality regarding expectations (Wicks, Berman & Jones, 1999). In other 
words, affective trust speaks to the relational context of trust that will act as a moral control in 
terms of how parties behave in the relationship (Granovetter, 1985). The essence of affective 
trust is thus contingent with a partner’s emotions and the development of emotional bonds 
between parties that may venture beyond that which is justified by available knowledge 
(Johsnon & Grayson, 2005; Nicholson et al., 2001). However, although it is important for 
business parties to improve their understanding of one another in order to create emotional 
openness, they should remain vigilant and beware of over-emphasising affective-based trust 
(Abosag et al., 2015). Several authors (e.g. Abosag et al., 2016; Anderson & Jap, 2005; Baker, 
2009) have identified that trust can “blind” parties in terms of the effectivity and desirability of 
their relationship, hence inferring that trust can potentially result in the manifestation of dark 
side behaviour in business relationships. Although personal qualities are important in creating 
emotional bonds between partners as basis of affective trust (which is needed to strengthen and 
reinforce economic and structural bonds), firms must ensure that trust is not only established at 
affective level, but that it includes contractual and competence trust to ensure that “the ties that 
bind, are not ties that blind” (Cohen & Prusak; 2001:56; Johnson & Grayson, 2005). 
 
The association between cognitive/performance-based trust and affective trust  
 
Research concerning whether cognitive (performance-based) trust and affective trust occur 
simultaneously in a business relationship, or whether one precedes the other, is limited 
(Abosaget al., 2015). Hence, the interactivity between these dimensions needs to be 
investigated in order to discuss the potential association between cognitive trust and affective 
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trust. Lewis and Weigert (1985) claims that cognitive trust provides a foundation for affective 
trust and should therefore exist before the development of affective trust. Even though 
researchers like Johnson and Grayson (2005) recognise cognitive trust as a positive antecedent 
of affective trust, attitude theory researchers have long argued that the relationship between 
cognition and affect in attitude formation is bidirectional. McAllister (1995) and Nicholson et 
al. (2001) claim that, once strong affective-based trust exists between business partners, the 
need for cognitive trust may be reduced. In other words, when a relationship is characterised 
by high levels of trust, parties may become less attentive in terms of the decisions and actions 
of counterparties. In contrast, however, Chowdhury (2005) argues that cognitive trust may not 
always develop affective trust due to a misalignment between the shared values and perceptions 
of parties. Some studies (e.g. Johnson & Grayson, 2005; McAllister, 1995; Nicholson et al., 
2001) indicate a significant and positive relationship between cognitive trust and affective trust, 
while others suggest the association between these dimensions is influenced by complex 
constructs such as organisational culture. For example, Rodriguez and Wilson (1995) maintain 
that affective trust does not impact on cognitive trust in an individualist culture, but it does, 
however, in a collectivist culture. 
 
3.3 SHARED VALUES 
 
Studies across a variety of disciplines have associated shared values with the concept of culture 
(Baker, 2009). In the area of marketing management, Deshpande and Webster (1989:4) define 
organisational culture as “the pattern of shared values and beliefs that helps people understand 
organisational functioning and thus provides norms for appropriate organisational behaviour”. 
Molla and Bhalla (2006) furthermore explain that organisations impose different values and 
beliefs (also known as culture) on their business partners – which often defines both expected 
and accepted behaviour modes, working relationships and communication patterns. Hence, due 
to the aforementioned relation between shared values and organisational culture, the current 
research adopts the construct of shared values as a proxy of organisational culture. 
Furthermore, when conceptualising shared values, it is important to note that literature has often 
used the term “shared values” synonymously with shared goals, even though some have 
recognised a distinction between the two concepts (Sin, Tse, Yau, Lee and Chow, 2004). 
Several authors (e.g. Anderson & Weitz, 1989; Morgan & Hunt, 1994) provide evidence for 
this distinction between shared values and shared goals. These authors explain that difference 
in growth objectives is a difficult and pervasive problem in business relationships, and that 
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cultural similarity is operationalised separately from the goal congruence construct (Baker, 
2009). With reference to the cultural similarity construct, Anderson and Weitz (1989:314) 
explain that “the essence of the problem is lack of shared values and methods which manifests 
itself as differences in cognitive styles, operating methods and choices”. For the purpose of this 
study, there will be a conceptual distinction between shared values and shared goals as these 
constructs connote different things. When partnering firms possess similar goals, it does not 
necessarily mean they share an entire set of values (Baker, 2009). For example, a party might 
value ethical and legal behaviour to obtain relationship goals, whereas their business partner 
might support underhanded, sneaky and opportunistic behaviour as valid means for achieving 
desired results (Baker, 2009). However, even though these constructs are inherently different 
in nature, it is possible that shared values and shared goals are related. Baker (2009) suggests 
that shared goals is only a component of the much broader construct of shared values.   
Shared values can have a significant influence in motivating business partners to achieve 
relationship objectives (Kashyap & Sivadas, 2012). Similar to the manner in which most 
relational constructs are utilized to examine relationships in a business-to-business context, 
shared values have been operationalised, conceptualised and defined in many different ways. 
Several researchers (e.g. Barnes et al., 2005; Ford, Hakansson & Johanson, 1993; Peck, 
Christopher, Clark & Payne, 2013; Hakansson & Snehota, 1995) suggest that shared values, as 
a component construct of business relationships, are made up four facets. The first facet is the 
win-win facet, which describes partnering firms’ recognition of the need for working together 
(Baker, 2009; Peck et al., 1999). The second facet includes the affective component, or the 
“good feelings”, that members have for each other (Baker, 2009; Barnes, 1999). The third facet 
represents the ownership component and describes how vertical integration is likely to have an 
impact on business relationships (Hakansson & Snehota, 1995) and, lastly, the fourth facet is 
the depth facet, representing the amount of activities performed jointly by business partners 
(Baker, 2009; Ford et al., 1993). In addition, Mukherjee and Nath (2003) also conceptualise 
that shared values as a construct contain several components, or facets, instead of being a latent 
construct. For example, according to Baker (2009), in an online banking context the authors 
describe shared values as the extent to which banks and their customers share common beliefs 
regarding matters like ethics, security and privacy. 
Because of the impactful effect shared values can have on interfirm dynamics, the current study 
identifies it as a potential antecedent of dark side behaviour. In order to explore the effect of 
shared values and certain behavioural outcomes associated with dark side behaviour, Morgan 
and Hunt’s (1994) conceptualisation of shared values is adopted. These aforementioned authors 
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define shared values as “the extent to which partners have beliefs in common about what 
behaviours, goals and policies are important or unimportant, appropriate or inappropriate, and 
right or wrong” (Morgan & Hunt, 1994:25). Drawing from this definition, it can be inferred 
that business partnerships characterised by a substantial amount of shared values, may comprise 
of parties that are “on the same page” in terms of how their relationship works, should work 
and how business practices and endeavours should be approached (Baker, 2009).  Thus, shared 
values can express the extent to which a business relationship might consist of partners that 
essentially think the same way or share similar philosophies regarding how they conduct 
themselves within their relationships. Tate (1996) supports the importance of shared values as 
an essential component for successful relationship development and maintenance by referring 
to the marriage analogy. He explains that “both parties must understand each other’s needs, and 
must be compatible, with shared values” (Tate, 1996:7). 
 
3.4. OPPORTUNISTIC BEHAVIOUR 
 
It has been cited and emphasised throughout literature that the construction of successful long-
term business relationships will result in mutual gains and cooperation, as well as discourage 
involved parties from acting opportunistically (Ganesan, 1994). However, many researchers 
have argued that long-term business relationships often encompass the history of partners’ 
behaviour, which has the ability to influence interfirm dynamics and the continuity of the 
relationship (Anderson & Narus, 1990; Morgan & Hunt, 1994; Bucklin & Sengupta, 1993). 
According to Morgan and Hunt (1994), opportunistic behaviour has been recognised as one of 
the most influential historical factors that can have a profound effect on the relationship 
development and maintenance process. Thus, based on the research recommendations by the 
abovementioned authors, the current study examines opportunistic behaviour as a potential 
antecedent of dark side behaviour.  
In the following section, the concept of opportunistic behaviour is firstly discussed by (1) 
drawing from two main theories of firm governance (namely, transactions cost theory and social 
exchange theory), and (2) considering the intrinsic characteristics of opportunism according to 
Williamson (1975). Secondly, forms of opportunism and possible outcomes are explored in 
order to provide a better understanding of how opportunistic behaviour can potentially appear 
in business relationships, as well as to emphasise the consequences that might accompany its 
manifestation.    
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3.4.1 Concept of opportunistic behaviour 
 
The concept of opportunism has been described as a multi-disciplinary concept utilised across 
various fields of business management literature, such as strategic management (e.g. Inkpen & 
Beamish, 1997), marketing (e.g. Grayson & Ambler, 1999), psychology (e.g. Ephross & 
Vassill, 1993), as well as transaction costs studies in new institutional economics (e.g. 
Williamson, 1985; Klein, 1996). However, when exploring the concept of opportunistic 
behaviour in a relationship marketing context, several authors (e.g. Das & Rahman, 2015; 
Wathne & Heide, 2000) suggest that there are two main theories of firm governance from which 
opportunism emerges, namely the transaction cost economics (TCE) and social exchange 
theory (SET). 
The first assumption is that parties are naturally inclined to act opportunistically, or to seek self-
interest, whereas the second assumption regarding bounded rationality focuses more on parties’ 
limitation concerning knowledge (Das & Rahman, 2015; Williamson, 1981). In other words, 
due to parties not being in possession of all the facts and information, Williamson (1981) infer 
that they will not make entirely rational decisions. Consequently, all partnership agreements 
developed between firms are usually incomplete and cannot specify every contingency 
(Williamson, 1981; Provan & Skinner, 1989). Hence, opportunities for renegotiations will 
emerge in the future, along with alternative opportunities, and an imbalance of power and 
dependence might occur between partnering firms which, in turn, can potentially result in 
opportunistic behaviour (Williamson, 1981; Provan & Skinner, 1989; Das & Rahman, 2015). 
Furthermore, Williamson (1993) extended the concept of transaction cost theory by suggesting 
that the amount of transaction costs in a business-to-business context (e.g. costs of managing 
the relationship, the opportunity costs of making relationship decisions, relationship switching 
costs, etc.) can influence whether or not opportunism can occur. For example, if a relationship 
is characterised by low relationship costs, it might be easier for firms to act opportunistically 
and seek better alternative partners. 
The second theory that underlines the concept of opportunism is the social exchange theory 
(SET), which has been used as a basis to explain the relationship marketing theory and interfirm 
relationships (e.g. Dwyer et al., 1987; Das & Rahman, 2015; Kingshott, 2006; Luo, 2002). The 
social exchange theory (SET) suggests that there is alternative and more efficient forms of 
governance for relationships, and it thus rejects the assumption of opportunism (Das & Rahman, 
2015). Heide and John (1992) argue that business parties involved in an exchange relationship 
tend to rely more on trust, commitment, cooperation, satisfaction, and other relational norms 
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than strictly on contractual agreements. Drawing from the social exchange theory, an exchange 
can be viewed as a social behaviour that may result in both economic and social outcomes 
(Emerson, 1976). The exchange parties compare their relational outcomes to that of alternative 
exchange options and, although economic results are important, they make decisions based on 
the social outcomes (Emerson, 1976). Therefore, a business relationship resulting in positive 
relational outcomes can lead to higher level of trust and commitment and, over time, norms can 
potentially develop that govern the relationship (Lambe, Wittman & Spekman, 2001). Several 
authors (e.g. Achrol et al., 1999; K Lai, 2005; Brown et al., 2000) suggest that these relational 
norms can reduce the onset of opportunism in a business relationship. 
 
3.4.2 Forms of opportunistic behaviour 
 
Opportunism may exist in many forms. Wathne and Heide (2000) identifies opportunistic 
behaviour as active or passive. Active opportunism refers to a situation in which one party does 
something that harms its counterparty – for example, contract breaching and the violation of 
promotion agreements (Rahman, 2015). Passive opportunistic behaviour, on the other hand, 
arises when one partner neglects to do something that would have otherwise benefited its 
counterparty (e.g. quality shrinking, misrepresentation or exaggeration of capability, etc.) 
(Rahman, 2015). Wathne and Heide (2000) propose a matrix that identifies four forms of 
opportunism – namely, evasion, refusal to adapt, violation, or forced renegotiation (see Figure 
3.1) Opportunistic behaviour can be identified according to two general categories, namely 
active and passive (Wathne & Heide, 2000). Opportunism can thus occur when a business 
partner either engages in, or refrains from, particular actions. However, the specific 
manifestation of active and passive opportunism may depend on whether a particular behaviour 
(or lack thereof) takes place within existing exchange circumstances, or whether the original 
circumstances have changed as result of exogenous events (Wathne & Heide, 2000).  
In Figure 3.2, the manifestation of active and passive opportunism under existing and new 
circumstances is illustrated, as well as the possible effects of the different forms of opportunism 
on relationship outcomes (Wathne & Heide, 2000). Wathne and Heide (2000) draw from 
Kaufmann’s (1987) and Ghosh and John’s (1999) idea that a relationship should be analysed 
from a dual perspective of (1) creating joint value and (2) claiming a share of it. However, in 
principle, any form of opportunistic behaviour may potentially restrict both value creation and 
result in redistribution. Hence, depending on the specific form of opportunistic behaviour, the 
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manner in which wealth creation and distribution is affected may differ (Wahtne & Heide, 
2000). 
 
Figure 3. 1 Forms of opportunism and possible outcomes 
 
Notes: O = Party engaging in opportunistic behaviour; E = Exchange partner; S = System 
(e.g. other parties) 
 
Source: Wathne & Heide (2000) 
 
In Figure 3.2, Cell 1 describes the manifestation of passive opportunism that, under existing 
circumstances, takes on the form of shrinking, or evasion of obligations in business-to-business 
relationships. Acccording to Wathne and Heide (2000) the situation in which a franchisee fails 
to comply with a franchisor’s quality standard, can serve as an example of this form of 
opportunistic behaviour. From the franchisee’s position, quality shrinking produces an 
immediate benefit in the form of a cost saving. In the long term, shrinking can create customer 
dissatisfaction, which can adversely affect revenues of both the franchisor and other franchisees 
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(Muris, 1981; Wathne & Heide, 2000). Thus, opportunistic evasion can potentially influence 
both wealth distribution and creation (Wathne & Heide, 2000). 
Passive opportunism under new circumstances can result in inflexibility, or refusal to adapt 
(Cell 2). According to Wathne & Heide (2000) the direct cost effect of this form of opportunism 
is likely to be minimal and can result in the opportunistic party experiencing a revenue gain in 
the short term. However, in the long term, this form of opportunistic behaviour can cause severe 
partner inflexibility that can prevent the relationship from being modified to reflect new 
circumstances. In other words, there may be a different revenue effect in the form of forgone 
revenues from appropriate adaptation (Wathne & Heide, 2000). The “Cola Wars” serves as an 
appropriate example of passive opportunism under new circumstances (Muris, Scheffman & 
Spiller, 1992; Wathne & Heide, 2000). In the 1980s, there was a need for rapidly changing 
strategies in the form of new product introduction, packing, promotional deals, advertising 
content and pricing (Muris et al., 1992). During this period, the failure to make strategic 
adjustments created a considerable competitive disadvantage for many companies. In the soft 
drink industry, specifically, many independent bottlers not only refused to participate in the 
various programs, but opportunistically extracted “special concessions” in exchange for 
participation (Muris et al., 1992). For example, Coca Cola’s inability to restructure its bottler 
agreements under new market conditions led to the company finding itself at a competitive 
disadvantage (Muris et al., 1992; Wathne & Heide, 2000). Hence, overall wealth creation may 
be impeded – which, in turn, can hurt parties in the relationships. 
Cell 3 entails active opportunism under existing circumstances (violation) that describes the 
situation in which one party is engaging in behaviours that were explicitly or implicitly 
prohibited (Wathne & Heide, 2000).This form of opportunistic behaviour might increase the 
victimised party’s direct costs. For example, a manufacturer that is concerned about 
opportunistic violations of distribution restrictions may need to invest in systematic and costly 
monitoring efforts. Furthermore, from a revenue standpoint, the opportunistic party’s gains 
from territory violations can come at the expense of other distributors whose revenue streams 
are reduced (Wathne & Heide, 2000). Dutta, Heide and Bergen (1999) claim that these 
distributors’ service provision may become subjected to free-rising as a result of the violation 
that has occurred. Hence, the manufacturer’s revenues may suffer as well, due to other 
distributors reducing their support of the focal party (Wathne & Heide, 2000). 
Lastly, in Figure 3.2, the fourth cell depicts opportunism under new circumstances (forced 
renegotiations). In this situation, one party uses the new circumstances to extract concessions 
from the other, as in the aforementioned case regarding the relationship between Coca Cola and 
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its bottlers. The most apparent consequence of this form of opportunistic behaviour is a 
redistribution of wealth in the magnitude of the concessions in question. However, there are 
also cost and revenue effects that are more subtle in nature (Wathne & Heide, 2000). 
Furthermore, this form of opportunistic behaviour can give rise to opportunity-excessive costs 
(Masten, 1993; Wathne & Heide, 2000). In other words, the main costs associated with this 
type of opportunism comes from transactions maladapted to the environment (Williamson, 
1991; Wathne & Heide, 2000). Hence, in the long run, a failure to adapt can limit both parties’ 




Well-established in a variety of disciplines such as management, business and economics, 
uncertainty has been a key factor in influencing firm behaviour as well as shaping dynamics 
regarding managerial decision-making (Simon, 1957; Thompson, 2003; Tangpong et al., 2016). 
Several authors (e.g. Abosag et al., 2015; Abosag et al., 2016; Baker, 2009; Ting et al., 2007) 
theorise that uncertainty can result in the onset of dark side behaviour between partnering firms. 
In particular, Abosag et al. (2016) suggest that when a business relationship becomes 
characterised by intolerable uncertainty, parties are often more likely to pursue self-interest 
instead of mutual interest as they might lack the necessary information needed to make 
confident predications concerning their relationship. Thus uncertainty, if not managed 
appropriately, can result in potentially damaging behaviours. Drawing from the 
abovementioned arguments, the current study identifies uncertainty as a possible antecedent of 
dark side behaviour. In the following section, the concept of uncertainty will be discussed, along 
with different types – namely contextual, relationship and decision-making uncertainty.  
 
3.5.1 Concept of uncertainty 
 
The Encarta Dictionary define uncertainty as “the doubt or lack of accurateness” (Rich, 
Geersbro & Ritter, 2010). Uncertainty is antonymous with certainty which in terms of business 
relationships can refer to an accurate, deterministic prediction of future occurrences (Rich et 
al., 2010). Thus, prediction in this case implies that the object of uncertainty is related to the 
future, not to the past (Rich et al., 2010). In other words, uncertainty is not a lack of 
interpretation of the past, but rather the inability to accurately predict the future of business-to-
business partnerships. This explanation is parallel to that of Milliken (1978:135) who describes 
uncertainty as “an individual’s perceived inability to predict something accurately”. The notion 
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of an individual perception indicates that uncertainty is subject-specific and resides in the “eye 
of the beholder” (Rich et al., 2010). Different individuals, or different parties in a business 
relationship, may therefore have varying degrees of perceived uncertainty regarding a similar 
situation. Thus, a party’s perception pertaining uncertainty can be divided into two levels of 
analysis, namely collective uncertainty and individual uncertainty (Rich et al., 2010). 
Individual uncertainty refers to elements of the future that a specific partner perceives as 
uncertain, but its counterparty acknowledges as certain. Collective uncertainty, on the other 
hand, focuses on elements of the future that no-one can predict and that are collectively 
unknown (e.g. random events caused by natural forces or accidents) (Rich et al., 2010). Several 
authors (Rich et al., 2010; Anderson et al., 1994; Leonidou et al., 2006) maintain that both 
individual uncertainty and collective uncertainty exist in business-to-business relationships as 
uncertainty is an integrated part of life (collective uncertainty), as well as due to relationship 
boundaries that prevent partnering firms from perceiving the “bigger picture” which, as result, 
can cause individual uncertainty. 
Similarities can be found between Rich et al. (2010) and Ting, Chen and Bartholomew’s (2007) 
definitions of uncertainty. Ting et al. (2007) describe uncertainty as “an inability to attach a 
probability to different states of the nature of outcomes”. Both of these definitions address 
uncertainty as entailing influential attributes, namely limited information and bounded 
rationality. Gifford, Bobbitt and Slocum (1979) suggest that parties will find themselves in 
uncertain situations if they lack critical information needed to make a precise judgement or 
predictions. When partnering firms have incomplete information regarding their environment, 
relationship or counterparty, opportunistic behaviour can arise (Ting et al., 2007). Whang 
(1992) implies that, given limited information, parties will more likely make decisions in their 
own interest as means to decrease vulnerability and reduce possible negative outcomes. Hence, 
parties may experience increased vulnerability due to opportunism that occurs in the 
relationship. With regard to bounded rationality, business partners may be unable to foresee all 
of the situations that could potentially result in opportunism and dark side behaviour (Ting et 
al., 2007). These situations are usually characterised by high levels of uncertainty as the actions 
of one party can only be observed with clarity (Landry & Amara, 1998). 
This study, however, adopts a more specific definition of uncertainty that more accurately 
describes the appearance of uncertainty in business-to-business relationships. Pfeffer and 
Salancik (1978:578) defines uncertainty as “the degree to which an organisation cannot 
anticipate or accurately predict the future of its relations with another, resulting mainly from 
problems in having adequate, relevant, and timely information available”. This definition, 
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similar to the previously mentioned definitions of uncertainty, addresses the importance of 
information and how a lack of it can increase uncertainty within business relationships (Ting et 
al., 2007; Whang, 1992; Rich et al., 2010; Gifford et al., 1979). Additionally, a distinction can 
also be made between uncertainty in general and business uncertainty (Abosag et al., 2015). 
Achrol and Stern (1988) define uncertainty as the extent to which a party has sufficient 
information to make key decisions, as well as the ability to confidently predict the consequences 
of these decisions. However, business uncertainty more specifically refers to the unanticipated 
changes in circumstances concerning partners’ business exchanges (Noordeweir et al., 1990). 
Hence, uncertainty in business relationships make it more challenging to predict partners’ 
demands and requirements, as well as foreseeing the outcomes of decisions (Kohli, 1989). 
 
3.5.2 Types of uncertainty 
 
Eriksson and Sharma (2003) describe uncertainty as a construct characterised by complexity 
and multidimensionality. In a business-to-business context, uncertainty comprises of three 
relevant dimensions that address various aspects of a relationship, namely contextual, 
relationship and decision-making (Eriksson & Sharma, 2003). In order to accurately explore 
the construct of uncertainty, these aforementioned dimensions are examined as each addresses 
a specific aspect of uncertainty in business relationships and can potentially explain why certain 




Environmental uncertainty is defined as the uncertainty inherent to the environment in which 
business partners operate, and it often refers to the difficulty to accurately predict the condition 
of the operating environment (Buchko, 1994; Tangpong, Li & Hung, 2016). This definition 
aligns with Leonidou, Barnes and Talias’ (2006) definition that refers to environmental 
uncertainty as the difficulties pertaining to planning effectively for future conditions concerning 
the business relationship that is caused by both diversity (i.e., the existence of multiple external 
factors which need to be considered when making decisions) and dynamism (i.e. changes in 
external factors over time) associated with the external operating environment. However, due 
to human cognitive limitations, it is not possible for parties to perceive the external environment 
in its entirety (Eriksson & Sharma, 2003). As environmental context affects parties’ perception 
of relationship cooperation, the concept of contextual uncertainty addresses these human 
limitations, and is based on parties’ interacting with their environment in order to obtain 
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feedback regarding the adequacy of their cognition (Eriksson & Sharma, 2003; Achrol & Stern, 
1988). The current study thus refers to environmental uncertainty as contextual uncertainty, as 
the surrounding environment is not objective (Eriksson & Sharma, 2003), and parties’ 
perception regarding their environment is often shaped by their knowledge (Achrol & Stern, 
1988). 
Contextual – or environmental – uncertainty can arise from rapid change in the environment in 
which a business relationship operates (e.g. rapid technological changes, unpredictable actions 
of competitors, changing customer preference, as well as high rates of changes in output) 
(Kumar, Scheer & Steenkamp, 1995; Lee, Yeung & Cheng, 2009). Because of this volatile 
dynamism of the operating environment, it is suggested that contextual uncertainty comprises 
of two dimensions (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1969), namely unpredictability (the rate of change and 
causal relatedness of environmental events) and complexity (the heterogeneity and 
interdependence of environmental factors) (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1969). Eriksson and Sharma 
(2003) imply that, the more volatile the environment becomes, the more parties are confronted 
with uncertainty due to the higher levels of unpredictability and complexity characterising their 
operating environment. These underlying elements of unpredictability and complexity 
contribute to the identification of uncertainty as a potential antecedent of dark side behaviour 
(Abosag et al., 2015). Ting et al. (2007) explain that, due to the lack of knowledge often 
associated with uncertainty regarding the future operating environment, firms may become 
tempted to make decisions in their own interest and, consequently, leave other parties 
vulnerable to opportunistic behaviour. Hence, the argument of contextual uncertainty as an 
antecedent of dark side behaviour is consistent with argument of the relational approach to 
marketing, which infers that contextual uncertainty is caused by the unpredictable nature of the 
environment (Eriksson & Sharma, 2003). In other words, due to the turbulent environments in 
which business relationships operate, parties often lack knowledge of cause-effect 
relationships, as well as the timing of change (Eriksson & Sharma, 2003). This lack of 
information pertaining to their surrounding environment and the future operations within it, can 
lead to parties relying on their current knowledge and making decisions out of self-interest 




In literature, relationship uncertainty has been referred to as internal uncertainty (Leonidou et 
al., 2006) as well as behavioural uncertainty (Tangpong et al., 2016). Anderson, Hakansson 
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and Johanson (1994) explain that internal uncertainty exists when one party in a working 
relationship cannot adequately predict the future status, direction or outcomes of their partner. 
This type of uncertainty focuses mainly on the business relationship itself and can be attributed 
to several reasons – for example, poor understanding of the specific roles of involved parties, 
inadequate exchange information, and difficulties in measuring the costs and benefits of the 
relationship (Eriksson & Sharma, 2006). Additionally, Zaheer and Venkatraman (1995) define 
behavioural uncertainty as uncertainty stemming from the inability to accurately predict the 
behaviours of parties in a business relationship, and is often associated with the likelihood of 
the manifestation of opportunism in business relationships (Sutcliffe & Zaheer, 1998). The 
current study, however, addresses this type of uncertainty as “relationship uncertainty” and 
adopts Eriksson and Sharma’s (2006) definition of relationship uncertainty as the uncertainty 
regarding future behaviour of counterparties, as well as the outcome of present cooperation, 
due to the impact of decision-makers’ bounded rationality.  
There are two sources of relationship uncertainty (Eriksson & Sharma, 2003). Firstly, 
partnering firms may operate independently from one another, and their intentions concerning 
the relationship may overlap only partly. Thus, business partners may not be fully aware of 
each other’s goals and expectations, which may cause uncertainty in the relationship as parties 
might be unsure how to proceed with relationship operations (Eriksson & Sharma, 2003). 
Secondly, the resources within cooperating firms are different due to the historic and path-
dependent process linked to the development of resources within parties (Barney, 1996). In this 
case, neither party is fully aware of the resources of the other and, therefore, decision makers 
may be inadequately informed regarding relationship resources (Nelson & Winter, 1982). 
Subsequently, cooperative relationships very often entail uncertainty, and intentions may not 
always translate into actions (Eriksson & Sharma, 2003). This lack of linkage between 
intentions and actions, along with inadequate information pertaining to resources, can result in 
the onset of dark side behaviour in business relationships (Abosag et al., 2016). 
When considering the impact of relationship uncertainty on business partnerships, it is 
important to acknowledge that parties are also exposed to outcome-related uncertainty. 
Although partners behave and commit accordingly, the future outcome of a relationship remains 
uncertain (Eriksson & Sharma, 2003). Therefore, the future outcomes of a business relationship 
can be influenced by internal factors, as well as its operating environment (Leonidou et al., 
2006). This study recognises the potential impact of contextual/environmental uncertainty on 
relationship uncertainty, as a party’s perception of unpredictability and complexity regarding 
its environmental context may influence beliefs about a firm-environment interface (Eriksson 
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& Sharma, 2003). Several authors (e.g. Eriksson & Sharma, 2003; Leonidou et al., 2006; Ting 
et al., 2007) argue that it is expected that contextual uncertainty will define relationship 
uncertainty and that adverse environmental factors, for example, can have a negative effect on 
dyadic business relationship cooperation. Therefore, relationship uncertainty, if left 
unmanaged, can result in potentially detrimental behaviours and, consequently, symptoms of 




Partners’ perception of uncertainty with regard to cooperative relationship behaviour can be 
shaped by the internal resources, structure and routines of involved parties (Eriksson & Sharma, 
2003). Several authors (e.g. Cyert & March, 1963; Nelson & Winter, 1982) imply that a firm’s 
resources, routines and structures assist parties in collecting and interpreting information, as 
well as with making decisions based upon the gathered information. Thus, parties’ individual 
decision making capabilities are affected by their perception of a decision situation which, in 
turn, is determined by internal factors of a party, such as a firm’s dynamics of social interaction 
in the relationship (Schein, 1965), available resources (Thompson, 1996) and organisational 
culture (Schein, 1985). Eriksson and Sharma (2003) infer that organisational routines and 
processes can potentially influence the perceptions held by each party concerning the match 
between the needs and capabilities of business partners, as well as the uncertainty pertaining 
the cooperative relationship. In the case of decision-making uncertainty, managers often lack 
comprehensive knowledge regarding the internal operations of the relationship. As a result, 
decisions are often made based on speculations regarding counterparties’ actual internal 
operations, as well as their actions and behaviour (March & Olsen, 1976). Therefore, due to 
incomplete information and knowledge, intolerable uncertainty can emerge in business 
relationships as “there is uncertainty in situations where there is a choice” (Eriksson & Sharma, 
2003:964). Additionally, business-to-business literature acknowledges that, the more familiar 
a decision-maker is with the resources and internal workings of its own firm and also the 
operations of its counterparty, the more confident they will act in a decision situation.  
Similar to relationship uncertainty, Eriksson and Sharma (2003) recognise that decision-making 
uncertainty can also be affected by contextual uncertainty. Although firms adapt to their context 
in order to make sense of their situation (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967), this process of adaption 
requires advanced learning skills that are difficult to acquire to be in place (Argyris & Schon, 
1978). In other words, the more uncertain the environment in which partnering firms operate, 
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the more difficult and resource consuming it is for parties to adapt to its context and the 
relationship (Eriksson & Sharma, 2003). Abosag et al. (2016) suggest that uncertainty can 
transition from a tolerable component of business relationships to an intolerable dark side 
element when organisations fail to learn from uncertain situations or are unable to manage 
uncertainty. Hence, knowledge and information concerning the business environment and its 
key players (e.g. business partners, alternative partners, third parties, etc.) is fundamental for 




In summary, the current chapter identifies potential antecedents of dark side behaviour (namely, 
trust, shared values, opportunistic behaviour and uncertainty), which may further result in the 
onset of certain behavioural outcomes that can damage relational ties between business 
partners. These antecedents are described as natural” to any partnership in the sense that they 
are usually present in any relationship but often differ in terms of intensity (Fang et al., 2011; 
Baker, 2009). Abosag et al. (2016) argue that when these constructs – identified as antecedents 
in this chapter – are not monitored continuously and left unmanaged, they can cause damaging 
behaviours which consequently may harm a relationship. Several authors (e.g. Anderson & Jap, 
2005; Barners, 2005; Fang, Chang & Peng, 2011; Abosag et al., 2016; Villena, Revilla & Choi, 
2011) agree that, in order to ensure relationship success, it is not enough to only focus on 
positive relational elements, as parties must safeguard themselves against negative perception, 
actions and behaviours. It is therefore possible that the conscious reduction of negative impacts 
pertaining to dark side behaviour can have a greater effect on partnerships than merely focusing 
on the development and maintenance of positive relational drivers (Baumesiter et al., 2001). 
For this reason, potential antecedents of dark side behaviour are investigated in order to obtain 
a better understanding of how the management – or lack of it – can result in certain attitudes 
and behaviours that might influence relational dynamics adversely and thus affect relationship 
efficiency, desirability and contingency. 
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It is a known truth that there is no such thing as a perfect relationship. Just like the institution 
of marriage and romantic affairs possess undesirable attributes that can cause manipulation, 
insecurities and conflict to arise, business partnerships also retain an ever-present negative 
component. However, the behaviours and attitudes that often lead to the appearance of 
relational problems, are generally caused by specific characteristics inherent to the relationships 
and involved parties. In the previous chapter, possible antecedents were identified and exami 
ned in order to obtain a better understanding of how dark side behaviour can occur in business 
relationships. Although every relationship is different and can entail situation-specific 
antecedents (Abosag et al., 2016), the current study adopts those that have most commonly 
been identified as harmful or potentially dangerous to business relationships. In the current 
chapter, the potential behavioural outcomes of these antecedents are explored, which entail the 
constructs of conflict (functional and dysfunctional), power (non-coercive and coercive), 
dependence, and commitment (see Table 4.1). Several authors (e.g. Anderson & Jap, 2005; 
Abosag et al., 2015; Abosag et al., 2016; Baker, 2009; Lund et al., 2015) suggest that these 
aforementioned outcomes can result in more intense detrimental behaviours and attitudes that 
may damage relational bonds between partners severely. Abosag et al. (2016) refer to these 
consequences of behavioural outcomes as “symptoms” of dark side behaviour – which will be 
the discussed in Chapter 5. 
The current chapter explores each of the abovementioned constructs identified as behavioural 
outcomes in the context of business relationships. Conflict, power, dependence and 
commitment are examined through the exploration of their respective conceptualisations and 
dimensionality, as well as other factors that could potentially offer more insight into how these 








Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
62 
 






Conflicting situations in which differences in opinions regarding tasks, 
procedures, strategy, and other business-related issues are openly 
discussed and resolved, which consequently facilitates the strengthening 





Strong disagreements, underlying emotions, and negative actions (e.g. 
attacks, clashes and sarcasm) that create frustration and hostility among 
parties. 










A mechanism for gaining compliance from another party that reference 
and mediates negative consequences for noncompliance. 
Gundlach & 
Cadotte, 1994 
Dependence A firm’s need to maintain a relationship with a desirable partner in order 
to achieve certain goals and objectives. 
Frazier, 1983 
Commitment An exchange partner’s belief that a particular relationship is so important 
it must be maintained, and that it is worth developing even further in order 






Conflict is commonly described as tension that exists between social entities due to real or 
perceived differences (Raven & Kruglanski, 1970) and is considered an inevitable part of 
relationships (Stern & El-Ansary, 1992). More specifically, in relevance to business 
partnerships, IMP literature describes conflict as “a measure of differences between partners 
over the direction of the relationship or involving their respective contributions and benefits 
(Johnsen & Lacoste, 2016:78). Several authors (e.g. Frazier, 1999; Skarmeas, 2006; Thomas, 
1992) recognise it to be one of the major constructs used in describing channel relationships, 
as it addresses the incompatibility of activities between parties. However, Skarmeas (2006) and 
Zhou et al. (2007), suggest that conflict can be perceived as either a positive or negative 
relational force depending on (1) the particular relationship under scrutiny, (2) the distribution 
of power among parties, and (3) whether the conflict is classifies as functional or dysfunctional. 
Therefore, because conflict can affect the direction and dynamic of relationships, the current 
study adopts conflict as a potential behavioural outcome that may arise due to certain relational 
characteristics, as well as cause dark side symptoms to surface in business partnerships.  
 
4.2.1 Definition of conflict 
 
Conflict in relationships has been studied extensively throughout many disciplines (Reid, 
Pullins, Plank & Buehrer, 2004). Conflict is most frequently defined as the perception of a 
channel member that its goal attainment is being impeded by another, with stress or tension as 
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result (Gaski, 1984). In business-to-business context, however, conflict is more specifically 
described as “a breakdown or disruption in normal activities in such a way that the individuals 
or groups concerned experience difficulty working together” (Yandle & Blythe, 2000:14). The 
abovementioned authors, along with others (e.g. Vaaland & Hakansson, 2003; Gadde & 
Hakansson, 1993; Coser, 1956), agree that the concept of conflict should be investigated 
through the examination of two perspectives. The first perspective recognises conflict as a 
disease in relationships that can result in disruptive, dissociating and dysfunctional 
consequences (Coser, 1956). Firms often try to avoid this type of conflict, or to reduce its 
consequences, out of fear that too little coherence can result in destructive behaviours and the 
dissolution of relationships (Vaaland & Hakansson, 2003). The second perspective entails a 
more ambiguous view regarding the assessment of relational costs and benefits (Vaaland & 
Hakansson, 2003). According to Gadde and Hakansson (1993), the functionality of conflict can 
be illustrated along two axes: the first indicating the degree of collaboration between parties, 
and the second referring to the degree of conflict in connection with business relationships. In 
Figure 4.1, the dimensions of collaboration and conflict are used to generate four possible 
combinations pertaining to the nature of conflict in business relationships (Gadde & Hakansson, 
1993:75). 
 












Source: Gadde & Hakansson (1993) 
 
Figure 4.1 explains that a low degree of conflict may either cause a marginal relationship in 
which none of the parties involved benefit in terms of complementarity, or the relationship may 
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be “nice”. In this case, a “nice” relationship may be characterised by transaction efficiency and 
well-developed institutional mechanisms for handling hostility (Gadde & Hakansson, 1993:75). 
However, if a relationship is characterised by a high degree of conflict and a low degree of 
collaboration, efficiency might become a problem and may eventually result in relationship 
termination (Gadde & Hakansson, 1993). Finally, Vaaland and Hakansson (2003) emphasise 
that a partnership characterised simultaneously by a high degree of conflict and collaboration, 
can indicate that a relationship is well-developed. Thus, an interfirm partnership that falls in 
this fourth quadrant often possesses the competence and insight to manage conflict before it 
results in the onset of dark side behaviour (Abosag et al., 2016).  
 
4.2.2 Stages of conflict  
 
Vaaland and Hakansson (2003) elaborate on the conceptualisation of conflict by highlighting 
three important attributes. Firstly, conflict comprises of a sequence of interlocking episodes that 
refers to its gradual escalation in business relationships (Vaaland & Hakansson, 2003). This 
sequence entails five episodes, or stages. The first stage is characterised by latent conflict, 
which refers to underlying relational tensions that have not yet evolved into a defined dispute 
between partners (Moore, 2014). Latent conflict tensions can arise, when two or more parties 
are dependent on each other to achieve desired objectives, or due a problem that is not yet fully 
defined (Moore, 2014; Vaaland & Hakansson, 2003). This stage is typically accompanied by 
factors that can potentially cause conflict within the relationship – mainly factors such as goal 
incompatibility, domain dissensus and differences in perception (Duarte & Davies, 2003). In 
the second stage perceived conflict arises, which could potentially stem from latent conflict. 
However, if there is no preceding latent conflict, perceived conflict mostly surfaces due to 
misunderstandings regarding parties’ intentions. Also, it is usually during this stage of 
perceived conflict that parties become aware of the problem or the incompatibility of their 
objectives. In the third stage, conflict is not only perceived but also felt and cognised. Felt 
conflict is characterised by the personalisation of conflict, which causes parties to focus on the 
dysfunctionality often associated with conflict and how it makes them feel. The fourth stage 
entails manifest conflict, during which parties engage in behaviour that evoke a response from 
one another. These responses may include aggression, apathy and opportunism, as well as other 
dark side behaviour associated with conflict that can result in destructive and undesirable 
business relationships. The fifth and final stage focuses on the aftermath or outcome of conflict, 
which is often explored in terms of the development of each conflict stage that is determined 
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by a complex combination of effects of preceding episodes and the environment (Vaaland & 
Hakansson, 2003).  
4.2.3 Dimensions of conflict 
 
Several authors (e.g Johnsen & Lacoste, 2016; Abosag et al., 2015; Massey & Dawes, 2007) 
infer that conflict can either strengthen the relationship, or cause detrimental attitudes and 
behaviours to arise (Abosag et al., 2016; Skarmeas, 2006). Johnsen and Lacoste (2016) address 
the component of bipolarity in conflict by suggesting two opposing sides, or dimensions. These 
positive and negative ends of conflict have been frequently termed throughout business 




Functional conflict usually refers to differences in opinions regarding tasks, procedures, 
strategy, business ideas and other business-related issues that tend to be openly discussed and 
resolved, and as result facilitate the strengthening of the relationship (Skarmeas, 2006; Pfajar, 
Shoham, Brencic, Koufopoulos, Katsikeas & Mitrega, 2017). This dimension of conflict has 
often been referred to “healthy conflict” as it usually produces positive outcomes that result 
from “the open-minded contesting of the diverse perspectives that is generally superior to 
individual perspectives” (Skarmeas, 2006:568). Frazier (1999) claim that, although 
disagreements between partners are an unavoidable component of business relationships, 
conflict derived from these disagreements can rejuvenate, develop and strengthen bonds if 
managed correctly. Therefore, functional conflict can increase collaboration efficiency between 
partnering firms as well as generate favourable relationship outcomes (Jehn & Mannix, 2001). 
For example, in a business relationship characterised by functional conflict, partners are often 
more willing to look at and accept new ideas, as well as to be open to beneficial changes 
suggested by counterparties (Pfajfar et al., 2017; Menon, Bharadwaj & Howell, 1996). In 
addition, literature regarding relationship marketing suggest that high levels of functional 
conflict may stimulate specific structuring ties that can improve the pattern and quality of 
interactions between parties, as well as coordinate relationship activities (Katsikeas, Skarmeas 
& Bello, 2009). Functional conflict, if managed properly, can therefore strengthen the structure 
of partner relations by improving the quality of connections and the intensity of interactions 
among partnering firms (McEvilly, Perrone & Zaheer, 2003). 
 
 





Dysfunctional conflict  
 
Dysfunctional conflict refers to strong disagreements, underlying emotions, and negative 
actions (e.g. attacks, clashes and sarcasm) that create frustration and hostility among parties 
(Pfajfar et al., 2017). In a relationship characterised by negative feelings, attitudes and 
behaviours, stagnation can result in terms of interactivity between partnering firms (Pfajfar et 
al., 2017). Skarmeas (2006) explains that an undesirable relational climate can pull apart and 
disintegrate business relationships – especially if such a situation persists and conflicting issues 
are not managed and resolved. Firms are less willing to explore new ideas, make adaptions or 
accommodate their counterparty’s behaviour or suggestions if their relationship is characterised 
by friction, anger and hostile feelings (Pfajfar et al., 2017). Dysfunctional conflict can lead to 
the emergence of serious problems that can interfere with the achievement of relationship goals 
(Webb & Hogan, 2002). Pfajfar et al. (2017) suggest that dysfunctional conflict is also unable 
to motivate parties to be proactive in their interactions, as proactivity often requires mobilizing 
behaviour to produce positive relationship outcomes. Therefore, due to a lack of efficient 
connections made between members, as well as limited mobilising forces, relationships 
characterised by dysfunctional conflict may undermine relational outcomes and result in poor 




The concept of power in relationship marketing literature has received irregular and contrasting 
treatment from several authors (e.g. Hingley, 2005; Meehan & Wright, 2012; Wang, Huo, Tian 
& Hua, 2015). Among those who recognise the concept of power as “alien” to the effective 
workings of business relationships, Hingley (2005) identifies power as negating in terms of 
cooperation. However, the negative view surrounding power is not deemed universal. An 
opposing perspective comes from a number of authors (e.g. Svensson, 2001; Kalafatis, 2002; 
Earp, Harrison & Hunter, 1999) who emphasise that not all partnerships result in mutual benefit, 
as they are not characterised by an equal distribution of power, nor do they always have to be. 
However, power “as the potential to influence” is implicit in all relationships (Meehan & 
Wright, 2012:669). The possession of power is critical as it can position firms to control and 
direct the actions and decisions of business partners (Johnsen & Lacoste, 2016). Thus, because 
the distribution of power between partnering firms can influence relationship structures and 
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dynamics, the execution of power is adopted as a behavioural outcome that can result in the 
onset of detrimental attitudes and actions. In this section, the concept of power is discussed, 
along with its dimensions and five-base typology of power by French et al.  (1959). 
 
4.3.1 Concept of power 
 
There has been a long-lasting confusion regarding the concept of power, as well as ambiguity 
concerning the interpretation of its impact in relationships (Emerson, 1962; Bowles & Gintis, 
1993; Dahl, 1957; French & Raven, 1968). Several authors (e.g. Cook & Emerson, 1978; Gaski, 
1984) agree with Dahl’s (1957) initial definition, which describes power as a situation in which 
one party can get another to act in a manner they usually would not. French and Raven (1968) 
focus on the components of influence and control to elaborate the aforementioned 
conceptualisation by defining power as a force induced by a party on another in order to bring 
about a certain change. Influence is distinguished from control, as it is implied the stronger 
partner in a relationship will not be able to exercise control, if “weaker” parties are exposed to 
a stronger force from an alternative party (French & Raven, 1968). Power is thus defined as the 
maximum potential influence a party can induce upon another in a relationship (French & 
Raven, 1968; Rehme, Nordigarden, Ellstrom & Chicksand, 2016).  
Building on Dahl’s (1957) definition, Emerson (1962) elaborates by describing power 
according to a situation in which the power of actor A over actor B is the amount of resistance 
on the part of B which can be potentially overcome by A. Rehme et al. (2016) comment with 
regards to the component of “overcoming resistance” by inferring that Emerson’s (1962) 
definition of power is more comprehensive than that of Dahl (1957), as the latter does not 
completely define the exercise of power in business relationships. In economics, the concept of 
power is primarily used to understand the share of value gained from a business relationship. 
Relative profitability is sometimes used as a substitute for relative power (Rehme et al., 2016). 
Bowles and Gintis (1993:88) define power as “the ability of furthering one’s interests by 
imposing (or credibility threatening to impose) sanctions on another agent when the converse 
is not true”. Consequently, when economists refer to the exercising of power in business 
relationships as “the impositions of sanctions”, they imply the unwillingness of the influence 
(Bowles & Gintis, 1988). In this case, the focus is on the effects, or the potential effects, of 
power in monetary terms (Rehme et al., 2016). In distribution channel literature, on the other 
hand, power is defined as the ability of a channel member to control their decision variables in 
the marketing strategy of another member in a given channel at a different level of distribution 
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(El-Ansary & Stern, 1992). Several authors (e.g. Hunt & Nevin, 1974; Etgar, 1976; Gaski, 
1984) maintain that this perspective regarding power often connects the aspect of changing 
behaviour with that of value appreciation. A behavioural change is related to a firm’s decision 
variables and the effects these decisions may have on the performance of the individual firm as 
well as its business relationships (Rehme et al., 2016). 
The current study acknowledges that, even though there are a number of earlier 
conceptualisations of power, it is Emerson’s (1962) definition that is the commonly held 
operationalisation in the context of business-to-business research (Rehme et al., 2016). 
Bierstedt (1950) emphasises that, as a universal phenomenon within all social relations, power 
has a wide scope and therefore requires precise definitions for specific research contexts. This 
study investigates the distribution of power within a partnership, as well as how an imbalance 
can result in dark side behaviour. Emerson’s (1962) definition therefore appropriately addresses 
the capability of a partner to exert power over their weaker counterparty in order to obtain 
certain outcomes. 
 
4.3.2 Five-base typology of power  
 
Rehme et al. (2016) claim that, in order to fully comprehend the impact of power business 
relationships, it is important to acknowledge that its distribution among parties is based on 
several power bases that can result in behavioural change. Power research is predinantly rooted 
in French and Raven’s (1959) five-base typology, which formalises the concept of power and 
also identifies five different sources of power that affect business relationships (Meehan & 
Wright, 2012). According to many authors (e.g. Bonoma, 1982; Gaski, 1986; Maumann & 
Reck, 1982) the five bases of power are often used as a measure of power in marketing and 
purchasing research. Meehan and Wright (2012) maintain that, although the typology of power 
is more attributional in nature, it can potentially capture information about why parties comply. 
In other words, the typology does not necessarily address how partners act in terms of 
exercising power, but it does provide a possible explanation as to why power can result in 
certain detrimental attitudes and behaviours.  
Abolhasanpour et al. (2011) motivate that the typology of power can be used to define the 
various resources that influence the decisions of parties in business relationships. These 
resources establish the foundation for the sentiments that characterise the behaviour of parties 
(Abolhasanpour et al., 2011; Skinner, Gassenheimer & Kelley, 1992).  
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French and Raven’s (1959) typology of power comprises of five sources – namely reward, 
referent, legitimate, expert and coercive. Reward power refers to a partner’s perception of its 
counterparty’s ability to mediate and bestow rewards upon it (Rehme et al., 2016; 
Abolhasanpour et al., 2011; Skinner et al., 1992; French & Raven, 1959). For example, in 
business relationships between organisations in a supply chain, parties can award their partners 
for satisfactory compliance with increased business negotiations and shared benefits from cost 
reductions (Maloni & Benton, 1999). Referent power is based on the identification of parties 
with one another (Abolhasanpour et al., 2011; Skinner et al., 1992). In other words, referent 
power, as a consequential base, focuses on the desire of organisations to identify with one 
another in order to obtain recognition by association (Abolhasanpour et al., 2011; Skinner et 
al., 1992, Maloni & Benton, 1999). Legitimate power is defined as the perception held by one 
party with regards to its partner’s legitimate right to prescribe behaviour (Abolhasanpour et al., 
2011; Skinner et al., 1992). Maloni and Benton (1999) claim that legitimate power, which 
includes both inherent and legal forms, addresses a party’s belief regarding their right to 
influence counterparties. Expert power refers to the perception of one party that its partner 
possesses critical knowledge or unique expertise (Abolhasanpour et al., 2011). Lastly, coercive 
power is based on the perception of one party in a business relationship that the other has the 
ability to mediate punishment (Abolhasanpour et al., 2011; Skinner et al., 1992; French & 
Raven, 1959).  
 
4.3.3 Dimensions of power 
 
Heide and John (1988) recognise power as a two-way interaction between parties engaged in a 
relationship. This countervailing bi-directional dynamic is considered central to all power 
analyses (Meehan & Wright, 2012). Several authors (e.g. French & Raven, 1959; Maloni & 
Benton, 2000; Zhao, Huo, Flynn & Yeung, 2008) identify two dimensions of power, namely 
non-coercive power and coercive power. Whereas non-coercive power is a mechanism that 
references or mediates positive consequences for compliance, coercive power can be defined 
as a mechanism for gaining party compliance that references and mediates negative 




Many studies (e.g. Leonidou et al., 2008; El-Ansary & Stern, 1992; Etgar, 1979; Frazier & 
Summers, 1984; Hunt & Nevin, 1974) have identified that the non-coercive dimension can 
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comprise of several bases of power from French and Raven’s (1959) typology. These bases 
include reward power (based on the perception of one party that the other has the ability to 
mediate rewards), referent power (based on one party’s identification with its counterparty), 
legitimate power (based on the perception of one party that the other has a legitimate right to 
prescribe behaviour), expert power (based on the perception of one party that its partner has 
some special knowledge or expertise) as well as information power (based on the perception of 
one party that another is in possessing of some unique information) (French & Raven, 1959; 
Leonidou et al., 2008). Thus, non-coercive power does not encompass any aggressive elements 
that might produce friction among parties (Leonidou et al., 2008), but rather involves targeting 
admiration for the source and the provision of benefits for partners (Hunt & Nevin, 1974).  
Frazier and Summers (1984) comment that non-coercive power can actually foster relatively 
high levels of agreement between partnering firms since it may to a large extent contain the 
inherent desirability to perform certain actions. For example, the use of non-coercive power 
can support effective communication between business partners, as well as the sharing of 
information and skills (Liu, Li & Zhang, 2010). When parties share information, they provide 
a signal of good faith and benevolent motives and intentions to counterparties (Doney & 
Cannon, 1997). Non-coercive power can generate benevolence which, when perceived by 
partners, can result in them choosing to invest more in the relationship as firms often feel 
pressure to reciprocate their partners’ willingness to establish a benevolent relationship 
(Leonidou et al., 2008; Abolhasanpour et al., 2011). When firms share expertise, they might 
develop the belief that their partners are capable of fulfilling promises and are thus reliable 
(Doney & Cannon, 1997) which, in turn, can lead to greater relational value, interest, 
congruence, as well as higher levels of agreement among parties (Luo, Liu, Zhang & Huang, 
2011; Leonidou et al., 2008). Hence, the positive outcomes associated with non-coercive 
power, can result in an increase in partner credibility and the belief that both firms are motivated 




In a business relationship, coercive power is based on the perception of one party that another 
party has the ability to mediate punishment if they do not comply with their requests (El-Ansary 
& Stern, 1992; Frazier & Summers, 1984; Hunt & Nevin, 1974). According to Goodman and 
Dion (2001) these punishments may, for example, entail the imposition of financial penalties, 
withholding crucial support and information as well as withdrawal from initial promises and 
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agreements. The execution of coercive power usually reflects aggressive, forceful and 
suppressive behaviours – which essentially forces the other party in a relationship to do things 
they would not otherwise have done (Frazier & Rody, 1991). When firms exercise measures of 
coercive power, tension and frustration can arise in the relationship as one partner might 
disapprove of the other’s actions, or feel offended by something their counterparty has done 
(Rawwas, Vitell & Barnes, 1997; Frazier & Rody, 1991). Yu and Pysarchik (2002) argue that 
coercive power is generally employed when one party ignores (or pretends to ignore) a problem 
concerning the relationship, adopts a non-compliant behaviour, or produces poor results. Thus, 
coercive power can influence the onset of dark side behaviour as it can result in suppressing a 
firm’s willingness to cooperate in the long-term (Dapiran & Hogarth-Scott, 2003), intensify 
conflict and clashes between parties (Gaski, 1984; Lusch & Brown, 1982), negatively affect 
overall relationship satisfaction (Leonidou et al., 2008), increase perceived costs (Ramaseshan, 
Yip & Pae, 2006) as well as cause communication difficulties (Leonidou, 2004). Many 
empirical studies (e.g. Lee, 2001; Frazier & Rody, 1991; Rawwas et al., 1997; Yu & Pysarchik, 
2002; Abolhasanpour et al., 2011) have found that the execution of coercive power is both risky 
and counterproductive as it can cause typically good-functioning business relationships to 




Dependence is often defined as the obverse of power (Emerson, 1962). Some authors (e.g. 
Gaski, 1984; Caniels & Gelderman, 2007; Handley & Benton, 2012) even identify power and 
dependence as conceptually inseparable. Many channel behaviour studies conducted in 
Western countries have supported, explicitly or implicitly, the causal relationship between 
power and dependence (e.g. Gaski, 1988; Frazier, 1983; Zhuang & Zhou, 2004). However, the 
current study accepts the arguments of those who oppose Gaski’s (1984) work by distinguishing 
between power and dependence. These authors emphasise power as a firm’s resource control 
and its behavioural influence over another (e.g. Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003; Caniels & Roeleveld, 
2009; Kumar, 2005), whereas dependence focuses more on the importance to achieve a desired 
goal that is considered superior to alternative options (Buchanan, 1992; Emerson, 1962; 
Schmitz et al., 2016). Although it is comprehensible why power and dependence are often 
treated as a single construct, for the purpose of the current study it is deemed more sensible to 
address them separately. Schmitz et al. (2016) argue that the notion of behavioural power used 
in a business-to-business context equips the power construct with a slightly different notion 
than that of dependence. 
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Furthermore, several authors maintain that some degree of dependence among business partners 
can be beneficial as it may lead to an increase in information sharing (Barnes, Naude & Michell, 
2005), mutual adaptations made on behalf of parties (Heide & John, 1988), higher relational 
satisfaction (Andaleeb, 1996), and better relationship performance (Buchanan, 1992). 
However, excessive level of dependence can result in the loss of strategic flexibility and shifting 
power (Harrison et al., 2012). Thus, as it can result in the onset of detrimental attitudes, the 
current study adopts dependence as a behavioural outcome caused by several relationship 
factors which possess an inherently “dark” component.   
 
4.4.1 The concept of dependence 
 
Schmitz, Schweigger and Draft (2016) identify dependence as an important component in the 
development of cooperative relationships. Emerson (1962) defines dependence as a party’s 
need to rely on the contribution of another in order to obtain certain goals. In a business-to-
business context, dependence can emerge when the outcomes of a particular relationship with 
a specific partner is superior to the outcomes of potential alternatives that are available 
(Anderson & Narus, 1990). Parallel to the notions of the abovementioned authors, the current 
study adopts Frazier’s (1983) definition which describes dependence as a firm’s need to 
maintain a relationship with a desirable partner in order to achieve certain goals and objectives.  
Schmitz et al. (2016) elaborate on the conventionalisation of dependence by acknowledging 
two theoretical lines of thought that can predominantly explain and support the notion of 
dependence in business partnerships, namely transaction cost theory and resource-dependence 
theory. The transaction cost theory argues that increased switching costs can lead to the creation 
of bonding effects between business partners (Rindfleisch & Heide, 1997). Geiger et al. (2012) 
elaborate on the possible association between the transaction cost approach and dependence by 
emphasising that, in order for a business relationship to be truly of value, it requires relation-
specific investments (e.g. dedicated knowledge or assets) form both parties involved. This 
augmented relational investment could potentially lead to an increase in relationship switching 
costs, as well as the emergence of an unequal distribution of dependence among parties 
(Bendapudi & Berry, 1997; Schmitz et al., 2016). The transaction cost theory also provides 
valuable insight into how the appearance of dependence can result in the onset of dark side 
business behaviour (Baker, 2009). For example, when parties draw closer together, switching 
to alternative partners can put them at a disadvantage rather than benefit them. Thus, when a 
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firm becomes overly dependent on a particular relationship, they might become “entrapped” 
and incapable of functioning at full capacity on its own.  
Resource-dependence theory emphasises a firm’s need to rely on external resources in order to 
operate in certain environment (Schmitz et al., 2016). Hillman, Withers and Collins (2009) 
explain that power relations that emerge from resource exchanges between parties, can 
potentially create dependencies on behalf of the weaker partner. For example, when a firm 
cannot operate on their own, or achieve their goals without another party’s resources, they 
develop a sense of relationship dependency. Consequently, dependence can allow for the 
appearance of relationship symptoms that might be harmful for involved parties. The resources-
dependence theory can therefore explain why certain factors of dark side behaviour manifest in 
business relationships.  
 
4.4.2 Sources of dependence 
 
Sources of dependence can be grouped into three main categories, namely relational sources, 
partner-inherent sources and market-related sources (Schmitz et al., 2016). Relational sources 
comprise of reasons that underlie the business relationship between partnering firms (Schmitz 
et al., 2016). For example, several authors (e.g. Laaksonen. Pajunen & Kulmala, 2008; Kopfer, 
Kotzab, Corsten & Felde, 2005; Casciaro & Piskorski, (2005) infer that a closely integrated 
partnership is likely to become dependent because of (1) the mutual adaptation of involved 
parties, (2) close exchange relationship, or (3) joint investment. Partner-inherent sources 
possess knowledge or specific capabilities, as well as access to tangible and intangible resources 
that are linked to the specific partner (Laaksonen et al., 2008). Market-related sources of 
dependence refer to the lack of alternative options (or sources) on the market to replace the 
incumbent partner (Harrison, Beatty, Reynolds & Noble, 2012; Handley & Benton, 2012). 
 
4.4.3 Dimensions of dependence 
 
Svensson (2004) maintain that a partnership’s perceived dependence can be influenced by 
factors such the composition of the relationship, the number of existing alternative partners, as 
well as the amount of preventive activities. The level of dependence within a business 
relationship can also be influenced by a manifold of economic, social and technical nature 
(Hakansson & Snehota, 1995). Hammerkvist, Hakansson and Mattsson (1982) identify a set of 
underlying dimensions of dependence which includes technical, time, knowledge, social and 
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economic/juridical dependencies. In addition to the abovementioned dimensions, the current 
study also acknowledges two other dimensions identified by Mattsson (1997), namely market 
and IT dependence. Table 4.2 provides a summary of the dimensions of dependence that can 
potentially influence business relationships. 
 
Table 4.2 Dimensions of dependence 
Dimension Explanation 
Technical Technical dependence refers to the situation in which parties engaged in a relationship 
use compatible equipment, as well as alter their mutual business activities according to 
each other’s technical requirements. 
Time Time dependence entails a time-based need, or synchronisation, of mutual business 
activities between two parties. 
Knowledge Knowledge dependence can be described as the interaction process between business 
partners during which they learn about each other’s strengths and weaknesses. This 
interaction creates knowledge regarding each other’s ability to solve problems. 
Social Social dependence refers to the interaction process between parties that is generally 
based on personal relations. In other words, the social atmosphere and the personal 
chemistry between partnering firms can affect the business activities of their 
relationship. 
Economic/juridical Economic, or juridical, dependence can be defined as the formal dependence that may 
exist between partners (e.g. written agreements). This dimension can potentially 
strengthen the dependence between partnering firms’ business activities in an economic 
and juridical sense. 
Market Market dependence includes a firm’s image and status which may positively influence 
its counterparty’s image and status. Hence, one party might become dependent on 
another due to an increase in their goodwill in the marketplace brought on by their 
relationship. 
IT IT dependence refers to a situation in which business partners may have invested in a 
common IT-standard, for example, in terms of electronic data interchange. This means 
that their hardware and software used to communicate with each other are compatible. 
 
Source: Hammarkvist et al. (1982) & Mattsson (1997) 
 
According to Hammarkvist et al. (1982) and Mattsson (1997), dependence is often referred to 
as a natural force in business relationships and it can include either all or just some of the 
dimensions stipulated in Table 4.2. The multi-dimensionality of dependence can thus help in 
the assessment of dependence in business relationship, as well as provide insight to its initial 
emergence between partners (Svensson, 2002). A firm can thus become dependent on another 




Commitment often plays an important role in cooperative partnerships (Morgan & Hunt, 1994), 
as well as the achievement of relationship objectives (Hofenk, Schipper, Semeijn & Gelderman, 
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2011). Several studies (e.g. Morgan & Hunt, 1994; Jokela & Soderman, 2017; Cox, Sanderson 
& Watson, 2001) have found that commitment can influence relationship efficiency and 
desirability in terms of favourable cost savings, flexibility and risk-sharing. Business 
relationships characterised by commitment can often experience beneficial outcomes such as 
cooperation (Mazzola, Bruccoleri & Perrone, 2015), along with the creation of new sources of 
value and growth (Mouzas, 2006; Brady, Davies & Gann, 2005). Anderson and Narus (1990) 
initially identified commitment as a positive relationship as it is considered a critical bonding 
mechanism that contributes to the potential longevity of a relationship. However, Baker (2009) 
argues that excessive levels of commitment can also cause partners to “blindly” invest in the 
development and maintenance of a relationship – regardless of its desirable and efficiency. In 
other words, partners may over time become exaggeratedly focused on the “good feelings” 
associated with commitment and, as result, neglect critically assessing their relationships 
(Baker, 2009). Thus, the current study identifies commitment as a possible behavioural 
outcome of dark side behaviour that result due to particular factors inherent to relationships, 
which can subsequently affect the dynamics of a partnership.  
 
4.5.1 Definition of commitment 
 
Commitment plays a pivotal role in both personal and business relationships (Anderson & 
Weitz, 1989; Dwyer et al., 1987; Morgan & Hunt, 1994; Moorman et al., 1992; Wilson, 1995), 
and is often defined differently depending on the perspective from which the concept is studied. 
For example, the concept of commitment may be derived from a range of perspectives, from 
social exchanges (Cook & Emerson, 1978) and marriages (Thompson & Spanier, 1983) to 
business relationships (Morgan & Hunt, 1994) and strategic networks (Andresen, Lundberg & 
Roxenhall, 2012). However, the current study focuses on commitment in context of business-
to-business research as it investigates the role of commitment in the emergence of dark side 
behaviour in business partnerships. Table 4.3 provides some frequently cited definitions of 
commitment throughout business management literature.  
Although many of the definitions in Table 4.3 differ in one aspect or another, it is clear that 
certain commonalities exist. The theme regarding the desire to maintain and continue a 
relationship with a specific business partner is consistent in most of these definitions of 
commitment, and, according to Baker (2009), it serves as the primary determinant of the 
concept. This study focuses in particular on the definition by Moorman et al. (1992:316), which 
describes commitment as “an enduring desire to maintain a valued relationship”. Several 
authors have cited this aforementioned definition in order to explain important elements 
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pertaining to commitment that appear consistently in literature. The first element emphasises 
that commitment is “enduring” which means that it involves an implicit or explicit 
understanding regarding the partners’ intention to continue the relationship after transactions 
have been completed, as well as their joint decision to address potentially unforeseen issues as 
they arise (Tellefsen & Thomas, 2005). The second element of commitment reflects “desire” 
and, according to Macneil (1980), it is based on personal choice rather than legal obligation. In 
other words, even though committed parties are often bound by short-term contractual 
agreements, they choose to remain in the relationship after contractual objectives have been 
met (Dwyer et al., 1987). Lastly, commitment is value driven. Parties often establish long-term 
relationships with the intent to derive some special long-term benefits from relational 
agreements with partners (Tellefsen & Thomas, 2005; Goodman & Dion, 2001). 
 
Table 4.3 Definitions of commitment 
Definition Source 
An exchange partner’s belief that a particular relationship is so important it must 
be maintained, and that it is worth developing even further in order to warrant 
that it would endure indefinitely. 
Morgan & Hunt, 1994 
Commitment is the “enduring desire to maintain a valued relationship”. Moorman, Zaltman & 
Deshpande, 1992 
The commitment phase of relationship building can be conceptualised as an 
implicit or explicit pledge or relational continuity between exchange partners. 
Dwyer, Schurr & Oh, 
1987 
Commitment can be defined as “the unwillingness to consider partners other than 
those in the current relationship”. 
Leik & Leik, 1977 
Commitment can simply be defined as the forsaking of alternative options in 
terms of business relationships. 
Gundluch, Arcrol & 
Mentzer, 1995 
 
4.5.2 Dimensions of commitment 
 
Commitment is a multi-dimensional construct which comprises of three dimensions, namely 
calculative, affective and normative (Meyer & Allen, 1991; Fullerton, 2005). Calculative 
commitment has been referred to as economic commitment (Young & Denize, 1995), 
constraints commitment (Bendapudi & Berry, 1997), as well as structural commitment 
(Williams, Han & Qualls, 1998). Affective commitment, on the other hand, is often linked to 
the concepts of common values, trust, benevolence and relational norms such as friendship, 
reciprocity and culture (Roxenhall & Andresen, 2012). Normative commitment refers to a 
party’s feelings of moral obligation and responsibility towards its counterparty. It is often 
treated implicitly as the consequence of affective commitment as it’s based on norms and values 
derived from the latter (Roxenhall & Andresen, 2012). 
 







Geykens, Steenkamp, Scheer and Kumar (1996:304) define calculative commitment as “the 
need to maintain a relationship given the significant anticipated termination or switching costs 
associated with leaving”. The calculative dimension focuses on the investment of relationship-
specific assets among business partners (Rylander, Strutton & Pelton, 1997) and is perceived 
as a function of pledges, idiosyncratic investments, the sharing of information and the allocation 
of relationship-specific resources (Dwyer et al., 1987; Gundlach et al., 1995). Several authors 
(e.g. Morgan & Hunt, 1994; Achrol & Gundlach, 1999; Wuyts & Geykens, 2005) maintain that 
relational inputs and investments can result in the implementation of early promises, which 
could consequently enhance partner credibility at the beginning of the relationship and also 
reduce negative attitudes (e.g. suspicion). Calculative commitment can therefore exist based on 
the calculation of the costs and benefits of a firm’s involvement in the relationship (Abosag, 
Yen & Tynan, 2015).  
Furthermore, Abosag et al. (2016) argue that calculative commitment can act as reinforcement 
to keep business partners within a relationship, based on the mutual understanding that it is 
more costly to leave the relationship than it is to maintain it. In other words, the calculative 
dimension often entails parties feeling a measure of obligation to continue the business 
relationship (Roxenhall & Andresen, 2012). Firms utilize calculative commitment to express 
their willingness to maintain their relationship by making adaptions and sacrifices (Anderson 
& Weitz, 1992), abandoning their search for alternatives (Alajoutsijarvi, Moller & Tahtinen, 
2000) as well as initiating trust between parties (Dwyer et al., 1987). Although it can help to 
establish long-term relationships, calculative commitment may also hinder firms from 
exploring more desirable partners, and it could also result in partners feeling “locked in” 
(Abosag et al., 2015; Meyer & Herscovitch, 2001; Sharma, Young & Wilkinson, 2006). 
Roxenhall and Andresen (2012) address the dark side of calculative commitment by inferring 
that it can both positively and negatively impact on business relationships. The positive impact 
of calculative commitment relates to future values in which parties can anticipate future 
relational gains (Roxanhall & Andresen, 2012), whereas the negative component focuses on 
“locked-in” values. For example, parties may be aware of the amount of relationship-specific 
investments already made (e.g. time, money, effort, knowledge, etc.) and find switching to 
alternatives too costly (Roxanhall & Andresen, 2012). Thus, because of high relationship 
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termination costs and the costs associated with finding and establishing new business 
relationships, parties often become trapped in current partnerships. In empirical research 
conducted by Bansal, Irving & Taylor (2004), it was found that, if business partners feel locked-
in, regardless of present future values, calculative commitment might cause negative attitudes 




Affective commitment arises in relationships when parties feel psychologically bound to their 
partners and the partnership possesses high levels of shared values (Bansal et al., 2004). The 
affective dimension thus allows for the creation of emotional bonds that drive parties to 
maintain and improve the quality of their relationship (Fletcher, Simpson & Thomas, 2000). 
Relationship marketing literature often associates affective commitment with the concept of 
loyalty (Gilliland & Bello, 2002). Unlike calculative commitment, which is based on perceived 
constraints that binds parties contractually together, affective commitment is based on a set of 
perceptions, knowledge, beliefs and emotions that connect partners and encourage them to 
invest further in the maintenance and development of their relationship (Abosag et al., 2015). 
A social structure is subsequently generated because of partners’ willingness to be 
psychologically and emotionally consistent throughout their interaction with one another 
(Meyer & Allen, 1991). However, affective commitment can also cause detrimental behaviours, 
as parties can become “blinded” by strong emotional and psychological aspects pertaining their 
relationship. When a partnership becomes characterised by excessive levels of affective 
commitment, firms do not always evaluate the relationship accurately in terms of economic and 
rational desirability. Because of strong emotional and relational ties, partners might become 
oblivious to certain issues, as well as driven to preserve an unproductive relationship. Hence, 
over-emphasising affective commitment may impair a firm’s decisions concerning the 
maximisation of relationship desirability and performance output (Abosag et al., 2015). 
 
The association between calculative/instrumental commitment and affective commitment  
 
Several authors (e.g. Anderson & Weitz, 1992; Martin 2008; Rylander, Strutton & Pelton, 
1997) suggest that the dimensions of commitment should be regarded as components and not 
perceived as different types of commitment. A business relationship is characterised by both 
calculative and affective commitment, even though the degree to which each dimension is 
present in a relationship may differ. For example, partners might be mainly driven by a sense 
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of business (calculative) commitment to maintain the relationship, but not necessarily feel 
emotionally and morally linked to their partner, or vice versa (Roxenhall & Andresen, 2012). 
Therefore, Meyer and Allen (1991) infer that the composition of commitment in partnerships 
can affect the relationship and determine behavioural outcomes of parties. 
In his research, Martin (2008) emphasises the importance of the association between the 
dimensions of commitment, along with the effects of differing levels of each in relationships. 
The aforementioned author suggests that an association exists between affective and calculative 
commitment, as parties may be less bound to a relationship by calculative (business-related) 
commitment and more so morally and emotionally (Martin, 2008). Roxenhall and Andresen 
(2012) elaborate by inferring that a strong affective dimension can replace a less strong 
calculative dimension as relationships are often complex and driven by non-logical aspects. 
Hence, a business relationship established on the foundation of affective commitment is often 
characterised by shared values, confidence and trust (Roxenhall & Andresen, 2012). However, 
higher levels of calculative commitment in a relationship may assume the need for less strength 
in terms of the affective dimensions (Roxenhall & Andresen, 2012). Thus, the current study 
acknowledges that the dimensions of commitment can be potentially linked and that it can 




In conclusion, the current study identifies conflict, power, dependence and commitment as 
potential behavioural outcomes, caused by several factors inherent to business relationships – 
namely trust, shared values, opportunistic behaviour and uncertainty. Based on literature 
examined throughout the chapter, these constructs have the potential to influence relationship 
structures and dynamics (Baker, 2009), as well as the efficiency, desirability and continuity 
thereof (Abosag et al., 2016). In other words, these antecedents can result in the onset of 
outcomes related to particular behaviours and attitudes, which can subsequently cause severe 
dark side symptoms to arise. Although conflict can be either functional or dysfunctional 
(Skarmeas, 2006), both dimensions possess the ability to cause the onset of dark side behaviour 
in business relationship.  
Because of the inherently different nature of these dimensions, the current study explores 
conflict by individually examining both the functional and dysfunctional dimensions, as well 
as their influence on certain symptoms of negative relationship behaviour. Similarly, power can 
also be characterised by a degree of bipolarity (Johnsen & Lacoste, 2016), and therefore its role 
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in the manifestation of dark side behaviour is also investigated through the examination of its 
dimensions, namely non-coercive and coercive power. Finally, the current study also adopts 
dependence and uncertainty as potential behaviour outcomes as there is sufficient literature that 
suggest that these constructs can be brought on by the abovementioned antecedents, potentially 
resulting in “darker” behavioural forces (Abosag et al., 2015; Abosag et al., 2016). 
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Business partnerships, like personal relationships, can over time become characterised by 
several detrimental factors when parties display certain behaviours and attitudes. These 
negative relational factors usually possess the capacity to harm relationships, as well as 
individual actors, if not resolved and managed correctly (Abosag et al., 2016). Baker (2009) 
refers to these potential harmful consequences of relationship behaviours and attitudes as 
symptoms of dark side behaviour. The Oxford Dictionary defines a symptom as “an indication 
of the existence of something, especially of an undesirable nature” (Baker, 2009). Thus, 
according to the aforementioned definition, any potentially destructive attitude, action or 
decision that arises due to preceding behaviours in partnerships can be deemed a symptom. 
Although an increasing amount of attention has recently been devoted to exploring the negative 
side of business relationships, research avenues pertaining to the actual manifestation of dark 
side behaviour and its outcomes, remain mostly unexamined. Several authors (e.g. Abosag et 
al., 2016; Abosag et al., 2015; Anderson & Jap, 2005; Hibbard et al., 2001; Villena et al., 2011), 
however, emphasise the importance of understanding how, why and when dark side behaviour 
occurs in business relationships. Abosag et al. (2016) maintain that the management of 
detrimental elements in partnerships can prove to enhance relationship performance and 
success – even more so than the investment in positive relational drivers.  
In his research concerning the dark side of relationship marketing, Baker (2009) identified 
several possible symptoms that might surface due to excessive levels of seemingly positive 
relationship elements: relational myopia, complacency, vulnerability, and suspicion. In its 
examination of dark side behaviour in interfirm partnerships, the current study adopts these 
symptoms as identified by Baker (2009) and applies it to the context of this study. The current 
chapter thus examines each of these symptoms in a business-to-business context in order to 
obtain a better understanding regarding the manifestation of dark side behaviour.  
 
5.2 RELATIONAL MYOPIA 
 
The term myopia, also known as near-sightedness or short-sightedness, was initially used in the 
field of ophthalmology to describe an eye condition in which visual images come into focus in 
front of the retina (Saw, Katz, Schein, Chew and Chan, 1996). The focusing of light in front of 
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retina, instead of on it, causes defective vision by making distant objects appear blurry and 
closer ones normal (Saw et al., 1996). However, the terms “myopia” and “myopic” are used 
beyond the boundaries of ophthalmology in a variety of disciplines ranging from business 
management to psychology. These terms have appeared in several studies (e.g. Levitt, 1960; 
Laverty, 1996; Richard, Womack & Allaway, 1992; Baker, 2009; Johnston, 2009) as 
metaphorical devices in order to explain cognitive thinking and decision making that is narrow 
in scope, or lacking foresight in terms of wider interests and long-term consequences. In other 
words, “myopia” is often used to describe decisions that may be beneficial in the present, but 
detrimental in the future, as well as viewpoints that fail to consider anything outside a narrow 
and limited range (Levinthal & March, 1993). The current study thus identifies and adopts 
relational myopia as a symptom of dark side behaviour as it can affect the functionality, 
efficiency and desirability of a partnership, especially in the long term.  
 
5.2.1 Definition of relational myopia 
 
Time often plays a fundamental role in relationships. One of the most important concerns 
regarding time in business-to-business operations often involves the balancing of long-term 
objectives and change with short-term performance and benefits (Laverty, 1996). Several 
authors (e.g. Baker, 2009; Hayes & Abernathy, 2007) maintain that business relationships are 
sometimes characterised by short-sightedness, especially when it comes to identifying 
problems and opportunities (Laverty, 2004; Baker, 2009). Short-sightedness can distort 
strategic vision, often causing parties to embrace a narrow perspective regarding a relationship, 
its dynamics and the environment in which it operates (Baker, 2009; Smith, Drumwright & 
Gentile, 2010). Levitt (1960) initially termed this phenomenon as marketing myopia in order 
to describe how short-sightedness, or narrowness, can influence a firm’s ability to define its 
business. 
Marketing myopia is based on the supposition that product-based definitions of a business are 
inferior to customer-specific definitions (Levitt, 1960). For example, in the 1950s the railroads 
were largely product-focused, adopting a myopic view by assuming itself to be in the railroad 
business rather than the transportation business (Levitt, 1960). Consequently, railroad 
companies overlooked the threat posed by alternative forms of transportation which, as result, 
led to an industry-wide decline (Stock, 2002). Johnston (2009) claims that organisations should 
therefore define themselves in terms of the value they add and the benefits they offer by 
packaging market offerings as “solutions” as well as de-emphasising products through 
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corporate branding. Hence, although Levitt’s marketing myopia provides a seminal exploration 
of organisational cognitive failure, Johnston (2009) argues that it has become outdated due to 
the rise of the highly influential resource-based view. Several authors (e.g. Stock, 2002; 
Richard, Womack & Allaway, 1992) agree that Levitt’s work regarding marketing myopia fails 
to consider further dimensions (i.e. capability myopia and boundary myopia) which can be used 
to describe cognitive failure within organisations.  
The concept of capability myopia emerged due to the resource-based view school of strategy 
that encourages firms to adopt an “inside-out” view with emphasis on their capabilities 
(Wernerfelt, 1984). Prahalad and Hamel (1990) developed the concept of core competencies in 
order to link underlying capabilities and end products, providing firms with a source of 
competitive advantage as well as a basis for new products and new market entries. The Icarus 
paradox, however, recognises that changes in the environment can reduce the potency of a 
competitive advantage brought on by core competencies, hence calling attention to the need for 
“dynamic capabilities”. In the successful 2005 film, Kinky Boots, a traditional shoe 
manufacturer was saved from bankruptcy by reinventing itself as a manufacturer of boots for 
transvestites. This film serves as an appropriate example of how a company transposed its 
products to a new market in order to obtain a new competitive advantage (Johnstone, 2009). 
Teece, Pisano and Shuen (1997) maintain that firms should therefore prioritise the development 
of dynamic capabilities as it will allow them to integrate, build and reconfigure internal and 
external competencies. However, if a firm fails to perceive itself as “a bundle of competencies”, 
capability myopia may occur as a result of the firm being constrained in its ability to create new 
value propositions, or to respond to changes in the environment.  
In addition to capability myopia, Johnston (2009) identifies another important dimension, 
boundary myopia, which can potentially impact the cognitivism of business-to-business 
relationships. Moore (1996) suggests that business ecosystems form due to the increasingly 
virtual nature of organisational structures, along with the reduction of friction that decelerates 
the rate of change regarding business interaction. In these high-opportunity environments, a 
diverse population of organisations exist that interact in a constant sequence of transient 
relationships with one another (Brandenburger & Nalebuff, 1996). Iansiti and Levien (2004) 
assert that, instead of organisations focusing primarily on their internal capabilities, they should 
rather emphasise the collective properties of the business relationships in which they 
participate. Hence, the concept of boundary myopia is derived from the General Systems 
Theory – a multi-disciplinary approach in which a system can be seen as embedded in a larger 
“super-system” and in itself comprising of smaller sub-systems (Von Bertalanffy, 1986). 
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Organisations can reduce and manage boundary myopia by perceiving themselves as 
“boundary-less” firms (Gergen, 1978; Ashkenas, Ulrich, Jick & Kerr, 1995) with their 
capability sets being broadened through access to external competencies and new ideas that 
would be more readily generated for value creation. Ackoff (1999) claims that by reframing the 
organisational boundary of a firm to include the super-system of external capabilities from 
potential business partners, gaps in both capability and business relationships can be dissolved. 
However, phenomena such as the Not Invented Here syndrome (Katz & Allen, 1982) and 
spatial learning myopia (Levinthal & March, 1993) can constrain firms from adopting the 
boundary-less firm approach. In other words, boundary myopia often manifests when 
organisations only work with counter parties whom they are familiar with, and trust. This 
myopic view of relational boundaries is an example of high bonding social capital, but low 
bridging social capital, whereby Cohen and Prusak (2001:56) claim that “ties that bind can also 
be the ties that blind” due to insularity. Thus, both boundary myopia and capability myopia 
would be useful to conceptualise cognitive failure in organisations regarding the adoption of a 
broader perspective concerning relationships (Baker, 2009). 
This study acknowledges the various dimensions of myopia (e.g. capability myopia and 
boundary myopia) because of its impact on business relationships, but focuses primarily on 
relational myopia that, to some degree, entails aspects of both. Baker (2009) defines relational 
myopia as the occurrence in which two firms embrace a too narrow perspective regarding their 
relationship, its dynamics and how it should be governed as it manoeuvres through the business 
environment. Parties that possess differing perspectives regarding their relationship, and the 
environment in which it operates, are often in a better position to identify problems and 
opportunities, or at least have the insight to do so (Baker, 2009). Conversely, business 
relationships characterised by relational myopia often lack vision and tend to disregard the 
external environment in which they operate completely. Relational myopia usually occurs when 
firms deal with dynamic events in a standardized way, using standard operating procedures to 
address issues, which can lead to acting or reacting unreflectively and automatically (Baker, 
2009).  
Hence, a connection can be drawn between relational myopia and the theoretical implications 
as reported by Cyert and March (1963) in A Behavioural Theory of the Firm, which addresses 
how organisations behave in the marketplace and interact with other parties. Cyert and March’s 
(1963) findings convinced Starbuck, Barnett and Baumard (2008) that operational success can 
over time lead to a more simplistic orientation rather than a more complicated one. 
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This is often referred to as strategic inertia since the adaption of a more simplistic orientation 
in business over time, can lead to a narrower and more specialized firm (Starbuck, Barnett & 
Baumard, 2008). Baker (2009) claims that, although Starbuck et al. (2008) initially defined 
organisational behaviour at firm level, it can be applied to business-to-business relationships. 
For example, if a firm adopts a narrow and simplistic mindset, it is mostly likely that they will 
allow their relationships to be governed by a similar way of thinking (Baker, 2009). Several 
authors (e.g. Baker, 2009; Boughton, Nowak & Washburn, 1996; Moorman et al., 1992) argue 
that it might actually be difficult to envision a situation where a firm’s vision regarding 
organisational governance differs from the manner in which they manage business 
relationships. Hence, if this connection between firm level behaviour and business-to-business 
level behaviour is accepted, the association between relational myopia and the behavioural 
theory of the firm should be apparent. 
 
5.2.2 Types of relational myopia 
 
Marketing myopia was initially described as an organisation’s short-sightedness when 
attempting to define its business (Levitt, 1960). Several authors (e.g. Laverty, 1996; Richard et 
al., 1992; Johnston, 2009) agree that the concept of marketing myopia is analogous to product 
orientation in which a firm perceives itself as a product-producer. For example, in the case of 
the railroad industry, companies were more focused on the products they offered than the 
market they served. Alternatively, organisations can also adopt a customer orientation, whereby 
a firm defines itself as a satisfier of customers’ needs and wants (Richard et al., 1992). A 
customer orientation can help organisations anticipate and adapt to changes in customer 
demands. However, Oxenfeldt and Moore (1978) claim that customer orientation can also be 
considered a type of marketing myopia as firms often overemphasize the satisfaction of 
customer wants and needs which, in turn, can result in the obliviousness of competition. 
Therefore, marketing strategies should transcend industry boundaries and present firms with 
the capability to solve problems and exploit opportunities by looking beyond immediate 
competitors for strategies (Lovelock, 1983). This broader perspective can consequently result 
in cross-fertilization of ideas and produce innovative strategies (Houston, 1986). 
Richard et al. (1992) offer a systematic way of classifying various types of myopia along two 
dimensions – business definition and business environment perspective – with the intention to 
enrich the existing explanation of marketing myopia. Figure 5.1 illustrates these dimensions 
along with the various types of marketing myopia. The first of the two dimensions identified 
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by Richard et al. (1992) involves business definition whereby firms define themselves as 
inward-orientated or outward-orientated.  Firms that are narrowly defined by the type of product 
they produce are generally inward-orientated (e.g. a firm that defines itself as a cold breakfast 
cereal firm), whereas outward-orientated firms characterised by a broader perspective, are 
usually more concerned with satisfying customer wants and needs (e.g. they perceive 
themselves as a breakfast foods company). The second dimension focuses on a firm’s business 
environment perspective by describing firms as possessing either a single-industry perspective, 
or a multi-industry perspective (Richard et al., 1992). Organisations that adopt a single-industry 
perspective are often preoccupied with the actions and reactions of immediate competitors, as 
opposed to firms with a multi-industry perspective that emphasise a broader outlook of the 
market (Lovelock, 1983). Richard et al. (1992) proposes that a combination of these two 
dimensions of myopia can produce a matrix comprising of four scenarios: classic myopia, 
competitive myopia, efficiency myopia and innovative firm. 
 
Figure 5.1 Firm scenarios 
Source: Richard et al. (1992) 
 
The current study accepts the principles of Richard, Womack & Allaway’s (1992) classification 
of the various types of marketing myopia and applies it to relational myopia. In Figure 5.2, 
various dimensions and types of relational myopia is shown in order to describe how it 
manifests in business relationships. The two dimensions of relational myopia used in the matrix 
(see Figure 5.2) comprise of time orientation and relationship conformity.  
Time orientation refers to the extent to which an organisation focuses on either the short term 
or the long term (Voss & Blackmon, 1998). This dissertation adopts time orientation as a 
dimension of relational myopia as several studies within business management literature have 
acknowledged time as an important variable that may impact on business relationships (e.g. 
Davies & Prince, 2005; Verhoef, Franses & Hoekstra, 2002; Doney & Cannon, 1997). Several 
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authors (Ganesan, 1993; Narayanan & Raman, 2004; Cannon, Doney, Mullen & Petersen, 
2010) claim that business relationships based on long-term orientation allow firms to sacrifice 
short-term gains in favour of benefits gained by both parties in the long run. Parties often 
approach relationships with a problem-solving orientation in order to achieve future objectives, 
as well as relational success (Cannon et al., 2010). Thus, if a relationship becomes undesirable, 
or a more promising alternative appears, long-term orientated firms will be in a better position 
to identify opportunities and issues as they have better insight regarding where the firm is going 
and which business relationships are going to get it there. Short-termism, on the other hand, 
focuses on goals and objectives in the near future, instead of building a sustainable competitive 
advantage (Hayes, 1980). Although a short-term orientation is not harmful in itself, firms that 
adopt a short-term focus regarding business relationships can fall prey to sacrificing long-term 
goals for immediate results, misallocating resources, as well as overlooking important future 
opportunities and issues (Voss & Blackmon, 1998). Therefore, a short-term orientated firm 
might neglect to identify a more desirable business relationship for becoming too focused on 
its current partners and short-term goals.   
The second dimension of relational myopia focuses on relationship conformity, which refers to 
the degree of interfirm adaptions made by parties in a business relationship. Similar to 
individuals that interact for more than a short period of time and need to make adaptions with 
regard to each other’s needs, firms must also often conform to some degree in order to meet the 
requirements of a particular business relationship and its counterparties (Newcomb, Turner & 
Converse, 1952). Relationship conformity and adaption should therefore be perceived as 
important aspects of interfirm exchange relationships as most business relationships are based 
on some kind of match between the operations of two organisations (Hallen, Johanson & Seyed-
Mohamed, 1991). For example, it is expected that suppliers will adapt to the needs of specific 
key customers and, in turn, that customers will similarly acclimatize to the capabilities of 
certain suppliers (Hallen et al., 1991). Hence, relationship conformity can be assumed to be a 
significant feature in the dynamics of business relationships as both parties might need to make 
alterations in order to create an initial fit between their needs and capabilities, as well as adapt 
to any changes in business conditions (Turnbull, Ford & Cunningham, 1996).  
Several types of conformity have been identified in fields of psychology that can be applied to 
conformity in business relationships, namely compliance, internalisation and identification, as 
well as ingratiation (Kelman, 1958). Furthermore, as shown in Figure 5.2, business 
relationships can be characterised by either high or low levels of conformity - which, in turn, 
can affect the operations of all parties involved, as well as the functioning of their relationship. 
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Business partnerships that possess high levels of relationship conformity are more prone to 
make several changes and adaptions in order to achieve optimal relationship desirability and 
efficiency, whereas low conformity signifies that both parties maintain some degree of 
independence and individuality despite being in a relationship (Turnball et al., 1996; Hallen et 
al., 1991). 
 
Figure 5.2 Types of relational myopia 
 
Source: Adapted from Richard et al. (1992) 
 
Parallel to work by Richard, Womack and Allaway (1992), in which they present four scenarios 
of marketing myopia (Figure 5.1), this study suggests that the combination of time orientation 
and relationship conformity can produce four similar scenarios in terms of relational myopia 




Classic myopia refers to the scenario of marketing myopia in which a firm adopts a product 
definition as well as a single-industry perspective (Richard et al., 1992). Companies 
characterized by classic myopia are often narrowly defined by their product and do not practise 
the marketing concept (Richard et al., 1992) which suggests that organisations should analyse 
the needs of customers and respond accordingly to satisfy them in a manner superior to those 
of the competitors (Houston, 1986). In addition to this product definition, classic myopic firms 
also possess a single-industry perspective, which means that they often only focus on the actions 
and reactions of immediate competitors (Richard et al., 1992). Elgin Watch, a company that 
defined itself as a producer of fine, traditionally styled, manually-wound watches, serves as a 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
89 
 
prime example of a classic myopic firm. Elgin Watch was so focused on their product that they 
neglected to notice a change in consumer tastes which indicated an increasing desire for low-
priced and convenient (i.e. self-winding) watches (Richard et al., 1992). Elgin Watch also had 
a single-industry perspective and as result, was caught by surprise when new competitors who 
entered the market captured a large share of it by offering consumers what they wanted (i.e. 
low-priced, self-winding watches). Consequently, these new competitors employed new 
channels of distribution which had been initially overlooked by Elgin Watch.  
In this study, however, classic myopia will be defined as business relationships which are 
usually characterised by high relationship conformity and short-term orientation. Firms with 
high levels of relationship conformity tend to make numerous adjustments to internal workings 
(e.g. daily operations, processes, networks, etc.) and to alter their corporate culture (e.g. vision, 
mission, organisational values, etc.) in order to accommodate the establishment, and 
betterment, of their business relationships. This integration and adaption that transpires between 
firms can result in “lock-in” situations in which parties become interdependent on one another 
to such an extent that they get “stuck” in a particular way of doing things (Frow, Payne, 
Wilkinson & Young, 2011). Because of the transaction costs, legal aspects and effort often 
associated with establishing and maintaining interfirm partnerships, firms can become “blind” 
to alternative partners, as well as new and innovative ways of conducting business. Classic 
relational myopic firms are usually also short-term orientated, which indicates that they tend to 
focus on immediate gains that can result in the sacrifice of long-term objectives and the 
negligence of issues concerning future opportunities or threats (Voss & Blackmon, 1998; 
Hayes, 1985). Classic myopia in a partnership, therefore, occurs when parties conform to the 
requirements of their business relationships, and surrender their independence to some degree 
in order to achieve specific short-term objectives.  
An example of classic myopia can be found in the Italian construction industry (Anderson & 
Jap, 2005). Between the late 1980s and early 1990s, 49 large general contractors in Italy formed 
a network designed to aid the control and distribution of resources, as well as to diffuse risk 
among all members. They were operating like a cartel which positioned group members to 
protect one another from competitive pressures by restraining and controlling competition 
among themselves (Anderson & Jap, 2005). After some time, however, several destabilizing 
properties were developed that eventually led to negative returns for all members involved. 
Thus, by insulating each other from the pressures of the market, they unwittingly removed the 
external pressures that drive companies to innovate and progress - which ultimately resulted in 
the involved contractors becoming inefficient (Anderson & Jap, 2005). 





Richard et al. (1992) initially defines competitive myopia as the compromise between customer 
and competitor orientation in which firms adopt a customer definition along with a single-
industry perspective. Competitive myopic firms adhere to the marketing concept as they are 
often characterised by the needs and wants of customers, and as they tend to incorporate a 
single-industry perspective narrowly focused on the actions and reactions of immediate 
competitors (Richard et al., 1992). Management is usually inbred – meaning that they adhere 
to the notion that their industry is unique; they are not willing to learn from firms facing parallel 
situations in other industries. As a result of this narrow-sightedness and lack of learning, there 
is no cross-fertilization of ideas and, even though competitive myopic firms practise the 
marketing concept, their strategies lack creativity (Richard et al., 1992). Therefore, competitive 
myopia hinders a firm’s ability to identify strategic alternatives and confine innovative thinking 
to the industry they are in. An example of a competitive myopic firm is Schlitz Brewing that 
adopted a customer definition, as is evidenced by the introduction of a myriad of product 
extensions (e.g. light beer and premium priced beer). However, despite Schlitz Brewing 
exercising the marketing concept, the company also adopted a single-industry perspective that 
damaged their market share due to their lack of sophisticated marketing techniques (Richard et 
al., 1992). 
This study reviews competitive myopia in the context of business partnerships characterised by 
low relationship conformity and short-term orientation. In this case of competitive myopia, 
firms mostly maintain their independence by only conforming to relationship requirements that 
are deemed absolutely necessary (Hallen et al., 1991). In addition to low relationship 
conformity, competitive myopic relationships are often short-sighted and tend to focus on the 
achievement of a specific goal, or the immediate response to an opportunity or threat. 
Competitive relational myopia is most likely to occur when business relationships are formed 
with the intention of obtaining some sort of competitive edge. Examples of competitive myopia 
can also be found in episodic business relationships (e.g. temporary strategic alliances, or 
impermanent business collaborations, “one-shot” projects, etc.). Halinen and Täthinen (2002) 
propose that an episodic relationship is established for a certain purpose and/or time period, and 
dissolves after it has served its purpose and/or the specific time period has elapsed. Hence, 
relationships characterised by competitive myopia are not considered forward-looking as they 
become preoccupied with obtaining the immediate competitive edge for which the relationship 
was initially established. The co-branding strategy formed between the fast fashion brand, 
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H&M, and luxury designer-labels serves as a potential example of competitive myopia. In 2015, 
H&M teamed up with designer-label brand, Balmain, in order to respond to the fast-changing 
marketplace and increasing customer demand for affordable high fashion items (Shen, Choi & 
Chow, 2017). The relationship between H&M and Balmain was established in order to share 
core competencies, thereby creating a competitive edge by obtaining access to new markets, as 
well as satisfying the needs of customers better than its competitors. However, due to the 
element of short-termism, both parties neglected to consider how the collaboration might 
impact them in the long run. After achieving their initial objective, both H&M and Balmain 
started to experience issues regarding product cannibalism and brand image, respectively (Shen 
et al., 2017). Hence, the relationship became competitively myopic due to parties over-
emphasising immediate competitive gains and neglecting to consider other factors that might 




In a marketing perspective, efficiency myopia is often associated with product definition, as 
well as a multi-industry perspective (Richard et al., 1992). Efficiency myopic firms do not 
practice the marketing concept and tend to perceive other industries as potential competitors 
and sources of solutions to problems. Management is cross-bred, and their acceptance of the 
notion of similarities between industries contribute greatly to their willingness to learn from 
firms in other industries (Richard et al., 1992). Efficiency myopic firms are also somewhat 
more strategic than the previous two myopia types due to the cross-fertilization of ideas. 
However, the myopic component resides in the firms’ concern with improvements in 
production efficiency and borrowing of only technological innovations (Richard et al., 1992). 
In the past, IBM demonstrated the problems associated with an efficiency myopic firm. 
According to Loomis (1991) IBM initially defined itself by its product (i.e. computers), while 
Japanese computer firms at the time were, in addition to their products, deploying systems 
engineers to assist customers in developing software. Where IBM declined to provide this 
service, Japanese firms started using their knowledge of customer needs to capture significant 
market share in the mainframe computer market (Loomis, 1991; Richard et al., 1992). Thus, 
even though IBM had a multi-industry perspective, they were too product-orientated and lost 
market share due to neglecting customer needs.  
Similar to classic and competitive myopia, this study adopts Richard, Womack and Allaway’s 
(1992) concept of efficiency myopia and applies it to business relationships (Baker, 2009). 
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Efficiency myopia is apparent in partnerships where firms experience high levels of relationship 
conformity, while also adopting a long-term orientation. Parties that usually fall prey to 
efficiency myopia often establish long-term relationships with the narrow intent of obtaining 
operational excellence and particular performance outcomes. Thus, sometimes the efficiency 
of a business relationship dis-able parties from noticing other relational issues. This “short-
sightedness” – or myopic view – often appears when parties make various adaptions to meet 
relationship requirements and become more interdependent, as well as compromise to maintain 
the relationship in the long run. One case study that outlines the relationship between an 
automaker and one of its suppliers provides a telling example of efficiency myopia (Anderson 
& Jap, 2005). In this case, both the automaker and its supplier were invested in deepening the 
relationship and, over the years, the supplier in particular went to great lengths to forge strong 
relational bonds, learn the automaker’s business and to win their trust. The supplier developed 
elaborate routines to ensure just-in-time delivery to the automaker’s assembly line from its own 
nearby facility and, in a conscious effort to build social relationships, encouraged his own 
employees to build personal ties with the automaker’s employees, especially those who worked 
on the factory floor (Anderson & Jap, 2005). This relationship building resulted in advantages 
for both the automaker and its supplier, and the relationship appeared to be very efficient and 
mutually beneficial. However, unbeknown to the automaker, the supplier was systematically 
cutting costs in violation of the contract, exploiting his employees’ relationships with the 
automaker’s employees to hide the resulting irregularities from the automaker’s purchasing 
department (Anderson & Jap, 2005). The automaker thus neglected to see the supplier taking 





The scenario representing a non-myopic relationship replaces Richard, Womack and Allaway’s 
(1992) dimension of the innovative firm in the matrix (see Figure 5.1) as this study focuses 
specifically on relational myopia in a business-to-business context. The concept of a non-
myopic relationship was, however, derived from the scenario pertaining the innovative firm 
and, therefore, requires exploration. The innovative firm scenario is often associated with a 
customer definition and a multi-industry perspective (Richard et al., 1992). It possesses nothing 
of the narrowness that characterise previous forms of myopia as innovative firms not only 
practice the marketing concept, but look to other industries for competitors, as well as sources 
of solutions to problems (Richard et al., 1992). Apple, identified as the most innovative 
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company by BusinessWeek in 2009, is a prime example of an innovative firm. Not only does 
Apple offer new products on an ongoing basis (e.g. the iMac, iPod, iPhone and iPad) but they 
are generally also perceived, organisationally and culturally, as a creative powerhouse (Kunz, 
Schmitt & Meyer, 2011). Thus, an innovative firm can be associated with images of creativity 
or dynamism, along with whether the firm is seen as changing markets with its value 
propositions (Kunz et al., 2011). In 1983, the hiring of John Sculley from Pepsico revealed 
Apple’s willingness to apply marketing strategies from the soft drink industry to the PC industry 
(Levy, 2000). It appeared that some of the marketing strategies used in the soft drink industry 
were applicable to the PC industry. One such case was Apple’s low-price PC of the 80s, the 
MacIntosh Classic, which was often joked to be the PC counterpart of Coke Classic (Richard 
et al., 1992; Lawson & Samson, 2001).  
The current study adopts the principles of the innovative firm’s concept (Richard et al., 1992) 
and applies it to the phenomenon of relational myopia (Baker, 2009). A non-myopic 
relationship can be classified as a scenario of relational myopia associated with low conformity 
and long-term orientation. Business relationships characterised by low conformity allow parties 
to retain independence, yet still develop their own core competencies and focus on individual 
objectives, regardless of the relationship (Gramling, Jenkins & Taylor, 2010; Ramalingegowda 
& Yu, 2012). In other words, by only adapting and conforming to relationship requirements 
where it is absolutely necessary, parties can prevent relational myopia, “lock-in” situations, as 
well as becoming too dependent on one another.  
In addition to low conformity, non-myopic relationships are long-term orientated. These non-
myopic relationships can be perceived as strategic alliances, as it relates to an agreement 
between two or more parties that pursue a set of agreed upon objectives while remaining 
independent organisations (Mowrey, Oxley & Silverman, 1996). Hence, non-myopic 
relationships can be characterised as continuous business relationships that will be maintained 
for a long period of time in order to obtain particular objectives. The strategic alliance between 
Starbucks and Barnes and Noble serves as an appropriate example of a non-myopic 
relationship. Over the years Starbucks had developed many successful alliances with other 
companies with the aim of expanding into new markets. In 1993, Starbucks partnered with the 
bookstore chain, Barnes and Noble, by offering their coffee products at retail outlets (Gulati, 
Huffman & Neilson, 2002). Both companies benefited significantly, with Starbucks expanding 
into a new market at a relatively low cost, and Barnes and Noble seizing the opportunity to 
provide their customers with more value (Gulati et al., 2002). Both companies continued to 
operate independently, but they formed a long-term strategic alliance to obtain mutual 
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beneficial objectives. Table 5.1 provides additional examples of strategic alliances and long-
term business collaborations that can be classified as non-myopic relationships. 
 
Table 5.1 Examples of non-myopic relationships  
Business relationship Description 
Biotherm and Renault The skin-care company, Biotherm, and the automobile manufacturer, Renault, 
combined their expertise to develop a new car concept, the Spa Car, which is 
designed to simultaneously care for the health of its occupants and to protect the 
environment. 
NASA and LEGO Seeking to create fun and educational toys that teach children about real-world 
challenges, LEGO has undertaken initiatives in diverse areas. LEGO partnered 
with NASA to create a program that will familiarise young children and 
adolescents with the aerospace sector. 
Harvard and MIT Harvard University and Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) signed an 
agreement to create EDX – a non-profit organisation that aims to provide free 
online courses, adapted from traditional courses, to anyone with access to the 
Internet. 
Reebok and Marvel Reebok Classics and Marvel Entertainment formed a strategic alliance to 
present a line of footwear inspired by comic book superheroes. With this joint 
initiative, the companies sought to recreate images of classic comic book 
superheroes on classic, retro-styled sneakers. 
Coca-Cola and Sanofi  The renowned Coca-Cola brand and the French pharmaceutical group, Sanofi, 
signed a 50-50 partnership agreement to produce and market “beauty drinks” 
containing a number of active ingredients that promote wellness, health and 
beauty. 
 




Complacency has often been explained through the use of a metaphorical device involving the 
boiling of a frog. Several authors (Chowdhury & Lang, 1996; Richardson, Nwankwo & 
Richardson, 1994; Hambrick & D’Aveni, 1988) describe complacency by using the “boiled 
frog” metaphor in which a live frog is initially dropped into a pan of cold water, but the water 
then being heated very gradually, along with the frog, until it reaches boiling point (Chowdhury 
& Lang, 1996). In the end, the frog dies as it failed to notice and react to the water being heated 
gradually (Chowdhury, & Lang, 1996). Tichy and Devanna (1986:44) explain that the frog 
“could have jumped out of the pan at any time, but the change in its environment happened so 
gradually that no response was triggered in the frog, and death ensued”. The frog metaphor 
appropriately illustrates how complacency can negatively influence a business relationship. 
When a partnership becomes characterised by the aforementioned “boiled-frog” syndrome, 
partners usually exhibit complacent behaviour towards their relationships, as well as the 
business environment in which they operate. In other words, the frog – which symbolises 
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involved parties – remains blissfully unmoved while the environment around it heats up 
(Richardson et al., 1994). Complacency has been referred to as “satisfaction or self-satisfaction 
accompanied by the unawareness of dangers and deficiencies” (Chowdhury & Lang, 1996), 
along with the inability of partnering firms to recognise deficiencies in their once productive 
systems (Baker, 2009). Parallel to the frog that eventually dies due to its inability to recognise 
the water heating up, complacency transpires when parties fail to recognise changes in their 
environment and to react accordingly (Chowdhury & Lang, 1996). Because of its ability to 
influence the desirability and efficiency of business partnerships, the current study adopts 
complacency as a possible symptom of dark side behaviour. 
 
5.3.1 Definition of complacency 
 
Complacency has received little attention from researchers in the field of relationship marketing 
– mostly as it is such a difficult negative relational mediator to observe in comparison to others 
(e.g. unfairness, conflict, opportunism, etc.) (Lund et al., 2015). Friend and Johnson (2017) 
claim that the complexity of complacency is rooted in it being “a mental state of being” that, 
by definition, possesses the potential to “blind” parties in terms of threatening situations and 
behaviour.  In other words, firms often do not realise that they have become complacent in their 
relationship until some resulting negative behaviour arises (e.g. they are being taken advantage 
of by a dishonest partner), which could otherwise have been avoided if they had been more 
vigilant (Lund et al., 2015). Thus, complacency can be considered a threat to all interpersonal 
and business relationships (Friend & Johnson, 2017; Lund et al., 2015; Chowdhury & Lang, 
1996).   
One of the most problematic aspects of complacency for business relationships is that it usually 
occurs in relationships where strong feelings of trust, commitment, loyalty and satisfaction 
result in parties becoming more comfortable and confident in their counterparties which, in 
turn, can eventually lead to them letting down their guard (Lund et al., 2015). It is exactly these 
positive relational constructs that allow complacency to manifest with time (Haytko, 2004) and 
why complacent behaviour is regarded as a dark side element of business relationships 
(Anderson & Jap, 2005; Baker, 2009).  
In 1996, Chowdhury and Lang published a qualitative exploratory study that investigated 
complacency and how it relates to small business failure. These authors adopted the definition 
of complacency found in the Webster’s New International Dictionary (1961) as “the 
satisfaction of self-satisfaction accompanied by the unawareness of dangers and deficiencies” 
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(Chowdhury & Lang, 1996:24). However, it is suggested that this definition of complacency 
presents two possible implications (Baker, 2009: Chowdhury & Lang, 1996). First, it is implied 
that “unawareness” may be the result of a firm’s poor problem sensing ability where 
management is content with the status quo, and secondly, actions deemed successful in the past 
are no longer effective (Reece, 1994; Kiesler & Sproull, 1982; Chowdhury & Lang, 1996; 
Baker, 2009). In other words, advantageous systems and processes that used to work previously 
either produce less – or has stopped yielding entirely – beneficial outcomes to which firms have 
become accustomed. Therefore, complacency, as evident in the abovementioned implications, 
relates to the inability of parties to recognise the deficiency in their once productive systems 
(Chowdhury & Lang, 1996).  
Furthermore, Austin (1991) defines complacency as the lack of consistency, or a decrease in 
the performance level of parties, whereas Shipley (1994) infer that complacent behaviour may 
involve an internal unwillingness to change the status quo that can result in inefficiency 
regarding relational performance and organisational operation. Based on these definitions, it is 
evident that complacency usually entails feelings of satisfaction and an unwillingness, or 
inability, to recognise the need for change within business relationships. For example, success 
and desirable relationship performance may lull parties into believing that their relationship is 
infallible and without need for change (Baker, 2009). Firms may begin to believe that their 
success is the outcome of a partnership in its current state and that changes to the relationship, 
or constant evaluation in order to prevent complacent behaviour, may seem redundant 
(Anderson & Jap, 2005). Baker (2009) suggests that partnerships may become entrapped by an 
if it isn’t broken, don’t fix it mentality.  
Theoretical justification for the onset of complacency can also be drawn fro the behavioural 
theory of the firm as it is argued that a firm’s success often results in “programmed” and 
structured responses to its environment which can alternatively be described as complacency 
and specialisation (Miller, 1990). This standardised reaction that develops over time, as 
emphasised by Miller (1990), is consistent with Cyert and March’s (1963) generalisations that 
suggest parties incorporate certain biases in their assessment of relationships and environment 
that favour past successes. In support of the link between the phenomenon of complacency and 
the behavioural theory of the firm, Lund et al. (2015) maintain that complacency can be caused 
by a number of personal, interpersonal and organisational factors that dictate how parties act 
and react in a business relationship. The Asiana Airline accident of 2013 serves as a prime 
example of how an individual can become complacent due to repetitiveness and lack of 
vigilance (Paramurasan & Manzey, 2010). During the final two minutes before crashing into 
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the seawall short of the runway at the San Francisco International Airport, all three pilots of 
Asiana Airlines Flight 214 had told investigators that they were relying on the plane’s 
automated devices for speed control (Parasuraman & Manzey, 2010). This example emphasises 
how individuals, as well as organisations, can become complacent due to repetitiveness and 
being too comfortable. In order to further explore complacency as a symptom of dark side 
business behaviour, this study will investigate the manifestation of complacency in business 
relationships and how parties, just like the pilots of Flight 214, become too comfortable, or 
passive, as a result of receptiveness and over-reliance on past methods that were once 
successful.  
 
5.3.2 The complacency gap 
 
The GAP model was initially constructed upon the underlying assumption that all companies 
want to perform as best as they can by striving for the fulfilment of service promises and 
perfection according to pre-established standards (Parasuraman, Zeithaml & Berry, 1985). 
Rosene (2003) evaluates the GAP model by acknowledging that, at different stages, 
organisations may experience a feeling of contentment before the optimal level of performance 
is reached. It is suggested that a “hidden” gap pervades organizations, namely a complacency 
gap. This contentment, thus, can be visualized by a general feeling that permeates the whole 
organization’s atmosphere (e.g. a complacent culture) or can be traced and found specifically 
in one or more explanatory gaps described in the model in the form of contented behaviour 
(Rosene, 2003). The current study agrees with Rosene’s (2003) view of complacency in the 
GAP model and argues that it can potentially describe the onset of complacency in business 
relationships. In this section, the original GAP model as initially presented by Parasuraman et 
al. (1985) is discussed, along with Rosene’s (2003) altered model that incorporates the hidden 
gap of complacency. Additionally, the current study also offers a model that more explicitly 
explains the appearance of this complacency gap in a business-to-business context. 
 
The GAP model  
 
The GAP model, initially submitted by Parasuraman et al. (1985), identifies five gaps that 
consist of one external gap, defined as the difference between the expected service and the 
perceived service, and four internal gaps – namely, consumer expectation/management 
perception gap, management perception/service quality specification gap, service quality 
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specification/service delivery gap and service delivery/external communications gap (Kasper, 
Van Helsdingen, De Vries, 1999). In Figure 5.3 the original GAP model is depicted. 
The GAP model allows for the conceptualization of actual service organization problems 
(Rosene, 2003). The current study accepts the fundamental principles on which the model is 
built but adapts it to explain the specific relational dynamics in business relationships. In other 
words, instead of addressing the GAP model in terms of service quality between a company 
and its consumers, the adapted version will refer to the relationship quality, or efficiency, 
between parties engaged in a business relationship. 
 









Source: Kasper et al. (1999); Rosene (2003) 
 
Several studies (e.g. Baker, 2009; Starbuck et al., 2008; Anderson, Håkansson & Johanson, 
1994) infer that, seeing as the original GAP model explains service relationships between 
companies and consumers, the key principles regarding relationship management remain 
applicable and can be applied to business-to-business context. Figure 5.4 depicts the GAP 
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Source: Adapted from Parasuraman et al. (1985); Rosene (2003); Kenny et al. (2017) 
 
The “hidden” complacency gap 
 
Although, the GAP model (Parasuraman et al., 1985; Kasper et al., 1999) allows for the 
conceptualisation of problems pertaining to service organisations, other authors (e.g. Rosene, 
2003; Kenny et al., 2017; Baker, 2009) propose additional considerations. Rosene (2003) 
identifies an underlying connection between all the gaps in the model, which speaks to a cultural 
issue that cuts across these sub-standards. The GAP model generally assumes that all companies 
are driven by an organisational culture that make them want to perform as best as they can by 
striving for perfection according to established standards and the fulfilment of promises 
(Rosene, 2003). However, in many organisations, better is more valued than best, and thus an 
alternative perspective for the existence of these gaps exists. Rosene (2003) claims that, at 
different stages, a feeling of contentment is achieved before the optimal level of performance 
is reached. Complacent behaviour often emerges when parties start to experience this aforesaid 
feeling of contentment, which can subsequently result in parties becoming unable to detect 
issues pertaining to the relationship (Baker, 2009). Therefore, several authors maintain that 
there is an overall complacent culture, or a culture of complacency, that is present throughout 
the whole organisation, acting as an overriding hidden gap (Rosene, 2003). Schneider and 
Bowen (2010) discuss the impact of corporate culture on both service quality and business 
relationships by pointing out that some organisations are characterised by “schizophrenic” 
cultures in which parties verbally declare that they want one kind of culture, yet create routines 
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and behaviours that support another. For several other authors (e.g Kasper et al., 1999; Posner, 
Kouzes & Schmidt, 1985), the corporate culture of organisations and business relationships, 
refers to shared values and shared beliefs which dictate how individuals within an organisation, 
and parties in a business relationship, act and behave. However, Berry (1999) recognised that 
complacency is an ever-looming threat in business relationships, which often emerges when 
companies foster a culture that favours best practices and familiarity concerning business 
operations, over constant evaluation and exploring new avenues.  
Rosene (2003) recognises complacency as a “hidden” gap in the GAP model which needs to be 
acknowledged in order to fully comprehend why Gap 5, or service quality discrepancy between 
a service provider and a customer, occur. Based on the principles of this complacency gap, this 
study addresses a similar gap in order to potentially explain how complacency can appear in 
business partnerships. Thus, the figures below illustrate the various incorporations of 
complacency in (1) the original GAP model and (2) an adapted model for business relationships. 
 
Figure 5.5 Complacency gap option 1 
Source: Adapted from Rosene (2003); Kenny (2017); Staughton & Johnson (2005) 
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Figure 5.6 Complacency gap option 2 
 
Source: Adapted from Rosene (2003); Kenny et al. (2017); Staughton & Johnston (2005) 
 
The hidden gap of complacency can be illustrated as an overriding cloud above the four internal 
gaps (Figure 5.5) or as an interspace between the parties involved in the business relationship 
(Figure 5.6). In the adapted model, party A and party B operate in close proximity, depicting a 
close business relationship that functions efficiently and at a level that is satisfactory. However, 
in this interspace between parties, complacency can appear when partners become too 
comfortable and familiar with the present state of various areas pertaining business partnerships 
(Baker, 2009; Lund et al., 2015). For example, business parties may become complacent 
because of a high degree of comfort, the adoption of a “we have nothing new to learn” attitude, 
or simply a lack of vision (Rosene, 2003; Baker, 2009). Regardless of the reason for the 
emergence of complacency, a relationship may become characterised by dark side behaviour, 
and consequently start to operate inefficiently – which, if not managed correctly, can result in 
the termination of the relationship (Baker, 2009).  
The culture of complacency can be described as a shared attitude of comfort and familiarity 
between partners that could eventually exert a negative influence on the relationship (Rosene, 
2003; Baker, 2009; Friend & Johnson, 2017). However, Rosene (2003) suggests that it is 
possible to address the complacency in a more specific manner and not only as an attitude, but 
rather as a series of behaviours present in any ongoing business relationship. More specifically, 
it is possible to uncover “hidden” complacency in each of the four internal gaps described by 
the adapted GAP model. Figure 5.7 shows this aforementioned proposal in which complacency 
gaps applied to the GAP model may assist in explaining the onset of complacent behaviour in 
business relationships.  
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Figure 5.7 Complacency gap option 3 
 
Source: Adapted from Rosene (2003); Kenny et al. (2017); Staughton & Johnston (2005) 
 
A revised approach to identifying complacent behaviour in business relationships 
 
The current study aims to discuss the completeness of the GAP model by acknowledging that, 
at different stages, a feeling of contentment is often achieved before the optimal level of 
performance is reached. Similar to Rosene (2003) identifying the need to include an additional 
gap to the service quality GAP model, this study recognises the importance of adding a similar 
gap that can potentially explain the manifestation of complacency in business relationships. 
Although hidden, this complacency gap has proven real in many organisations that face 
problems and issues which arise due a complacent culture that influences relationship 
dynamics, processes, as well as managerial activity (Rosene, 2003; Baker, 2009). Thus, this 
feeling of contentment that might characterise partnerships can be referred to as either a general 
feeling that permeates the whole organisation’s atmosphere (e.g. a complacent culture), or it 
can be traced and found specifically in one or more of the explanatory gaps described in the 
GAP model. In order to explain this argument, the following section elaborates on a series of 
behaviours often associated with each internal gap: 
Gap 1: Lack of adequate information. The knowledge gap occurs due to the misperception of 
parties regarding their expectations of one another (Kenny et al., 2017). In other words, 
business partners incorrectly perceive the wants and needs of their counterparties, as well as 
what they specifically want out of the relationship. This “mismatch” between parties’ 
perceptions and expectations can result in increased levels of relationship uncertainty, due to a 
lack of information regarding relational exchanges. Achrol and Stern (1988) define uncertainty 
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as the extent to which a party has sufficient information to anticipate the consequences of their 
decisions and to enable them to make key decisions with confidence. Several other authors 
acknowledge that the presence of high levels of uncertainty in a business relationship can 
demotivate firms to take risks and explore other alternatives due to unpredictability and 
complexity that often accompany the unknown environments (Eriksson & Sharma, 2003; 
Baker, 2009; Lee, 1998; Ting et al., 2007). Complacency can thus potentially manifest within 
this knowledge gap due to a lack of information regarding relationship exchanges which, in 
turn, can lead to a lack of innovation, the inability and unwillingness to learn, and decreased 
risk-taking. For example, when partners are confronted with heightened levels of 
unpredictability and complexity due to relationship uncertainty, they are more likely to “stick 
to what they know” rather than to explore other alternatives or to seek actively within their 
environment for new opportunities (Baker, 2009). A culture of complacency can therefore 
appear when firms lack critical information about their environment and business partners. 
They will be less likely to venture out of their “comfort zone” and continue to operate as always 
because of their inability to make business decisions with confidence (Eriksson & Sharma, 
2003). This complacent behaviour can eventually result in the relationship becoming “stale” 
and could cause a decrease in relationship efficiency and desirability. 
Gap 2: Ambiguous definition of relationship requirements. This gap reflects the incorrect 
translation of what is expected from the relationship into clear rules and guidelines (Staughton 
& Johnston, 2005). Often business partners are unable, or unwilling, to translate relationship 
information into clear definitions and specifications, which stipulate relational operations and 
how the relationship should be governed. Subsequently, complacency can become a problem 
during the translation of perceptions into specifications due to the tendency of parties to act 
according to successful past experiences and proven managerial routines. Firms may tend to 
favour their own definitions and specifications of relationship management, which can result in 
the ineffective processing of relationship information into appropriate, mutually beneficial 
requirements (Baker, 2009). Thus, complacency concerning relationship policy formulation 
often occurs due to accurate relational information being ignored or being wrongly translated 
into requirements. Organisations are often “blinded” by their own secure ways of doing things 
and, as a result, they unknowingly allow their subjectivity to influence their relationships 
(Baker, 2009).  
Gap 3: Operational shortcomings. This particular gap occurs due to the inability, or 
unwillingness, of individual parties to correctly translate specifications into actions and 
operations (Rosene, 2003; Staughton & Johnston, 2005). The appearance of the efficiency gap 
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can be considered quite common for business relationships due to the difficulty of maintaining 
relationship efficiency across all areas of the relationship. Similar to the previous gap that 
addresses the incorrect translation of perceptions into specifications and objectives, 
complacency can occur in the efficiency gap as parties will most likely choose to implement 
known procedures when faced with uncertainty (Baker, 2009). In other words, when firms are 
unable to turn specifications into actions, whether due to inability or unwillingness, they will, 
in most cases, fall back on cognitive biases and choose to do things in ways that are familiar to 
them in an attempt to minimise risk and negative outcomes (Baker, 2009; Friend & Johnson, 
2017; Lund et al., 2015). Furthermore, Chowdhury and Lang (1996) emphasise the association 
between complacency, managerial weaknesses and the five dimensions of decline (i.e. a 
reduction in organisational size; internal stagnation or inefficiency; a failure to recognise 
internal or external warning signals; a failure to adapt to external environment demands; and a 
stage in the organisation’s life cycle). These authors suggest that complacency underlies all 
forms of decline, even though its magnitude tends to increase due to firms’ lack of problem 
sensing and motivation for action (Chowdhury & Lang, 1996). Hence, firms are more likely to 
succumb to complacency within the efficiency gap when they implement known procedures 
regarding the specifications-to-operations translation process and fail to consider alternative 
methods that could potentially be more advantageous for the relationship. This hidden gap of 
complacency can therefore develop due to managerial weaknesses regarding relationship 
operations, as well as due to the implementation of less efficient, less risky, “known” methods 
(Lund et al., 2015; Chowdhury & Lang, 1996). 
Gap 4: Communication and interpretation. The communication gap can appear when ineffective 
communication exists between parties and, when promises made do not match the actions and 
performance of the relationship (Baker, 2009; Olkkonen, Tikkanen & Alajoutsijärvi, 2000). 
The propensity to over promise, together with ineffective horizontal communication between 
parties, can explain why certain detrimental behaviours and attitudes arise in business 
relationships. Miscommunication, or the lack of appropriate continuous communication, could 
cause negative behavioural outcomes to appear and cause harm to the relationship (Abosag et 
al., 2016; Baker, 2009; Staughton & Johnston, 2005). The notion of complacency can therefore 
be applied to communication gap and it can potentially manifest when firms may become too 
comfortable with “distorted” messages that do not reflect relationship operations and the actions 
of involved parties (Rosene, 2003; Baker, 2009). As complacency is often defined as the 
satisfaction or self-satisfaction accompanied by unawareness of actual dangers and 
deficiencies, partnerships may become characterised by complacency when parties don’t 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
105 
 
evaluate their relationship, along with the manner in which they communicate. In other words, 
complacent behaviour might manifest in the communication gap when firms constantly take 
each other at “face value”. Crosno and Dahlstrom (2008) support this notion of complacent 
communication by suggesting that inadequate and ineffective communication could potentially 
lead to the prevention of goal congruence, as well as information asymmetry. Consequently, 
when parties misunderstand one another, they often rely on past experiences and on what they 
know – which, in turn, can lead to the distortion of the communication stream between partners, 




The term “vulnerability” is derived from the Latin word “vulnerare” (to be wounded) and 
describes the potential to be harmed, which emphasises the sensitivity to a perturbation or stress 
(Downing et al., 1997). In recent years, the concept of vulnerability has been broadly employed 
in research on global environmental change, disaster risk reduction and social-ecological 
change research (Kasperson & Kasperson, 2005). However, the focus of vulnerability has 
gradually been transformed from concern with the fragility of environmental systems (i.e. 
physical vulnerability) to investigating the vulnerability of human society (i.e. social 
vulnerability). In this section, the concept of vulnerability is discussed in the context of 
business-to-business relationships. Several authors (e.g. Svensson, 2000; Christoper & Peck, 
2004; Jüttner et al., 2003; Wagner & Neshat, 2010) describe the phenomenon of vulnerability 
as comprising of a disturbance in the natural operation of relationships, along with 
consequential outcomes that affect relational dynamics. Thus, as vulnerability possesses the 
ability to disrupt the functionality of relationships, the current study adopts it as a symptom of 
dark side behaviour that arises due to an increase in specific behaviours and attitudes.   
 
5.4.1 Concept of vulnerability 
 
Svensson (2004) defines vulnerability as the gap between the focal firm’s perceived 
dependence on another firm, as well as the focal firm’s perceived trust in another firm. The first 
part of this definition emphasises that perceived dependence can influence an organisation’s 
perceived vulnerability. Thus, vulnerability can be referred to as the simultaneous consideration 
of a disturbance, along with its negative consequences (Svensson, 2002). For example, if parties 
are heavily dependent on one another, perceived vulnerability is most likely to be higher. The 
second part of the definition entails perceived trust, which can also influence the level of 
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perceived vulnerability (Svensson, 2002). The importance of trust can be explained by its ability 
to contribute to the strength of business relationships (Hakansson & Snehota, 1995). Therefore, 
the gap between perceived dependence and perceived trust is argued to affect the degree of 
perceived vulnerability in business partnerships (see Figure 5.8). 
 









Source: Svensson (2004) 
 
As depicted by Figure 5.8, Svensson (2000) offers a conceptual framework that addresses three 
principal components of vulnerability, namely the source of disturbance, the category of 
disturbance and the type of logistics flow. However, Svensson (2002) refined the construct of 
vulnerability to only include two key elements: the disturbance itself, and its negative 
consequences. In this case, a disturbance refers to a quantitative and qualitative deviation from 
what is normal or expected (Svensson, 2004). For example, excessive levels of conflict can 
interrupt or disturb the natural operations of a partnership (Abosag et al., 2016). Subsequently, 
a negative consequence of a (preceding) disturbance can be defined as a deteriorated goal 
accomplishment in terms of quantitative and qualitative deviations (Svensson, 2004). Baker 
(2009) infers that vulnerability can be deemed a negative consequence that arises due to some 
disturbance in relational operations. Thus, with reference to the abovementioned components, 
vulnerability can also be conceptualised as “a condition that affects a firm’s goal 
accomplishment dependent upon the occurrence of negative consequences of disturbance” 
(Svensson, 2004:470).  
Furthermore, in an international joint venture context, Attridge, Berscheid and Sprecher (1998) 
define vulnerability similarly to Svensson (2004) by describing it as a party’s concerns 
regarding the continuance of a partnership, along with its partner’s future provision of need 
satisfaction.  However, in more recent years vulnerability has received increased attention in 
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the context of supply chain management and relationship marketing. Supply chain vulnerability 
has been defined broadly as “an exposure to serious disturbances” (Christoper & Peck, 2004:3), 
as well as “the propensity of risk sources and risk drivers to outweigh risk mitigating strategies, 
thus causing adverse supply chain consequences” (Jüttner et al., 2003:200). Hence, the 
aforementioned definitions can be deemed relevant to business relationships, as supply chain 
channels often comprise of several parties, or organisations, that are bound together by 
contractual agreements and other relational ties. Parallel to Svensson’s (2000) definition, these 
authors also maintain that the concept of vulnerability focuses on the occurrence of a 
disturbance in operations and consequential outcomes of this disruption.  
 
5.4.2 Typology of vulnerability scenarios 
 
Svensson (2002) claimed that the phenomenon of vulnerability in marketing channels is a result 
of the dependence of business activities among partnering firms. Based on Svensson’s (2002) 
inductive approach, a typology of vulnerability was developed in order to describe the different 
ways in which vulnerability can manifest among marketing channel members (see Figure 5.9). 
Although research pertaining vulnerability mostly concern supply chain channels, several 
authors (e.g. Morgan & Hunt, 1994; Hakansson & Snehota, 1995; Svensson, 2002) infer that 
the concept of vulnerability can be extended to other fields of research, for example 
organisational behaviour, relationship marketing, strategic management, etc.  
Figure 5.9 shows that the typology of vulnerability comprises of two major generic dimensions 
of dependence: time-dependence and relationship-dependence. First, time-dependence 
addresses the time orientation associated with business partnerships, as well as the period of 
time a firm plans to remain dependent on another party. This dimension consists of two 
underlying dimensions, namely temporary and permanent dependencies. While the temporary 
sub-dimension often infers that relational dependence is short-term orientated, permanent 
dependence on the other hand, is considered to be more long-term orientated (Svensson, 2002). 
In other words, it addresses the time orientation of business relationships, as well as the period 
of time they plan to remain dependent on a counterparty. 
  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
108 
 









Source: Svensson (2002) 
 
The second generic dimension entails relationship-dependence, which refers to business 
activities being dependent on the interaction process between parties (Waters-Fuller, 1995). 
Svensson (2002) argues that relationship-dependence can also comprise of two sub-dimensions, 
namely unilateral and bilateral dependencies. Unilateral dependence refers to the situation in 
which dependence is a one-sided phenomenon – where one party is dependent on an 
independent counterparty. On the other hand, bilateral dependence occurs when a business 
relationship is characterised by mutual dependence and parties are equally dependent on one 
another (Svensson, 2002).  
Based on these dimensions, Svensson (2002) compiled a matrix that explains the different 
scenarios pertaining vulnerability in business relationships. The first scenario, termed dynamic 
vulnerability, refers to a situation in which a business relationship is characterised by temporary 
and bilateral dependencies. This scenario signifies that there are low levels of dependence 
among partners and that the relationship is short-term orientated. Dynamic vulnerability is most 
likely to surface in a relationship that operates within a highly active and competitive 
environment (Svensson, 2002). For example, the emergence of fast fashion in the fashion 
industry has caused collaboration between fashion retailers and their suppliers to become more 
short-term orientated due to constantly changing customer demands (Bhardwaj & Fairhurst, 
2010). Thus, to accommodate the changing needs of the market while still maintaining optimal 
firm operations, parties often engage in short-term, low-dependent relationships that allow them 
to rapidly shift to alternative partners in response to emerging market trends (Bhardwaj & 
Fairhurst, 2010). This type of vulnerability can have a detrimental impact on firms as partners 
may not want to commit to the continuance of a partnership in case they need to exit 
unexpectedly in pursuit of more attractive alternatives.  
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The second scenario, static vulnerability, implies that partners are exposed to permanent and 
unilateral dependencies (Svensson, 2002). Static vulnerability usually involves relationships 
that are characterised by a high degree of dependence between partners, as well as a long-term 
relationship orientation. This scenario is likely to surface in monopolistic markets where parties 
often have no other choice but to remain in a relationship with the main player (Svensson, 
2002). For example, if a company is highly dependent on a specific counterparty to supply a 
key component needed to produce a product or to deliver a service, the relationship can be 
considered monopolistic due to the lack of adequate alternatives. Therefore, the static scenario 
is considered the most severe form of vulnerability as parties can become “trapped” in a long-
term relationship due to excessive levels of dependence.  
The third scenario, elastic vulnerability, applies to a business relationship that is characterised 
by temporary and unilateral dependencies (Svensson, 2002). In the case of elastic vulnerability, 
a firm may be highly dependent on its partner and the relationship would usually be short-term 
orientated. According to Svensson (2002), this type of vulnerability generally occurs in a 
duopolistic, or an oligopolistic, market.  
The fourth scenario is a relationship characterised by non-elastic vulnerability. In this scenario 
there are usually bilateral dependencies among firms and the relationship would have a long-
term focus close to permanent. Thus, business relationships subjected to non-elastic 
vulnerability often entail low levels of dependence, due to mutual dependence, which might 
occur over a long period of time (Svensson, 2002).  
 
5.5 SUSPICION  
 
Atkinson and Butcher (2003:282) commented that “competing perspectives and personal 
motivation can conspire to render even the most innocent of acts subject to scrutiny and 
suspicion”. In no realm is this statement more accurate than in the context of business 
relationships, w here even the slightest passive or innocuous action of an organisation may 
ignite the first sparks of suspicion in its partner (Hunter et al., 2011). Relationship marketing 
literature characterises inter-organisational relationships as ubiquitously opportunistic (Wathne 
& Heide, 2000), inferring that suspicion is – and will always be –interwoven in the fabric of 
business relationships. Similarly, Jap (2001) claims that suspicion can arise due to several 
detrimental behaviours and attitudes, which are usually inherent to any relationship. Therefore, 
based on the recommendations of several studies (e.g. Baker, 2009; Hunter et al., 2011; 
Anderson & Jap, 2005; Abosag et al., 2016), the current study adopts suspicion as a symptom 
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of dark side behaviour, as it can potentially signify that a relationship has become ineffective 
and undesirable.  
 
5.5.1 Concept of suspicion 
 
Several disciplines, such as psychology, sociology and supply channel management, attempt to 
offer definitions for suspicion. While parallel in nature, some of these definitions fail to 
explicitly identify many of the central characteristics of suspicion (Hunter, Gassenheimer & 
Siguaw, 2011). Deutsch (1962), for example, defines suspicion as a choice to engage in 
behaviour to prevent or reduce the harmful consequences of another person’s behaviour, 
whereas others (e.g. Barone, Manning & Miniard, 2004; Campbell & Kirmani, 2000) refer to 
it as a mental state in which a perceiver contemplates the possibility that the suspect may have 
hidden motives to justify behaviour. Both of these definitions suggest that suspicion entails the 
perception of one party to believe the motives of a counterparty to be ulterior. Similarly, 
McCornack and Levine (1990) define suspicion as the belief that messages produced in a 
particular setting by a specific party may be deceptive. In addition, Fein, Hilton and Miller 
(1990) maintain that suspicion involves uncertainty regarding motives, as it might compromise 
the sureness and confidence that usually accompany the certainty of a partner’s motive. 
Although each of these authors address the components of uncertainty and ulterior motives in 
their definitions, they neglect to explicitly express that the motive has the ability to discredit a 
suspect’s behaviour and actions (Hunter et al., 2011).  
Most research concerning suspicion focuses solely on individuals, but Fein (1996) argues that 
it need not be limited to interpersonal relationships. For the purpose of the current study, 
suspicion is conceptualised as a state held by an organisation questioning the motives of a 
business partner. More specifically, suspicion in an inter-organisational context can be 
described as “a dynamic cognitively effortful state in which one organisation, because of 
uncertainty as to whether another party may be concealing harmful or opportunistic intentions, 
engages in active and thoughtful consideration of these motives and plausible causal 
explanations underlying the other organisation’s behaviour” (Hunter et al., 2011:2). This 
definition not only identifies suspicion as a mental state (Barone et al., 2004), but it also 
emphasises the incorporation of uncertainty regarding motives (Campbell & Kirmani, 2000; 
Fein et al., 1990).  
Furthermore, relationship marketing literature delineate suspicion from two key relational 
elements in order to demarcate the related construct domain (Hunter et al., 2011). First, as 
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opposed to being a motive or the consequential behaviour of opportunism, suspicion exists as 
a state in which the perceiver entertains the notion that its business partner may be behaving 
opportunistically (Hunter et al., 2011). Secondly, several authors (e.g. Hunter et al., 2011; 
Morgan & Hunt, 1994; Narayandas & Rangan, 2004) also acknowledge that trust can be linked 
to suspicion. Fein (1996) argues that suspicion does not generate an overly cynical, distrustful 
mindset, but rather a mindset characterised by neither trust nor distrust. Trust and distrust both 
represent states of perceived certainty about reliability and integrity, whereas suspicion 
signifies a mental state of uncertainty and scepticism regarding a partner’s motives (Hunter et 
al., 2011). Therefore, when suspicion threatens a relationship, partners often become uncertain 
as to the motivation underlying the behaviour of their partners (Baker, 2009).  
 
5.5.2 Effect of suspicion on inter-organisational relationships 
 
Based on evidence derived from literature, it is clear that suspicion can entail both beneficial 
outcomes and drawbacks for business partnerships. Hunter et al. (2011) developed a conceptual 
model of suspicion in business partnerships that accounts for an inverted U-shaped relationship 
with bi-polar outcomes. In other words, this model indicates the consequential outcomes often 
associated with low and high levels of suspicion in a relationship. Figure 5.10 provides a visual 
representation of the conceptual model by Hunter et al. (2011) applied to a business-to-business 
context. 
  
Figure 5.10 The relationship between level of suspicion and effects on B2B relationships 
Source: Adapted from Hunter et al. (2011) 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
112 
 
Benefits of suspicion 
 
Research on interpersonal interaction suggest that partners in well-developed relationships 
manifest a strong truth bias or presumption of truthfulness (McCornack & Parks, 1986). This 
truth heuristic is used as a shortcut in evaluating partner behaviour, rather than expending the 
effort and energy to carefully examine information and actions (Stiff, Kim & Ramesh, 1992). 
The injection of suspicion, usually through ambiguous information and actions, however, 
increases cognitive involvement regarding partner activities (Stiff et al., 1992). Thus, 
suspicious parties tend to defer judgement until more information regarding the underlying 
behaviour of their counterparties becomes available (Fein, 2011). Figure 5.10 shows that 
suspicion can potentially be beneficial to business relationships. Hunter et al. (2011) explain 
that mild to moderate levels of suspicion may have a legitimate and useful function in interfirm 
relationships, as it might encourage partners to pay greater attention to surrounding 
circumstances (Fein, 1996), and result in the more thoughtful evaluation of information (Vonk 
& Van Knippenberg, 1994). Several authors (e.g Hunter et al. 2011; Kramer & Gavrieli, 2004; 
Fein, 1996) suggest that mild levels of suspicion in partnership can push parties to be more 
vigilant, as well as encourage them to develop an early warning system. Hence, heightened 
levels of vigilance in relationships can better equip parties concerning the identification of dark 
side behaviour (Hunter et al., 2011; Baker, 2009). Anderson and Jap (2005) agree that mild 
suspicion can be considered beneficial in relationships, as increased vigilance and continuous 
evaluation result in reduced vulnerability.  
 
Drawbacks of suspicion 
 
Hunter et al. (2011) maintain that there is a point where increased suspicion causes cognitive 
ineffectiveness, and that augmented levels may disable partners from making rational 
judgements and accurate assessments. Several authors (e.g Kramer, 2002; Toris & DePaulo, 
1985; Levine & McCornack, 1989) infer that excessive levels of suspicion can lead to 
relationship paralysis– which consequently hinders firms from effectively reacting on their 
discontent and other negative relationship behaviour. Hunter et al. (2011) suggest that high 
levels of suspicion may result in suspicious parties modifying their actions in order to protect 
themselves against exploitation. Similarly, Anderson and Jap (2005) argue that suspicion 
breeds suspicion, as parties often become dubious when they suspect their partners of having 
ulterior motives. Both these aforementioned findings address particular elements of the 
interpersonal deception theory, which suggests that “interpersonal deception activates strategic 
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behaviour on the part of both sender and receiver. . . as the interaction dynamic evolves, both 
parties’ behaviour changes and influences one another” (Burgoon, Buller, Ebesu & Rockwell, 
1994:31). For example, when a partnership becomes characterised by suspicion, partners’ 
willingness to invest in idiosyncratic investments and the sharing of information, often decline 
(Jap, 2001). In addition, high levels of suspicion can also affect relationship continuity, and 
erode competitive advantage (Hunter et al., 2011). Thus, when a relationship is characterised 
by excessive suspicion, the persuasiveness of the suspected party, and the clarity of bilateral 
goals, diminish (Kramer, 2002). 
  
5.6 CONCLUSION  
 
In conclusion, this chapter explored possible symptoms of dark side behaviour that can arise in 
business relationships due to several behavioural outcomes, which would initially have been 
caused by components generally inherent to partnerships. These symptoms (which include 
relational myopia, complacency, vulnerability and suspicion) were selected based on their 
capacity to affect relationship dynamics, as well as the functionality, desirability and continuity 
of business partnerships (Baker, 2009).  
To summarise, relational myopia is defined as the occurrence in which firms embrace an 
excessively narrow perspective regarding their relationship, its dynamics and the environment 
in which it operates (Baker, 2009). Complacency refers to the satisfaction that often 
accompanies the unawareness of dangers and deficiencies, as well as the inability to recognise 
deficiencies in once productive systems (Chowdhurry & Lang, 1996). Vulnerability is 
described by Svensson (2004) as the gap between a firm’s perceived dependence on partner 
and its perceived trust in this particular partner. Lastly, suspicion is defined as the perception 
of an actor to believe the motives of another to be ulterior (Hunter et al., 2011).  
It is evident in the explanations of the abovementioned symptoms that each entail a specific 
complement that can result in dangerous behaviours, attitudes, perceptions and beliefs, which 
might negatively impact the dynamics and future of business relationships, as well as individual 
actors. Abosag et al. (2016) therefore suggests that, the understanding why and how these 
dangerous symptoms appear in relationships, can better equip firms to resolve and manage the 
phenomenon of dark side behaviour. In the next chapter, the relationships pertaining to 
antecedents, behavioural outcomes and these symptoms of dark side behaviour are theorised 
and discussed, in order to evaluate how dark side behaviour can occur in business relationships. 
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Susan Cain, a praised American writer, former lawyer and current negotiations consultant, once 
commented that one genuine relationship is worth a fistful of business cards. This quotation 
speaks volumes concerning the beneficial properties often associated with well-functioning 
business relationships, and how powerful partnerships can advantageously influence not only 
engaged firms but the market as a whole. However, similar to how there is no such thing as a 
perfect romantic relationship, business relationships also possess an inescapable “dark side” 
that often entails stages with detrimental components. Several authors (e.g. Anderson & Jap, 
2005; Barners et al., 2005; Fang, Chang & Peng, 2011; Abosag et al., 2016; Villena, Revilla & 
Choi, 2011; Hibbard, Kumar & Stern, 2001; Blois, 2010) suggest that in order to ensure 
relationship success, it is not enough to only invest in the positive relational elements. Instead, 
partnering firms should consciously reduce negative relational drivers, as the management of 
dark side behaviour can potentially contribute more significantly to business relationship 
development than the mere enhancement of positive components (Baumeister et al., 2001). 
However, in order to manage this dark side phenomenon effectively, firms must first understand 
how inherent relationship attributes can result in particular behavioural outcomes – which, in 
turn, may “darken” typically good-functioning relationships. Abosag et al. (2016) claim that 
firms can obtain valuable understandings concerning the nature of their business relations, as 
well as how to manage them better, by more vigilantly monitoring and analysing negative 
relationship elements. Hence, business partners need to develop the dynamic capabilities that 
allow them to identify not only antecedents and consequential outcomes of dark side behaviour, 
but also the symptoms that may arise and that can potentially harm the dynamics and longevity 
of the relationship. These types of dynamic capabilities can thus assist firms in attaining 
successful relationship management competencies.   
In this chapter, the theoretical framework concerning the manifestation of dark side behaviour 
in business-to-business relationships is discussed. Firstly, the parallel relationships between 
antecedents (shared values, trust, opportunistic behaviour, and uncertainty) and behavioural 
outcomes (conflict, power, dependence, and commitment) are explored and, secondly, the 
association between the aforementioned outcomes and the symptoms of dark side behaviour 
(relational myopia, complacency, vulnerability, and suspicion).  
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6.2 RELATIONSHIP MARKETING THEORIES 
 
Relationship marketing, or business relationship management, has important roots in social 
exchange theory (SET), which serves as a key theoretical base for the current study. Social 
exchange theory is a psychological theory derived from the work of Thibaut and Kelley (1959), 
used for explaining human behavior within groups. The theory is rooted in the notions of 
reciprocal exchange. The reciprocal rule dictates that as one individual gives, another person 
returns, in some measure, what was given (Bothamley 1993; Thibaut and Kelley 1959). The 
balance of this exchange is not always equal however. Social exchange theory explains that 
how an individual feels about a relationship and the exchanges within the relationship are 
dependent on the individual‟s perceptions of (1) the difference between what is put into the 
relationship and exchange versus what is returned (2) the kind of relationship a party feel they 
deserve and (3) the chances of having a better relationship with someone else or the 
attractiveness of alternatives (Thibaut and Kelley 1959). Over the past decade, SET has been 
applied to a relationship marketing context in order to explain the relationship dynamics 
between partnering firms (Luo, 2002) Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005). Thus, the current study 
adopts SET as a theoretical foundation to explain how dark side behaviour can manifest in 
business partnership and consequently affect relationship dyanmics.  
Other important theories that are addressed throughout this study, which contributes to the 
examination of how dark side behvaiour occurs in business relationship, include transaction 
cost theory (TCT), the Behavioural Theory of The Firm (BTF), resource depency theory and 
process theory of relationship ending.  
Behavioural Theory of the firm is a composition of a number of theories that have emerged 
within economics, sociology, business and management studies in order to deal with the issues 
of how firms behave in a marketplace and what determines the interfirm relationships (Starbuck 
et al., 2008). Baker (2009) draws a connection between BTF and the appearance relational 
myopia and complacency, suggesting that firms wil often deal with dynamic events and changes 
in their environment in a standardised way and that firms wil, due to standardised operating 
procedures, will often act or react unreflectively and automatically. Starbuck et al. (2008) also 
explain that BTF suggests that positive outcomes usually reinforce certain behaviours even if 
better alternatives are available. Thus, because of preceding behaviours that cultivate automatic 
responses, as well as reinforce certain mindsets based on previous experiences and 
performance, BTF can ultimately explain why particular behaviours lead to dark side 
behaviour. 
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Furthermore, Williamson (1993) extended the concept of transaction cost theory (TCT) by 
suggesting that the amount of transaction costs in a business-to-business context (e.g. costs of 
managing the relationship, the opportunity costs of making relationship decisions, relationship 
switching costs, etc.) can influence the develop of behaviours and attitudes in a partnership (i.e. 
conflict, power, dependence and commitment). The transaction cost theory argues that 
increased switching costs can lead to the creation of bonding effects between business partners 
(Rindfleisch & Heide, 1997). For example, Geiger et al. (2012) elaborate on the possible 
association between the transaction cost approach and dependence by emphasising that, in order 
for a business relationship to be truly of value, it requires relation-specific investments (e.g. 
dedicated knowledge or assets) form both parties involved. This augmented relational 
investment could potentially lead to an increase in relationship switching costs, as well as the 
emergence of an unequal distribution of dependence among parties (Bendapudi & Berry, 1997; 
Schmitz et al., 2016). Thus, transaction cost theory also provides valuable insight into how the 
appearance of detrimental behaviours can result in the onset of dark side business behaviour.  
Another theory that potentially explains the onset of dark side behaviour in business 
relationship due to the emergence of certain behaviours and attitudes is reseource dependency 
theory. Resource dependency theory emphasises an organization’s need to rely on other parties 
in order to achieve their desired goals (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003). For example, if a business 
relationship is characterised by asymmetric dependence, where one party needs to rely on a 
counterparty’s contribution in order to pursue its own goals, opportunistic behaviour can 
potentially manifest (Schmitz et al., 2016). For instance, if parties are not mutually dependent, 
a superior party driven by self-interest can influence an inferior party to pursue goals that are 
not mutually beneficial. Thus, the resource dependency theory provides a strong theoretical 
foundation for examining how dark side behaviour manifests in business relationships.   
Halinen and Tahtinen’s (2002) process theory of relationship ending was also included in the 
current study, as it offers possible insight into the appearance of vulnerability and suspiscion in 
business relationships. These authors explain that predisposing factors may already exist when 
firms enter into a business partnership, which makes it more vulnerable to breakdown (Halinen 
& Tahtinen, 2002). In other words, there might have been issues pertaining the structure or 
foundation of the relationship prior to its inception, that may ultimately result in its failure. 
Halinen and Tahtinen (2002) also suggest that precipitating events, which may change how a 
relationship is structured, can also lead to relationship dissolution. Thus, the process theory of 
relationship ending emphasises the likelihood of predisposing factors or precipitating events 
causing damage to business relationships. Based on this framework, it is clear to see how parties 
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engaged in otherwise functioning business relationships, characterised by trust and 
commitment, may all of a sudden become vulnerable to the actions of partners in a way they 
had previously not realised (Baker, 2009). 
 
6.3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Abosag et al. (2016) argue that a focal aspect to successfully managing the dark side of business 
relationships, resides in the understanding of when, why and how it occurs, as well as because 
of what. Figure 1.1 provides a theoretical framework for the manifestation of dark side 
behaviour in business-to-business relationships, including several potential antecedents, 
behavioural outcomes and symptoms that could possibly influence the onset of this detrimental 
phenomenon. As depicted in the figure below, shared values, trust, opportunistic behaviour and 
uncertainty are identified as antecedents because of their inherent nature to influence and shape 
relationship dynamics and its directionality (Morgan & Hunt, 1994; Baker, 2009; Abosag et al., 
2016). Subsequently, based on current literature findings and recommendations, conflict, 
power, dependence and commitment are selected as behaviour outcomes that result due to the 
aforementioned antecedents. These outcomes all have the ability, if not managed correctly, to 
result in the symptoms of dark side behaviour, which are negative relationship attributes that 
often occur naturally in partnership because of particular predisposing behaviours (Abosag et 
al., 2016). Ultimately, relational myopia, complacency, vulnerability and suspicion are adopted 
as possible symptoms of dark side behaviour (Baker, 2009), which serves as an indication that 
the relationship is no longer as favourable, efficient and functional as it once was. According 
to Baker (2009), if these symptoms are not reduced correctly, and in a timely manner, it has the 
capacity to severely damage the relational bonds and steer the relationship towards a premature 
ending.  
Baker’s (2009) model investigated the relationship between positive relationship drivers (i.e. 
trust, commitment, shared values and satisfaction) and symptoms of dark side behaviour (i.e. 
relational myopia, complacency, vulnerability and suspicion) in order to determine whether 
excessive levels of the respective positive relationship drivers can result in the dark side of 
business partnerships. Although, the current study adopts Baker’s (2009) symptoms of dark 
side behaviour, it examines a different approach to explaining the onset of dark side behaviour 
in business-to-business relationships. Antecendents (i.e., trust, shared values, opportunistic 
behavour and uncertainty) and behaviour outcomes (i.e. conflict, power, dependence and 
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commitment) were identified and adopted as these constructs, according to the literature, all 
play a significant role in the development of business relationships and can influence the 
attitudes and behaviours of engaged parties (Morgan & Hunt, 1994; Johnsen & Lacoste, 2016; 
Ting et al., 2007). 
 
6.3.1 Trust and behavioural outcomes 
 
Morgan and Hunt (1994) define trust in a relationship marketing context as a firm’s confidence 
in a business partner’s reliability and integrity. Trust has commonly been referred to as the 
willingness of partners to rely on each other’s word (Moorman et al., 1992), as well as the 
underlying belief that partners will fulfil needs and undertake certain actions (Anderson & 
Weitz, 1989). Drawing from the abovementioned descriptions of trust, it is evident why trust is 
considered such a fundamental “building block” in the development and maintenance of 
business relationships (Anderson & Jap, 2005). Because of the inherent qualities that often 
accompany trust, it is possible to infer that the level of trust between firms can influence the 
relational dynamics, functionality, desirability and continuity of partnerships (Baker, 2009; 
Abosag et al., 2015). Therefore, the current study investigates how varying degrees of trust in 
a business relationship can affect the onset of several behavioural outcomes (namely, conflict, 
power, dependence and commitment), which might consequently result in dark side behaviour. 
 
Trust and conflict 
 
Several studies (e.g Kang & Jindal, 2015; Samaha, Palmatier & Dant, 2011; Williamson, 1985; 
Weng & Huang, 2012; Graça & Barry, 2019) have found the degree of conflict in a business 
partnership to affect the level of trust among parties. The current study, however, explores the 
reverse of the aforementioned by examining the effect of trust on the arousal of conflict in 
relationships. For the purpose of investigating the role of conflict in the onset of dark side 
behaviour, the dimensions of dysfunctional and functional conflict are treated as separate 
constructs.   
Mishra (1996) implies that when partners trust one another, they are usually more inclined to 
accept disagreements at face value, and less likely to misinterpret conflict scenarios based on 
the belief that a partner’s behaviours might be driven by hidden agendas. Across various 
disciplines, and especially in the field of business management, most studies have investigated 
the effect of low levels of trust on relationships. For example, Simons and Peterson (2000) 
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claim that when parties don’t trust each other, they are more likely to interpret the ambiguous 
behaviour of others negatively, as well as justify the resulting conflict as a plausible explanation 
for their actions. Similarly, several other authors (Morgan & Hunt, 1994; Anderson & Narus, 
1990; Moorman et al., 1993) have found that low levels of trust can result in a firm’s lack of 
confidence in their partner’s competence, credibility, goodwill, as well as their intentions to act 
and make decisions in a mutually beneficial way. In other words, a low level of trust can 
potentially result in a harmful conflicting situation, as parties might not trust their partners’ 
motives, or might lack confidence in their ability to appropriately fulfil what is expected of 
them in the relationship. Hence, drawing from literature, it is more likely that a low degree of 
trust may result in dysfunctional conflict, as well as decrease the appearance of functional 
conflict. According to Mishra (1996) and Pfajar et al. (2017), when parties don’t trust each 
other enough, they are less inclined to accept disagreements and, because they are unsure of 
their partner’s true motives, more likely to misinterpret the situation. Consequently, the 
aforementioned scenario causes strong disagreements, underlying emotions and negative 
actions that create frustration and result in hostile behaviour (Pfajar et al., 2017, Wu et al., 
2012). Parties might also be less willing to resolve conflict productively if they perceive their 
parties to be having ulterior motives (Abosag et al., 2016).  
In contrast to the effect of low levels of trust, several authors (e.g. Arnott, Wilson, Massey & 
Dawes, 2007; Panteli & Sockalingam, 2005; Massey & Dawes, 2007, Graça & Barry, 2019) 
maintain that higher levels of trust can strengthen relational bonds, and reduce the emergence 
of dysfunctional conflict in business relationships. For example, Morris and Cadogan (2001) 
found that sufficient trust can prevent a hasty or premature rupture in relationships which may 
lead to dysfunctional conflict. In other words, higher levels of trust in a relationship can help 
resolve harmful conflict as firms are more likely to retain confidence in their partners’ reliability 
and integrity, and would feel more inclined to resolve issues appropriately (Morgan & Hunt, 
1994; Anderson & Jap, 2005; Wu et al., 2012). In their pivotal work regarding relationship 
marketing, Morgan and Hunt’s (1994) commitment-trust theory illustrates that higher partner 
trust can result in increased functional conflicts, which may consequently facilitate the 
strengthening of relational bonds. Therefore, based on the abovementioned literature pertaining 
trust and conflict, it is possible to infer the following: 
H1: There is a relationship between trust and functional conflict 
H2: There is a relationship between trust and dysfunctional conflict 
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Trust and power 
 
Business relationships are rarely characterised by an equal distribution of power among parties, 
as one actor is usually pulling on the shorter end (Johnsen & Lacoste, 2016). Several studies 
(e.g. Emerson, 1962; Johnsen & Lacoste, 2016; Leonidou et al., 2008; Dapiran & Hogarth-
Scott, 2003) have explored the influence of power on relational exchanges. The majority of 
studies, however, tend to investigate the effect of power on trust and not so much the reverse. 
For example, Schilke, Reimann and Cook (2015) found that intense power inequality can 
decrease trust in a social exchange. Results reflected that low-power groups are inclined to 
anticipate that more powerful exchange partners would place little value on their relationship 
with them and are more likely to act opportunistically (Schilke et al., 2015). Consequently, in 
the particular case, low-power actors decide that their more powerful partners cannot be trusted. 
This indicates that higher levels of power, or a greater disparity in power among parties, can 
result in lower levels of trust. Other studies (e.g. Abolhasanpour et al., 2011; Pulles, Veldman, 
Schiele & Sierksma, 2014; Jain et al., 2014) indicate that non-coercive forms of power (e.g. 
reward power) can enhance the level of trust among exchange partners. Liu et al. (2010) and 
Jain et al. (2014) claim that non-coercive power usually fosters a high degree of agreement, 
which may subsequently support effective communication and information sharing, as well as 
increased partner credibility.  
Although the current study agrees that the distribution of power in a relationship has the ability 
to influence the level of trust among parties, it aims to investigate the reverse association in 
which trust affects power. Drawing from existing literature, it is possible to infer that when a 
partnership is characterised by high levels of trust, parties tend to exhibit more confidence in 
their partners’ abilities and competence (Morgan & Hunt, 1994), and according to Anderson 
and Jap (2005) they are more inclined to believe that their partners will fulfil their needs and 
undertake certain actions. Thus, due to this predisposition that parties will behave and act 
accordingly and as expected, firms may feel less disposed to influencing their partner to behave 
and act in manner they would not have otherwise in order to achieve certain objectives 
(Emerson, 1962; Jain et al., 2014). In other words, higher levels of trust among business 
partners can decrease the likelihood of the exertion of power. Furthermore, it is also plausible 
to infer that low levels of trust can heighten the impact of power in a relationship. For example, 
Ratnasingham (1999) investigated the risks often associated with low trust among trading 
partners in electronic commerce and found that there are certain risks that arise from low trading 
partner trust, which among others, include coercive power. Hence, it can also be theorised that 
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low levels of trust among partners can increase the usage of power in business relationship. 
Based on the aforementioned literature, the current study derives the following hypotheses: 
H3: There is a relationship between trust and non-coercive power 
H4: There is a relationship between trust and coercive power 
 
Trust and dependence 
 
Dependence has been defined as a firm’s need to maintain a relationship with a specific partner 
in order to achieve certain objectives (Frazier, 1983; Schmitz et al., 2016). Previous studies 
have mostly either investigated trust and dependence as antecedents of several relationship 
marketing phenomena or have explored the effect of dependence on trust. For example, Zhang 
and Huo (2012) explored the relationship between dependence and trust in supply chains, and 
found that dependence is positively associated with trust, indicating that it prompts a 
manufacturer to build trust with both customers and suppliers. According to the transaction cost 
theory, if dependence is high but manufacturers do not invest in building trust with partners, 
they are more likely to develop opportunistic behaviours (Laaksonen et al., 2008).  
Although, the current study acknowledges the association between dependence and trust, it 
aims to examine the less researched avenue that includes exploring the effect of trust on 
dependence. In interfirm relationship development, trust emerges from one party’s perception 
of the other’s devotion to the partnership (Wang et al., 2011). Trust can provide possible 
methods to tackle the negative effects of dependence (McCarter & Northcraft, 2007), and 
reciprocal trust may reduce the risk that a powerful partner might take advantage of its 
dependence (Zhao et al., 2008). When a relationship is characterised by higher levels of trust, 
parties might be more inclined to rely on their partners and invest in the relationship (Schmitz 
et al., 2016), as well as be encouraged to share resources and information to obtain mutual goals 
and objectives (Morgan & Hunt, 1994). Consequently, high levels of trust can cause parties to 
become “entwined” and reliant on one another, which may result in increased dependence. 
However, low levels of trust can also influence the degree of dependence among partners. When 
a partnership is characterised by low levels of trust, parties may experience a lack of confidence 
in their partners’ competence and behaviours (Johnsen & Lacoste, 2016). This may reduce 
partner and relationship dependency, as firms may not entrust their partners to complete certain 
tasks, or to be reliant in terms of goal achievement. Additionally, low levels of trust can cause 
firms to refrain from sharing resources and information, which can prevent dependencies from 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
122 
 
forming (Johnsen & Lacoste, 2016). Therefore, based on this discussion pertaining the 
relationship between trust and dependence, the following hypothesis can be derived: 
H5: There is a relationship between trust and dependence 
 
Trust and commitment 
 
Commitment can refer to firm’s willingness to make short-term sacrifices in order to maintain 
a relationship (Anderson & Weitz, 1992). According to Jiang, Henneberg and Naudé (2012), 
higher levels of commitment are expected to be linked with relationship success since more 
committed partners will endeavour to balance short-term problems with long-term goal 
achievement. Long-term partnerships cannot be maintained without an adequate level of 
commitment between firms (Jiang et al., 2012, Hashim & Tan, 2015). A number of studies (e.g. 
Human & Naudé, 2014; Chen, Yen, Rajkumar & Tomochko, 2010; Hashim & Tan, 2015) have 
reported findings that show a positive relationship between trust and commitment. Some studies 
(e.g. Dowell et al., 2015; Chen et al., 2017; Kwon & Suh, 2005, Hashim & Tan, 2015) have 
also indicated that if a firm does not feel its partner is honest, competent and benevolent enough, 
the relationship might become characterised by low levels of trust – which may subsequently 
result in low levels of commitment. Trust is considered a major determinant of relationship 
commitment (Morgan and Hunt, 1994), and thus no commitment is consummated unless 
partners feel that trust has been established (Kwon & Suh, 2005). In contrast, when a 
relationship is characterised by high levels of trust, firms may be more confident that their 
partners will not act opportunistically towards them (Roberts-Lombard, Mpinganjira & 
Svensson, 2017). Trust can help reduce levels of perceived vulnerability to risk (Svensson, 
2004), as well as create an environment where firms can invest in building long-term 
relationships (Oh, 1987). Morgan and Hunt (1994) also emphasise the importance of trust 
pertaining firms’ decisions to invest in the development of a relationship. Accordingly, the 
current study hypothesises the following: 
H6: There is a relationship between trust and commitment 
 
6.3.2 Shared values and behavioural outcomes 
 
Shared values have been defined as the extent to which parties have beliefs in common about 
what behaviours, goals and policies are important or unimportant, appropriate or inappropriate, 
and right or wrong (Morgan & Hunt, 1994). When a business relationship is characterised by a 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
123 
 
substantial amount of shared values, parties may be considered to be “on the same page” 
regarding how their relationship works, should work, and how business practices and 
endeavours should be approached (Baker, 2009). In other words, shared values can express the 
extent to which business partners might think in the same way or share similar beliefs regarding 
how they conduct themselves in their relationships. Because shared values can affect 
relationship dynamics, along with its functionality and desirability, the current study 
investigates the relationship between shared values and particular behavioural outcomes that 
can potentially result in the onset of dark side behaviour.  
 
Shared values and conflict  
 
Conflict has been described as the tension that arises between parties due to perceived 
differences (Raven & Kruglanksi, 1970) and partners being incompatible (Skarmeas, 2006). 
Several authors (e.g. Johnsen & Lacoste, 2016; Yandle & Blyth, 2000; Abosag et al., 2015) 
claim that conflict within business relationships tend to surface when firms find it difficult to 
work together, consequently causing the disruption of operations. There is a lack of research 
regarding the influence of shared values on business relationships and, therefore, the current 
study investigates the association between shared values and conflict in order to better 
understand particular behavioural outcomes that emerge in partnerships. Firstly, this study 
theorises that when a relationship is characterised by a substantial amount of shared values, 
business partners are more likely to think the same way and share similar perspectives regarding 
their relationship and its dynamics (Baker, 2009). Consequently, it is less likely that differences, 
disagreements and incompatibilities will surface in the relationship, which can possibly reduce 
the appearance of dysfunctional conflict. Additionally, partnerships with high levels of shared 
values are also more prone to better resolve and manage conflict situation, as parties are usually 
driven by similar mindsets and values (Baker, 2009). Hence, the amount of shared values within 
a relationship can affect the degree of functional conflict between parties. Secondly, low levels 
of shared values can potentially result in more disagreements and difference among partners, 
as firms may not be compatible or share similar outlooks regarding the relationship and how it 
should be governed (Baker, 2009). Therefore, low levels of shared values within a partnership 
can potentially increase dysfunctional conflict, as well as decrease functional conflict. The 
current study therefore hypothesises the following: 
H7: There is a relationship between shared values and functional conflict 
H8: There is a relationship between shared values and dysfunctional conflict 
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Shared values and power 
 
Raven and French (1968) incorporated the elements of control and influence to define power 
as the force induced by an actor on another in order to bring about change. A number of studies 
have explored the influence of power dynamics within business relationships, and they infer 
that the distribution of power among partners can have a noteworthy effect on relational 
operations. For example, Rehme et al. (2016) and Schilke et al. (2015) both identified that more 
powerful actors often use, or misuse, their position of power to encourage or force their 
“weaker” counterparties to act in specific way in order to achieve certain objectives. Thus, the 
current study explores the effect of shared values on power, by inferring that the amount of 
shared values among parties may influence the level of consensus in the relationship, which 
can subsequently affect parties’ decision to exert their power and act opportunistically (Schilke 
et al., 2015, Dietz & Weibel, 2014; Miocevic, 2020; Abosag et al., 2015). In other words, when 
a relationship is characterised by a substantial amount of shared values, parties are more likely 
to have similar perspectives regarding their relationship, and disagreements and 
incompatibilities are less likely to surface. Consequently, high levels of shared values among 
partners can influence power dynamics, as firms may be less likely to exert power when they 
believe their partners to act in a desirable manner. However, it is also possible that higher levels 
of shared values within a partnership, can cause low-power parties to become more accepting 
of their powerful partner’s use of power in the relationship (Johnsen & Lacoste, 2016; 
Miocevic, 2020; Abosag et al., 2015). Based on the abovementioned theory pertaining shared 
values and power dynamics, the current study proposes the following: 
H9: There is a relationship between shared values and non-coercive power 
H10: There is a relationship between shared values and coercive power 
 
Shared values and dependence 
 
Dependence within a business relationship has been defined as firm’s need to rely on the 
contribution of another in order to achieve certain goals and objectives (Emerson, 1962). 
Schmitz et al. (2016) suggest that sources of dependency can be grouped into three main 
categories, namely relational, partner-inherent and market-related sources. When investigating 
the effect of shared values – an imperative driver of relationship development – on dependence 
in a partnership, the current study considers relational sources to be the central focus. Relational 
sources generally comprise of reasons that underlie relational bonds between partners (Schmitz 
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et al., 2016). For example, several authors (e.g. Laaksonen et al., 2008; Kopfer, Kotzab, Corsten 
& Felde, 2005; Casciario & Piskorski, 2005) imply that dependence is more likely to emerge 
when partners form close ties, and jointly invest more in the relationship. However, Anderson 
and Jap (2005) found that when firms form close exchange relationships, characterised by high 
levels of compatibility, trust and commitment, they often tend to become more entwined in 
terms of resources, operations and goal achievement. Consequently, firms may become overly 
dependent due to these relational aspects, which can over time potentially cripple parties’ 
perceptions of the relationship, its dynamics and the environment in which it operates (Baker, 
2009).  
Although there is a fair amount of research pertaining the effect of dependence on exchange 
relationships, little to no studies have investigated the association between shared values and 
dependence in a business-to-business context. Based on literature concerning both shared 
values and dependence, it possible that when a relationship is characterised by high levels of 
shared values, parties might be more compatible, and also share similar perspectives regarding 
their relationship, its dynamics and how it should be governed (Baker, 2009). The “good 
feelings” often associated with these higher levels of compatibility and understanding (Baker, 
2009) might inspire parties to increase their investment in the relationship, as well as encourage 
the development of relational bonds and resource ties. Consequently, a substantial amount of 
shared values can result in firms becoming more entwined with one another, which can 
ultimately lead to high levels of dependency. On the other hand, low levels of shared values 
within a relationship can signify incompatibility among partners, which may prevent them form 
investing in the development of relationship, or sharing resources and information beyond 
contractual agreements (Anderson & Jap, 2005; Abosag et al., 2015). Thus, the following 
hypothesis can be derived from the abovementioned literature: 
H11: There is a relationship between shared values and dependence 
 
Shared values and commitment 
 
Shared values have been of great interest to organisational researchers, in particular to those 
who explore the development of commitment within business relationships (Zineldin & 
Jonsson, 2000). Many authors (e.g. Morgan & Hunt, 1994; MacMillian, Money, Money & 
Downing, 2005; Fullerton, 2003; Theron, Terblanche & Boshoff, 2008; Dolatabadi & Safa, 
2010; Phelps & Campbell, 2012) report a positive relationship between shared values and 
relationship commitment. Kelman (1961) claims that partners’ attitudes and behaviours usually 
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result from having the same values as the other. For example, when a relationship is 
characterised by high levels of shared values among firms, they are more likely to be compatible 
and to share similar philosophies pertaining their relationship and its future (Morgan & Hunt, 
1994; Baker, 2009). Therefore, it possible that the level of shared values in a business 
relationship can influence the level of commitment between partnering firms. Accordingly, the 
following hypothesis is proposed: 
H12: There is a relationship between shared values and commitment 
 
6.3.3 Opportunistic behaviour and behavioural outcomes 
 
One of the key elements that drives transaction cost analysis is opportunistic behaviour 
(Zineldin & Jonsson, 2000). Opportunism has been defined as “self-interest seeking with guile” 
(Williamson, 1975:6). More specifically, however, opportunistic behaviour within business 
partnerships commonly refers to a situation in which parties realise their own gains separately 
(Conner & Prahalad, 1996) and, as a result, individual needs are prioritised and pursued over 
mutual goals and objectives (Abosag et al., 2016). A magnitude of studies (e.g. Abosag et al., 
2016; Laan, Voordijk & Dewulf, 2011; Lai et al., 2012; Brookes, Altinay & Aktas, 2015; 
Mukherjee & Nath, 2003) have explored the impact of opportunistic behaviour on exchange 
relationships. For example, Anderson and Jap (2005) maintain that opportunistic behaviour can 
result in certain behaviours, attitudes and actions that can potentially damage relationship 
dynamics, as well as leave parties vulnerable to exploitations and deceit. Therefore, the current 
study examines the association between opportunistic behaviour and possible behavioural 
outcomes that can lead to the manifestation of dark side behaviour in interfirm partnerships.  
 
Opportunistic behaviour and conflict  
 
Many studies (e.g. Zineldin & Jonsson, 2000; Morgan & Hunt, 1994; Das & Rahman, 2015; 
Skarmeas, 2006) have explored the impact of opportunistic behaviour on business relationships. 
For example, Samaha, Palmatier and Dant (2011) maintain that opportunism in partnerships 
causes partners to start looking out for their narrow self-interests rather than mutually beneficial 
interests. When opportunistic behaviours and attitudes surface within relationships, it is more 
likely that parties might violate agreements and indulge in deceitful behaviour aimed at seeking 
self-interest (John, 1984; Williamson, 1975). Several authors (e.g. Kang & Jindal, 2015; Cheng 
& Sheu, 2012; Claro, Vojnovskis & Ramos, 2018; Foss & Weber, 2016) have found that 
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conflict – especially dysfunctional conflict – can result in the onset of opportunistic behaviour 
in exchange relationships. The current study, however, investigates the reverse by exploring 
the effect of opportunistic behaviour on both dysfunctional and functional conflict. Skarmeas 
(2006) has reported a negative relationship between opportunism and functional conflict. 
Opportunistic behaviour often reflects a lack of candor or honesty concerning transactions, and 
often include guileful self-interest seeking behaviour embodied in calculated efforts to mislead 
and confuse trading partners (Williamson, 1985). When a firm acts opportunistically, they may 
misrepresent information and material facts, evade obligations, fail to honour promises, as well 
as demonstrate no regard for principles (Skaremas, 2006). Consequently, this type of behaviour 
can generate feelings of tension and frustration, as well as incite resentment and vindictiveness 
in partners, as operations are usually disrupted, and a sense of justice undermined. Under these 
circumstances, firms are often more likely to lock themselves into a “conflict spiral” rather than 
to work together to resolve relationship problems in a mutually beneficial way (Skarmeas, 
2006).  
Based on these abovementioned findings and theoretical underpinnings, the current study 
theorises that increased opportunistic behaviour might result in higher levels of dysfunctional 
and lower levels of functional conflict, and vice versa. Accordingly, the following hypotheses 
are developed: 
H13: There is a relationship between opportunistic behaviour and functional conflict 
H14: There is a relationship between opportunistic behaviour and dysfunctional 
conflict 
 
Opportunistic behaviour and power 
 
According to Cai, Goh, de Souza and Li (2013), the use of power can potentially influence the 
operational decisions of parties in supply chain relationships. Several authors have explored the 
impact of power on opportunism in interfirm partnerships, and most reported that a relationship 
does indeed exist between power and opportunism. Joshi and Arnold (1997), as well as Lusch 
and Brown (1996), argue that power can either have a positive or negative effect on 
opportunism, depending on specific circumstances. For example, in outsourcing relationships, 
Handley and Benton (2012) found that a buyer’s coercive power is related to an increased risk 
of opportunistic behaviour (e.g. poaching and shrinking) by the service provider, as well as that 
a buyer’s non-coercive power is related to a decreased risk of opportunistic behaviour (e.g. 
poaching and shrinking). Additionally, based on various theories and empirical tests, Hawkins, 
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Pohlen and Prybutok (2013) reported that power is an important factor that influences the 
appearance of opportunism in business relationships.  
Although the current study accepts that the degree and directionality of power can influence the 
level of opportunistic behaviour in partnerships, it investigates the reverse association by 
exploring the effect of opportunistic behaviour on both non-coercive and coercive power. Non-
coercive power is positively related to collaborative relationships (Benton & Maloni, 2005), 
and facilitates information and knowledge sharing, integrates processes (Cai et al., 2013; Zhao 
et al., 2008), as well as enhances understanding between partners (Wang, Ye & Tan, 2014). 
Non-coercive power is executed through a positive influence, and usually signals that partners 
treat each other like friends (Liu et al., 2010; Jain et al., 2014). Therefore, when parties act 
opportunistically, it may possibly affect the level of non-coercive power executed in a 
relationship, as firms may be more inclined to use their power out of self-interest to bring about 
a certain change and get their partners to act in a particular manner in order to achieve specific 
goals which are narrowly beneficial. On the other hand, coercive power reflects negative 
aspects pertaining to the use of power (Benton & Maloni, 2005), and can damage cooperation 
between partners, increase conflict and reduce relationship satisfaction (Leonidou et al., 2008). 
When firms act opportunistically, it possible that they might exert their position of power to 
force their partners to act specific in order to achieve self-interest orientated objectives. Thus, 
the current study proposes the following hypotheses: 
H15: There is a relationship between opportunistic behaviour and non-coercive power 
H16: There is a relationship between opportunistic behaviour and coercive power 
 
Opportunistic behaviour and dependence 
 
Wang, Huo, Tian and Hua (2015) refer to opportunism as a situation in which a firm seeks to 
benefit at the expense of its partner, by breaching agreements, withholding information, or 
withdrawing promises. Luo (2006) emphasises that opportunistic behaviour can also arise in 
the form of partner manipulation and entrapment. Although many studies (e.g. Joshi & Arnold, 
1997; Hartmann & Herb, 2014; Hawkins, Wittmann & Beyerlein, 2008) have investigated the 
effect of dependence on opportunistic behaviour within exchange relationships, this study 
explores the relationship between opportunistic behaviour and dependence. When opportunistic 
behaviours are directed at influencing partners to use their efforts to achieve the self-interest of 
one party, or aligning the relationship with the self-interest of the latter (Hawkins et al., 2013), 
it possible that it can influence the level of dependence among partners. Thus, it is possible that 
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parties can use manipulation and other opportunistically inclined behaviours that speak to the 
development of relational sources of dependence. For example, when a firm wants to control 
and exploit its partner, it might act opportunistically in order to obtain heavy resource ties and 
relational bonds to ensure partners become dependent and cannot function without their input 
in the relationship. Accordingly, the current study hypothesises the following:  
H17: There is a relationship between opportunistic behaviour and dependence 
 
Opportunistic behaviour and commitment 
 
Morgan and Hunt (1994) found that when a party believes that a partner engages in 
opportunistic behaviour, such perceptions might result in decreased trust. Similarly, these 
authors suggest that opportunism may have an indirect negative effect on commitment via trust 
(Morgan & Hunt, 1994). Skarmeas et al. (2002), along with several others (e.g. Liu et al., 2010; 
Mysen et al., 2011; Ting et al., 2007; Gutiérrez, Cillán & Izquierdo, 2004), reported a direct 
negative effect of opportunism on commitment. The current study agrees that when a 
partnership is characterised by high levels of opportunism, firms might pursue self-seeking 
agendas over mutually beneficial gains, which can consequently affect the desirability and 
continuity of the relationship. In other words, if partners act opportunistically, they may feel 
less inclined to maintain the relationship because of the unfavourability brought on by 
opportunism (Morgan & Hunt, 1994). Therefore, the following is proposed: 
H18: There is a relationship between opportunistic behaviour and commitment 
 
6.3.4 Uncertainty and behavioural outcomes 
 
Achrol and Stern (1988) define uncertainty as the extent to which a partner has sufficient 
information to make key decisions, can foresee the consequences of these decisions, and has 
confidence in them. Similarly, Eriksson and Sharma (2003) refer to uncertainty in business 
partnerships as the “gap” between expected and realised future outcomes, emphasising the 
effect of how limited information can influence firms’ abilities to make decisions. In other 
words, uncertainty can reflect a firm’s inability to predict something accurately (Milliken, 
1978). Several researchers have investigated the effect of uncertainty within exchange 
relationships. For example, Klein (1996) found that high levels of uncertainty may produce 
information asymmetries between sellers and buyers, increasing the potential of opportunism 
in the relationship. Hedaa (1993) reported that uncertainty may lessen the ability of firms to 
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plan for future conditions, which may lead to reluctance to invest additional time and resources 
in the working relationship. Hakansson and Snehota (1995) also found that high levels of 
uncertainty can cause problems concerning the coordination of activities performed by partners. 
Based on the abovementioned theory and findings, it is plausible to infer that uncertainty can 
potentially influence inter-firm partnerships. The current study, therefore, adopts uncertainty as 
an antecedent of dark side behaviour, as it can potentially shape the behaviours, actions and 
perceptions of partners, which can subsequently affect the dynamic of a relationship, as well as 
its favourability and efficiency.  
 
Uncertainty and conflict 
 
A number of studies (e.g. Leonidas et al., 2006; Mysen et al., 2010; Abosag et al., 2016; Ting 
et al., 2007) have treated uncertainty and conflict as antecedents of various relationship 
marketing phenomenon. However, very few have investigated the relationship between 
uncertainty and conflict. Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) describe uncertainty as the degree to 
which an organisation cannot anticipate or accurately predict the future of its relationship with 
another, which can result mainly from problems regarding the availability of adequate, relevant 
and timely information. More specifically, Eriksson and Sharma (2003) refer to relationship 
uncertainty as the lack of certainty pertaining their partners’ decisions and intentions, which 
can disable firms from making accurate predictions, as well as confidently making decisions 
concerning the future of their relationship. Hence, when a partnership is characterised by high 
levels of uncertainty, parties might feel vulnerable due to a lack of certainty pertaining their 
partners’ decisions and intentions, and they may consequently feel less inclined to invest in  
relationship development, or to share information openly (Abosag et al., 2016). On the other 
hand, it is also possible that lower levels of uncertainty can result in higher levels of functional 
conflict, as more certainty may encourage parties to be more cooperative and transparent, and 
to increase knowledge sharing (Leonidas et al., 2006). Therefore, the current study proposes 
the following: 
H19: There is a relationship between uncertainty and functional conflict 
H20: There is a relationship between uncertainty and dysfunctional conflict 
 
Uncertainty and power 
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According to resource dependency theory, firms often form an interdependent partnership to 
deal with external and internal uncertainties (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2007; Wang et al., 2015). 
Although resource dependencies theory implies that uncertainty does have a general effect on 
the use of power in exchange relationships, research studies pertaining to the association 
between uncertainty and the use of non-coercive and coercive power is minimal. However, 
several authors have investigated the relationship between uncertainty and power dynamics, of 
which most have reported a positive relationship. For example, Ketchen and Hult (2007) 
suggest that higher levels of uncertainty in a partnership can encourage parties to use their 
power in order to try and reduce these uncertainties. Hence, in certain and stable relationships, 
parties are usually less motivated to control their partners’ behaviour (Ketchen & Hult, 2007).  
Wang et al. (2015) infer that when facing uncertainties, firms can potentially exercise two types 
of power in attempt to control the behaviour of their partners. From an economic perspective, 
parties can protect their interests by punishing their partners if they do not satisfy needs or do 
not act accordingly (Wang et al., 2015). Chiang and Feng (2007) suggest that when 
uncertainties increase in a partnership, firms might be more inclined to use coercive power to 
control the behaviours of partners. On the other hand, parties can also use non-coercive power 
to reduce uncertainties (Paulraj & Chen, 2007). Firms may choose to influence, control or 
change their partners’ behaviours in a more positive way through the use of non-coercive power 
(Wang et al., 2015). In other words, parties may be more prone to exert either reward, expert, 
reference or legitimate power in order to cope with relationship uncertainties and increased 
information sharing (Leonidas et al., 2006). Accordingly, the current study hypothesises the 
following: 
H21: There is a relationship between uncertainty and non-coercive power 
H22: There is a relationship between uncertainty and coercive power 
 
Uncertainty and dependence 
 
Thompson (1967) maintains that an organisation’s technical core needs to be protected from 
uncertainty in order to function effectively. Similarly, business partners need to invest and 
develop in critical components of their relationship in order to ensure uncertainties can be 
overcome, or reduced (Abosag et al., 2015). Although, several studies (e.g. Martin, Gözübüyük 
& Becerra, 2015; Gao, Sirgy & Bird, 2005; Paulraj & Chen, 2007) have investigated the 
association between dependence and uncertainty, few have explored the effect of uncertainty 
on dependence within a business-to-business context. When a relationship is characterised by 
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high levels of uncertainty, parties often lack confidence to perform certain tasks or make 
required decisions (Eriksson & Sharma, 2003). Ketchen and Hult (2007) suggest that when 
faced with uncertainties, partnering firms might increase information sharing, as well as 
combine their efforts in order to better equip themselves to handle uncertainties that appear in 
their relationship. Consequently, parties become more entwined and become more confident 
pertaining the governance of their relationship.  For example, Gao et al. (2005) found that firms 
in a highly and mutually dependent relationship are likely to perceive less uncertainty in their 
partnership. Therefore, high levels of uncertainty can result in higher levels of dependence as 
parties might draw closer and increase their sharing of information and resources in order to 
reduce uncertainties within their partnership. However, it is also possible that the level of 
uncertainty can diminish relational ties and increase vulnerability, causing firms to withdraw 
themselves and their resources from the relationship in order to protect themselves (Jiang, Shiu 
& Henneberg, 2013).  
Based on the abovementioned literature pertaining the potential association between 
uncertainty and dependence, the following is proposed: 
H23: There is a relationship between uncertainty and dependence 
 
Uncertainty and commitment 
 
A number of studies (e.g. Kwon & Suh, 2004; Weigel, Brown & O’Riordan, 2011; Gao et al., 
2005) have explored the relationship between uncertainty and commitment – especially as an 
indirect effect through which uncertainty influences trust, which subsequently affects the level 
of commitment in a relationship. However, Gitiérrez, Cillàn and Izquierdo (2004) suggest that 
it is possible that uncertainty can influence relational commitment. These authors infer that the 
reduction of fear and the lack of confidence that is usually associated with uncertainty in a 
relationship, is often considered an important requisite for firms in order to commit to a partner. 
When a partnership is characterised by a high degree of uncertainty, parties might be less 
willing to commit due to feelings of insecurity, doubt, or fear of erring (Gitiérrez et al., 2004). 
Therefore, the level of uncertainty within a partnership can potentially influence the evel of 
commitment between business partners, as uncertainty has the ability to affect important 
relational components and behaviours. Accordingly, the current study proposes the following 
hypothesis: 
H24: There is a relationship between uncertainty and commitment 
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6.3.5 Functional conflict and symptoms of dark side behaviour 
 
Functional conflict refers to the healthy and vigorous challenge of ideas, beliefs and 
assumptions (Tjosvold, 1985). Similarly, Skarmeas (2006) and Pfajar et al. (2017) describe 
functional conflict within a partnership as differing opinions among partners pertaining to 
relationship tasks, strategy business ideas and other relationship-related issues that tend to be 
discussed openly and resolved, and which subsequently facilitates the strengthening of 
relational bonds. Pascale (1990) also referred to functional conflict as the constructive form of 
conflict that has been posited to exist in innovative and successful organisations and interfirm 
relationships. Several studies have indicated that functional conflict can result in positive 
relational outcomes such as increased collaboration (Jehn & Mannix, 2001), improved quality 
of connections, as well as intensified interactions between parties (McEvilly, Perrone & Zaheer, 
2003). The current study thus investigates the relationship between functional conflict and 
symptoms of dark side behaviour in order to explain how it can possibly harm business 
relationships if not managed correctly.  
 
Functional conflict and relational myopia 
 
Baker (2009) defines relational myopia as the occurrence in which partnering firms embrace a 
too-narrow perspective regarding their relationship, its dynamics and how it should be governed 
as it manoeuvres through its operating environment. Parallel to strategic inertia, relational 
myopia can also surface due to a lack of innovative ideas, challenging perspectives, and the 
unwillingness to consider alternatives (Baker, 2009). Usually, when firms exhibit a high level 
of functional conflict, parties are more willing to consider new ideas and changes suggested by 
partners, and also more likely to volunteer information and new ideas (Bharadwaj & Howell, 
1996). Schwenk (1989) suggests that when functional conflict arises, there is constructive 
interaction between parties during which opinions and feelings are freely expressed. 
Consequently, it is possible that functional conflict can lead to careful consideration of 
alternatives and assumption of underlying decisions (Cosier & Schwenk, 1990). Therefore, it 
is possible that lower levels of functional conflict can result in higher levels of relational 
myopia. However, Cosier and Dalton (1990) maintain that functional conflict can also generate 
stronger commitment to chosen strategies, procedures and ideas. Hence, higher levels of 
functional conflict also have the potential to increase relational myopic tendencies within a 
relationship. Accordingly, the following hypothesis can be derived: 
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H25: There is a relationship between functional conflict and relational myopia 
 
Functional conflict and complacency 
 
Baker (2009) describes complacency as the inability of firms to recognise deficiencies in their 
once-productive systems. One of the most problematic aspects of complacency for business 
relationships is that it usually occurs in “strong” relationships, which contain intense feelings 
of trust, commitment, loyalty and satisfaction (Lund et al., 2015). For example, when a business 
partnership becomes characterised by excessive levels of comfort and confidence, partners 
might neglect to vigilantly monitor their relationship dynamics, as well as their operating 
environment (Lund et al., 2015). Thus, complacency can surface due to positive relationship 
experiences and “good feelings” that often accompany desirable partnerships. 
Several studies (e.g. Jehn & Mannix, 2001; Shi, Cao, Chen & Chow, 2019; Pfajfar et al., 2017; 
Massey & Dawes, 2007) have explored the phenomenon of functional conflict in business 
relationship. For example, Jehn and Mannix (2001) maintain that functional conflict is 
associated with positive outcomes, such as the identification and discussion of alternative 
perspectives and removal of impediments in order to work effectively together. Similarly, 
Pfajfar et al. (2017) suggest that functional conflict can lead to creative friction – which can 
encourage parties to challenge current perspectives through the exploration of new ideas, 
procedures and business models. Therefore, it is possible that functional conflict can interrupt 
or prevent the onset of a complacent culture in relationships, as it generally entails a component 
that challenges current perspectives, using differences in opinions to find new and mutually 
beneficially solutions. However, because complacency can also stem from positive relationship 
experiences and high levels of favourability, functional conflict also has the potential to 
influence the appearance of relationship complacency. In other words, firms may neglect to 
explore alternative partners due to excessive confidence and trust in their present relationship 
and their ability to resolve conflicting situations. The current study accordingly hypothesises 
the following: 
H26: There is a relationship between functional conflict and complacency 
 
Functional conflict and vulnerability  
 
Attridge et al. (1998) define vulnerability as a party’s concern regarding the continuation of a 
relationship and its partner’s future provision of need satisfaction. Vulnerability within a 
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business partnership can be influenced by the degree of dependence between firms, as well as 
by how much they trust each other to act accordingly and make appropriate decisions 
(Svensson, 2004). In other words, vulnerability can be described as the extent to which parties 
feel vulnerable in their relationships because of the likelihood that a particular disturbance 
might occur, which may subsequently harm them and their business (Svensson, 2002). Pfajfar 
et al. (2017) maintain that functional conflict has the capacity to strengthen relational bonds, 
improve the quality of connections, as well as to intensify interactions. Several authors (e.g. 
Jehn & Mannix, 2001; Pfajfar et al., 2017; Johnsen & Lacoste, 2016) also infer that functional 
conflict can positively influence relationships, as it can enhance cooperation, stimulate idea 
generation, strengthen feelings of security, as well as increase the level of confidence of 
partners in one another. Therefore, it is possible that, when a relationship is characterised by 
high levels of functional conflict, parties may feel less vulnerable as they might be more 
confident that their partners will act with integrity, and that they will experience more security 
concerning the continuity of their relationship. Based on the abovementioned theory, the current 
study accordingly proposes: 
H27: There is a relationship between functional conflict and vulnerability 
 
Functional conflict and suspicion 
 
Anderson and Jap (2005) suggest that firms might experience a sense of increased vulnerability 
out of fear of being victimised by their business partners. This fear that others will act 
opportunistically, or foster negative intentions, can result in the onset of suspicion within 
relationships (Anderson & Jap, 2005). Suspicion within the context of business relationships 
has been conceptualised as a dynamic cognitive effortful state in which a firm, because of 
uncertainty as to whether a partner may be concealing harmful or opportunistic intentions, 
engages in the active and thoughtful consideration of these motives and plausible casual 
explanations underlying partner behaviour (Hunter et al., 2011). Baker (2009) identifies 
suspicion as a symptom of the dark side of relationship marketing, as it can potentially damage 
typically good-functioning relationships, as well as weaken relational bonds.  
When a partnership becomes characterised by high levels of functional conflict, differing 
opinions can be resolved in a way that usually strengthen relational ties (Pfajfar et al., 2017), 
increase cooperation (Jehn & Mannix, 2001), enhance positive relationship drivers (e.g. trust 
and commitment) and intensify interactions (McEvilly et al., 2003). In other words, functional 
conflict can result in a better understanding between partners concerning each other’s needs 
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and behaviours, as well as increased communication efficiency and how well they work 
together (Johnsen & Lacoste, 2016; Pfajfar et al., 2017). Thus, it is possible that functional 
conflict can reduce suspicion within business relationships as parties are less likely to believe 
that their partners have ulterior motives or hidden agendas. Accordingly, the current study 
proposes the following hypothesis: 
H28: There is a relationship between functional conflict and suspicion 
 
6.3.6 Dysfunctional conflict and symptoms of dark side behaviour 
 
Dysfunctional conflict usually comprises of strong disagreements, underlying emotions and 
negative actions that create frustration and hostility within a relationship (Pfajfar et al., 2017). 
Similarly, Menon, Bharadwaj and Howell (1996) suggest that dysfunctional conflict commonly 
concerns unhealthy behaviours between partners that involve friction, anger, clashes and 
tension in their interaction, which can disrupt operations and build distrust. Skarmeas (2006) 
found that dysfunctional conflict can result in the onset of an undesirable relationship climate 
that can potentially damage and disintegrate relational bonds between partners. Several others 
(e.g. Bradford, Stringfellow & Weitz, 2004; Rose & Shoham, 2004; Amason, 1996; Pfajfar et 
al., 2017) have also investigated the effect of dysfunctional conflict on business relationships, 
and have reported parallel findings, reflecting the destructive nature of dysfunctional conflict. 
For example, Bradford et al. (2004) suggest that dysfunctional conflict limits the processing of 
new information, gives rise to hostile attributions concerning the behaviours of partners, 
decreases willingness to tolerate opposition, as well as disturbs effective communication and 
cooperation within a network. Therefore, dysfunctional conflict has the capacity to create 
obstacles that inhibit decisions and, ultimately, hurt the desirability, functionality and efficiency 
of interfirm relationships.  
 
Dysfunctional conflict and relational myopia 
 
Pfajfar et al. (2017) maintain that firms that find themselves in relationships characterised by 
friction, anger and hostile feelings, are less willing to adapt and accommodate business partners. 
Consequently, when a relationship becomes undesirable and inefficient due to dysfunctional 
conflict, parties may be driven to seek and explore alternative partnerships (Skarmeas, 2006). 
Therefore, it is possible that dysfunctional conflict can reduce relational myopic tendencies, as 
friction and hostility might prohibit firms from adopting a too narrow perspective regarding 
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their relationship and its dynamics (Baker, 2009). However, according to Bradford et al. (2004), 
dysfunctional conflict can also limit the processing of new information, which can potentially 
cause to firms to become disconnected from their operating environment and oblivious to more 
attractive alternatives. In other words, dysfunctional conflict can potentially also encourage the 
appearance of relational myopia in partnerships – especially when the relationship becomes 
isolated from its operating environment and parties are ill-informed regarding their options. 
Thus, based on the abovementioned theory, it is possible to infer the following: 
H29: There is a relationship between dysfunctional conflict and relational myopia 
 
Dysfunctional conflict and complacency 
 
According to Baker (2009), complacency can manifest within business relationships due to 
strong relational foundations built over time on feelings of trust, commitment, satisfaction and 
loyalty. When a partnership becomes characterised by dysfunctional conflict, parties are more 
likely to exhibit hostility towards one another (Pfajfar et al., 2017) and may be more inclined 
to act in a way that can potentially damage their relationship and partner (Skarmeas, 2006). 
Therefore, because dysfunctional conflict can hinder the development of relationships, it can 
also possibly reduce the likelihood that a complacent culture will emerge. In other words, 
dysfunctional conflict can impede on relationship success and the emergence of emotional 
dependencies (Webb & Hogan, 2002), which can prevent complacency from surfacing in 
business relationships. The current study proposes the following hypothesis: 
H30: There is a relationship between dysfunctional conflict and complacency 
 
Dysfunctional conflict and vulnerability 
 
Dysfunctional conflict within interfirm partnerships commonly entails strong disagreements, 
underlying emotions and negative actions that produce frustration and hostility between parties 
(Pfajfar et al., 2017). Skarmeas (2006) claim that dysfunctional conflict can damage 
relationship dynamics and cause parties to pull away from one another, which in turn can 
decrease important relationship factors such as trust and commitment. Hence, when a 
relationship is characterised by high levels of dysfunctional conflict, firms might feel more 
vulnerable as they are less confident that their partners will act and behave with integrity and 
honesty and in a way that emphasises mutual benefit (Skarmeas, 2006; Johnsen & Lacoste, 
2016). In other words, because dysfunctional conflict can harm relational ties and destroy 
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feelings of trust, security and confidence among partners, it possible to conceive that 
dysfunctional conflict can influence the degree of vulnerability in partnerships. Accordingly, 
the current study proposes the following: 
H31: There is a relationship between dysfunctional conflict and vulnerability 
 
Dysfunctional conflict and suspicion 
 
Pfajfar et al. (2017) and Skarmeas (2006) agree that dysfunctional conflict usually entail intense 
disagreements and negative emotions, which can cause partners to become frustrated and 
hostile, and could consequently lead to the disintegration of relational bonds, as well as the 
willingness to work together. Tension caused by dysfunctional conflicts can diminish trust, as 
well to encourage parties to act opportunistically and to seek more desirable and compatible 
partners (Pfajfar et al., 2017; Skarmeas, 2006; Johnsen & Lacoste, 2016). Hunter et al. (2011) 
claim that suspicion increases when parties are uncertain in terms of the motivations underlying 
their partner’s actions and decisions. Dysfunctional conflict can cause partners to move away 
from one another and drive them to pursue self-interest over mutual interest (Baker, 2009). 
Thus, dysfunctional conflict can decrease trust, commitment and loyalty (Baker, 2009), as well 
as increase the likelihood pertaining the emergence of opportunism in relationships (Pfajfar et 
al., 2017). Consequently, because of dysfunctional conflict, parties may become more 
suspicious of their partner’s actions and decisions as firms may question the integrity and 
motive of their intentions. Accordingly, the current study proposes the following: 
H32: There is a relationship between dysfunctional conflict and suspicion 
 
6.3.7 Non-coercive power and symptoms of dark side behaviour 
 
Jain et al. (2014) broadly conceptualise non-coercive power as the mechanism that references 
or mediates positive consequences for compliance. A manifold of studies (e.g. Wilkinson, 1979; 
Ramaseshan et al. 2006; Yu & Pysarchik , 2002; Raven et al., 1993; Jonsson & Zineldin, 2003; 
Liu, Zhang & Yuan, 2010) have explored the phenomenon of non-coercive power in the context 
of exchange relationships, of which many have reported it to have a positive impact on 
components of  interfirm partnerships. Leonidou et al. (2008) suggest that the exercise of non-
coercive power can help to increase financial and social benefits through, for example, the 
offering of financial rewards, provision of assistance, and access to specialised information. 
Subsequently, the aforementioned use of non-coercive power can promote common interests 
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and collective goals within a relationship, as well as enhance a friendly and constructive 
atmosphere. These positive aspects may lead to higher levels of satisfaction within the working 
relationship (Leonidou et al., 2008). Similarly, Arend and Wisner (2005) remark that non-
coercive power is a driver for teamwork, improved relationships in the supply chain and better 
individual performance for a firm. Non-coercive power can also cultivate relatively high levels 
of agreement between partners (Leonidou et al., 2008). Because of its ability to influence 
relationship dynamics, the current study examines the association between non-coercive power 
and possible symptoms of dark side behaviour. 
 
Non-coercive power and relational myopia 
 
Non-coercive power involves the target’s admiration for the source (referent) and provision of 
benefits to partners, such as exchange of information and expertise, rewards, and/or the use of 
legitimate rights (Jain et al., 2014). The use of non-coercive power suggests that firms often 
communicate with their partners and share information and skills (Liu et al., 2010). When 
parties share information, they provide a signal of “good faith” and benevolent motives and 
intentions (Jain et al., 2014). Similarly, when firms share expertise, they develop the belief that 
partners are capable of fulfilling promises and that they are therefore reliable (Moorman et al., 
1992). According to Luo et al. (2011), the abovementioned outcomes of non-coercive power 
within a relationship can foster great value and interest congruence between business partners, 
as well as promote high levels of agreement. Consequently, these positive outcomes can 
enhance the credibility of partners and promote the belief that parties are motived to seek mutual 
gain (Jain et al., 2014). The provision of rewards and assistance by partners can also act as a 
sign of support and goodwill, which can result in higher levels of trust and commitment in the 
relationship (Hald, Cordon & Vollmann, 2009). Relational myopia can, hence, appear within 
relationships due to the constructive and positive outcomes of non-coercive power. In other 
words, firms may become excessively reliant and trusting based on positive feelings and results 
brought on by the exercise of non-coercive power, which may disable them from identifying 
threats and opportunities in both internal and external environments. Accordingly, the current 
study hypothesises:  
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Non-coercive power and complacency 
 
Lund et al. (2015) maintain that complacency may surface when involved firms become 
excessively confident in their position in the relationship and overly attached to their partners 
because of past experiences and positive feelings. Consequently, relationship complacency can 
cause parties to let down their guard, disabling them from vigilantly monitoring their internal 
and external environments (Baker, 2009). Complacency may occur when a partnership is 
characterised by successful past experiences and consistent feelings of satisfaction, reliability, 
trust and quality exchanges (Baker, 2009; Lund et al., 2015). Partners may become 
overconfident in their “proven” current practises and productive systems, and thus unable to 
recognise decencies or a decline in efficiency (Baker, 2009). Because non-coercive power has 
the ability to cultivate high levels of agreement and cooperation between parties, as well as 
enhance trust and partner satisfaction (Leonidou et al., 2008; Ramaseshan et al. 2006), it is 
possible that a complacent culture can appear in a relationship characterised by high levels of 
non-coercive power. However, non-coercive power also has the capacity to disrupt operations 
and prevent complacency when firms use non-coercive measures to change either the attitude 
of a partner, or the direction of the relationship (Gelderman, Semeijn & De Zoete, 2008). 
Therefore, the current study proposes the following hypothesis: 
H34: There is a relationship between non-coercive power and complacency 
 
Non-coercive power and vulnerability 
 
Baker (2009) describes vulnerability as the extent to which a firm feels their partner’s actions 
or decisions might hurt their business or the relationship. Vulnerability usually addresses the 
concern of parties regarding the continuation of their relationship and a partner’s ability to 
provide future need satisfaction (Svensson, 2004). Because non-coercive power can enhance 
teamwork, as well as increase trust and commitment (Arend & Wisner, 2005; Jain et al., 2014), 
it is possible that higher level of non-coercive power exercised in a relationship can reduce 
feelings of vulnerability among parties. On the other hand, firms may also use non-coercive 
power to enforce their beliefs, influence the direction of a relationship, or change the attitudes 
of their partners (Jain et al., 2014). In other words, parties may use non-coercive power 
opportunistically in order to promote their self-interest and individual agenda (Dapiran & 
Hogarth-Scott, 2003). Thus, as opposed to reducing vulnerability, non-coercive power can also 
cause parties to feel vulnerable. Additionally, the exercise of non-coercive power can also result 
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less powerful actors becoming more dependent on their stronger partners – which can ultimately 
result in them becoming entrapped in a relationship. Non-coercive power can, hence, lead to 
higher level of dependence between parties, which can consequently increase the degree of 
vulnerability. Accordingly, the current study hypothesises the following: 
H35: There is a relationship between non-coercive power and vulnerability 
 
Non-coercive power and suspicion 
 
Although non-coercive power is often associated with positive relationship outcomes (e.g. 
cooperation, satisfaction, trust, etc.), it can also be used to manipulate others and influence them 
to behave in a manner they would not have otherwise (Johnsen & Lacoste, 2016). McCormack 
and Levin (1990) refer to suspicion as a belief that certain messages (i.e. behaviours, decisions, 
and actions) produced in a particular setting by a specific party may be deceptive. Suspicion 
within business relationships often entail uncertainty pertaining partners’ motives, as the 
sureness and confidence that usually accompany certainty in terms of intentions are absent (Fein 
et al., 1990). When a powerful party uses non-coercive power to change the direction of the 
relationship, or influence another to act differently, partners might become suspicious of the 
motives underlying the exercise of non-coercive power (Abolhasanpour et al., 2011). For 
example, opportunistic parties may use rewards to influence their partners to act in a way that 
benefits the self-interest of the initial firm. Thus, when the motives behind the use of non-
coercive power is unclear, it is possible that the level of suspicion in a partnership might 
increase. Based on this theory, the following can be derived: 
H36: There is a relationship between non-coercive power and suspicion 
 
6.3.8 Coercive power and symptoms of dark side behaviour 
 
Coercive power has been defined as the mechanism for gaining target compliance that 
references or mediates negative consequences of noncompliance (Jain et al., 2014). The use of 
coercive power by a firm is based on the intention of causing loss to a partner (Zhuang, Xi & 
Tsang, 2010), and is usually considered negatively orientated power (Jain et al., 2014). 
Coercive power stems from the expectation held by one relationship partner that the other more 
powerful partner can punish them if they do not comply with the demand made by the more 
powerful party (French & Raven, 1968). Lunenburg (2012:3) explains that coercive power has 
“the ability to influence others by punishing them or by creating a perceived threat to do so”. 
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In other words, coercive power is based on one party’s perception that another may impose 
punishment if requests of the latter are not complied with (Lacoste & Blois, 2015). According 
to several authors (e.g. Frazier & Rody, 1991; Rawwas et al., 1997; Jain et al., 2014; Leonidou 
et al., 2008), the exercise of coercive power involves aggressive, forceful and suppressive 
behaviour, which can cause other parties in the relationship to perform tasks that they would 
not otherwise have undertaken. This unwilling engagement is most likely to escalate tension 
and frustration between partners (Rawwas et al., 1997) and can, consequently, result in the 
onset of several symptoms of dark side behaviour. 
 
Coercive power and relational myopia 
 
Many studies have explored the harmful impact of coercive power on business relationships, 
and most have reported a negative relationship between coercive power and constructive 
relationship outcomes, such as satisfaction (Gelderman et al., 2008; Leonidou et al., 2008) and 
cooperation (Ferrer, Santa, Hyland & Bretherton, 2010). Coercive power within a partnership 
constitutes a serious obstacle to effective collaboration (McDonald, 1999), as the depth of 
collaboration often depends on the power position of partners (Cox, 2007). Hence, unequal 
power may hinder the attempt of parties to build collaborative relationships (Van Weele & 
Rozemeijer, 2001). Hausman and Johnston (2010) also found that when the more powerful 
parties in a relationship act opportunistically through coercion, there is a decline in levels of 
trust and commitment. Subsequently, coercive power can result in higher monitoring costs and 
intensified disagreements between partners (Leonidou et al., 2008). Furthermore, because 
relational myopia generally occurs due to consistent and intense levels of positive relational 
drivers (e.g. trust, commitment, satisfaction, etc.), it is possible that coercive power can hinder 
its onset (Baker, 2009). In other words, as coercive power can result in lower levels of 
collaboration, cooperation and partner satisfaction (Van Weele & Rozemeijer, 2001; Leonidou 
et al., 2008; Gelderman et al., 2008), parties might be more inclined monitor their internal and 
external environments – which, in turn, can prevent the relationship from becoming myopic. 
Accordingly, the current study proposes the following: 
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Coercive power and complacency 
 
Several authors (e.g. Gelderman et al., 2008; Leonidou et al., 2008; Van Weele & Rozemeijer, 
2001) have found that when the more powerful partner in a relationship uses coercive power, a 
reduction pertaining the level of trust, commitment, satisfaction and collaboration may occur. 
Because complacency generally emerges due to excessively high levels of the abovementioned 
relationship outcomes (Baker, 2009), it is possible that coercive power can hinder, and even 
prevent, the appearance of a complacency in a relationship. Leonidou et al. (2008) infer that 
coercive power can result in increased vigilance and intensified disagreements between parties, 
which can prevent firms from becoming overly reliant on current practices, blindly trusting 
their partners. Subsequently, coercive power can decrease the appearance of complacent 
behaviours in a partnership. However, some authors (e.g. El-Ansary & Stern, 1972; 
Abolhasanpour et al., 2011; Johnsen & Lacoste, 2016; Leonidou et al., 2008; Jain et al., 2014) 
maintain that suppression is a key component of coercive power, and that it is the reason that 
tension and frustration are often associated with coercive power. Powerful partners can employ 
suppressive behaviours to force partners to act in a way they would not otherwise have done 
(Jain et al., 2014). Therefore, complacency can also surface when the more powerful firms in 
a partnership use coercive power to govern their relationship according to their specific 
preferences. The current study thus proposes the following hypothesis: 
H38: There is a relationship between coercive power and complacency 
 
Coercive power and vulnerability  
 
Hunt and Nevin (1974) describe coercive power as the aggressive and manipulative use of 
power in an exchange relationship. Firms may use coercive power, in the form of threats and 
punishments, to gain partners’ compliance (Kumar, 2005). Consequently, coercion can have a 
negative impact on relationships, and as a result parties might start to feel vulnerable and 
experience frustration with regard to relationship dynamics (Leonidou et al., 2008; Jain et al., 
2014). Yeung, Selen, Zhang and Huo (2009) suggest that the use of coercive power can also be 
a sign of future opportunistic behaviour and can, therefore, increase the feeling of vulnerability, 
as well as hesitation pertaining to the sharing of information and investing in relationship 
development. Based on the abovementioned theory, the current study proposes the following 
hypothesis: 
H39: There is a relationship between coercive power and vulnerability 
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Coercive power and suspicion 
 
Several authors (e.g. Yeung et al., 2009; Chung, 2012; Van Weele & Rozemeijer, 2001; Ireland 
& Webb, 2007; Hausman & Johnston, 2010) infer that coercive power can result in opportunism 
and, as a result hinder cooperation, information sharing and the development of trust and 
commitment. In this case, firms might become fearful of being exploited by their partners – 
which could subsequently signal that they neither credible nor interested in the welfare of their 
counterparties (Chung, 2012). This opportunistic behaviour element underlying the use of 
coercive power, can result in lower levels of trust, commitment and transparency among parties. 
Therefore, when the exercise of coercive power leads to the weakening of relational bonds, as 
well as the fear of opportunism and a decline in information sharing, parties are more inclined 
to be suspicious of their partners. Accordingly, the current study proposes the following: 
H40: There is a relationship between coercive power and suspicion 
 
6.3.9 Dependence and symptoms of dark side behaviour 
 
Dependence within a business-to-business relationship indicates that a firm requires a 
contribution from, or interaction with, a partner organisation in order to achieve certain goals 
(Frazier et al., 1983). Jarratt and Morrison (2003) suggest that dependence can be mutual 
(symmetric), powerful (high in magnitude), or vulnerable (easy to replace). Although 
dependence has been regarded as a position to avoid in interfirm partnerships as it may impact 
negatively on satisfaction, other studies (e.g. McCarter & Northcraft, 2007; Jiang et al., 2010) 
have reported positive associations such as technology access, information flow and cost 
savings. Johnson (1999) asserts that, even though dependence provides a platform for 
collaboration, it does not necessarily follow. The aforementioned author maintains that “a 
firm’s deliberate choice to work within what could be considered a negative structural 
constraint (i.e. dependence) may generate positive consequences” (Johnson, 1999:6). However, 
these seemingly positive outcomes that stem from dependence can, over time, result in other 
detrimental relationship behaviours, which might negatively influence the functionality, 
desirability and efficiency of business partnerships. The current study, therefore, explores the 
association between dependence and various symptoms of dark side behaviour.  
 
Dependence and relational myopia 
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Many studies (e.g. Jarratt & Morrison, 2003; Zhang & Huo, 2013; Jiang et al., 2012; Scheer, 
Miao & Palmatier, 2015; Schmitz et al., 2016; Gelderman & Van Weele, 2004) have explored 
the influence of dependence on positive relational drivers and relationship dynamics. For 
example, Jiang et al. (2012) found that there is a positive relationship between dependence and 
trust. They infer that business partners might encourage one another to develop relational norms 
in order to strengthen and enhance the investment in the relationship (Jiang et al., 2012). Thus, 
high levels of dependence may also signify a highly cooperative relationship with little need 
for opportunism. MacKenzie (1996) claim that when a relationship is characterised by high 
levels of dependence, trust can be enhanced as dependent parties will not want risky actions to 
jeopardise their relationship.  
Jiang et al. (2012) also found that there is a positive relationship between dependence and 
several pivotal constructs linked to relationship quality, namely commitment, communication, 
satisfaction and long-term orientation. Because of these “good feelings” generated through 
dependence, firms may become excessively reliant and overconfident with regards to their 
partnership with a particular party. Subsequently, due to this intense bond between parties, 
firms may adopt a myopic perspective regarding their relationship, how it is governed as well 
as the environment in which it operates. Furthermore, several authors (e.g. Cox, Lonsdale, 
Watson & Qiao, 2003; Lonsdale, 2001; Narasimhan, Nair, Griffith, Arlbjorn & Bendoly, 2009; 
Harrison, Beatty, Reynolds & Noble, 2012) use the term “lock-in situation” parallel to 
dependence, as the former often describe a heavy degree of dependence in which a partner has 
no alternative but to maintain the relationship presently employed. In other words, when one 
party is heavily dependent upon another, they might become locked in their relationship 
(Narasimhan et al., 2009). Consequently, Baker (2009) infers that a state of lock-in can also 
cause parties to adopt a myopic perspective with regards to their relationship and its 
environment. Based on the abovementioned literature, the current study proposes the following 
hypothesis: 
H41: There is a relationship between dependence and relational myopia 
 
Dependence and complacency 
 
Schmitz et al. (2016) claim that specific forms of dependence, the intensity of dependence, and 
lock-in can affect the relationship between business partners. Barnes, Naudé and Michell (2005) 
refer to the increase in information exchange and sharing of resources, while others emphasise 
mutual adaptations (Heide & John, 1990), higher relational satisfaction (Andaleeb, 1992), and 
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increased relational performance (Buchanan, 1992) as positive outcomes of dependence within 
business relationships. However, some who explored the negative connotations of dependence 
in partnerships found that it can potentially result in the loss of strategic flexibility, an 
imbalance of power among parties, as well as the increased risk of opportunism (Cox et al., 
2003; Harrison et al., 2012; Schmitz et al., 2016). Because complacency usually occurs due to 
overconfidence and satisfaction stemming from excessive trust in current procedures and 
relationships (that have proven to be successful in the past), it is possible that dependence can 
cause a complacent culture within a partnership (Baker, 2009). Dependence can potentially 
increase the level of communication, information sharing, satisfaction, trust and commitment 
in a relationship, which in turn can cause the onset of complacency, so that parties may not see 
the need to consider alternatives. Because dependence can lead to a lack of strategic flexibility 
(Schmitz et al., 2016) as well as “lock-in situations” (Narasimhan et al., 2009), it is possible 
that the relationship may become governed by a complacent culture that lacks the initiative to 
explore new ways of doing business. Accordingly, the current proposes the following 
hypothesis: 
H42: There is a relationship between dependence and complacency 
 
Dependence and vulnerability 
 
Vulnerability has been defined as the gap between the perceived dependence and the level of 
trust between partners within a relationship (Svensson, 2004). More specifically, vulnerability 
within business relationships can be influenced by the degree to which parties are dependent 
on one another, as well as how much they trust each other to act accordingly and make mutually 
beneficial decisions (Svensson, 2002). According to several authors (e.g. Hillman et al., 2009; 
Johnsen & Lacoste, 2016; Schmitz et al., 2016; Harrison et al., 2012), heavy dependence within 
a relationship can signify that parties are excessively dependent on each other or the partnership, 
which can ultimately make them more vulnerable to possible opportunistic behaviour – 
especially when dependence is non-symmetric and one party has more power. In other words, 
when a relationship is characterised by high levels of dependence, firms may rely too much on 
their partners for goal achievement, making highly dependent parties more vulnerable to 
opportunistic behaviour from their less dependent counterpart (Johnsen & Lacoste, 2016; 
Svensson, 2002). Thus, the current study hypothesises the following: 
H43: There is a relationship between dependence and vulnerability 
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Dependence and suspicion 
 
Partnerships are often considered ubiquitously opportunistic (Weide & Heide, 2000), which 
implies that suspicion is, and always will be, a part the business-to-business relationships 
(Baker, 2009). Jap (2001) suggests that the mere suspicion that a partner might be acting 
opportunistically is sufficient enough to damage – even destroy – the relationship and to drive 
firms to pursue their self-interest out of defence. Several authors (e.g. Joshi & Arnold, 1997; 
Provan & Skinner, 1989; Dong, Liu, Yu & Zhneg, 2015; Mysen et al., 2011; Hawkins et al., 
2008) acknowledge that when a relationship is characterised by heavy dependence, parties are 
more likely to foster opportunistic intentions and agendas. Thus, when the less dependent party 
acts seemingly opportunistically, and the level of trust between firms is not satisfactory 
(Svensson, 2004), it is possible that heavy dependence can result in the more dependent party 
becoming suspicious of the former’s behaviour and intentions. Accordingly, the current study 
proposes the following hypothesis: 
H44: There is a relationship between dependence and suspicion 
 
6.3.10 Commitment and symptoms of dark side behaviour 
 
In deriving their definition of commitment, Morgan and Hunt (1994) drew from a variety of 
disciplines such as social exchange, marriage and organisational behaviour. These authors 
defined commitment as an exchange partner’s belief that an ongoing relationship with another 
is so important that it warrants maximum effort to maintain. In other words, committed parties 
are more inclined to believe their relationship is worth working on to ensure that it endures 
indefinitely (Morgan & Hunt, 1994). Furthermore, Leik and Leik (1977) refer to commitment 
as the unwillingness to consider partners other than those in the current relationship. This 
aforementioned definition is consistent with that of Gundlach et al. (1995) who define 
commitment as the forsaking of alternative options.  
Commitment is often perceived as essential for achieving or obtaining positive outcomes within 
business relationships (Morgan & Hunt, 1994). In order to ensure the realisation of these 
beneficial outcomes, firms often focus on maintaining and fostering commitment within their 
partnerships, especially as it is considered one of the key ingredients of successful long-term 
relationships (Dwyer et al., 1987; Garbarino & Johnson, 1999). Although the majority of 
studies that focus on interfirm commitment include positive connotations, some researchers 
(e.g. Anderson & Jap, 2005; Abosag et al., 2016; Baker, 2009) have recently started to examine 
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a potential dark side of commitment. Picking up on this later development, the current study 
explores the association between commitment and possible symptoms of dark side behaviour 
that can ultimately harm the partnership.  
 
Commitment and relational myopia 
 
Commitment is often associated with various positive relational outcomes (Dwyer et al., 1987; 
Garbarino & Johnson, 1999; Morgan & Hunt, 1994). However, Baker (2009) found that 
excessive levels of commitment can result in partners adopting a too narrow perspective 
regarding the relationship and how it should be managed. In other words, firms may become so 
overly committed to each other that their focus becomes “narrowed” due to the good feelings 
between them (Anderson & Jap, 2005; Baker, 2009). These good feelings about the relationship 
and the involved partner may be misinterpreted because of the relationship yielding positive 
benefits and performance outcomes (Baker, 2009). This is consistent with the behavioural 
theory of the firm as it suggests that positive outcomes can reinforce certain behaviours despite 
the availability of better options (Ginsberg & Baum, 1994). Hence, firms may become myopic 
over time, as they might confuse these good feelings for success, or current success for future 
success. In addition, as firms become more focused on the relationship, they might start to 
neglect the monitoring of their environments (Baker, 2009). In other words, as a relationship 
progresses over time and parties realise efficiencies and measures of success, the resulting 
confidence in their relationship might discourage parties form seeking alternatives. Weiner 
(1982) suggests that highly committed firms will show persistence in their relational obligations 
without regard for environmental and other relational cues that may indicate a change of 
perspective. Thus, when firms are committed to their relationship obligations, but refuse to 
monitor the dynamics surrounding those obligations, it is possible that they have adopted a 
myopic view concerning their partnership. Accordingly, the current study proposes the 
following: 
H45: There is a relationship between commitment and relational myopia 
 
Commitment and complacency 
 
Similar to the case of relational myopia, the good feelings and positive reinforcement that often 
accompany commitment within relationships might be misinterpreted by parties and, 
consequently, discourage them from being more vigilant and considering alternatives (Baker, 
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2009). This might be especially true if business partners have enjoyed some measure of success 
earlier on in their relationship, as they might believe this success to always be a given 
(Chowdhury & Lang, 1996; Hagen, 1999; Bergquist, 2006). Consequently, parties might 
perceive the idea of monitoring the specifics of the relationship, or its environment, as 
counterintuitive and even a waste of time (Baker, 2009). This inaction can effectively lock firms 
into a relationship that should potentially be terminated or refined in some way to serve partners 
better (Baker, 2009). However, commitment to the relationship and its dynamics can keep firms 
from taking the necessary steps to change the dimensions of their partnership (Haytko, 2004).  
Furthermore, complacency stems from the inability to recognise the need for action (Baker, 
2009). Tan and Akhtar (1998) indirectly support the association between commitment and 
complacency, as they found that high levels of commitment can lead to mental exhaustion or 
“burnout” in an employer-employee context. Extrapolating these findings to a business-to-
business context, it is possible to infer that high levels of commitment can lead to the firm-level 
equivalent of relational burnout or exhaustion, which may subsequently result in the onset of 
complacency (Baker, 2009). In contrast, it is also possible that high levels of commitment can 
motivate parties to maintain and develop their relationship by ensuring they remain innovative, 
as well as perceptive to changes in their environment (Ng, Feldman & Lam, 2010; Heavey 
Simsek & Fox, 2015). Thus, the current study proposes the following hypothesis: 
H46: There is a relationship between commitment and complacency 
 
Commitment and vulnerability 
 
When firms allow themselves to become committed to their partners, they may potentially be 
creating a situation that allows for the onset vulnerability (Baker, 2009). Halinen and Tahtinen’s 
(2002) process theory of relationship ending offers possible insight into the appearance of 
vulnerability in business relationships. More specifically, these authors explain that 
predisposing factors may already exist when firms enter into a business partnership, which 
makes it more vulnerable to breakdown (Halinen & Tahtinen, 2002). In other words, there 
might have been issues pertaining the structure or foundation of the relationship prior to its 
inception, that may ultimately result in its failure. Halinen and Tahtinen (2002) also suggest 
that precipitating events, which may change how a relationship is structured, can also lead to 
relationship dissolution. Thus, the process theory of relationship ending emphasises the 
likelihood of predisposing factors or precipitating events causing damage to business 
relationships. Based on this framework, it is clear to see how parties engaged in otherwise 
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functioning business relationships, characterised by trust and commitment, may all of a sudden 
become vulnerable to the actions of partners in a way they had previously not realised (Baker, 
2009).  
Several studies have investigated the link between commitment and vulnerability. For example, 
Mesner and Stebe (2004) found that increased feelings of insecurity, or vulnerability, can 
negatively influence a party’s commitment towards their relationship. These feelings might 
result due to predisposing factors that were triggered due to a sort of disturbance (Svensson, 
2002; Hakansson & Tahtinen, 2002) which, despite the good intentions of partners, may still 
lead to the onset of vulnerability. Other authors (e.g. Lacey, 2007; Morgan & Hunt, 1994; Wong 
& Sohal, 2002) conceptualised commitment as encompassing vulnerability, which suggests that 
when firms choose to commit to one another they accept the vulnerability that originate from 
being in the relationship. Firms that are committed to their partners often forfeit alternative 
options (Fullerton, 2003), with the resulting exclusivity thus binding partners tightly together 
(Baker, 2009). Consequently, parties may start to feel increasingly vulnerable, as they have 
effectively cut themselves off from other market opportunities (Baker, 2009). In other words, 
when partnering firms form close ties, and start to share their information and resources, they 
might be more vulnerable to opportunistic behaviour from their partner. However, Wong, Chan 
& Leung (2008) found that lower levels of commitment can also result in increased 
vulnerability. Firms may not feel confident in their partner’s desire to continue the relationship, 
nor trust them to act with integrity and according to contractual agreements. Therefore, based 
on the abovementioned literature, the current study proposes the following:  
H47: There is a relationship between commitment and vulnerability 
 
Commitment and suspicion 
 
Similar to the association between commitment and vulnerability, the crux of the relationship 
between commitment and suspicion resides in the increased integration between parties 
(Svensson, 2004). When a relationship is characterised by high levels of integration between 
parties, firms are generally more vulnerable to opportunistic behaviour from their partners 
(Abosag et al., 2016). Baker (2009) maintains that when firms find themselves overly exposed 
due to an excessively committed relationship, they may be hypersensitive to any changes in 
relational dynamics. For example, if partners do not strictly abide by contractual agreements or 
meet relationship objectives accordingly, suspicion may surface between firms as they are more 
aware of their vulnerability (Baker, 2009). Thus, excessive levels of commitment can 
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potentially cause the onset of suspicion within a relationship. However, lower levels of 
commitment between parties can also result in suspicion as parties may be less trusting and 
more inclined to question their motivation underlying their actions and behaviour (Anderson & 
Jap, 2005; Abosag et al., 2016). Accordingly, the current study proposes the following: 
H48: There is a relationship between commitment and suspicion 
 
6.4 CONCLUSION  
 
This chapter explores several important theoretical underpinnings regarding the manifestation 
of dark side behaviour in interfirm relationships. Firstly, the linkage between antecedents and 
the occurrence of particular behavioural outcomes is investigated. Drawing from a wide range 
of literature (i.e. business-to-business, strategic management, organisational behaviour, 
relationship marketing, supply chain management, international business, etc.), several inherent 
relationship attributions (namely, shared values, trust, opportunistic behaviour, and uncertainty) 
were identified and examined due to their capacity to cause specific behavioural outcomes, 
which subsequently can affect relationship dynamics, as well as its longevity and directionality 
(Abosag et al., 2016). Secondly, the association between these abovementioned outcomes and 
symptoms of dark side behaviour (e.g. relational myopia, complacency, vulnerability and 
suspicion) was also examined in order to provide a system for evaluating business relationships, 
thereby recognizing when partnerships have become inefficient and unfavourable. In 
conclusion, this chapter constitutes the theoretical foundation for the current study’s framework 
(see Figure 1.1), by drawing from prevailing literature to explain the onset of dark side 
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CHAPTER 7: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
The current study explores two sets of simultaneous associations pertaining to the so-called 
dark side of business relationships. The first set of associations concern the relationship 
between potential antecedents (trust, shared values, opportunistic behaviour and uncertainty) 
and behavioural outcomes (conflict, power, dependence and commitment) of the dark side of 
business relationships. The second set of associations considers the relations between the 
aforementioned behaviours and symptoms (relational myopia, complacency, vulnerability and 
suspicion) of dark side behaviour. In order to test the conceptual model, data was collected from 
account managers and other middle to top level managers from organisations across various 
industries in South Africa. Many studies in the field of business-to-business research (e.g. Shin 
et al., 2000; Guenzi, Pardo & Georges, 2007; Guesalaga, 2014) have identified these targeted 
individuals as ideal respondents, due to their experience and expertise in the direct management 
and development of business relationships. However, because of the known difficulty with the 
availability and accessibility of this population, the sample is restricted (Hair et al., 2019). 
Therefore, although a sample calculator (Soper, 2015) was used to calculate the recommended 
sample needed to test the conceptual model, Tabachnick and Fidell’s (1996) rule of thumb is 
adopted as it supports a more realistic approach to business-to-business samples. Furthermore, 
a hard copy survey was selected as the key measurement instrument to gather data from 
respondents, and data was analysed using SPSS and SmartPLS software. In this chapter, the 
research question is first discussed by referring specifically to the research objectives of the 
current study. Next, the research method is addressed with emphasis on the sampling plan and 
the development of the measurement instrument. Lastly, in the data analysis section, the data 
analysis plan for the study will be explained along with the procedures and considerations 
pertaining to the descriptive and inferential analyses.  
 
7.2 RESEARCH QUESTION 
 
Companies often spend a significant amount of time and effort to build and maintain business 
relationships that offer valuable relational benefits. These efforts usually generate positive 
outcomes in the form of increased trust, greater commitment, as well as enhanced cooperation 
among parties (Abosag et al., 2016). In addition, these positive outcomes often encourage 
business partners to develop reciprocal norms that improve relationship value creation through 
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continuous learning, interaction and the promotion of psychological closeness and reciprocity 
(Abosag et al., 2016; De Wulf et al., 2001).  It is because of this positive perception of inter-
organisational partnerships that existing management literature focus predominantly on the 
“bright side” of business-to-business relationships. However, in recent years, several studies 
(e.g. Anderson & Jap, 2005; Barners, 2005; Fang, Chang & Peng, 2011; Abosag et al., 2016; 
Villena, Revilla & Choi, 2011) have identified that, beneath the surface of assuming positive 
relationships, a natural occurring negative side resides. Correspondingly, Abosag et al. (2016) 
concluded that in order to ensure relationship success, it is not enough to only invest in positive 
relational attributes, but that there is increasing value in parties safeguarding themselves against 
negative perceptions, actions and behaviours. Baumeister et al. (2001) also suggested that the 
conscious management of negative impacts regarding the dark side can have a greater influence 
on business relationships, than when merely focusing on the development of positive 
relationships. In other words, a better understanding of the phenomenon of dark side behaviour 
in business relationships can assist companies in developing better relationships with partners, 
as well as protecting themselves against opportunistic behaviour (Abosag et al., 2016).  
Therefore, the current study investigates the onset of dark side behaviour in business-to-
business relationships – specifically, how, why and when it appears, along with what causes it 
to arise. Based on the aforementioned description of the research problem, the primary 
objectives for this study include the following: 
• To investigate whether a relationship exists between antecedents of dark side behaviour 
(trust, shared values, opportunistic behaviour and uncertainty) and consequential 
behavioural outcomes (functional and dysfunctional conflict, coercive and non-coercive 
power, dependence and commitment). 
• To investigate whether a relationship exists between behavioural outcomes (functional 
and dysfunctional conflict, coercive and non-coercive power, dependence and 
commitment) and symptoms of dark side behaviour (relational myopia, complacency, 
vulnerability and suspicion). 
 
7.3 RESEARCH METHOD  
 
There are three primary research methodologies that were considered during the research design 
of the current study, namely quantitative, qualitative and a mixed methods approach.  
Quantitative research methods refer to methods in which numbers are used to explain findings 
(Kowalczyk, 2016). The research procedures entail experiments and quasi-experiements, with 
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the collection of the data being statistical based (Creswell, 2003; Maxwell & Delaney, 2017). 
Hennink, Hutter and Bailey (2020) explains that the general purpose of quantitative research is 
to explain, predict or investigate relationships, describe current conditions, and examine 
possible impacts on specified outcomes. The advantages of quantitative research methods 
include (Creswell & Poth, 2016): (1) drawing conclusions from a large sample, (2) the 
employment of efficient data analysis, (3) the examination of probable cause and effect, and (4) 
controlled bias. Limitations of quantitative research are that it is impersonal, there is limited 
understanding of the context of participates, and it is largely research driven (Crewell & Poth, 
2016). 
In contrast to quantitative research methods, qualitaitive research methods emply descriptive 
procedeures to generate meaning and understanding of the phenonomenon being studied 
(Cresswell, 2003). In this research method, the researcher may be a part of the research 
instruments. For example, a social sciences the researcher would actively interact with the 
people they are studying. Open ended questions are used, rather than closed ended in 
quantitative methods. According to Creswell (2003:9) “qualitative research is largely inductive, 
with the inquirer generating meaning from the data collected in the field”. This method can be 
employed if the researcher is not certain of which variables to control (Creswell, 2003). Thus, 
qualitative research methods may be useful in cases where the researcher wishes to gather a 
general idea from the subjects, the goal being to explore, interpret and describe a situation. 
A mixed method approach combines both quantitative and qualitative methods in order to get 
a full understanding of the phenomenon under study (Maxwell & Delaney, 2004). Thus, a 
mixed research method usually results in profounder research due to its “methodological 
pluralism or eclecticism” (Johnson et al., 2016:14). Creswell and Poth (2016) opines that mixed 
research methods are quite new and still developing in the sphere of social sciences, and usually 
involves combining both statistical trends and stories to study human and social problems.  
The current study employs quantitative research methods to investigate the impact of dark side 
behaviour in business-to-business relationships. Quantitative measures were employed to 
examine this phenomenon because of its formal, objective and systematic nature regarding the 
usage of numerical data to test theory-based conceptual models (Burns & Groves, 2005). Thus, 
composite quantitative measures are used to measure latent variables in the conceptual model, 
explore relationships between variables, and determine the interactions between variables 
(Zikmund et al., 2013). This section first addresses the sampling plan followed to identify the 
target population and sample frame, evaluate sampling methods, as well as calculate the 
appropriate sample size for the study. The development of measurement approach is then 
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discussed in terms of the measurement instrument employed to collect data, the items used to 




This section focuses on the sampling plan for the current study, and discusses the population, 
sample frame, sampling method and sample size. Figure 7.1 offers a brief summary of these 
aspects of sampling components.  
 




The population comprises of individuals, or groups, in managerial positions that are responsible 
for managing a firm’s relationships with business partners such as suppliers, customers and 
buyers, service providers, collaborators, or any other organisation they might do business with. 
Therefore, the population can be described as all business-to-business partnerships in the 
economy. As the current study focuses on the onset of dark side behaviour in business-to-
business relationships, the target population therefore involves respondents who understand and 
possess relevant expertise and experience, to answer questions regarding the dynamics 




The sample frame for this study primarily includes key account managers as they are directly 
involved in the development and maintenance of business relationships with partner 
organisations; as they are also responsible for connecting business executives and various 
stakeholders; and for reporting on the success of partnerships (Georges & Eggert., 2003). 
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Several authors (e.g. Shin et al., 2000; Baker, 2009; Walter, Ritter & Gemünden, 2001) suggest 
that when conducting research in a business-to-business context, account managers are often in 
the best position to provide information concerning interfirm relationships because of their 
experience and knowledge in relationship and network management. However, other middle to 
top managers were also included in the sample frame, as Gregory, Harris, Armenakis and Shook 
(2009) suggest that these individuals can also provide relevant information regarding the 
dynamics of business relationships between firms. Furthermore, all respondents came from 
organisations located in South Africa, and no specific industry was examined. As the population 
of business-to-business research usually restricts the sample (Hair et al., 2019), geographically 
convenient and no-industry-specific respondents were selected to participate in this study in 




Sampling methods are generally employed as it allows researchers to make an inference about 
a population based on results generated from a subset (or sample) without having to investigate 
every individual in the representative population (Zikmund et al., 2013). There are several 
different sampling techniques available, which can be categorised in two groups: probability 
sampling and non-probability sampling. The current study adopts non-probability sampling 
methods as these are less expensive and increase the accessibility to respondents (Zikmund et 
al., 2013). Three non-probability sampling techniques were used to collect data from 
respondents, namely convenience sampling, judgement sampling, and snowball sampling. First, 
convenience sampling was employed where respondents were selected based on their 
availability and willingness to partake in the research (Creswell & Creswell, 2018). Secondly, 
judgement sampling was also used as this study required the researcher to use judgement in 
selecting who to ask to participate (Honigmann, 2003). For example, previously identified, or 
acquainted, key account managers or business executives were contacted and specifically asked 
to take part in the research. Lastly, snowball sampling, which is commonly used in social 
sciences when investigating hard-to-reach groups, was adopted and respondents were asked to 




Barlett, Kotrlik, Higgins and Williams (2001) claim that a major advantage of quantitative 
research lies in its ability to use smaller groups of respondents to make inferences about larger 
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groups that would be expensive to investigate. Hence, for the purpose of the current study, an 
adequate sample size was calculated using an online A-priori sample size calculator for 
structural equation models (Soper, 2015). This calculator uses the number of observed and 
latent variables in a model, the anticipated effect size, and the desired probability and statistical 
power, to determine the sample size required for a study that employs structural equation 
modelling (Soper, 2015). As result, the calculator generates both the minimum sample size 
required to detect the specific effect, as well as the minimum sample size required given the 
structural complexity of the model (Soper, 2015). This SEM calculator was used to generate 
the required sample size for the current study with an anticipated effect size of 0.1, a desired 
statistical power level of 0.8, an amount of 14 latent variables and 53 observed variables, as 
well as a probability level of 0.05.  
After calculation, three results where produced: 
• a minimum sample size of 2219 needed to detect an effect,  
• a minimum sample size of 114 needed for model structure,  
• and a recommended minimum sample size of 2219.  
However, it would have been difficult to obtain this number of respondents due to the 
systematic limitations of the research, personal limitations of the researcher, and the restrictive 
nature of the target population. Therefore, Tabachnick and Fidell’s (1996) rule of thumb was 
adopted for the current study, which suggests that business-to-business research should entail 
a more realistic sample size of 200 to 400 respondents.  
 
7.3.2 Measurement development 
 
The following section discusses the measurement instrument used to collect data, the 
development of measurement items, as well as the method of distribution of the instrument. For 
the current study, paper-based questionnaires (see Appendix A) were used to gather data from 





In survey research, questionnaires are often perceived as the main instrument for collecting 
data. Several authors (e.g. Zikmund et al., 2013; Flowerdew & Martin, 2005; Trobia, 2018) 
claim that questionnaires can be inexpensive, practical and simple to administrate, and can 
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reach a large sample – which is especially beneficial in business-to-business research where the 
nature of the population often restricts the sample. In the case of the current study’s target 
population, the sample is restricted as it is often difficult to obtain access to respondents in 
managerial and executive positions. The respondents’ willingness to participate in scientific 
research also contributes to the restrictive nature of the sample, as many managers and 
executives often do not have the time or need to participate.  
Zikmund et al. (2013) also infer that questionnaires are often relatively easy and straight-
forward to analyse due to the quantitative nature of survey research. Furthermore, the 
questionnaire used in this study employs two types of questions, namely open-ended and close-
ended (or fixed alternative) questions. Open-ended questions are more suitable when detailed 
answers are warranted, and respondents are expected to answer to their own account (Trobia, 
2018). In the questionnaire employed in this study, open-ended questions are mostly used to 
collect demographic information. Closed-ended questions, on the other hand, allow almost 
immediate statistical treatment and were therefore used to measure scale items concerning 
model constructs. Consistent with the recommendation of Zikmund et al. (2013) and Trobia 
(2018), the measurement items were formulated as statements, requiring respondents to indicate 
their level of agreement based on a 7-point Likert scale. This scale was anchored at 1 = strongly 




The measurement items used in the current study were adopted from existing literature. First, 
most questions pertaining demographic information were adopted from a study by Zaefarian et 
al. (2017), which focuses on firm and respondent characteristics. Questions regarding firm 
characteristics included the number of employees and company age, respondent characteristics 
focus on the respondent’s years with the organisation, their position within the company, as 
well as how many years they have been employed in their current position (Zaefarian et al., 
2017). Additionally, respondents were also asked to think of a particular business relationship 
that has been problematic in the past, or is currently problematic, and to answer relevant 
questions. These items focused on the main reasons for problems in their business relationships, 
as well as what type of business partner (e.g. supplier, customer or buyer, service provider, 
collaborator, etc.) they considered to be most problematic. Secondly, scale items regarding 
model constructs were selected based on the results obtained in their respective studies, with 
the primary focus being their performance in exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis, as 
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well as values pertaining Cronbach’s alpha and composite reliability. All the scale items 
included in the questionnaire obtained satisfactory Cronbach’s alpha and composite reliability 
scores in the studies they were sourced from. Table 7.1 provides a summary of the measurement 
items included in the questionnaire (see Appendix A). 
 




Antecedents of dark side behaviour   
Trust 4 Ulaga & Eggert (2006) 
Shared values 4 Kashyap & Sivadas (2012) 
Opportunistic behaviour 4 Wong, Tjosvold & Yu (2005) 
Uncertainty 4 Lai, Tian & Huo (2012); Kwon & Suh 
(2004) 
Behavioural outcomes of dark side behaviour   
Functional conflict 3 Tang, Fu & Xie (2017) 
Dysfunctional conflict 4 Pfajfar et al. (2017) 
Non-coercive power 4 Jain, Khalil, Johnston & Cheng (2014) 
Coercive power 4 Jain, Khalil, Johnston & Cheng (2014) 
Dependence 3 Mysen, Svensson & Payan (2011) 
Commitment 4 Ulaga & Eggert (2006) 
Symptoms of dark side behaviour   
Relational myopia 3 Baker (2009) 
Complacency 4 Baker (2009) 
Vulnerability 3 Baker (2009) 
Suspicion 5 Baker (2009) 
 
Method of distribution 
 
Paper-based questionnaires have traditionally been the first choice for data collection in survey 
research (Ebert, Huibers, Christensen & Christensen, 2018). However, due to declining 
response rates over the past decade, the risk of selection bias in cross-sectional studies have 
increased (Ebert et al., 2018). The growing use of the internet offers new ways of gathering 
data, but trials using web-based questionnaires have so far produced mixed results (Ebert et al., 
2018). For the purpose of the current study, it was decided that only paper-based questionnaires 
would be used to collect data. This decision was made based on the nature of the target 
population and their preferred manner of response. Ebert et al. (2018) support the usage of 
paper-based questionnaires, as their research suggests that, even though web-based 
questionnaires are more cost-effective, paper-based questionnaires (in some cases) still obtain 
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Social desirability bias 
 
Researchers using questionnaires and interviews rely on truthful responses from participants to 
draw meaningful conclusions. Socially desirable responding (SDR) is the tendency for 
participants to present a favourable image of themselves (Johnson, Fendrich & Hubbell, 2002). 
The participant may believe the information they report (i.e., self-deception), or may ‘fake 
good’ to conform to socially acceptable values, avoid criticism, or gain social approval (King 
& Bruner, 2000; Van de Mortel, 2008). Social desirability response bias can affect the validity 
of a questionnaire (Huang et al., 1998). Psychologists have developed and validated scales to 
detect SDR – for example, the 33-tem Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale (MCSDS) 
(Van de Mortel, 2008). However, according to Edens et al. (2001:249) there is no “categorical 
standard for differentiating between socially desirable and non-socially desirable responding”. 
For the purpose of the current study, social desirability bias was addressed by ensuring 
respondents that their answers will remain anonymous in hope that it will encourage truthful 
responding (Krumpal, 2013). Although, no scales were implemented to detect social 
desirability, a 7-point Likert scale was used to measure the degree to what participants agree 
with provided statements. Revzina (2008) argue that a 7-point Likert scale can provide a better 
understanding of how participants answer, as well as provide them with more options for 
responding to a question - without forcing to either agree or disagree with a statement. 
 
7.4 DATA ANALYSIS  
 
In the following section, the data analysis for the current study will be discussed in terms of (1) 
the data analysis plan to be executed after questionnaires have been collected from respondents, 
(2) the descriptive analysis and (3) the inferential analysis. The data analysis plan comprises of 
three phases, namely data capture, data cleaning and data analysis. After responses were 
inputted and the dataset cleaned of any errors, the data was analysed in order to derive 
descriptive and inferential statistics. SPSS software was used to generate descriptive statistics 
to describe respondent characteristics – namely, central tendency, distribution and dispersion. 
Additionally, scores pertaining the frequency of each item of the measurement instrument were 
also obtained during the descriptive analysis, along with the results pertaining tests for 
normality. After the descriptive analysis, SmartPLS was used to generate the inferential 
statistics require to assess the measurement and structural models.  
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7.4.1 Data analysis plan 
 
The data analysis plan for the current study comprises of three phases, namely data capture, 
data cleaning and data analysis. Figure 7.2 briefly depicts the data analysis plan by summarising 
the three abovementioned phases from the initial retrieval of questionnaires to the analytical 
procedures undertaken to obtain statistical results.  
 
Figure 7.2 Data analysis plan 
7.4.1.1 Data capture and cleaning 
 
After questionnaires were retrieved, responses were first captured on a Microsoft Excel 
spreadsheet. Demographic information that entailed open-ended questions concerning firm and 
respondent characteristics were re-coded in order to transform the data into numeric values. 
Once the capturing of data was complete, the accuracy of the recoding was checked by a third 
party, and no errors were found.  
Furthermore, after questionnaire responses was captured and re-coded, the data was cleaned in 
Microsoft Excel. Data cleaning refers to the process of deleting and correcting (or removing) 
corrupt or inaccurate records from a record set, table or database (Dasu & Johnson, 2003). 
Hence, data cleaning usually entails the identification of incomplete, incorrect, inaccurate or 
irrelevant parts of data, which is then replaced, modified or deleted (Dasu & Johnson, 2003). 
In this phase, the dataset was screened for missing values and errors, and unsatisfactory 
(incomplete) responses were consequently removed. However, responses that contained only 
one or two missing values were retained. The selected data analysis tools (SPSS and SmartPLS) 
allow researchers to treat missing values through several options. For the current study, missing 
values were replaced with extreme outlying values (i.e. 99999) as suggested by Hair et al. 
(2017). 
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7.4.1.2 Data analysis 
 
After the dataset was captured and cleaned, the error-free data was imported to selected 
software platforms for data analyses. Descriptive statistics were obtained through the use of 
statistical package for the social science (SPSS) software (see IBM, 2009), while PLS-SEM 
software (see Hair et al., 2019; Ringle, Wende & Becker, 2015) was employed to conduct 
inferential analyses.  
 
Statistical Package for the social sciences (SPSS) 
 
The dataset containing the cleaned and re-coded data was imported to SPSS software (version 
23) for conducting the descriptive analysis, and the relevant statistics were generated. SPSS is 
used by researchers from various disciplines for complex statistical data analysis and data 
management (IBM, 2009). Field (2013) commented that SPSS is a comparably “easy-to-
handle” statistics program that provides commonly used procedures for complex statistical data 
– especially the processing and analysing of survey data. A manifold of statistical methods exist 
that can be leveraged in SPSS, which makes it attractive and preferable for quantitative research 
(Field, 2013). However, several researchers argue that the potential for using SPSS as an 
analytical tool has become more extensive over the past years (e.g. Field, 2013; Bronstad & 
Hemmesch, 2010; Charry, Coussement, Demoulin & Heuvinck, 2016; Trif & Bacali, 2011). 
The current study primarily employed SPSS to obtain descriptive statistics regarding the 
demographic characteristics of the sample, as well as frequencies for measurement items. 
Furthermore, as the current study adopted a structural equation modelling approach, relevant 
PLS-SEM software was used for further inferential analytical procedures.  
 
Partial least squares structural equation modelling (PLS-SEM) 
 
In recent years, PLS-SEM has increasing been applied to various social science disciplines, 
including marketing management (Hair et al., 2017), strategic management (Hair et al., 2012), 
organisational management (Sosik et al., 2009), hospitality management (Nitzl, 2016) and 
supply chain management (Kaufmann & Gaeckler, 2015). According to Hair et al. (2019), the 
PLS-SEM method is very appealing to many researchers as it enables them to estimate complex 
models with many constructs, indicator variables and structural paths, without imposing 
distributional assumptions on the data. More importantly, PLS-SEM is a causal-predictive 
approach to structural equation modelling that emphasises prediction in estimating statistical 
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models with structures designed to provide causal explanations (Sarstedt et al., 2017; Hair et 
al., 2019). Therefore, the PLS-SEM method overcomes the apparent dichotomy between 
explanation – as usually emphasised in academic research – and prediction, which is the basis 
for developing managerial implications (Hair et al., 2019). Furthermore, the use of PLS-SEM 
for the current study is supported by several considerations as recommended by Hair et al. 
(2019). These authors suggest that researchers should employ PLS-SEM methods when:  
(1) the analysis is concerned with testing a theoretical framework  
(2) the structural model is complex and includes many constructs, indicators or model 
relationships, 
(3) the research objective is to better understand increasing complexity by exploring 
theoretical extensions of established theories (exploratory research for theory 
development) 
(4) a small population restricts the sample size (e.g. business-to-business research) 
(5) distribution issues are of concern (such as lack of normality) 
(6) research requires latent variable scores for follow-up analyses (Hair et al., 2019).  
Thus, based on these considerations, PLS-SEM is an attractive and preferable analytical method 
for this research, especially as the current study entails a complex structural model, has a small 
population that restricts the sample, and has issues concerning the normality of data. 
Furthermore, to execute the PLS-SEM procedure, the software package SmartPLS (version 3) 
was used to analyse data (Hair et al., 2019).  
 
7.4.2 Descriptive analysis 
 
According to Zikmund et al. (2013), the execution of descriptive analysis is an important first 
step when analysing data. Descriptive analysis offers a more detailed account of the data in 
terms of important characteristics and its distribution which, in turn, can help with the detection 
of outliers and input errors. The current study employed SPSS software to generate descriptive 




A univariate analysis was employed in order to generate the descriptive statistics required to 
evaluate demographic data and the measurement items of constructs. The generated descriptive 
statistics were used to report on the three major characteristics concerning variables, namely 
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central tendency, dispersion, and distribution. First, the central tendency of data was evaluated, 
which included the examination of the mean, median, and mode (Zikmund et al., 2013). 
Secondly, the dispersion of data, which refers to the spread of values around the central 
tendency, was assessed by examining standard deviation scores (Zikmund et al., 2013). Lastly, 
in order to evaluate the distribution of data, the results pertaining skewness and kurtosis were 




The current study also assessed the distributional normality, as it is a key criterion for various 
multi-variate analysis techniques (Zikmund et al., 2013). The normality of data was assessed 
by evaluating the skewness of data, as well as kurtosis. Skewness measures the symmetry of 
data, while kurtosis is often used to evaluate the “peakedness” or “flatness” of a distribution 
(Zikmund et al., 2013). Therefore, these statistics were used to determine the shape of the 
distribution, along with frequency tables generated in SPSS for each item of the measurement 
instrument. In addition, tests for normality (namely, Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk) 
were generated in order to obtain statistics to further explain the distribution of data.  
 
7.4.3 Inferential analysis 
 
This section focuses on the inferential analysis followed in the current study to derive statistics 
required for the assessment of the measurement and structural models. Figure 7.3 depicts the 
aspects and statistics that were considered regarding the evaluation of the model. While the 
preliminary considerations were explored beforehand and included in the data plan (see section 
6.4.1.2), this section specifically discusses the assessment of the measurement model and 
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According to Hair et al. (2019), the first step in reflective model assessment involves examining 
the indicator loadings. It is recommended that loadings should exceed 0.708, as they indicate 
that, because the constructs explain more than 50% of the indicators’ variance, this would 
provide acceptable item reliability (Hair et al., 2019). During the initial PLS Algorithm run, 
several measurement items did not meet the benchmark of 0.708 and were removed to ensure 
satisfactory results were eventually obtained. These items are identified in the results chapter. 
Furthermore, measurement reliability and validity were assessed through the evaluation of 
internal consistency reliability, convergent validity, and discriminant validity. Hair et al. (2019) 
suggest that the second step in assessing the measurement model should therefore be to assess 
internal consistency reliability, using composite reliability. Higher values usually indicate 
higher levels of reliability – for example, reliability values between 0.60 and 0.70 are 
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considered acceptable for exploratory research, while values between 0.70 and 0.90 range from 
satisfactory to good. However, values of 0.95 and higher may be problematic as it can signify 
that items are redundant, thus reducing construct reliability (Hair et al., 2019). Additionally, 
Cronbach’s alpha was another measure used to evaluate the internal consistency reliability of 
the measurement model. Although Cronbach’s alpha assumes thresholds similar to that of 
composite reliability, it is a less predictive measure as items are unweighted, thus producing 
lower values (Hair et al., 2019). Hair et al. (2019) argue that Cronbach’s alpha may be too 
conservative, whereas the composite reliability may be too liberal. Hence, the current research 
assessed internal consistency reliability through the evaluation of both of these measures. 
In order to evaluate the measurement model, the results pertaining to convergent validity of 
each construct was assessed. Convergent validity is the extent to which measurement items 
converge to explain the variance within a construct (Hair et al., 2019). Average variance 
extracted (AVE) scores were assessed to evaluate convergent validity for the current 
measurement model. An acceptable AVE should be 0.50 or higher, which would indicate that 
the construct explains at least 50% of the variance of its items (Hair et al., 2019).   
The last step when evaluating the measurement model entailed an assessment of discriminant 
validity, which indicates the extent to which a construct is empirically distinct from other 
constructs in the model (Hair et al., 2019).  The current study employed two metrics to 
investigate discriminant validity, namely the Fornell-Larcker criterion and the Heterotrait-
Monotrait (HTMT) ratio. Fornell and Larcker (1981) proposed the traditional metric and 
suggested that each construct’s AVE should be compared to the squared inter-construct 
correlation (as a measure of shared variance) of that same construct and all other reflectively 
measured constructs in the structural model. Thus, results concerning the Fornell-Larcker 
criterion were checked to ensure that the shared variance for all model constructs are not higher 
than their AVEs (Hair et al., 2019). Henseler et al. (2015) propose that the Heterotrait-
Monotrait (HTMT) ratio also be used to assess discriminant validity. The HTMT ratio is defined 
as the mean value of the item correlations across constructs relative to the (geometric) mean of 
the average correlations for the items measuring the same construct (Hair et al., 2019).  
Discriminant validity problems are present when HTMT values are high. Henseler et al. (2015) 
propose a threshold value of 0.9 for structural models with constructs that are conceptually very 









After the measurement model provided satisfactory results, the next step entailed the evaluation 
of PLS-SEM results required for the assessment of the structural model. Standard assessment 
criteria, as suggested by Hair et al. (2019), was followed. This considered the coefficient of 
determination (R2) and the statistical significance and relevance of the path coefficients. In 
addition, the current study also assessed the model’s out-of-sample predictive power by using 
the PLSpredict procedures (Shmueli et al., 2016).  
Structural model coefficients for the relationships between constructs are derived from 
estimating a series of regression equations. Before the structural relationships were assessed, 
collinearity was first examined in order to ensure that there is no bias regarding regression 
results (Hair et al., 2019). The VIF values, calculated through the variable scores of the 
predictor constructs in a partial regression, were checked against a benchmark of 3 to warrant 
that the data does not suffer from collinearity issues (Hair et al., 2019).  
After the absence of collinearity was established and no relevant issues were apparent, the 
current study examined the R2 value of the endogenous constructs. The coefficient of 
determination (R2) measures the variance, which is explained in each of the endogenous 
constructs and is, therefore, a measure of the model’s explanatory power (Shmueli & Koppius, 
2011). Rigdon (2012) refers to R2 as a measure of in-sample predictive power, which ranges 
from 0 to 1 – with higher values indicating a greater explanatory power. The results of R2 were 
evaluated according a guideline that suggests that R2 values of 0.75, 0.50 and 0.25 indicate 
substantial, moderate and weak explanatory power respectively (Hair et al., 2019; Henseler et 
al., 2009; Hair et al., 2011). However, Hair et al. (2019) argues that acceptable R2 values are 
based on the context of the study, and that, in some disciplines, an R2 value of as low as 0.10 is 
considered satisfactory.  
Although many researchers interpret the R2 statistic as a measure of their model’s predictive 
power, several authors (e.g. Hair et al., 2019; Shmueli, 2010; Shmueli & Koppius, 2011) argue 
that R2 only explains the model’s in-sample explanatory power and not it’s out-of-sample 
predictive power. Hence, the current study employed a set of procedures for out-of-sample 
prediction, as suggested by Shmueli, Ray, Estrada & Chatla (2016), which entails the estimation 
of the model on an analysis sample, as well as the evaluation of its predictive performance on 
data other than the analysis sample (also called the holdout sample). The PLSpredict generated 
holdout sample-based predictions in PLS-SEM and was conducted in SmartPLS software. 
During the interpretation of PLSpredict results, the current study focused on examining the 
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model’s key endogenous constructs. The Q2predict statistic was evaluated first, as recommended 
by Shmueli et al. (2019), in order to verify that predictions outperform the most naïve 
benchmark, which is defined by the indicator means from the analysis sample. Subsequent to 
the assessment of Q2predict values, the predictions statistics were examined, namely RMSE and 
MAE values (Hair et al., 2019). These prediction statistics were also compared with a naïve 
benchmark which uses a linear regression model (LM) to generate predictions for the manifest 
variables by running a linear regression of each of the dependent construct’s indicators on the 
indicators of the exogenous latent variables in the PLS path model (Hair et al., 2019). Thus, the 
RMSE and MAE values were compared in order to establish the predictive power of the out-
of-sample predictive power of the model. 
After having substantiated the model’s explanatory power and predictive power, the final step 
in assessing the structural model included the evaluation of statistical significance and 
relevance regarding path coefficients and specific indirect effects. As suggested by Hair et al. 
(2019), a bootstrapping procedure was executed in SmartPLS in order to obtain the statistics 
required to assess the current study’s hypotheses. Hence, t-statistics and p-values were used to 
assess the relationships between constructs in the main model (Hair et al., 2014), as well as to 




In conclusion, after data was collected from respondents, data capture and cleaning commenced 
and was ultimately analysed to derive important descriptive and inferential statistics. However, 
before the conceptual model could be tested, a sampling plan and measurement instrument 
needed to be developed. The sampling plan outlined the target population and sample frame, 
sampling methods, as well as the sample size. The measurement instrument for the current 
study, on the other hand, entailed a questionnaire survey, which comprised of open-ended and 
closed-ended questions. These questions were used to obtain demographic information from 
respondents, as well as measurement scale items pertaining model constructs. Furthermore, 
following the collection of data, the data was captured and cleaned, and prepared for data 
analysis. SPSS and SmartPLS software were used to, respectively, obtain descriptive and 
inferential statistics required to test the conceptual framework.  
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This chapter reports the outcomes of the analytical procedures that were undertaken to derive 
important statistical results from the current research data. In other words, this chapter reports 
on the data analysis phase, following the cleaning of collected data to ensure consistency and 
the absence of errors. In the first part of this chapter, the results of the descriptive analysis 
generated through the use of IBM SPSS software is reported. The results of the descriptive 
analysis include an evaluation of the realised sample, descriptive statistics of the demographic 
profile of respondents, firm and business relationships, as well as frequencies pertaining to scale 
items. Next, the distributional properties of the responses to scale items (skewness and kurtosis) 
are reported. Subsequent to the discussion of descriptive statistics, the second part of this 
chapter addresses the results of the inferential analyses. Whereas research data was analysed in 
SPSS version 23 to obtain descriptive statistics, inferential results were generated through the 
employment of SmartPLS 3. The results of the inferential analyses were thus assessed by 
evaluating the statistics concerning the measurement model (i.e. reliability and validity), as well 
as evaluating the structural model and hypothesis testing. First, the measurement model was 
evaluated by investigating the outer loadings of scale items and removing those that were not 
satisfactory. Secondly, the reliability and validity were assessed by evaluating construct 
reliability and validity and discriminant validity. Thirdly, the structural model was considered 
and evaluated according to results derived from collinearity statistics, coefficient of 
determination and predictive accuracy measures. Based on these results, the final section of this 
chapter entails the ultimate consideration of the structural model and the hypotheses included 
in this research.  
 
8.2 ANALYSIS PROTOCOL 
 
Subsequent to the retrieval of questionnaires from respondents, Microsoft Excel was employed 
to capture data in spreadsheets. However, in order to prepare the relevant data for statistical 
analyses, the dataset was first evaluated, and cleaned where necessary, to ensure consistency 
and the absence of errors. Although there were four questionnaires out of the 213 received that 
presented missing values, only one response was removed as more than 50 percent of values 
were missing. The other questionnaires that contained missing values, had only one or two 
values missing, and were retained for further analysis.  
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First, SPSS version 23 was used to obtain summary statistics in order to describe research 
variables – which is illustrated through histograms and frequency tables in the proceeding 
sections of the current chapter. The measurement of central tendency (mean, median and mode), 
as well as measures of spread (standard deviation, skewness and kurtosis) were generated and 
reported. Secondly, the relationships between variables were analysed using SmartPLS 3.0, 
which allows researchers to treat missing values through several options, namely mean value 
replacement, casewise deletion and pairwise deletion (Hair et al., 2017). Missing values were 
replaced by extreme values (i.e. 99999) as suggested by Hair et al. (2017). Furthermore, in 
order to have obtained construct reliability and validity, problematic scale items with outer 
loadings lower than 0.7 and t-values lower than 1.96 were removed (Hair et al., 2017), namely 
items NP1, NP2, O3, O4, RM1, S1, T1, U1 and U2. 
 
8.3 DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS 
 
In the following section, the descriptive statistics and frequency tables of demographic 
variables, as well as scale items concerning model constructs will be discussed. First, the 
description of the realised sample will be examined in terms of the characteristics of 
respondents and the problematic business relationships they were asked to consider. Subsequent 
to reporting the demographic profile of the sample, summary statistics and frequency tables 
regarding scale items of model constructs will be reported. 
 
8.3.1 Description of realised sample 
 
A structural equation modelling calculator developed by Daniel Soper (2015) generated three 
results concerning sample size, namely a minimum sample size of 2219, minimum sample size 
for model structure of 114, and a recommended minimum sample size of 2219. However, 
because of the nature of business-to-business research and limited accessibility and availability 
of the target population, Tabachnick and Fidell’s (1996) rule of thumb was adopted – which 
suggests a more realistic sample size of 200 to 400 respondents.  Hence, 250 questionnaires 
were distributed to selected respondents (account managers and other middle and top-level 
managers) across various industries in South Africa. From this sample comprising of 250 
respondents, 213 questionnaires were obtained during the data collection phase. However, as 
previously mentioned, during the data cleaning phase one response was removed from the 
sample, which resulted in a working sample of 212 responses.  
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The questionnaire, as indicated in Chapter 7, comprised of questions concerning both the 
demographic profile of respondents and statements used to measure model constructs.  After 
the collected data was transferred to spreadsheets in Microsoft Excel and underwent data 
cleaning (which entailed the identification and treatment of incomplete responses, bias 
responses and anomalies, as well as the evaluation of data capturing accuracy), re-coded 
numerical datasets were imported to SPSS software for statistical analysis. In Table 8.1, the 
descriptive statistics concerning the demographic profile of the sample is shown.  Items Q1 and 
Q2 focused on firm characteristics which reflects the approximate number of employees in the 
respondent’s company and the company’s approximate age (in years) respectively. Items Q3 to 
Q6 encompassed questions concerning respondent characteristics, namely: how many years the 
respondent has been employed by their current company (Q3), their current position in the 
company (Q4), what managerial level best describes their position (Q5), as well as how many 
years they have been active in their current position (Q6). However, because Q4 was posed as 
an open-ended question and thus generated a variety of responses, Q3 was primarily used to 
describe respondents’ current positions in their companies. Additionally, respondents were also 
asked to answer questions concerning a partnership that had been problematic in the past or 
was problematic at present. In Q7 respondents were asked more specifically to identify the main 
reasons they were experiencing problems with their partner, whereas Q8 focused on identifying 
what type of partner organisations (i.e. supplier, buyer or customer, service provider, 
collaborator, etc.) were more problematic. Both these aforementioned questions were open-
ended and respondents could select more than one answer, as well as provide their own specific 
answer if needed.  
 
Table 8.1 Descriptive statistics of demographic information 
  N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
  Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Std. Error Statistic Std. Error 
Q1 212 1.0 7.0 3.840 2.0054 .102 .167 -1.055 .333 
Q2 212 1.0 6.0 4.363 1.2676 -.753 .167 -.103 .333 
Q3 211 1.0 5.0 3.071 1.0996 -.142 .167 -.649 .333 
Q4 188 1.0 42.0 10.723 11.0341 1.278 .177 .434 .353 
Q5 211 1.0 3.0 1.735 .6588 .345 .167 -.749 .333 
Q6 212 1.0 4.0 2.712 .9525 .040 .167 -1.119 .333 
Q7 288 1.0 12.0 1.622 1.3965 4.571 .144 25.502 .286 




Figure 8.1 depicts the approximate number of employees in respondents’ companies. 
Respondents of companies with 10 or less employees accounted for 18.9% of the sample, while 
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companies with 5001 or more made up 16%. The majority of respondents (27.4%) came from 
companies that have between 51 to 250 employees. Furthermore, respondents from companies 
with a size of 251 to 750 were in the minority, making up only 6.1% of the sample. Other 
categories of approximate company size accounted for the following percentages of the sample: 
10.8% had between 11 and 25 employees, 9.3% of respondents came from companies with 26 
to 50 employees, and companies with a size of 251 to 750 made up 11.3%.  
 
Thus, based on Arowomole’s (2000) identification of firm sizes, 66.5% of respondents came 
from small to medium enterprises and 33.5% came from large companies.  
 














Figure 8.2 illustrates the frequencies of answers according to the approximate age of 
respondents’ companies. The majority of respondents came from companies between the age 
of 20 and 50 years, thus, accounting for 42% of the sample, whereas companies under two years 
of age were in the minority (2.8%). Companies with the age of 50 and older made up 16%, 
while 6.1% were between the age of 2 to 5 years, 17% aged 5 to 10 years, and 16% companies 
within the age range of 10 to 20 years. In other words, 58% of respondents came from 
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Questions Q3 to Q6 focused on the demographic profile of respondents by addressing the 
following: the approximate total number of years a respondent have been employed in their 
company, their current position and managerial level in the company, as well as how many 
years they have been employed in their current position.  
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Figure 8.3 shows the total number of years respondents have been employed by their company. 
The majority of respondents have been employed by their company for a total of 5 to 10 years, 
making up 33.1% of the sample. Other categories with high frequencies include those of 2 to 5 
years (20.9%), and 10 to 20 years (28%). Respondents who have worked at their companies for 
less than 2 years, or more than 20 years, each form only 9% of the sample. The abovementioned 
frequencies indicate that the majority of respondents (70.1%) have been employed for more 
than 5 years by their companies.  
 












Figure 8.4 shows the managerial level of respondents. Respondents in senior management 
positions account for 50% of the sample, whereas middle managers make up 38.2%, and the 
remaining 11.8% are respondents in lower management positions. In other words, the majority 
(88.2%) of respondents are either middle or senior managers, which can be advantageous to the 
current study as respondents in higher managerial positions are more likely to be in possession 
of more accurate information pertaining to the company’s business relations (Shin et al., 2000; 
Georges & Eggert, 2003). 
In Figure 8.5 (see next page), the data relating to the number of years respondents have been 
employed in their current position is shown. The majority of respondents (39.4%) have been 
active in their current position for a period of 2 to 5 years. The minority, on the other hand, 
have only been employed in their current position for less than one year, and makes up 8%. 
Respondents who have been working in their current position for 5 to 10 years and more 10 
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In addition to firm and respondent characteristics, the questionnaire also asked respondents to 
answer questions regarding particular business relationships that have been problematic in the 
past, or that were at present. The first question (Q7) asked respondents to identify the main 
reasons for problems with a particular business partner, whereas the second question (Q8) 
focused on the type of partner organisation that is usually problematic. 
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Figure 8.6 shows the frequency of answers concerning what respondents identified as the main 
reasons why their relationship with a particular business partner is problematic. The majority 
of the sample (63.7%) indicated that problems in their business relationships are mostly due to 
partners who do not deliver as promised. Furthermore, 27.7% of respondents identified that 
most of the problems were due to partners not communicating enough with them, while 3.1% 
indicated that problems arose due to business partners supporting their competitors better, and 
2.4% of problems were due to personality problems between parties. Hence, most respondents 
identified that their problematic business relationships were due to partners not delivering as 
promised. The remaining 3.1% of the sample includes other reasons such as, geographical 
implications, cultural differences and issues pertaining to franchise agreements. 
 













Figure 8.7 shows that 63.7% of respondents identified suppliers as the type of partner that is 
most problematic. Buyers, or customers, made up 13.9%, service providers accounted for 
18.4%, while 3.4% of respondents identified collaborates as problematic business partners. The 
remaining 0.3% are other types of business partners – for example, a group managing company. 
 
8.3.2 Descriptive results of scale items 
 
In this section, the descriptive statistics concerning scale items will be discussed. This involves 
the results obtained concerning antecedents of dark side behaviour (trust, shared values, 
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and commitment) and symptoms of dark side behaviour (relational myopia, complacency, 
vulnerability and suspicion). These items were measured in the questionnaire using a 7-point 
Likert scale in order to acquire information concerning the onset of dark side behaviour in 
business-to-business relationships. Table 8.2 shows the descriptive statistics for scale items 
used to measure the constructs of the conceptual model. 
 
8.3.2.1 Antecedents of dark side behaviour 
 
The current study explored trust, shared values, opportunistic behaviour and uncertainty as 
potential antecedents of dark side behaviour, that could cause behavioural outcomes that could 
damage business relationships. The following section reports on relevant descriptive statistics 
(namely mean, standard deviation, skewness and kurtosis), as well as the response frequencies 




Table 8.2 shows that the mean of item T1 is 3.25, the standard deviation is 1.68, the skewness 
is 0.32 and the kurtosis is -0.81. Based on these aforementioned results, the distribution for T1 
is potentially symmetrical and platykurtic (negative kurtosis) – which may infer that the data is 
not normally distributed. 
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Table 8.2 Descriptive statistics of scale items  
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 





T1 212 1.0 7.0 3.250 1.6831 .316 .167 -.806 .333 
T2 212 1.0 7.0 3.844 1.5049 .133 .167 -.426 .333 
T3 211 1.0 7.0 3.730 1.4000 .092 .167 -.055 .333 
T4 211 1.0 7.0 3.758 1.4453 .354 .167 -.044 .333 
C1 212 1.0 7.0 4.825 1.2816 -.133 .167 -.511 .333 
C2 212 1.0 7.0 5.292 1.2803 -.508 .167 -.231 .333 
C3 212 1.0 7.0 5.198 1.4002 -.599 .167 .043 .333 
C4 212 1.0 7.0 5.127 1.3966 -.504 .167 -.099 .333 
O1 212 1.0 7.0 4.481 1.7591 -.559 .167 -.770 .333 
O2 212 1.0 7.0 4.292 1.4406 -.390 .167 -.368 .333 
O3 212 1.0 7.0 4.566 1.8241 -.412 .167 -.779 .333 
O4 212 1.0 7.0 4.458 1.6358 -.370 .167 -.620 .333 
SV1 212 1.0 7.0 4.439 1.4045 -.516 .167 .116 .333 
SV2 212 1.0 7.0 4.594 1.4459 -.442 .167 .105 .333 
SV3 212 1.0 7.0 4.066 1.5068 -.155 .167 -.246 .333 
SV4 212 1.0 7.0 4.297 1.5150 -.399 .167 -.187 .333 
RM1 212 1.0 7.0 4.571 1.4764 -.372 .167 -.373 .333 
RM2 212 1.0 7.0 5.349 1.3423 -1.027 .167 1.243 .333 
RM3 212 1.0 7.0 5.113 1.3013 -.616 .167 .496 .333 
COM1 212 1.0 7.0 3.627 1.8156 .064 .167 -1.177 .333 
COM2 212 1.0 7.0 3.972 1.8081 -.361 .167 -1.258 .333 
COM3 212 1.0 7.0 3.792 1.7401 -.031 .167 -1.098 .333 
COM4 212 1.0 7.0 3.500 1.8408 .177 .167 -1.234 .333 
V1 212 1.0 7.0 4.292 1.8573 -.300 .167 -1.145 .333 
V2 212 1.0 7.0 4.137 1.8816 -.126 .167 -1.220 .333 
V3 212 1.0 7.0 4.080 1.8899 -.261 .167 -1.216 .333 
S1 212 1.0 7.0 4.401 1.5315 -.250 .167 -.587 .333 
S2 212 1.0 7.0 4.325 1.6530 -.232 .167 -.943 .333 
S3 212 1.0 7.0 4.524 1.6478 -.318 .167 -.840 .333 
S4 211 1.0 7.0 4.441 1.6125 -.425 .167 -.610 .333 
S5 211 1.0 7.0 4.227 1.5570 -.530 .167 -.435 .333 
U1 212 1.0 7.0 3.835 1.5351 -.140 .167 -.659 .333 
U2 212 1.0 7.0 4.679 1.4864 -.642 .167 .114 .333 
U3 212 1.0 7.0 4.420 1.3797 -.329 .167 -.429 .333 
U4 212 1.0 7.0 4.684 1.3310 -.499 .167 -.057 .333 
D1 212 1.0 7.0 3.958 1.7370 -.082 .167 -1.178 .333 
D2 212 1.0 7.0 4.231 1.7601 -.504 .167 -.811 .333 
D3 212 1.0 7.0 4.123 1.7345 -.218 .167 -.941 .333 
NP1 212 1.0 7.0 4.382 1.4894 -.477 .167 -.308 .333 
NP2 212 1.0 7.0 4.330 1.3955 -.374 .167 -.343 .333 
NP3 212 1.0 7.0 3.929 1.6203 .055 .167 -.912 .333 
NP4 212 1.0 7.0 3.863 1.6594 .063 .167 -.782 .333 
CP1 212 1.0 7.0 4.080 1.7329 -.229 .167 -.885 .333 
CP2 211 1.0 7.0 3.867 1.7678 -.141 .167 -1.080 .333 
CP3 212 1.0 7.0 3.920 1.7493 -.123 .167 -1.092 .333 
CP4 212 1.0 7.0 3.585 1.6428 -.097 .167 -1.039 .333 
FC1 212 1.0 7.0 5.118 1.3350 -.749 .167 .155 .333 
FC2 212 1.0 7.0 4.316 1.8055 -.354 .167 -1.036 .333 
FC3 212 1.0 7.0 4.693 1.6102 -.557 .167 -.565 .333 
DC1 212 1.0 7.0 4.241 1.4321 -.235 .167 -.566 .333 
DC2 212 1.0 7.0 3.910 1.6223 -.123 .167 -.906 .333 
DC3 212 1.0 7.0 4.184 1.5965 -.361 .167 -.673 .333 
DC4 212 1.0 7.0 4.024 1.6621 -.300 .167 -.830 .333 
 
Note: T = Trust, C = Commitment, O = Opportunistic behaviour, SV = Shared values, RM = 
Relational myopia, COM = Complacency, V = Vulnerability, S = Suspicion, U = Uncertainty, 
D = Dependence, NP = Non-coercive power, CV = Coercive power, FC = Functional conflict, 
DC = Dysfunctional conflict 
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Figure 8.8 shows the frequencies for T1, which depicts that 19.3% of respondents strongly 
disagreed, 18.4% mostly disagreed, 18.4% somewhat disagreed, 19.3% were neutral, 14.2% 
somewhat agreed, 7.1% mostly agreed and 3.3% strongly agreed. 
Item T2 has a mean of 3.84 and a standard deviation of 1.51. In addition, results pertaining 
skewness and kurtosis are, respectively, 0.13 and -0.43. Hence, the distribution can be described 
as potentially symmetric and mesokurtic, which indicates that the data for T2 is not normally 
distributed. In Figure 8.8, the frequencies for item T2 are shown, which shows that 6.1% of 
respondents strongly disagreed, 12.7% mostly disagreed, 22.2% somewhat disagreed, 27.8% 
were neutral, 17% somewhat agreed, 9% mostly agreed and 5.2% strongly agreed. 
Furthermore, the mean for item T3 is 3.73, the standard deviation is 1.4, the skewness is 0.09 
and the kurtosis is -0.06. The distribution shape can thus be described as potentially 
symmetrical and mesokurtic, which infers that the data is not normally distributed. Figure 8.8 
illustrates that 7.1% of the sample strongly disagreed, 10% mostly disagreed, 25.6% somewhat 
disagreed, 30.3% were neutral, 18% somewhat agreed, 5.2% mostly agreed and 3.8% strongly 
agreed. 
Item T4 has a mean of 3.76 and a standard deviation of 1.45, as well as a skewness and kurtosis 
of 0.35 and -0.04, respectively. Based on these statistics, the distribution can be described as 
asymmetrical and right-skewed, as well as potentially mesokurtic. Therefore, it can be assumed 
that the data is not normally distributed. In addition, Figure 8.8 shows that 5.2% of respondents 
strongly disagreed, 12.8% mostly disagreed, 25.1% somewhat disagreed, 33.2% were neutral, 




Items SV1 to SV4 were used to investigate the moderating role of shared values on the 
relationship between detrimental relationship elements and symptoms of dark side behaviour. 
Table 8.2 provides the descriptive statistics for scale items concerning shared values, whereas 
Figure 8.9 includes the relevant frequency tables. 
The mean for item SV1 is 4.44, the standard deviation is 1.41, the skewness is -0.52 and the 
kurtosis is 0.12. The distribution can thus be described as asymmetrical and left-skewed, as 
well as mesokurtic – which indicates that the data is not normally distributed. In Figure 8.20, 
the frequency table for item SV1 is shown, which depicts that 4.7% of respondents strongly 
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disagreed, 4.7% mostly disagreed, 10.8% somewhat disagreed, 29.2% were neutral, 27.4% 
somewhat agreed, 18.4% mostly agreed and 4.7% strongly agreed. 














Item SV2 has a mean of 4.60, a standard deviation of 1.45, a skewness of -0.44 and a kurtosis 
of 0.11. Based on these aforementioned results, the distribution can be characterised as 
asymmetrical and left-skewed, as well as potentially mesokurtic – which infers that the data is 
not normally distributed. Figure 8.9 shows that 4.2% of respondents strongly disagreed, 4.2% 
mostly disagreed, 8% somewhat disagreed, 31.6% were neutral, 24.1% somewhat agreed, 
18.9% mostly agreed and 9% strongly agreed. 
Table 8.2 depicts that item SV3 has a mean of 4.07 and a standard deviation of 1.51. 
Additionally, statistics pertaining to skewness and kurtosis are -0.16 and -0.25, respectively. 
Hence, the distribution can be described as potentially symmetrical and mesokurtic, indicating 
that the data is not normally distributed. In Figure 8.9, frequencies concerning item SV3 
illustrates that 7.1% of respondents strongly disagreed, 8% mostly disagreed, 15.6% somewhat 
disagreed, 31.6% were neutral, 22.2% somewhat agreed, 9.4% mostly agreed and 6.1% strongly 
agreed. 
Furthermore, item SV4 has a mean of 4.30, a standard deviation of 1.52, skewness of -0.40 and 
a kurtosis of -0.19. The distribution can be described as asymmetrical and left-skewed, as well 
as potentially mesokurtic – which also indicates that the data is not normally distributed. In 
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strongly disagreed, 7.1% mostly disagreed, 8.5% somewhat disagreed, 34.4% were neutral, 
20.3% somewhat agreed, 17.5% mostly agreed and 5.7% strongly agreed. 
 
Opportunistic behaviour  
 
In Table 8.2, the descriptive statistics for items pertaining to opportunistic behaviour are 
provided, whereas Figure 8.10 illustrates the frequencies for each scale item. 
 















The mean for item O1 is 4.48, the standard deviation is 1.76, the skewness is -0.56, and the 
kurtosis is -0.77. Based on the aforementioned statistics, the distribution can be described as 
asymmetrical and left-skewed, as well as platykurtic (negative kurtosis), which infers that the 
data is not normally distributed. The frequency table (Figure 8.10) shows that for item O1, 8.5% 
of the sample strongly disagreed, 9% mostly disagreed, 10.4% somewhat disagreed, 16% were 
neutral, 17.9% somewhat agreed, 30.7% mostly agreed and 7.5% strongly agreed. 
Item O2 has a mean of 4.29, a standard deviation of 1.44, a skewness of -0.39 and a kurtosis of 
-0.37. The distribution for O2 can thus be characterised as asymmetrical and left-skewed, as 
well as potentially mesokurtic – which indicates that the data is not normally distributed. In 
Figure 8.10 the frequencies for opportunistic behaviour scale items are illustrated and shows 
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disagreed, 22.6% were neutral, 31.6% somewhat agreed, 14.6% mostly agreed and 4.2% 
strongly agreed. 
Furthermore, the mean for item O3 is 4.57, the standard deviation is 1.82, the skewness is -0.41 
and the kurtosis -0.78. The distribution can be described as asymmetrical and left-skewed, as 
well as platykurtic (negative kurtosis). Hence, the data can be defined not normally distributed. 
Figure 8.10 depicts that 8% of respondents strongly disagreed, 9% mostly disagreed, 8.5% 
somewhat disagreed, 19.8% were neutral, 19.8% somewhat agreed, 17.5% mostly agreed and 
17.5% strongly agreed. 
The mean for item O4 is 4.46 and the standard deviation is 1.64. In addition, the results 
pertaining skewness and kurtosis are -0.37 and -0.62, respectively. These aforementioned 
results therefore define the distribution as asymmetrical and left-skewed, as well as potentially 
mesokurtic – which indicates that the data is not normally distributed. Figure 8.10 shows that 
5.2% of respondents strongly disagreed, 9.9% mostly disagreed, 10.8% somewhat disagreed, 




In this section, the descriptive statistics concerning uncertainty measurement items will be 
discussed, along with the frequency tables for each of the scale items U1 to U4. Figure 8.11 
displays the frequency tables for responses recorded pertaining uncertainty items. 
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The mean for item U1 is 3.84, the standard deviation is 1.54, the skewness is -0.14 and the 
kurtosis is -0.66. The distribution can thus be described as potentially symmetrical and 
mesokurtic, which indicates that the data is not normally distributed. Figure 8.11 shows that 
8.5% of respondents strongly disagreed, 13.7% mostly disagreed, 15.1% somewhat disagreed, 
28.3% were neutral, 20.3% somewhat agreed, 11.3% mostly agreed and 2.8% strongly agreed. 
Item U2 has a mean of 4.68 and a standard deviation of 1.49. In addition, results pertaining 
skewness and kurtosis are -0.64 and 0.11, respectively. Based on these aforementioned 
statistics, the distribution can be described as asymmetrical and left-skewed, as well as 
potentially mesokurtic. Thus, the data for U2 is not normally distributed. In Figure 8.11, the 
frequencies for item U2 is shown, which indicates that 4.7% of the sample strongly disagreed, 
4.7% mostly disagreed, 7.5% somewhat disagreed, 24.5% were neutral, 26.4% somewhat 
agreed, 23.6% mostly agreed and 8.5% strongly agreed. 
Furthermore, item U3 has a mean of 4.42, a standard deviation of 1.38, a skewness of -0.33 and 
a kurtosis of -0.43. Hence, the current distribution is asymmetrical and left-skewed, as well as 
potentially mesokurtic – which indicates that the data is not normally distributed. Frequencies 
pertaining U3 infers that 1.9% of respondents strongly disagreed, 8.5% mostly disagreed, 
14.2% somewhat disagreed, 24.1% were neutral, 28.3% somewhat agreed, 18.9% mostly 
agreed and 4.2% strongly agreed. 
The mean for item U4 is 4.68, the standard deviation is 1.33, the skewness is -0.50 and the 
kurtosis is -0.06. Based on these results, the shape of the distribution can be described as 
asymmetrical and left-skewed, as well as potentially mesokurtic. Therefore, it can be assumed 
that the data for item U4 is not normally distributed. Figure 8.11 shows that 1.4% of respondents 
strongly disagreed, 6.1% mostly disagreed, 9.9% somewhat disagreed, 22.2% were neutral, 
32.1% somewhat agreed, 22.2% mostly agreed and 6.1% strongly agreed. 
 
8.3.2.2 Behavioural outcomes  
 
In this section, the descriptive statistics and frequency tables concerning behavioural outcomes 
will be discussed. These outcomes include functional and dysfunctional conflict, non-coercive 
and coercive power, dependence and commitment. Table 8.2 provides the descriptive statistics 
generated for the abovementioned constructs.  
 
 






For the purpose of the current study, both dimensions of conflict (namely, functional and 
dysfunctional) were measured in order to determine how dark side behaviour occur in business-
to-business relationships. Figure 8.12 depicts the frequencies for functional conflict items, 
while Figure 8.13 entails the frequency of data for the various items concerning dysfunctional 
conflict. 
 














The mean for item FC1 is 5.12, the standard deviation is 1.34, the skewness is -0.75 and the 
kurtosis is 0.16. Based on the aforementioned results, the distribution can be described as 
asymmetrical and left-skewed, as well as potentially mesokurtic. Hence, it can be assumed that 
the data for FC1 is not normally distributed. Figure 8.12 shows the frequencies for FC1, which 
depicts that 0.9% of respondents strongly disagreed, 3.8% mostly disagreed, 8% somewhat 
disagreed, 15.6% were neutral, 25% somewhat agreed, 34.9% mostly agreed and 11.8% 
strongly agreed. 
Item FC2 has a mean of 4.32 and a standard deviation of 181. In addition, results pertaining 
skewness and kurtosis are, respectively, -0.35 and -1.04. The distribution can consequently be 
described as asymmetrical and left-skewed, as well as platykurtic (negative kurtosis). These 
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8.12, the frequencies for item FC2 are shown, which shows that 8.5% of the sample strongly 
disagreed, 12.3% mostly disagreed, 13.7% somewhat disagreed, 11.8% were neutral, 20.8% 
somewhat agreed, 24.5% mostly agreed and 8.5% strongly agreed. 
Furthermore, the mean and standard deviation for item FC3 is 4.70 and 1.61, respectively, 
whereas the skewness is -0.56 and the kurtosis is -0.57. The shape of the distribution is thus 
asymmetrical (negative skewed) and potentially mesokurtic, which may indicate that the data 
is not normally distributed. In Figure 8.12, the frequencies for FC1 are shown, and this indicates 
that 3.8% of the sample strongly disagreed, 8.5% mostly disagreed, 11.3% somewhat disagreed, 
16.5% were neutral, 20.8% somewhat agreed, 29.2% mostly agreed and 9.9% strongly agreed. 
 














The mean of item DC1 is 4.24, the standard deviation is 1.43, the skewness is -0.24 and the 
kurtosis is -0.57. Based on these statistics, the distribution can be described as potentially 
symmetrical and mesokurtic, which indicates that the data is not normally distributed. 
Additionally, Figure 8.13 illustrates the frequencies for item DC1, which shows that 2.8% of 
the sample strongly disagreed, 10.4% mostly disagreed, 17.9% somewhat disagreed, 20.3% 
were neutral, 30.2% somewhat agreed, 14.2% mostly agreed and 4.2% strongly agreed. 
Item DC2 has a mean of 3.91, a standard deviation of 1.62, a skewness of -0.12 and a kurtosis 
of -0.91. The shape of the distribution is thus potentially symmetrical and platykurtic (negative 
kurtosis), which may indicate that the data is not normally distributed. In Figure 8.13, the 
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disagreed, 18.4% somewhat disagreed, 19.3% were neutral, 21.2% somewhat agreed, 15.6% 
mostly agreed and 3.3% strongly agreed. 
Furthermore, the mean for item DC3 is 4.18, the standard deviation is 1.60, the skewness -0.36 
and the kurtosis -0.67. The distribution can thus be assumed to be asymmetrical and left-
skewed, as well as platykurtic (negative kurtosis) – which indicates that the data is not normally 
distributed. In addition, Figure 8.13 shows that 7.1% of the sample strongly disagreed, 11.3% 
mostly disagreed, 11.3% somewhat disagreed, 24.1% were neutral, 23.1% somewhat agreed, 
18.9% mostly agreed and 4.2% strongly agreed. 
The mean and standard deviation for item DC4 is 4.02 and 1.66 respectively, whereas results 
pertaining skewness and kurtosis are -0.30 and -0.83. Based on these results, the shape of the 
distribution can be described as potentially symmetrical and platykurtic (negative kurtosis). 
Hence, the data for DC4 is not normally distributed. The frequencies for DC4 shows that 9.9% 
of all respondents strongly disagreed, 12.7% mostly disagreed, 9.9% somewhat disagreed, 25% 




The degree of dependence in problematic business-to-business relationship was measured by 
means of three scale items, which asked respondent to what extend they agree with statements 
provided. In Figure 8.14, the frequencies for answer concerning item D1 to D3 is shown.  
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The mean for item D1 is 3.96, the standard deviation is 1.74, the skewness is -0.08 and the 
kurtosis is -1.18. The distribution shape is thus potentially symmetrical and platykurtic 
(negative kurtosis), which indicates that the data is not normally distributed. In Figure 8.14, the 
frequencies for D1 is illustrated, which reports that 7.5% of all respondents strongly disagreed, 
20.3% mostly disagreed, 13.2% somewhat disagreed, 15.1% were neutral, 20.3% somewhat 
agreed, 18.9% mostly agreed and 4.7% strongly agreed. 
Item D2 has a mean of 4.23 and a standard deviation of 1.76. In addition, results concerning 
skewness and kurtosis are -0.50 and -0.81, respectively. The distribution is thus asymmetrical 
and left-skewed, as well as platykurtic (negative kurtosis), which indicates that the data is not 
normally distributed. The frequencies for D2 (see Figure 8.14) show that 11.8% strongly 
disagreed, 9% mostly disagreed, 10.4% somewhat disagreed, 13.7% were neutral, 29.2% 
somewhat agreed, 20.3% mostly agreed and 5.7% strongly agreed. 
Table 8.2 depicts that item D3 has a mean of 4.12, a standard deviation of 1.73, a skewness of 
-0.22 and a kurtosis of -0.94. Based on these statistics, the distribution can be described as 
potentially symmetrical and platykurtic (negative kurtosis). Therefore, it can be assumed that 
the data is not normally distributed. Frequencies concerning item D3 is illustrated in Figure 
8.14 and shows that 8.5% of the sample strongly disagreed, 14.2% mostly disagreed, 12.7% 
somewhat disagreed, 16.5% were neutral, 25% somewhat agreed, 15.6% mostly agreed and 




The current study explores the role of power as a detrimental element of business relationships 
by examining both the impact of non-coercive and coercive dimensions. Table 8.15 depicts the 
frequencies for items pertaining to non-coercive power, while Table 8.16 shows the frequencies 
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The mean of item NP1 is 4.38, the standard deviation is 1.49, the skewness is -0.48 and the 
kurtosis is -0.31. Based on these results, distribution can be described as asymmetrical and left-
skewed, and mesokurtic. Thus, the data is not normally distributed. Figure 8.15 illustrates the 
frequencies for item NP1 and shows that 5.7% strongly disagreed, 4.7% mostly disagreed, 
16.5% somewhat disagreed, 21.7% were neutral, 25.9% somewhat agreed, 21.2% mostly 
agreed and 4.2% strongly agreed. 
Item NP2 has a mean of 4.33 and a standard deviation of 1.40. Additionally, the results 
pertaining skewness and kurtosis are -0.37 and -0.34, respectively. The shape of the distribution 
can be described as asymmetrical and left-skewed, as well as potentially mesokurtic, which 
indicates that the data is not normally distributed. The frequencies for NP2 (see Figure 8.15) 
shows that 3.3% of the sample strongly disagreed, 7.5% mostly disagreed, 15.6% somewhat 
disagreed, 24.5% were neutral, 27.8% somewhat agreed, 17.9% mostly agreed and 3.3% 
strongly agreed. 
The mean for item NP3 is 3.93, the standard deviation is 1.62, the skewness is 0.06 and the 
kurtosis is -0.91. The distribution can hence be described as potentially symmetrical and 
platykurtic (negative kurtosis), which indicates that the data is not normally distributed. The 
frequencies for answers regarding item NP3 depict that 5.7% of respondents strongly disagreed, 
17% mostly disagreed, 19.3% somewhat disagreed, 19.8% were neutral, 18.4% somewhat 
agreed, 14.6% mostly agreed and 5.2% strongly agreed. 
Furthermore, the mean for item NP4 is 3.86 and the standard deviation is 1.66. In addition, the 
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statistics, the distribution can be described as potentially symmetrical and platykurtic (negative 
kurtosis) which infers that the data is not normally distributed. Figure 8.15 shows that 8.5% of 
the sample strongly disagreed, 15.1% mostly disagreed, 17.9% somewhat disagreed, 22.6% 
were neutral, 18.4% somewhat agreed, 10.8% mostly agreed and 6.6% strongly agreed. 
The mean of item CP1 is 4.08, the standard deviation of 1.73, the skewness of -0.23 and the 
kurtosis is -0.89. Based on these statistics, the distribution is described as potentially 
symmetrical and platykurtic (negative kurtosis), which indicates that the data is not normally 
distributed. The frequency table (see Figure 8.16) for item CP1 shows that 13.3% of the sample 
strongly disagreed, 12.8% mostly disagreed, 14.2% somewhat disagreed, 20.4% were neutral, 
16.1% somewhat agreed, 19.4% mostly agreed and 3.8% strongly agreed. 
Item CP2 has a mean of 3.87, a standard deviation of 1.77, a skewness of -0.14 and a kurtosis 
of -1.08. The shape of the distribution for CP2 is thus potentially symmetrical and platykurtic 
(negative kurtosis), which infer that the data is not normally distributed. Figure 8.16 shows that 
frequencies for item CP2 and indicate that 13.3% of respondents strongly disagreed, 12.8% 
mostly disagreed, 14.2% somewhat disagreed, 20.4% were neutral, 16.1% somewhat agreed, 
19.4% mostly agreed and 3.8% strongly agreed. 
 














Furthermore, Table 8.2 shows that the mean for item CP3 is 3.92 and the standard deviation is 
1.75. Additionally, the results pertaining skewness and kurtosis are -0.12 and -1.09, 
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(negative kurtosis), which indicates that the data is not normally distributed. The frequencies 
for CP3 (see Figure 8.16) show that 10.8% of the sample strongly disagreed, 14.6% mostly 
disagreed, 15.6% somewhat disagreed, 17.5% were neutral, 17.9% somewhat agreed, 19.3% 
mostly agreed and 4.2% strongly agreed. 
The mean for item CP4 is 3.59, the standard deviation is 1.64, the skewness is -0.10 and the 
kurtosis is -1.04. Based on these results, the distribution is shaped potentially symmetrical and 
platykurtic (negative kurtosis), which infers that the data is not normally distributed. Figure 
8.16 shows that 15.1% of respondents strongly disagreed, 13.2% mostly disagreed, 18.4% 
somewhat disagreed, 18.4% were neutral, 22.6% somewhat agreed, 10.8% mostly agreed and 




In Figure 8.17 the frequencies for scale items pertaining commitment is shown. These 
frequencies will be discussed in the following section, along with the descriptive statistics 
regarding measurement items of commitment (see Table 8.2). 
 













The mean of item C1 is 4.83, the standard deviation is 1.28, the skewness is -0.13 and the 
kurtosis is -0.51. The distribution shape for C1 is symmetrical and mesokurtic, and thus 
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respondents strongly disagreed, 2.4% mostly disagreed, 11.8% somewhat disagreed, 27.8% 
were neutral, 24.5% somewhat agreed, 23.1% mostly agreed and 9.9% strongly agreed. 
Item C2 has a mean of 5.92 and a standard deviation of 1.28. Additionally, results pertaining to 
skewness and kurtosis are -0.51 and -0.23, respectively. Based on these descriptive statistics, 
the distribution is asymmetrical and left-skewed, as well as potentially mesokurtic – which 
indicates that the data is not normally distributed. Figure 8.17 shows the frequencies for 
commitment scale items, which depicts that 0.5% of respondents strongly disagreed, 1.4% 
mostly disagreed, 6.6% somewhat disagreed, 19.3% were neutral, 23.1% somewhat agreed, 
30.2% mostly agreed and 18.9% strongly agreed. 
For item C3, the mean and standard deviations are 5.20 and 1.40, respectively, with a skewness 
of -0.60 and a kurtosis of 0.33. The distribution of data can thus be characterised as 
asymmetrical and left-skewed, as well as potentially mesokurtic. Figure 8.17 shows that 1.9% 
of respondents strongly disagreed, 0.5% mostly disagreed, 10.8% somewhat disagreed, 14.6% 
were neutral, 27.8% somewhat agreed, 23.6% mostly agreed and 20.8% strongly agreed. 
Table 8.2 shows that item C4 has a mean of 5.13, a standard deviation of 1.40, a skewness of -
0.50 and a kurtosis of -0.10. The distribution shape can thus be described as asymmetrical and 
left-skewed, and potentially mesokurtic – which indicates that the data is not normally 
distributed. Furthermore, Figure 8.17 indicates that 1.4% of sample strongly disagreed, 2.4% 
mostly disagreed, 8% somewhat disagreed, 19.8% were neutral, 26.4% somewhat agreed, 
22.6% mostly agreed and 19.3% strongly agreed. 
 
8.3.2.3 Symptoms of dark side behaviour 
 
In the following section the descriptive statistics for scale items pertaining to dark side 
symptoms (namely, relational myopia, complacency, vulnerability and suspicion) will be 




In Table 8.2 the descriptive statistics for items concerning relational myopia is shown, while 
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The mean for item RM1 is 4.57, the standard deviation is 1.48, the skewness is -0.37 and the 
kurtosis is -0.37. Based on these results, the distribution can be described as asymmetrical and 
left-skewed, as well as potentially mesokurtic, which consequently indicates that the data is not 
normally distributed. In Figure 8.18, the frequencies for item RM1 is illustrated and shows that 
3.3% of respondents strongly disagreed, 4.7% mostly disagreed, 17% somewhat disagreed, 
18.4% were neutral, 28.3% somewhat agreed, 19.8% mostly agreed and 8.5% strongly agreed. 
Item RM2 has a mean of 5.35, a standard deviation of 1.34, a skewness of -1.03 and a kurtosis 
of 1.24. The distribution can thus be described as asymmetrical and left-skewed, as well as 
leptokurtic (positive kurtosis), which infers that the data is not normally distributed. Figure 8.18 
shows that 1.9% of the sample strongly disagreed, 3.3% mostly disagreed, 1.9% somewhat 
disagreed, 14.6% were neutral, 26.9% somewhat agreed, 32.1% mostly agreed and 19.3% 
strongly agreed. 
Furthermore, the mean of item RM3 is 5.11 and the standard deviation is 1.30. In addition, 
statistics pertaining skewness and kurtosis are -0.62 and 0.50, respectively. The distribution can 
hence be described as asymmetrical and left-skewed, as well as potentially mesokurtic – which 
indicates that the data is not normally distributed. The frequency table (Figure 8.18) for item 
RM3 shows that 1.4% of the sample strongly disagreed, 2.8% mostly disagreed, 3.8% 
somewhat disagreed, 22.2% were neutral, 29.2% somewhat agreed, 25.9% mostly agreed and 
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The descriptive statistics for scale items concerning complacency is shown in Table 8.2, 
whereas the frequencies pertaining responses for items COM1 to COM4 are illustrated in Figure 
8.19. 
 














The mean for item COM1 is 3.63, the standard deviation is 1.82, the skewness is 0.06 and the 
kurtosis is -1.18. The distribution can thus be described as potentially symmetrical and 
platykurtic (negative kurtosis), which indicates that the data is not normally distributed. In 
Figure 8.19, the frequencies for responses concerning item COM1 indicates that 16% of the 
sample strongly disagreed, 17% mostly disagreed, 15.1% somewhat disagreed, 15.1% were 
neutral, 17.9% somewhat agreed, 14.6% mostly agreed and 4.2% strongly agreed. 
Item COM2 has a mean of 3.97, a standard deviation of 1.81, a skewness of -0.36 and a kurtosis 
of -1.26. Based on these results, the distribution can be described as asymmetrical and left-
skewed, as well as platykurtic (negative kurtosis), which indicates that the data is not 
distributed. Figure 8.19 shows that 13.2% of the sample strongly disagreed, 16% mostly 
disagreed, 9% somewhat disagreed, 9.9% were neutral, 27.8% somewhat agreed, 22.2% mostly 
agreed and 1.9% strongly agreed. 
The mean of item COM3 is 3.79 and the standard deviation is 1.74. In addition, results 
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described as potentially symmetrical and platykurtic (negative kurtosis), which infers that the 
data is not normally distributed. The frequencies for item COM3 indicate that 11.3% of the 
sample strongly disagreed, 17.5% mostly disagreed, 15.1% somewhat disagreed, 16.5% were 
neutral, 20.3% somewhat agreed, 15.1% mostly agreed and 4.2% strongly agreed. 
Furthermore, item COM4 has a mean of 3.5, a standard deviation of 1.84, a skewness of 0.18 
and a kurtosis of -1.23. Based on these statistics, the distribution can be described as potentially 
symmetrical and platykurtic (negative kurtosis). Hence, the data for item COM4 is not normally 
distributed. In Figure 8.16, the frequencies for COM4 is illustrated and shows that 17% of the 
sample strongly disagreed, 22.2% mostly disagreed, 11.3% somewhat disagreed, 15.6% were 




Vulnerability was measured through the use of three scale items, namely V1, V2 and V3. In the 
following section, descriptive statistics concerning the vulnerability construct (see Table 8.2) 
will be discussed, along with the frequencies of responses (see Figure 8.20). 
The mean for item V1 is 4.29, the standard deviation is 1.86, the skewness is -0.30 and the 
kurtosis is -1.15. Based on these results, the distribution can be described as potentially 
symmetrical and platykurtic (negative kurtosis), which indicates that the data is not normally 
distributed. In Figure 8.20, the frequencies for item V1 shows that 8.5% of respondents strongly 
disagreed, 15.6% mostly disagreed, 9.4% somewhat disagreed, 16% were neutral, 15.1% 
somewhat agreed, 25.9% mostly agreed and 9.4% strongly agreed. 
Item V2 has a mean of 4.14, a standard deviation of 1.88, a skewness of -0.13 and a kurtosis of 
-1.22. The distribution can thus be described as potentially symmetrical and platykurtic 
(negative kurtosis) – which infers that the data is not normally distributed. Figure 8.20 shows 
that 9.4% of the sample strongly disagreed, 16% mostly disagreed, 13.7% somewhat disagreed, 
15.1% were neutral, 13.7% somewhat agreed, 22.2% mostly agreed and 9.9% strongly agreed. 
The mean for item V3 is 4.08, the standard deviation is 1.89, the skewness is -0.26 and the 
kurtosis is -1.22. The distribution can thus be described as potentially symmetrical and 
platykurtic (negative kurtosis), which indicates that the data is not normally distributed. In 
Figure 8.20 the frequencies for V3 is illustrated and shows that 13.2% of respondents strongly 
disagreed, 13.2% mostly disagreed, 11.3% somewhat disagreed, 14.6% were neutral, 16% 
somewhat agreed, 25.5% mostly agreed and 6.1% strongly agreed. 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
195 
 















In the following section, the descriptive statistics and frequencies of responses for scale items 
pertaining suspicion will be discussed. In Table 8.2, the descriptive statistics for the suspicion 
construct is shown, whereas Figure 8.21 illustrates the relevant frequencies. 
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The mean for item S1 is 4.40, the standard deviation is 1.53, the skewness is -0.25 and the 
kurtosis is -0.59. Based on these results, the distribution can be described as potentially 
symmetrical and mesokurtic, which indicates that the data is not normally distributed. Figure 
8.21 shows that 3.3% of respondents strongly disagreed, 9.9% mostly disagreed, 13.7% 
somewhat disagreed, 23.1% were neutral, 24.5% somewhat agreed, 17.5% mostly agreed and 
8% strongly agreed. 
Item S2 has a mean of 4.33, a standard deviation of 1.65, a skewness of -0.23 and a kurtosis of 
-0.94. The shape of the distribution can thus be characterised as potentially symmetrical and 
platykurtic (negative kurtosis), which infers that the data is not normally distributed. In Figure 
8.21, the frequencies for S2 is depicted and shows that 3.8% of respondents strongly disagreed, 
15.1% mostly disagreed, 12.7% somewhat disagreed, 17.9% were neutral, 22.2% somewhat 
agreed, 20.3% mostly agreed and 8% strongly agreed. 
The mean of item S3 is 4.52, the standard deviation is 1.65, the skewness is -0.32 and the 
kurtosis is -0.84. Based on these results, the distribution can be described as potentially 
symmetrical and platykurtic (negative kurtosis), which indicates that the data is not normally 
distributed. Figure 8.21 shows that 3.3% of respondents strongly disagreed, 11.8% mostly 
disagreed, 12.3% somewhat disagreed, 18.9% were neutral, 20.3% somewhat agreed, 22.6% 
mostly agreed and 10.8% strongly agreed. 
Furthermore, item S4 has a mean of 4.44 and a standard deviation of 1.61. Additionally, results 
pertaining skewness and kurtosis are -0.43 and -0.61, respectively. Thus, the distribution can 
be described as asymmetrical and left-skewed, as well as potentially mesokurtic – which infers 
that the data is not normally distributed. Figure 8.21 depicts that 4.7% of respondents strongly 
disagreed, 11.8% mostly disagreed, 8.5% somewhat disagreed, 20.9% were neutral, 25.6% 
somewhat agreed, 20.4% mostly agreed and 8.1% strongly agreed. 
Item S5 has a mean of 4.23, a standard deviation of 1.56, a skewness of -0.53 and a kurtosis of 
-0.44. Based on these above-mentioned statistics (see Table 8.2), the distribution can be 
described as asymmetrical and left-skewed, as well as potentially mesokurtic. Hence, it can be 
assumed that the data is not normally distributed. The frequency table (Figure 8.21) indicates 
that 4.7% of respondents strongly disagreed, 11.8% mostly disagreed, 8.5% somewhat 








8.4 TESTS FOR NORMALITY  
 
In the preceding sections, the skewness and kurtosis for each scale item were discussed, along 
with the shape of the distribution. According to these descriptive statistics (see Table 8.2), it 
can be assumed that none of the scale items are normally distributed. In Table 8.3, the tests for 
normality are presented, which includes results of both the Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-
Wilk tests. To determine the normality of data for the current study, the p-value was compared 
to the significance level. Hence, a significance level of 0.05 was selected for the current study, 
indicating that when p-value ≤ α, the data does not follow a normal distribution.  
In support of the conclusion derived from the results pertaining skewness and kurtosis about 
the normality of data, Table 8.3 (see next page) shows that the p-values for all scale items are 
lower that the significance level of 0.05. Therefore, the distribution of data for all scale items 
is not normal. The non-normality of the data contributed to the decision to use variance based 
structural equation modelling (SEM) to test theorised relationships between latent variables, as 
it is deemed to be less sensitive to distributional abnormality (Hair et al., 2017). 
 
8.5 INFERENTIAL ANALYSIS 
 
SmartPLS software (version 3) was employed to analyse data further, thereby generating 
inferential statistics (Hair et al., 2017). This section focuses on the reporting of results regarding 
the measurement model, reliability and validity of measurement items, as well as the structural 
model and hypothesis testing. The procedure as suggested by Hair et al. (2019) was followed. 
Figure 8.22 below offers a detailed account of the inferential analysis conducted to obtain the 
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Figure 8. 22 Summary of inferential analyses 
 
Table 8.3 Tests for normality 
 Kolmogorov-Smirnova Shapiro-Wilk 
 Statistic df Sig. Statistic Df Sig. 
T1 .148 211 .000 .928 211 .000 
T2 .149 211 .000 .950 211 .000 
T3 .153 211 .000 .944 211 .000 
T4 .197 211 .000 .935 211 .000 
C1 .166 211 .000 .935 211 .000 
C2 .198 211 .000 .913 211 .000 
C3 .167 211 .000 .909 211 .000 
C4 .155 211 .000 .920 211 .000 
U1 .171 211 .000 .944 211 .000 
U2 .170 211 .000 .921 211 .000 
U3 .177 211 .000 .941 211 .000 
U4 .199 211 .000 .929 211 .000 
D1 .166 211 .000 .925 211 .000 
D2 .219 211 .000 .905 211 .000 
D3 .175 211 .000 .935 211 .000 
NP1 .175 211 .000 .932 211 .000 
NP2 .173 211 .000 .940 211 .000 
NP3 .136 211 .000 .946 211 .000 
NP4 .118 211 .000 .949 211 .000 
CP1 .157 211 .000 .935 211 .000 
CP2 .133 211 .000 .928 211 .000 
CP3 .145 211 .000 .931 211 .000 
CP4 .152 211 .000 .929 211 .000 
FC1 .211 211 .000 .905 211 .000 
FC2 .185 211 .000 .917 211 .000 
FC3 .181 211 .000 .918 211 .000 
DC1 .188 211 .000 .943 211 .000 
DC2 .150 211 .000 .943 211 .000 
DC3 .159 211 .000 .934 211 .000 
DC4 .167 211 .000 .930 211 .000 
O1 .188 212 .000 .901 212 .000 
O2 .193 212 .000 .936 212 .000 
O3 .141 212 .000 .920 212 .000 
O4 .158 212 .000 .937 212 .000 
SV1 .175 212 .000 .929 212 .000 
SV2 .175 212 .000 .929 212 .000 
SV3 .176 212 .000 .944 212 .000 
SV4 .201 212 .000 .928 212 .000 
RM1 .182 211 .000 .939 211 .000 
RM2 .200 211 .000 .878 211 .000 
RM3 .163 211 .000 .914 211 .000 
COM1 .144 211 .000 .925 211 .000 
COM2 .235 211 .000 .882 211 .000 
COM3 .153 211 .000 .934 211 .000 
COM4 .182 211 .000 .913 211 .000 
V1 .173 211 .000 .913 211 .000 
V2 .158 211 .000 .922 211 .000 
V3 .162 211 .000 .908 211 .000 
S1 .150 211 .000 .946 211 .000 
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S2 .163 211 .000 .935 211 .000 
S3 .151 211 .000 .934 211 .000 
S4 .176 211 .000 .930 211 .000 
S5 .188 211 .000 .921 211 .000 
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction     
 
Note: T = Trust, C = Commitment, O = Opportunistic behaviour, SV = Shared values, RM = 
Relational myopia, COM = Complacency, V = Vulnerability, S = Suspicion, U = Uncertainty, 
D = Dependence, NP = Non-coercive power, CV = Coercive power, FC = Functional conflict, 
DC = Dysfunctional conflict 
 
8.5.1 The measurement model 
 
The measurement model, employing only reflective measures, yielded mostly satisfactory 
results, with the exception of the following items: NP1, NP2, O3, O4, RM1, S1, T1, U1 and U2 
(see Table 8.4). As these items obtained weak loadings and also cross-loaded on multiple 
constructs, they were removed in order to ensure that measurement reliability and validity were 
achieved. Furthermore, the remainder of scale items loaded as expected, and all were significant 
at the p<0.05 level. 
As can be seen from Table 8.4 (see next page), all the remaining items loaded as expected on 
their associated latent constructs exceeding all corresponding row and column loadings. 
Therefore, the measurement appears to exhibit satisfactory convergent validity.  
 
8.5.2 Reliability and validity  
 
The construct reliability, convergent validity and discriminant validity for each individual scale 
item of the measurement instrument were assessed. Construct reliability for each item was 
determined by the composite reliability, as well as Cronbach’s alpha coefficient, while the 
Average Variance Extracted (AVE) was used to evaluate the convergent validity. Furthermore, 
the Fornell-Larcker criterion, cross-loadings and Heterotrait-Monotrait ratio (HTMT) were 
assessed to determine the discriminant validity of scale items.  
 
Construct reliability and validity 
 
In Table 8.5, the results concerning Cronbach’s alpha coefficient, composite reliability and 
Average Variance Extracted (AVE) for each subscale item is presented. 
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Table 8.4 Construct reliability and validity diagnostics 
 Cronbach's Alpha Composite Reliability Average Variance Extracted (AVE) 
Complacency (COM) 0.840 0.891 0.673 
Coercive power (CP) 0.914 0.940 0.796 
Commitment (C) 0.930 0.950 0.826 
Dysfunctional conflict (DC) 0.935 0.954 0.838 
Dependence (D) 0.847 0.906 0.762 
Functional conflict (FC) 0.779 0.871 0.693 
Non-coercive power (NP) 0.837 0.924 0.859 
Opportunistic behaviour (O) 0.583 0.823 0.701 
Relational myopia (RM) 0.677 0.854 0.746 
Shared values (SV) 0.893 0.926 0.757 
Suspicion (S) 0.879 0.917 0.733 
Trust (T) 0.843 0.895 0.684 
Uncertainty (U) 0.720 0.873 0.776 
Vulnerability (V) 0.843 0.906 0.764 
 
Table 8.5 Cross-loadings 
 
COM CP C DC D FC NP O RM SV S T U V 
COM1 0.819 -0.165 -0.002 -0.194 0.073 0.426 -0.186 -0.067 0.035 0.074 -0.314 0.263 -0.079 -0.211 
COM2 0.779 -0.144 0.163 -0.098 0.173 0.271 -0.144 -0.080 0.192 0.184 -0.269 0.136 -0.174 -0.229 
COM3 0.831 0.093 -0.061 0.103 0.200 0.160 -0.038 0.053 0.019 -0.011 -0.122 0.111 0.001 -0.066 
COM4 0.849 0.089 -0.034 -0.066 0.176 0.288 -0.057 0.048 0.077 0.086 -0.207 0.200 -0.008 -0.119 
CP1 -0.047 0.844 -0.010 0.317 0.209 -0.237 0.664 0.344 0.088 0.142 0.377 -0.037 0.397 0.392 
CP2 -0.051 0.918 -0.065 0.431 0.025 -0.315 0.539 0.410 -0.011 0.037 0.460 -0.154 0.438 0.383 
CP3 -0.019 0.938 -0.032 0.433 0.126 -0.281 0.648 0.416 0.032 0.043 0.510 -0.175 0.468 0.420 
CP4 -0.013 0.866 -0.127 0.443 0.023 -0.287 0.507 0.341 0.000 0.105 0.398 -0.115 0.367 0.318 
C1 0.013 -0.072 0.894 -0.223 0.311 0.372 0.054 -0.140 0.583 0.489 -0.111 0.495 -0.084 -0.204 
C2 -0.088 -0.064 0.889 -0.203 0.134 0.226 0.113 -0.148 0.555 0.429 -0.047 0.327 -0.070 -0.102 
C3 0.032 -0.058 0.926 -0.225 0.244 0.334 0.123 -0.185 0.582 0.504 -0.096 0.427 -0.115 -0.106 
C4 0.059 -0.037 0.926 -0.205 0.260 0.390 0.118 -0.200 0.541 0.592 -0.115 0.460 -0.084 -0.149 
DC1 -0.111 0.376 -0.239 0.899 -0.046 -0.363 0.300 0.423 -0.105 -0.089 0.345 -0.272 0.343 0.363 
DC2 -0.071 0.472 -0.193 0.928 -0.010 -0.319 0.319 0.470 -0.055 0.000 0.320 -0.255 0.329 0.337 
DC3 -0.073 0.372 -0.183 0.910 -0.058 -0.293 0.271 0.435 -0.076 -0.084 0.333 -0.322 0.320 0.262 
DC4 -0.068 0.444 -0.245 0.924 -0.097 -0.343 0.300 0.480 -0.059 -0.072 0.349 -0.329 0.298 0.332 
D1 0.115 0.076 0.204 0.040 0.836 0.115 0.218 0.110 0.214 0.076 0.077 0.107 0.045 0.086 
D2 0.203 0.016 0.249 -0.164 0.885 0.092 0.174 0.036 0.324 0.109 -0.066 0.144 0.050 -0.019 
D3 0.155 0.166 0.237 -0.020 0.895 0.116 0.302 0.177 0.242 0.196 0.079 0.264 0.156 0.146 
FC1 0.278 -0.233 0.286 -0.130 0.089 0.771 -0.093 -0.124 0.241 0.346 -0.263 0.261 -0.071 -0.315 
FC2 0.356 -0.249 0.252 -0.342 0.072 0.874 -0.264 -0.293 0.233 0.310 -0.353 0.493 -0.182 -0.414 
FC3 0.266 -0.298 0.380 -0.390 0.145 0.847 -0.182 -0.378 0.265 0.271 -0.376 0.369 -0.270 -0.459 
NP1 0.066 0.136 0.524 0.058 0.381 0.270 0.392 -0.029 0.471 0.525 -0.048 0.278 0.109 0.042 
NP2 0.116 0.083 0.377 0.145 0.407 0.250 0.341 0.061 0.417 0.271 0.039 0.103 0.158 -0.000 
NP3 -0.197 0.573 -0.012 0.316 0.108 -0.297 0.900 0.393 -0.015 0.046 0.570 -0.224 0.376 0.400 
NP4 -0.114 0.692 -0.010 0.279 0.226 -0.294 0.901 0.374 0.080 0.119 0.425 -0.100 0.394 0.499 
O1 0.005 0.427 -0.112 0.420 0.158 -0.265 0.356 0.902 0.036 0.027 0.333 -0.227 0.317 0.267 
O2 -0.059 0.248 -0.183 0.324 0.086 -0.183 0.253 0.717 -0.041 -0.259 0.451 -0.170 0.370 0.288 
O3 -0.117 0.036 0.126 -0.140 0.066 0.180 0.002 0.002 0.132 -0.007 0.144 0.035 0.189 -0.070 
O4 -0.004 0.025 -0.011 -0.100 0.157 0.225 -0.035 0.083 0.035 -0.112 0.103 0.088 0.099 -0.064 
RM1 0.137 0.263 0.105 0.166 0.116 -0.063 0.237 0.262 0.430 0.262 0.139 -0.053 0.266 0.259 
RM2 0.047 -0.076 0.673 -0.205 0.301 0.350 0.066 -0.118 0.903 0.497 -0.224 0.308 -0.106 -0.127 
RM3 0.091 0.104 0.384 0.076 0.195 0.171 0.179 0.064 0.814 0.464 0.021 0.092 0.225 0.030 
SV1 -0.011 0.115 0.483 -0.118 0.115 0.311 0.173 -0.156 0.467 0.839 -0.162 0.397 -0.072 -0.078 
SV2 0.127 0.030 0.577 -0.106 0.204 0.376 0.146 -0.092 0.523 0.927 -0.186 0.482 -0.041 -0.150 
SV3 0.169 0.151 0.358 0.052 0.141 0.218 0.198 0.048 0.407 0.817 -0.105 0.284 0.012 -0.118 
SV4 0.065 0.036 0.486 -0.028 0.076 0.340 0.159 -0.100 0.541 0.894 -0.115 0.342 -0.010 -0.153 
S1 -0.119 0.241 -0.166 0.236 0.021 -0.319 0.316 0.354 -0.196 -0.323 0.690 -0.392 0.390 0.464 
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S2 -0.300 0.480 -0.020 0.225 -0.005 -0.355 0.492 0.346 -0.067 -0.053 0.875 -0.259 0.472 0.497 
S3 -0.322 0.361 -0.028 0.257 0.011 -0.306 0.407 0.309 -0.080 -0.080 0.830 -0.244 0.441 0.343 
S4 -0.291 0.397 -0.113 0.293 0.064 -0.367 0.397 0.335 -0.116 -0.181 0.871 -0.260 0.473 0.441 
S5 -0.106 0.488 -0.118 0.478 0.059 -0.300 0.395 0.435 -0.061 -0.098 0.802 -0.298 0.490 0.337 
T1 0.221 -0.128 0.101 -0.329 0.014 0.304 -0.229 -0.242 -0.025 0.003 -0.312 0.651 -0.334 -0.211 
T2 0.157 -0.119 0.469 -0.283 0.261 0.431 -0.005 -0.217 0.284 0.417 -0.264 0.852 -0.215 -0.138 
T3 0.187 -0.037 0.439 -0.188 0.151 0.371 -0.055 -0.149 0.244 0.494 -0.299 0.880 -0.195 -0.180 
T4 0.211 -0.171 0.466 -0.289 0.210 0.400 -0.134 -0.273 0.203 0.436 -0.304 0.900 -0.300 -0.286 
U1 0.067 0.369 -0.104 0.254 0.209 -0.137 0.363 0.306 0.047 -0.006 0.389 -0.125 0.667 0.239 
U2 0.126 0.283 0.137 0.078 -0.174 0.057 0.145 0.028 0.131 0.168 0.235 -0.039 0.406 0.019 
U3 -0.154 0.284 -0.086 0.240 0.022 -0.083 0.241 0.181 0.080 -0.031 0.346 -0.266 0.762 0.174 
U4 -0.159 0.336 -0.102 0.308 0.078 -0.302 0.320 0.375 -0.025 -0.115 0.477 -0.329 0.793 0.325 
V1 -0.269 0.340 -0.103 0.236 -0.034 -0.457 0.335 0.219 -0.056 -0.090 0.399 -0.245 0.258 0.787 
V2 -0.144 0.395 -0.182 0.363 0.104 -0.429 0.452 0.375 -0.021 -0.123 0.499 -0.224 0.323 0.924 
V3 -0.091 0.379 -0.118 0.322 0.154 -0.380 0.398 0.320 -0.017 -0.163 0.425 -0.170 0.257 0.904 
 
Firstly, in terms of the evaluation of Cronbach’s alpha coefficient of measurement items, 
literature suggests that a minimum score of 0.6 is acceptable (Hair et al., 2019). As illustrated 
in the table above, most of the current study’s measurement constructs exhibit satisfactory 
results concerning Cronbach’s alpha coefficient – with the exception of opportunistic behaviour 
(OB).  
However, Hair et al. (2013) infer that the Cronbach’s alpha coefficient may be sensitive to the 
number of scale items of the measurement instrument and can underestimate the internal 
consistency reliability. Hence, composite reliability is also assessed in order to determine 
construct reliability. Table 8.5 indicates that the Composite Reliability score for opportunistic 
behaviour is 0.823 which suggests that the construct exhibits good validity. All the remaining 
constructs obtained adequate results concerning composite reliability, as each construct 
exceeding the 0.7 benchmark (Hair et al., 2017).  
Thirdly, the AVE scores are all above the required minimum threshold value of 0.5 (Bagozzi 
& Yi, 1988), which indicates that each construct achieved convergent validity. In addition, 
discriminant validity is also supported by the abovementioned AVE scores which are all higher 
than the 0.5 benchmark (Hair et al., 2017), but a more robust assessment of discriminant validity 




Discriminant validity was further confirmed by the Fornell and Larcker (1981) method and the 
Heterotrait-Monotrait (HTMT) method (Henseler et al., 2014). The Fornell-Larcker method 
compares the square root of the AVE in the diagonal with correlation coefficients in the same 
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row and column for each construct (see Table 8.6). The square root of AVE scores for current 
research constructs exceed all row and column values, thus suggesting discriminant validity.  
 
Table 8.6 Fornell-Larcker criterion of discriminant validity  
 COM CP C DC D FC NP O RM SV S T U V 
COM 0.820                           
CP -0.036 0.892                         
C 0.009 -0.064 0.909                       
DC -0.088 0.455 -0.236 0.915                     
D 0.183 0.106 0.265 -0.058 0.873                   
FC 0.361 -0.314 0.368 -0.359 0.123 0.832                 
NP -0.168 0.681 -0.012 0.322 0.177 -0.318 0.927               
O -0.025 0.419 -0.166 0.451 0.151 -0.273 0.394 0.836             
RM 0.074 -0.010 0.642 -0.113 0.298 0.322 0.002 -0.038 0.864           
SV 0.097 0.088 0.557 -0.067 0.155 0.367 0.088 -0.105 0.552 0.870         
S -0.294 0.508 -0.082 0.367 0.037 -0.388 0.535 0.432 -0.119 -0.119 0.856       
T 0.227 -0.138 0.474 -0.322 0.209 0.459 -0.177 -0.241 0.258 0.442 -0.311 0.827     
U -0.177 0.354 -0.107 0.315 0.062 -0.241 0.334 0.373 -0.017 -0.092 0.473 -0.342 0.881   
V -0.189 0.426 -0.156 0.354 0.087 -0.481 0.483 0.325 -0.078 -0.144 0.475 -0.244 0.298 0.874 
 
In addition to the Fornell-Larcker criterion and evaluation of cross-loadings, the Heterotrait-
Monotrait ratio method, which employs a comparison of the heterotrait-hetermethod 
correlations and monotrait-monomethod correlations, was also used to assess discriminant 
validity. Discriminant validity is established between two constructs when the HTMT values 
are below 0.90 (Teo et al., 2008), or lower than 0.85 as suggested by Kline et al. (2011). In 
Table 8.7, the scores concerning the HTMT assessment are presented, which are all lower than 
0.85. Hence, the measurement for the current study exhibits satisfactory discriminant validity. 
 
Table 8.7 HTMT assessment of discriminant validity  
 COM CP C DC D FC NP O RM SV S T U V 
COM                            
CP 0.170                          
C 0.107 0.075                        
DC 0.158 0.492 0.252                      
D 0.228 0.140 0.292 0.111                    
FC 0.430 0.371 0.427 0.403 0.151                  
NP 0.201 0.779 0.032 0.363 0.203 0.385                
O 0.105 0.547 0.239 0.599 0.196 0.380 0.549              
RM 0.131 0.131 0.766 0.203 0.377 0.414 0.100 0.182            
SV 0.143 0.120 0.597 0.098 0.164 0.436 0.109 0.266 0.708          
S 0.351 0.559 0.097 0.404 0.097 0.465 0.620 0.621 0.180 0.140        
T 0.266 0.159 0.501 0.373 0.230 0.550 0.221 0.342 0.317 0.479 0.372      
U 0.235 0.430 0.129 0.377 0.086 0.286 0.417 0.556 0.300 0.098 0.579 0.442    
V 0.236 0.483 0.172 0.395 0.159 0.589 0.575 0.466 0.137 0.165 0.547 0.295 0.360  
 
Note: T = Trust, C = Commitment, O = Opportunistic behaviour, SV = Shared values, RM = 
Relational myopia, COM = Complacency, V = Vulnerability, S = Suspicion, U = Uncertainty, 
D = Dependence, NP = Non-coercive power, CV = Coercive power, FC = Functional conflict, 
DC = Dysfunctional conflict 
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8.5.3 The structural model 
 
The satisfactory performance of the measurement model allowed for the consideration of the 
structural model and the hypothesis testing of relationships between constructs. Hence, in the 
following section, the structural model will be evaluated through the assessment of collinearity 
statistics, the coefficient of determination (R2), as well as the predictive accuracy of the PLS 
model. This section concludes with reporting the results pertaining to the hypothesis testing. 
 
Assessment of collinearity 
 
When assessing the structural model, Hair et al. (2019) recommend that collinearity first be 
evaluated. Table 8.8 presents the inner VIF values of the structural model. All constructs exhibit 
VIF values of less than 3, which suggests that the data does not suffer from collinearity issues 
(Hair et al., 2010; Hair et al., 2019).   
 
Table 8.8 Collinearity statistics 
 COM CP C DC D FC NP O RM SV S T U V 
COM                             
CP 2.116               2.116   2.116     2.116 
C 1.257               1.257   1.257     1.257 
DC 1.385               1.385   1.385     1.385 
D 1.128               1.128   1.128     1.128 
FC 1.382               1.382   1.382     1.382 
NP 1.974               1.974   1.974     1.974 
O   1.182   1.182 1.182 1.182 1.182               
RM                             
SV   1.249 1.243 1.249 1.249 1.249 1.249               
S                             
T   1.418 1.243 1.418 1.418 1.418 1.418               
U   1.267   1.267 1.267 1.267 1.267               
V                             
 
Note: T = Trust, C = Commitment, O = Opportunistic behaviour, SV = Shared values, RM = 
Relational myopia, COM = Complacency, V = Vulnerability, S = Suspicion, U = Uncertainty, 
D = Dependence, NP = Non-coercive power, CV = Coercive power, FC = Functional conflict, 
DC = Dysfunctional conflict 
*Note: Table 8.8 contains inner VIF values 
 
Coefficient of determination (R2) 
 
In addition to the evaluation of collinearity statistics, the coefficient of determination was also 
assessed in order to determine the statistical power of the structural model. The R2 scores were 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
204 
 
evaluated according to Cohen’s (1988) criteria, which indicates that most constructs obtained 
a score between 0 and 3 and thus possess “weak” statistical power. However, results concerning 
the constructs of commitment (C), relational myopia (RM), suspicion (S) and vulnerability (V) 
reside between the threshold of 0.3 and 0.5, indicating medium statistical power. 
 
Table 8.9 Coefficient of determination (R2) 
 R Square R Square Adjusted 
COM 0.207 0.184 
CP 0.244 0.229 
C 0.375 0.369 
DC 0.267 0.253 
D 0.097 0.080 
FC 0.274 0.260 
NP 0.226 0.211 
RM 0.444 0.427 
S 0.378 0.360 




The predictive accuracy of the structural model was evaluated by inspecting the Q2predict values 
in the PLSpredict procedure (see Table 8.10). According to Hair et al. (2019), a positive Q2predict 
value indicates that the PLS path model’s prediction error is smaller than the prediction error 
given by the (most) naïve benchmark. Thus, a Q2predict value of zero or less suggests that the 
predictive power of the PLS-SEM analysis for that indicator does not outperform even the most 
naïve benchmark (Hair et al., 2019). All dependent construct indicators reported a positive 
Q2predict value of more than 0, with the exception of COM3, D1 and D2. Furthermore, Q2predict 
values higher than 0, 0.25 and 0.5, respectively, represent small, medium and large predictive 
accuracy. The majority of dependent construct indicators presented in Table 8.10 offer small 
predictive accuracy, with C1, C2 and C4 indicating medium predictive accuracy.  
Table 8.10 Predictive accuracy 
  PLS Model Linear Model 
Dependent construct indicators Q²_predict RMSE MAE RMSE MAE 
COM2 0.014 1.799 1.592 1.737 1.469 
COM3 -0.001 1.746 1.499 1.792 1.531 
COM4 0.022 1.824 1.597 1.846 1.557 
COM1 0.037 1.787 1.552 1.820 1.503 
CP2 0.187 1.594 1.314 1.572 1.254 
CP4 0.122 1.541 1.296 1.533 1.264 
CP3 0.185 1.582 1.327 1.623 1.302 
CP1 0.162 1.591 1.306 1.629 1.314 
C4 0.379 1.103 0.851 1.111 0.884 
C2 0.183 1.162 0.911 1.199 0.963 
C3 0.291 1.183 0.899 1.203 0.945 
C1 0.317 1.062 0.830 1.074 0.844 
DC2 0.187 1.466 1.189 1.504 1.218 
DC4 0.218 1.472 1.169 1.520 1.204 
DC1 0.152 1.322 1.039 1.344 1.063 
DC3 0.190 1.441 1.147 1.505 1.204 
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D1 -0.006 1.748 1.474 1.764 1.465 
D3 0.110 1.642 1.348 1.704 1.359 
D2 -0.015 1.780 1.466 1.760 1.420 
FC3 0.174 1.467 1.198 1.485 1.217 
FC2 0.224 1.595 1.300 1.609 1.293 
FC1 0.083 1.284 1.006 1.293 1.024 
NP4 0.162 1.522 1.201 1.549 1.217 
NP3 0.166 1.482 1.235 1.541 1.262 
RM3 0.136 1.212 0.932 1.164 0.860 
RM2 0.215 1.194 0.889 1.226 0.911 
S2 0.177 1.503 1.253 1.520 1.211 
S3 0.165 1.508 1.260 1.520 1.204 
S4 0.166 1.472 1.183 1.432 1.126 
S5 0.205 1.387 1.128 1.360 1.091 
V1 0.073 1.794 1.515 1.847 1.549 
V3 0.090 1.806 1.526 1.828 1.522 
V2 0.145 1.746 1.456 1.819 1.467 
 
Furthermore, the PLSpredict procedure also generates Root Mean Squared Error (RMSE), as 
well as Mean Absolute Error (MAE) statistics for dependent construct indicators, applied to the 
theorised PLS model and a system generated linear model. According to Hair et al. (2019), 
researchers can compare the RMSE and MAE values between the two models as further 
assessment of its predictive power. It is thus recommended that researchers should primarily 
use the RMSE, unless the prediction error distribution is highly non-symmetric, in which case 
MAE would be a more appropriate prediction statistic (Hair et al., 2019). From Table 8.10 it is 
clear that, for the minority of the cases, RMSE values are higher for the linear model, thus 
suggesting the PLS model exhibits medium predictive power. However, when comparing MAE 
values, Table 8.10 shows that the minority of dependent construct indicators produce lower 
PLS-SEM prediction errors compared to the naïve LM benchmark – which signifies that the 
model has a low predictive power.   
 
Structural model and hypothesis testing 
 
The satisfactory results obtained from the assessment of collinearity, coefficient of 
determination and predictive accuracy evaluation facilitate the final consideration of the 
hypotheses. Table 8.11 encompasses the results concerning the structural model and hypothesis 
testing, as well as whether direct relationships between constructs are supported or not.  
 
Table 8.11 Hypothesis testing 
Hypothesis Relationship Original sample T-statistic P-value Results 
H1 T ➞ FC 0,310 3,635 0,000 Supported 
H2 T ➞ DC -0,236 3,619 0,000 Supported 
H3 T ➞ NP -0,121 1,876 0,061 Not supported 
H4 T ➞ CP -0,054 0,824 0,410 Not supported 
H5 T ➞ D 0,251 3,002 0,003 Supported 
H6 T ➞ C 0,286 3,831 0,00 Supported 
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H7 SV ➞ FC 0,208 2,698 0,007 Supported 
H8 SV ➞ DC 0,086 1,333 0,183 Not supported 
H9 SV ➞ NP 0,193 2,771 0,006 Supported 
H10 SV ➞ CP 0,169 2,200 0,028 Supported 
H11 SV ➞ D 0,072 0,949 0,343 Not supported 
H12 SV ➞ C 0,428 7,610 0,000 Supported 
H13 OB ➞ FC -0,153 2,010 0,045 Supported 
H14 OB ➞ DC 0,363 5,051 0,000 Supported 
H15 OB ➞ NP 0,313 4,279 0,000 Supported 
H16 OB ➞ CP 0,339 5,074 0,000 Supported 
H17 OB ➞ D 0,187 2,194 0,028 Supported 
H18 OB ➞ C -0,073 1,117 0,264 Not supported 
H19 U ➞ FC -0,058 0,912 0,362 Not supported 
H20 U ➞ DC 0,107 1,487 0,137 Not supported 
H21 U ➞ NP 0,193 2,515 0,012 Supported 
H22 U ➞ CP 0,225 3,088 0,002 Supported 
H23 U ➞ D 0,084 0,956 0,339 Not supported 
H24 U ➞ C 0,057 0,811 0,417 Not supported 
H25 FC ➞ RM 0,120 1,835 0,067 Not supported 
H26 FC ➞ COM 0,397 5,230 0,000 Supported 
H27 FC ➞ V -0,332 4,341 0,000 Supported 
H28 FC ➞ S -0,202 2,998 0,003 Supported 
H29 DC ➞ RM 0,065 1,067 0,286 Not supported 
H30 DC ➞ COM 0,002 0,021 0,983 Not supported 
H31 DC ➞ V 0,114 1,475 0,140 Not supported 
H32 DC ➞ S 0,121 1,611 0,107 Not supported 
H33 NP ➞ RM -0,023 0,336 0,737 Not supported 
H34 NP ➞ COM -0,219 2,186 0,029 Supported 
H35 NP ➞ V 0,279 3,509 0,00 Supported 
H36 NP ➞ S 0,313 3,351 0,001 Supported 
H37 CP ➞ RM 0,036 0,512 0,609 Not supported 
H38 CP ➞ COM 0,204 1,982 0,048 Supported 
H39 CP ➞ V 0,070 0,877 0,381 Not supported 
H40 CP ➞ S 0,181 1,958 0,050 Supported 
H41 D ➞ RM 0,133 2,223 0,026 Supported 
H42 D ➞ COM 0,199 2,704 0,007 Supported 
H43 D ➞ V 0,083 1,327 0,185 Not supported 
H44 D ➞ S -0,017 0,267 0,789 Not supported 
H45 C ➞ RM 0,580 10,590 0,00 Supported 
H46 C ➞ COM -0,178 2,320 0,020 Supported 
H47 C ➞ V -0,022 0,301 0,763 Not supported 
H48 C ➞ S 0,041 0,777 0,437 Not supported 
 
Note: T = Trust, C = Commitment, O = Opportunistic behaviour, SV = Shared values, RM = 
Relational myopia, COM = Complacency, V = Vulnerability, S = Suspicion, U = Uncertainty, 
D = Dependence, NP = Non-coercive power, CV = Coercive power, FC = Functional conflict, 
DC = Dysfunctional conflict 
 
As presented in the table above, more than 50% of the hypotheses tested in the current study 
were supported at the p<0.05 confidence level, with H40 approaching significance. In addition 
to results pertaining hypothesis testing, Tables 8.12 and 8.13 show the specific indirect effects 
of relationships measured in the structural model. It is, however, clear that the majority of 
indirect effects between constructs were not supported. 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
207 
 
Table 8.12 Mediating effects  
Relationship Original sample T-statistic P-value Results 
OB ➞ C ➞ COM 0,013 0,873 0,383 Not supported  
SV ➞ C ➞ COM -0,076 2,148 0,032 Supported 
T ➞ C ➞ COM -0,051 2,160 0,031 Supported 
U ➞ C ➞ COM -0,010 0,742 0,458 Not supported  
OB ➞ CP ➞ COM 0,069 1,713 0,087 Not supported  
SV ➞ CP ➞ COM 0,034 1,406 0,160 Not supported  
T ➞ CP ➞ COM -0,011 0,690 0,490 Not supported  
U ➞ CP ➞ COM 0,046 1,692 0,091 Not supported  
OB ➞ D ➞ COM 0,037 1,556 0,120 Not supported  
SV ➞ D ➞ COM 0,014 0,842 0,400 Not supported  
T ➞ D ➞ COM 0,05 1,954 0,051 Not supported  
U ➞ D ➞ COM 0,017 0,832 0,406 Not supported  
OB ➞ DC ➞ COM 0,001 0,021 0,983 Not supported  
SV ➞ DC ➞ COM 0,000 0,017 0,986 Not supported  
T ➞ DC ➞ COM 0,000 0,02 0,984 Not supported  
U ➞ DC ➞ COM 0,000 0,017 0,986 Not supported  
OB ➞ FC ➞ COM -0,061 1,827 0,068 Not supported  
SV ➞ FC ➞ COM 0,082 2,358 0,018 Supported 
T ➞ FC ➞ COM 0,123 2,894 0,004 Supported 
U ➞ FC ➞ COM -0,023 0,868 0,386 Not supported  
OB ➞ NP ➞ COM -0,069 2,010 0,045 Supported 
SV ➞ NP ➞ COM -0,042 1,753 0,08 Not supported  
T ➞ NP ➞ COM 0,026 1,368 0,171 Not supported  
U ➞ NP ➞ COM -0,042 1,443 0,149 Not supported  
OB ➞ C ➞ RM -0,042 1,105 0,269 Not supported  
SV ➞ C ➞ RM 0,249 5,86 0,000 Supported 
T ➞ C ➞ RM 0,166 3,732 0,000 Supported 
U ➞ C ➞ RM 0,033 0,818 0,413 Not supported  
OB ➞ CP ➞ RM 0,012 0,502 0,616 Not supported  
SV ➞ CP ➞ RM 0,006 0,455 0,649 Not supported  
T ➞ CP ➞ RM -0,002 0,297 0,767 Not supported  
U ➞ CP ➞ RM 0,008 0,467 0,640 Not supported  
OB ➞ D ➞ RM 0,025 1,559 0,119 Not supported  
SV ➞ D ➞ RM 0,010 0,740 0,459 Not supported  
T ➞ D ➞ RM 0,033 2,044 0,041 Supported 
U ➞ D ➞ RM 0,011 0,825 0,409 Not supported  
OB ➞ DC ➞ RM 0,024 1,038 0,299 Not supported  
SV ➞ DC ➞ RM 0,006 0,701 0,484 Not supported  
T ➞ DC ➞ RM -0,015 0,946 0,344 Not supported  
U ➞ DC ➞ RM 0,007 0,691 0,490 Not supported  
OB ➞ FC ➞ RM -0,018 1,264 0,206 Not supported  
SV ➞ FC ➞ RM 0,025 1,335 0,182 Not supported  
T ➞ FC ➞ RM 0,037 1,736 0,083 Not supported  
U ➞ FC ➞ RM -0,007 0,730 0,465 Not supported  
OB ➞ NP ➞ RM -0,007 0,320 0,749 Not supported  
SV ➞ NP ➞ RM -0,004 0,312 0,755 Not supported  
T ➞ NP ➞ RM 0,003 0,285 0,776 Not supported  
U ➞ NP ➞ RM -0,004 0,301 0,763 Not supported  
OB ➞ C ➞ S -0,003 0,526 0,599 Not supported  
SV ➞ C ➞ S 0,017 0,773 0,440 Not supported  
T ➞ C ➞ S 0,012 0,751 0,452 Not supported  
U ➞ C ➞ S 0,002 0,407 0,684 Not supported  
OB ➞ CP ➞ S 0,061 1,753 0,080 Not supported  
SV ➞ CP ➞ S 0,031 1,497 0,135 Not supported  
T ➞ CP ➞ S -0,010 0,704 0,482 Not supported  
U ➞ CP ➞ S 0,041 1,446 0,148 Not supported  
OB ➞ D ➞ S -0,003 0,240 0,810 Not supported  
SV ➞ D ➞ S -0,001 0,172 0,863 Not supported  
T ➞ D ➞ S -0,004 0,252 0,801 Not supported  
U ➞ D ➞ S -0,001 0,187 0,852 Not supported  
OB ➞ DC ➞ S 0,044 1,576 0,115 Not supported  
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SV ➞ DC ➞ S 0,010 0,888 0,374 Not supported  
T ➞ DC ➞ S -0,029 1,333 0,183 Not supported  
U ➞ DC ➞ S 0,013 0,869 0,385 Not supported  
OB ➞ FC ➞ S 0,031 1,621 0,105 Not supported  
SV ➞ FC ➞ S -0,042 1,927 0,054 Not supported  
T ➞ FC ➞ S -0,062 2,079 0,038 Supported 
U ➞ FC ➞ S 0,012 0,819 0,413 Not supported  
OB ➞ NP ➞ S 0,098 2,247 0,025 Supported 
SV ➞ NP ➞ S 0,060 2,122 0,034 Supported 
T ➞ NP ➞ S -0,038 1,590 0,112 Not supported  
U ➞ NP ➞ S 0,060 1,984 0,047 Supported 
OB ➞ C ➞ V 0,002 0,218 0,827 Not supported  
SV ➞ C ➞ V -0,009 0,298 0,766 Not supported  
T ➞ C ➞ V -0,006 0,287 0,774 Not supported  
U ➞ C ➞ V -0,001 0,183 0,854 Not supported  
OB ➞ CP ➞ V 0,024 0,840 0,401 Not supported  
SV ➞ CP ➞ V 0,012 0,785 0,433 Not supported  
T ➞ CP ➞ V -0,004 0,457 0,648 Not supported  
U ➞ CP ➞ V 0,016 0,769 0,442 Not supported  
OB ➞ D ➞ V 0,016 1,137 0,256 Not supported  
SV ➞ D ➞ V 0,006 0,625 0,532 Not supported  
T ➞ D ➞ V 0,021 1,190 0,234 Not supported  
U ➞ D ➞ V 0,007 0,652 0,515 Not supported  
OB ➞ DC ➞ V 0,041 1,378 0,168 Not supported  
SV ➞ DC ➞ V 0,010 0,921 0,357 Not supported  
T ➞ DC ➞ V -0,027 1,366 0,172 Not supported  
U ➞ DC ➞ V 0,012 0,907 0,364 Not supported  
OB ➞ FC ➞ V 0,051 1,698 0,089 Not supported  
SV ➞ FC ➞ V -0,069 2,228 0,026 Supported 
T ➞ FC ➞ V -0,103 2,512 0,012 Supported 
U ➞ FC ➞ V 0,019 0,844 0,399 Not supported  
OB ➞ NP ➞ V 0,087 2,894 0,004 Supported 
SV ➞ NP ➞ V 0,054 2,117 0,034 Supported 
T ➞ NP ➞ V -0,034 1,757 0,079 Not supported  
U ➞ NP ➞ V 0,054 1,796 0,073 Not supported  
 
Note: T = Trust, C = Commitment, O = Opportunistic behaviour, SV = Shared values, RM = 
Relational myopia, COM = Complacency, V = Vulnerability, S = Suspicion, U = Uncertainty, 
D = Dependence, NP = Non-coercive power, CV = Coercive power, FC = Functional conflict, 
DC = Dysfunctional conflict 
 
8.6 CONCLUSION  
 
In conclusion, it is clear that the results for the current study were mostly satisfactory according 
the benchmarks stipulated in existing literature. Proper analytical protocol was followed in 
order to ensure data is consistent and free of any errors, as well as that reliability and validity 
of measurement items were achieved. According to the results concerning skewness and 
kurtosis, as well as the tests for normality, the data for the current research is not normally 
distributed – which supports the use of PLS-SEM measures as it can adequately analyse non-
normal distributions (Hair et al., 2019). Furthermore, after scale items with low outer loadings 
were removed, all model constructs reported satisfactory results concerning reliability and 
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validity. The structural model was initially evaluated by assessing the coefficient of 
determination, as well as ensuring there were no collinearity issues with the data. PLSpredit 
was also used to generate results regarding the predictive accuracy of the structural model. Most 
Q2predict values were satisfactory, and the majority of RSME values of the PLS model were lower 
than the prediction errors of the LM model – thus, indicating medium predictive accuracy (Hair 
et al., 2019). Lastly, the final consideration of the structural model indicated that more than 
50% of the hypotheses were supported at the confidence level of p<0.05, indicating that the 
model can potentially explain the onset of dark side behaviour in business-to-business 
relationships. 
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Relationships – especially business relationships – are often described as either positive or 
negative (Abosag et al., 2016). Traditionally, positive relationships are often seen as 
constructive and desirable, characterised by high levels of trust and commitment (Abosag et 
al., 2016; Baker, 2009). Negative relationships, on the other hand, are usually referred to as 
relationships lacking in trust, and where issues are present which can ultimately cause harm to 
involved parties (Anderson & Jap, 2005). However, Abosag et al. (2016) argue that a 
relationship should be perceived as neither positive nor negative, but rather as something that 
entails both positive and negative elements. In other words, even though every relationship has 
a negative side, the proper management thereof can prevent tolerable detrimental elements from 
becoming intolerable forces that can damage the partnership (Abosag et al., 2016). Therefore, 
this study investigates the manifestation of dark side behaviour in business-to-business 
relationships in order to better understand how to manage this phenomenon when it emerges 
within a partnership.  
In this chapter, the findings of the current study are discussed by drawing from literature to 
form conclusions pertaining to the associations that were reflected in the results and reported 
in Chapter 8. First, the associations between antecedents (i.e. trust, shared values, opportunistic 
behaviour and uncertainty) and behavioural outcomes (i.e. conflict, power, dependence and 
commitment) of the dark side of business relationship are discussed. Secondly, findings 
concerning the links between these behavioural outcomes and dark side symptoms (i.e. 
relational myopia, complacency, vulnerability and suspicion) are considered. Lastly, in addition 
to discussions regarding the key findings of the study, additional results concerning mediation 
effect are included and examined in order to provide a better understanding of how dark side 
behaviour can manifest in particular circumstances. Furthermore, this chapter acknowledges 
the limitations of the study, and provides recommendations for future studies concerning the 
dark side of business relationships. 
 
9.2 DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
 
In this section the results obtained in the current study are discussed by, firstly, indicating the 
acceptance or rejection of the null hypothesis and, secondly, discussing the relationship 
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between constructs and how it corresponds with existing literature. Figure 9.1 depicts the 
positive and negative associations found upon testing the conceptual model and represents a 
summary of the discussion that follows. This section will proceed with a discussion of findings 
regarding the relationships between antecedents and behavioural outcomes of dark side 
behaviour. This is followed by examining and explaining the results concerning linkages 
between behavioural outcomes and symptoms. Lastly, additional results are reported and 
discussed, including significant mediating effects found during data analysis. 
 
Figure 9.1 Supported relationships between constructs 
 
9.2.1 The association between antecedents and behavioural outcomes of dark side behaviour in 
business relationships 
 
In this section the acceptance or rejection of the hypotheses concerning the relationship between 
antecedents (i.e. trust, shared values, opportunistic behaviour and uncertainty) and behavioural 
outcomes (i.e. conflict, power, dependence and commitment) of the dark side of business 
relationships is examined. The results obtained in the current study are discussed by drawing 
from existing literature in order to better explain how the abovementioned antecedents can 
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translate into the selected behavioural outcomes, which can eventually result in symptoms of 
dark side behaviour. 
 
Trust and functional conflict 
 
The first hypothesis (H1) involves the relationship between trust and functional conflict. 
According to results, a p-value of <0,05 is obtained, which indicates that H1 is supported and 
signifies that trust can affect functional conflict in business relationships. Additionally, the 
original sample statistic (Beta coefficient) shows that trust and functional conflict are positively 
correlated, indicating a positive relationship between the constructs. This is consistent with the 
findings of previous studies (e.g. Morgan & Hunt, 1994; Wu, Weng & Huang, 2012; Kalafatis 
& Miller, 1997; Graça & Barry, 2019; Chung, Sternquist & Chen, 2006; Massey & Dawes, 
2007).  
In their pivotal work regarding relationship marketing, Morgan and Hunt (1994) found a 
positive relationship between trust and functional conflict, which served as the foundation for 
future studies regarding the association between these constructs. Several researchers (e.g. Wu 
et al., 2012; Graça & Barry, 2019; Massey & Dawes, 2007) argue that in any conflict situations, 
or situations characterised by differing opinions, partners who trust one another will be more 
willing to resolve the conflict through communication and will use a constructive thinking 
model to facilitate cooperation. In other words, they may use sincerity and communication, 
rather than argument, to enhance the efficiency of the relationship (Wu et al., 2012). Similarly, 
Morris and Cadogan (2001) maintain that trust can prevent a hasty or premature rupture in 
relationships which may result in conflict. High levels of trust within a partnership can help 
resolve harmful conflict as parties are more likely to retain confidence in their partners’ 
reliability and integrity, and might feel more inclined to resolve issues constructively (Morgan 
& Hunt, 1994; Anderson & Jap, 2005). In addition, when business partners trust one another, 
they are usually more inclined to accept stated disagreements at face value and to resolve them 
accordingly, and also less likely to misinterpret conflict scenarios (Mishra, 1996). Thus, higher 
levels of trust within a business relationship can result in higher levels of functional conflict.  
 
Trust and dysfunctional conflict  
 
The hypothesis (H2) offered in order to the determine whether there is a relationship between 
trust and dysfunctional conflict is supported (p<0,05). The original sample statistic, however, 
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indicates that trust and dysfunctional conflict are negatively correlated. This negative 
relationship between trust and dysfunctional conflicts corresponds with existing literature. 
Simons and Peterson (2000) claim that when partners don’t trust each other, they are more 
likely to interpret the ambiguous behaviours of others negatively, as well as to justify the 
resulting conflict as a plausible explanation for their actions. Other researchers (e.g. Morgan & 
Hunt, 1994; Anderson & Narus, 1990; Moorman et al., 1993) also found that low levels of trust 
within a business relationship can result in the lack of confidence in a partner’s competence, 
credibility, goodwill and their intentions to act and make decisions for of mutual benefit. 
Therefore, lower levels of trust within a partnership can result in higher levels of dysfunctional 
conflict. According to Mishra (1996) and Pfajar et al. (2017), when partners do not trust one 
another enough, they are less likely to accept disagreements and, because they are uncertain of 
their partner’s true motives, more inclined to misinterpret the situation. The resulting strong 
disagreements and underlying emotions can translate into frustration and hostile behaviour, 
which can severely damage the relationship. 
 
Trust and non-coercive power 
 
The hypothesis (H3) that addresses the relationship between trust and non-coercive power was 
not supported (p>0,05). Although literature infer that it is possible that the level of trust in a 
relationship can affect the decision to exercise non-coercive power, studies predominantly 
suggest  the reverse - that the use of non-coercive power is more likely to influence the level of 
trust among parties. For example, Schilke et al. (2015) found that intense power inequality can 
cause trust to decrease in a social exchange. But others (e.g. Abolhasanpour et al., 2011; Pulles 
et al., 2014) indicated more specifically that non-coercive forms of power can, in fact, enhance 
the level of trust between partners. Liu et al. (2010) and Jain et al. (2014) also maintain that 
non-coercive power can foster a high degree of agreement, which may subsequently support 
effective communication and information sharing, along with increased partner credibility. 
However, trust does not necessarily affect the decision of parties to exercise non-coercive 
power, as trust is more likely to be affected by a condition of pre-established power inequality 
that is either present from the start, or surfaces as the relationship develops. Thus, in the specific 
context of the current study, the results indicate that trust does not affect the use of non-coercive 
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Trust and coercive power 
 
The hypothesis (H4) proposed to investigate the relationship between trust and coercive power 
is not supported (p>0,05). Similar to the case of trust and non-coercive power, literature 
suggests that trust can possibly affect the use of coercive power in a relationship. For instance, 
when trust is low, parties might lack confidence in their partners’ competence, as well as 
question their integrity. Consequently, disagreements can occur which can push more powerful 
partners to use coercive forms of power in order get their partners to do something they would 
not have otherwise done (Jain et al., 2014). However, the results obtained indicate that trust 
does not have an effect on the degree of coercive power within the specific context of the current 
study. The decision to use coercive power within a relationship might not necessarily affect the 
level of trust, but rather the situation regarding the decision to opportunistically use power 
inequalities to influence partners. In other words, although trust may not influence the degree 
of coercive power in a partnership, it is possible that coercive power can influence the level of 
trust between partners. 
 
Trust and dependence 
 
The hypothesis (H5) proposing that there is a relationship between trust and dependence is 
supported (p<0,05) and, according to the relevant original sample statistics, is positive. 
Although literature addressing the direct effect of trust on dependence is limited, it is possible 
to draw from previous studies that investigate trust and dependence within a business-to-
business context. Schmitz et al. (2016) infer that, when partners trust each other, they often are 
more inclined to rely confidently on their partners and to invest in the relationship. Parties are 
also more willing to share information and resources with partners when there is trust in the 
relationship (Morgan & Hunt, 1994) which, in turn, can cause parties to become more 
dependent on one another in order to achieve objectives and conduct business operations. In 
other words, trust can encourage firms to work together and share important resources, resulting 
in the “entwinement” of their business, and causing them to become more reliant on each other 
and their combined efforts to perform and achieve objectives. Thus, higher levels of trust in a 
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Trust and commitment 
 
The hypothesis (H6) is supported because a significant (p<0,05) relationship between trust and 
commitment was observed. The original sample statistic also indicates that the relationship 
between trust and commitment is positive. This result is similar to the findings of previous 
studies that reported a positive relationship between trust and commitment (e.g. Morgan & 
Hunt, 1994; Svensson et al., 2010; Human & Naudé, 2014; Chen, Yen, Rajkumar & Tomochko, 
2010; Hashim & Tan, 2015). Morgan and Hunt (1994) referred to trust as a major determinant 
of commitment, inferring that no commitment is consummated unless parties feel that they can 
trust their partners. When a partnership is characterised by high levels of trust, firms may be 
more confident that their partners will not act opportunistically (Roberts-Lombard et al., 2017) 
and they might therefore be more willing to invest in the maintenance and development of the 
relationship (Morgan & Hunt, 1994; Hashim & Tan, 2015; Zabkar & Brencic, 2004). In other 
words, when partnering firms trust one another, they will more likely have a strong intention to 
maintain their relationship.  
 
Shared values and functional conflict 
 
The current study hypothesises that there is a relationship between shared values and functional 
conflict (H7). Results indicate that H7 obtained a p-value of 0.007 and an original sample 
statistic of 0.208. Thus, H7 is supported and the relationship between shared values and 
functional conflict is positive. Although there is a lack of literature that investigates the direct 
association between shared values and functional conflict, several authors (e.g. Yandle & 
Blythe, 2000; Abosag et al., 2015; Skarmeas, 2006; Johnsen & Lacoste, 2016) infer that shared 
values can influence the degree of functional conflict within a partnership. When a relationship 
is characterised by a substantial amount of shared values, parties are more likely to think the 
same way and share similar perspectives regarding their relationship and its dynamics (Baker, 
2009). Subsequently, shared values can lead to better communication and improved 
cooperation – which, in turn, can result in functional conflict. In other words, the more partners 
trust each other, the higher the degree of functional conflict within a relationship.  
 
Shared values and dysfunctional conflict  
 
The hypothesis (H8) offered in order to the determine whether there is a relationship between 
shared values and dysfunctional conflict is not supported (p>0,05). In other words, the amount 
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of shared values in a relationship does not affect the degree of dysfunctional conflict. While it 
is possible that high levels of shared values can help with conflict resolution (Haugh & McKee, 
2003), in the context of this study, there was no relationship found between shared values and 
dysfunctional conflict. Business partners might think the same way, as well as have similar 
perspectives regarding their partnership and its dynamics, but that doesn’t safeguard the 
relationship from harmful disturbances and aggressive disagreements (Svensson, 2002). 
Sometimes a situation presents itself and causes dysfunctional conflict to appear in a 
relationship characterised by high levels of trust, commitment and shared values (Johnsen & 
Lacoste, 2016). In this case, the dysfunctional conflict is not influenced by the level of shared 
values but is rather the result of a disturbance or an issue, which, despite the relational 
compatibility and stability of the relationship, causes severe conflict among parties. Thus, 
similar to stable personal relationships that experience periods of conflict because of individual 
issues (e.g. frustration, irritation, stress, etc.), strong business relationships may experience 
dysfunctional conflict that is not related to positive relationships drivers (e.g. trust, 
commitment, shared values, satisfaction, etc.). 
 
Shared values and non-coercive power 
 
The hypothesis (H9) that investigates the relationship between shared values and non-coercive 
power is supported (p<0,05), and the original sample statistic indicates that these constructs are 
positively correlated. When business partners have a high level of shared values among them, 
the more powerful firm might choose to exercise non-coercive forms of power when they want 
to bring about change or encourage their partners to act in a specific manner (Johnsen & 
Lacoste, 2016; Rehme et al., 2016; Schilke et al., 2015). Additionally, higher shared values can 
also allow parties to become more accepting of their partners’ use of non-coercive power as 
they have a better understanding of their intentions and rationale behind their actions (Johnsen 
& Lacoste, 2016). In other words, when parties think the same way and share similar 
perspectives, they will be more inclined to use non-coercive measures to influence and 
encourage counterparties to act in way they would not have otherwise, in order to achieve 
certain objectives. Thus, higher levels of shared values can encourage the use of non-coercive 
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Shared values and coercive power 
 
The current study also hypothesised (H10) that there is a relationship between shared values 
and coercive power. Results indicate that H10 is supported (p<0.05) and that there is a positive 
relationship between shared values and coercive power. Although the literature may infer that 
low levels of shared values are more likely to result in the use of coercive power, the current 
study found that a substantial amount of shared values among parties can actually encourage 
the decision to exercise coercive power. This echoes the work of several authors (e.g. Baker, 
2009; Anderson & Jap, 2005; Skinner, Dietz & Weibel, 2014; Miocevic, 2020; Abosag et al., 
2015) who infer that high levels of positive relationship drivers (e.g. trust, commitment, shared 
values, etc.) can disenable firms from recognising misbehaviour or hidden agendas. For 
example, when parties confidently believe themselves to be on same page, opportunities for 
manipulation and exploitation can arise. Thus, excessive levels of shared values can result in 
the use of coercive power in order to opportunistically change the behaviour of partners. In 
other words, the “blinding” effect of shared values (i.e. the acceptance of misbehaviour that 
accompany excessive levels of positive relational drivers) can encourage firms to exploit the 
relationship for their own benefit, without consequence or being persecuted by partners. In 
addition, an excessive amount of shared values can make firms more accepting of manipulation 
and aggressive power plays, as they misguidedly believe that, due to being on the same page, 
their partners will always emphasise mutual benefit and ethical behaviour. 
 
Shared values and dependence 
 
The hypothesis (H11) presented to explore whether shared values can influence the degree of 
dependence in a business relationship was not supported (p>0,05). Although the literature 
suggests that shared values can potentially affect the development of dependence within a 
partnership, in the specific context of the current study no significant relationship was found 
between these constructs. Anderson and Jap (2005), along with Baker (2009), imply that 
relational drivers can result in business partners becoming more dependent on one another as 
high levels of trust, commitment and shared values may encourage firms to share information 
and resources – which, in turn, can result in asymmetric or symmetric dependency. However, 
it is also possible that shared values can have no effect on the emergence of dependence in a 
relationship – especially when the partners do not emphasise the development of relational 
norms. Hence, because of the particular nature of a relationship, shared values may not play as 
influential a role as it would in a partnership focused on developing trust and a shared culture. 
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For example, in episodic relationships, which are terminated after a specific period of time or 
after certain goals have been achieved (Halinen & Tathinen, 2002), shared values may not affect 
the level of dependence between firms. Therefore, shared values will not always influence the 
degree of dependence in a business relationship.  
 
Shared values and commitment 
 
The hypothesis (H12) that proposed there is a relationship between shared values and 
commitment is supported (p<0,05). In addition, the original sample statistic is 0.428, indicating 
that shared values and commitment is positively correlated. Thus, the amount of shared values 
between firms can influence the level of commitment in a business relationship. This is in line 
with previous findings by several authors (e.g. Friman et al., 2002; Zineldin & Jonsson, 2000; 
Morgan & Hunt, 1994; Abosag, Tynan & Lewis, 2006) who reported a positive relationship 
between shared values and commitment. According to the commitment-trust theory (Morgan 
& Hunt, 1994), shared values affect both trust and commitment. Shared values can act as a base 
for developing business relationships and usually entail values such as integrity, respect and 
trust – which have been identified as fundamental building blocks for commitment (Morgan & 
Hunt, 1994; Friman et al., 2002; Zineldin & Jonsson, 2000). When a relationship is 
characterised by a substantial amount of shared values, partners usually have similar 
perspectives and are more likely to be compatible, which can, subsequently, encourage them to 
maintain the relationship because of its favourability. Thus, when a relationship is characterised 
by high levels of shared values, parties are prone to be more committed to their partners and 
the maintenance of their partnerships.  
 
Opportunistic behaviour and functional conflict  
 
The current study hypothesised that there is a relationship between opportunistic behaviour and 
functional conflict (H13). Results indicate that H13 is supported as it obtained a p-value of 
0.045. Opportunistic behaviour and functional conflict are also negatively correlated as H13 
has an original sample statistic of -0.153. These findings correspond with results found by 
Skarmeas (2006), who reported a negative relationship between opportunism and functional 
conflict. Opportunistic behaviour usually entails a lack of condor or honesty concerning 
transactions, and often includes guileful, self-interest seeking behaviour embodied in calculated 
efforts to mislead and confuse partners (Williamson, 1985). When a firm acts opportunistically, 
it may misrepresent information and material facts, evade obligations, fail to honour promises, 
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or demonstrate disregard for principles (Skaremas, 2006). This type of behaviour can generate 
feelings of tension and frustration, and it could also incite resentment and vindictiveness in 
partners – which is considered counterproductive to relationship development (Skarmeas, 
2006). Under circumstances characterised by opportunism, firms are often more likely to 
retaliate and engage in disagreements, rather than to work together to resolve relationship 
problems in a mutually beneficial way (Skarmeas, 2006). Thus, high levels of opportunistic 
behaviour can decrease the degree of functional conflict in a business relationship. 
 
Opportunistic behaviour and dysfunctional conflict  
 
The hypothesis (H14) offered to investigate the relationship between opportunistic behaviour 
and dysfunctional conflict obtained a p-value of smaller than 0.05 and was therefore accepted. 
In addition, the original sample statistic produced a result of 0.363, which indicates that there 
is a positive relationship between opportunistic behaviour and dysfunctional conflict. Several 
authors suggest that, when opportunistic behaviours and attitudes surface within partnerships, 
it is more likely that parties might violate agreements and indulge in deceitful behaviour aimed 
at seeking self-interest (John, 1984; Williamson, 1975; Skarmeas, 2006). When firms decide to 
act opportunistically, they may misrepresent information and material facts, evade obligations, 
fail to honour promises, as well as demonstrate no regard for principles (Skaremas, 2006). 
Consequently, opportunistic behaviour can result in tension and frustration, along with 
resentment and vindictiveness, which can lead to severe conflict and aggression. In other words, 
higher levels of opportunistic behaviour can increase the degree of dysfunctional conflict within 
a partnership.  
 
Opportunistic behaviour and non-coercive power 
 
The hypothesis (H15) presented to explore the relationship between opportunistic behaviour 
and non-coercive power is supported (p<0,05), and the original sample statistic indicates that 
these constructs are positively correlated. Firms often engage in opportunistic behaviour in 
order to realise their own gains separately, or to advance their position though self-interest 
initiatives (Abosag et al., 2016; Laan, Voordijk & Dewulf, 2011; Lai et al., 2012). Non-coercive 
power is often related to collaborative relationship (Benton & Maloni, 2005), is exercised 
through a positive influence, and usually depicts that partnering firms treat each other like 
friends (Liu et al., 2015; Jain et al., 2014). However, firms may use positive and constructive 
means to influence or encourage their partners to act in a manner they would not have otherwise, 
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in order to achieve specific objectives, or to bring about certain changes that would benefit them 
separately. In other words, parties can use non-coercive forms of power to realise their self-
interest. Thus, when firms start to act opportunistically, they may choose to pursue individual 
gains through the use of non-coercive power and, as a result, choose positive mechanisms (e.g. 
rewards) to influence their partners to submission.   
 
Opportunistic behaviour and coercive power 
 
The hypothesis (H16) that considered the relationship between opportunistic behaviour and 
coercive power is supported (p<0,05). The original sample statistic also indicates that the 
relationship between opportunistic behaviour and coercive power is positive. This is consistent 
with existing literature that infers that opportunistic behaviour can result in the use of coercive 
power (Johnsen & Lacoste, 2016; Benton & Maloni, 2005; Leonidou et al., 2008). Coercive 
power entails the use of harmful mechanisms in order to get partners to do something or act in 
a way they would not have otherwise (Leonidou et al., 2008). As in the case of opportunistic 
behaviour and non-coercive power, when firms choose to pursue self-interest and want to 
realise their own gains separately, they might do whatever it takes – even if it hurts their 
partner’s business and the relationship between them. Thus, when opportunistic behaviour 
arises in relationships, it may encourage partners to use coercive forms of power to obtain 
individual gains and objectives of self-interest.  
 
Opportunistic behaviour and dependence 
 
The current study also hypothesised that there is a relationship between opportunistic behaviour 
and dependence (H17). Results indicate that H17 obtained a p-value of 0.028 and an original 
sample statistic of 0.187. H17 is thus supported and findings show that there is a positive 
relationship between opportunistic behaviour and dependence. This corresponds with existing 
literature (e.g. Hawkins et al., 2013; Hartmann & Herb, 2014), which infers that it is possible 
that opportunistic behaviour can influence the degree of dependence within a relationship. 
Firms might use their efforts to realise individual gains, or align the relationship with their self-
interest – which, in turn, can influence the dependence level between partners. For instance, 
when a firm wants to control or exploit its partner’s position (in terms of resources, networks 
or information), it might act opportunistically in order to obtain heavy resource ties and 
relational bonds to ensure that the partner becomes dependent and cannot function without their 
input in the relationship. In other words, opportunistic behaviour can allow for the development 
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of certain dependencies when firms establish heavy resource ties and close relations with 
partners in order to exploit the relationship for their own benefit and self-interest. Through 
opportunistic behaviours, parties can entrap others in relationships and consequently use them 
to better their position, as well as make it very difficult for their partners to operate without 
them, or to consider alternatives.  
 
Opportunistic behaviour and commitment 
 
The hypothesis (H18) offered to examine the effect of opportunistic behaviour on commitment 
within business relationship is not supported (p<0.05). Although Morgan and Hunt (1994) 
inferred that opportunistic behaviour can reduce trust and commitment, it was found ,in the 
specific context of the current study, that opportunistic behaviour does not impact on the level 
of commitment between parties. Anderson and Jap (2005), as well as Baker (2009), suggest 
that in close relationships characterised by high levels of trust, commitment and other positive 
relational drivers, firms may sometimes not realise that their partners are acting 
opportunistically as they are “blinded” by the positive feelings generated by the relationship. 
This can possibly explain why opportunistic behaviour does not always influence commitment, 
as firms might be unaware of their partners’ opportunistic behaviours and attitudes. On the other 
hand, it is also possible that firms might be aware of their partners’ opportunistic behaviours 
but choose to tolerate it and maintain the relationship due to a lack of available alternatives 
(Abosag et al., 2016).  
 
Uncertainty and functional conflict 
 
The hypothesis (H19) proposed to investigate the relationship between uncertainty and 
functional conflict was not supported (p>0.05). Although, in the specific context of the current 
study, uncertainty does not affect functional conflict, it is possible that uncertainty can result in 
constructive conflicting situations (Leonidas et al., 2006). However, uncertainty is an ever-
present component of relationships, and, even though it can directly cause conflict to arise, 
Leonidas et al. (2006) suggest that uncertainty is more likely to affect relationship quality 
which, if not managed appropriately in response to uncertainty, can over time result in conflict. 
Leonidas et al. (2006) also specifically found a negative relationship between uncertainty and 
important relationship drivers (i.e. adaptation, commitment, communication, cooperation, 
satisfaction, trust and understanding), which are often considered the fundamental building 
blocks of functional conflict. Johnson and Lacoste (2016) emphasise that for conflict to be 
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functional, there must be a certain level of trust and communication between firms in order to 
provide a base for understanding. Thus, it is possible that there is no direct association between 
uncertainty and functional conflict. 
 
Uncertainty and dysfunctional conflict  
 
The current study also hypothesised that there is a relationship between uncertainty and 
dysfunctional conflict (H20), but this obtained a p-value of 0.137 and is, therefore, not 
supported. In addition to the argument that there is no direct relationship between uncertainty 
and conflict, it is also possible that the unawareness of uncertainties could explain why no 
association was found between uncertainty and dysfunctional conflict in the current study. In 
some situations, parties might be oblivious to some uncertainties in their environment, which 
prohibits the onset of conflicting situations that can cause severe disagreements and frustration 
(Abosag et al., 2016). As previously mentioned, uncertainty is also more likely to affect conflict 
indirectly through relationship quality. Leonidas et al. (2006) reported a negative relationship 
between uncertainty and various aspects of relationship quality (adaptation, commitment, 
communication, cooperation, satisfaction, trust and understanding) which, if not managed 
correctly, could result in dysfunctional conflict. In other words, uncertainty may not influence 
the onset of dysfunctional conflict directly, but it could potentially affect this through 
relationship quality.  
 
Uncertainty and non-coercive power 
 
The hypothesis (H21) presented to explore the relationship between uncertainty and non-
coercive power is supported (p<0,05). Additionally, the original sample statistic obtained a 
score of 0.193, indicating that there is a positive relationship between uncertainty and non-
coercive power. These results are in line with previous findings by Ketchen and Hult (2007), 
that higher levels of uncertainty in a relationship could encourage parties to use their power in 
order to try and reduce these uncertainties. Contrastingly, in certain and stable relationships, 
parties are less likely to control their partners’ behaviour (Ketchen & Hult 2007). Paulraj and 
Chen (2007) suggest, more specifically, that firms might use non-coercive forms of power to 
reduce uncertainties. When relationships are faced with internal and external uncertainties, 
parties might choose to influence, control or change their partners’ behaviours in a positive way 
through the use of non-coercive power (Wang et al., 2007). In other words, firms may be more 
prone to exert reward, expertise, reference or legitimate power in order to cope with relationship 
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uncertainties and increase information sharing (Leonidas et al., 2006). Thus, it is possible that 
higher levels of uncertainty can encourage parties to exert non-coercive forms of power.  
 
Uncertainty and coercive power 
 
The hypothesis (H22) that investigates the relationship between uncertainty and coercive power 
is supported (p<0,05). The original sample statistic of 0.225 confirms that there is a positive 
relationship between uncertainty and the use of coercive power in business relationships. As in 
the case of non-coercive power, existing literature suggests that firms might use power to reduce 
uncertainties that appear in their external and internal environments. From an economic 
perspective, parties can protect their interests by punishing their partners if they do not satisfy 
needs or do not act accordingly (Wang et al., 2015). Chiang and Feng (2007) suggest that when 
uncertainties increase in a partnership, firms might be more inclined to use coercive power to 
control the behaviours of partners. Thus, firms may employ coercive forms of power in order 
to govern their relationship through times of uncertainty, or when faced with increased 
uncertainties in external and internal environments.   
 
Uncertainty and dependence 
 
The current study also hypothesised that there is a relationship between uncertainty and 
dependence (H23). According to the results derived from the data, H23 is not supported as it 
obtained a p-value of 0.339. Although the resource dependency theory emphasises that firms 
often form interdependent partnerships to deal with uncertainties (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2007; 
Wang et al., 2015), in the specific context of this study the level of uncertainty does not seem 
to affect the degree of dependence between parties. Previous studies (e.g. Gao et al., 2005; 
Buvik & Grønhaug, 2000; Fynes et al., 2004) suggest that the extent to which parties are 
dependent on one another can influence the level of uncertainty that they face in a relationship. 
For example, Gao et al. (2005) found that buyer-perceived supplier dependence can reduce 
buyer uncertainty. Realising the relatively high bargaining power over the supplier and the 
ability to punish the supplier if it becomes opportunistic, the buyer could feel less worried about 
the performance of the supplier and its products (Gao et al., 2005). Drawing from the 
aforementioned research, it is possible to infer that, in some circumstances, uncertainty does 
not affect the level of dependence as parties feel their combined effort and pooled resources 
might be enough to withstand both internal and external uncertainties that might arise. On the 
other hand, individual firms may already have certain protocols and processes in place to deal 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
224 
 
with uncertainties on their own (Hibbard, Hogan & Smith, 2003; Boonyathan & Power, 2007; 
Huang, Yen & Liu, 2014; Ford & Mouzas, 2010), that it does not impact the dependencies that 
result from a relationship with another organisation.  
 
Uncertainty and commitment 
 
The hypothesis (H24) proposed to examine whether there is a relationship between uncertainty 
and commitment is not supported (p>0,05). Several researchers (e.g. Kwon & Suh, 2004; 
Weigel, Brown & O’Riordan, 2011; Gao et al., 2005) have explored the relationship between 
uncertainty and commitment – especially as an indirect effect through which uncertainty 
influences trust, which subsequently affects the level of commitment in a relationship. Gitiérrez 
et al. (2004) maintain that the reduction of fear and lack of confidence usually associated with 
uncertainty in a relationship, is often considered an important requisite for firms to commit to 
a partner. Thus, high levels of uncertainty can lead to parties being less willing to commit due 
to feelings of insecurity, doubt, or fear of erring (Gitiérrez et al., 2004). However, the current 
study found no relationship between uncertainty and commitment. Abosag et al. (2016) refer 
to uncertainty as a natural component of business relationships, that will one way or another 
affect its dynamics and functionality. Firms usually accept that there will be uncertainties and 
choose to develop and maintain their relationships regardless of these uncertainties. In other 
words, although uncertainty may affect the relationship in terms of functionality and efficiency, 
it might not necessarily affect the level of commitment between parties. In some cases, 
commitment might stem primarily from partner-inherent qualities (e.g. trust, reciprocal norms, 
shared culture and integrity) and may not be as significantly influenced by environmental forces 
such as uncertainty (Anderson & Jap, 2005; Johnsen & Lacoste, 2016).  
 
9.2.2 The relationship between behavioural outcomes and symptoms of dark side behaviour in 
business relationships 
 
In this section, the results pertaining the linkages between behavioural outcomes (i.e. conflict, 
power, dependence and commitment) and symptoms of dark side behaviour (i.e. relational 
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Functional conflict and relational myopia   
 
The hypothesis (H25) offered to investigate the relationship between functional conflict and 
relational myopia is not supported (p>0,05). Thus, this study reports that functional conflict 
does not affect the onset of relational myopia in business relationships. Schwenk (1989) 
suggests that, when functional conflicts arise, there is constructive interaction between parties 
during which opinions and feelings are freely expressed. Consequently, it is possible that 
functional conflict could lead to careful consideration of alternatives and assumptions 
underlying decisions (Cosier & Schwenk, 1990). In other words, relational myopia could 
potentially be avoided when a relationship is characterised by high levels of functional conflict. 
However, functional conflict – which entails the challenging of ideas, beliefs and assumptions 
– can also have no impact on the appearance of relational myopia in a business relationship. 
Every partnership, at one point or another, experiences periods of functional conflict and many 
perceive it as an inherent component of business relationships. Functional conflict seemingly 
does not play as significant of a role in the onset of relational myopia as other key relational 
drivers (e.g. trust, satisfaction, performance, commitment, and reciprocal norms). Parties may 
consider functional conflict as a given, or even something stipulated in the relationship contract. 
Therefore, functional conflict may not specifically influence a firm’s perspective regarding 
their relationship and its environmental forces. 
 
Functional conflict and complacency 
 
The current study hypothesised that there is a relationship between functional conflict and 
complacency (H26). This hypothesis is supported (p<0,05) and the original sample statistic 
indicates that functional conflict and complacency are positively correlated. This is in line with 
inferences made in literature that suggest that, when relationship problems and issues are 
successfully resolved, parties might develop a sense of overconfidence (Pfajfar et al., 2017), 
which can ultimately result in the onset of complacency. Jehn and Mannix (2001) maintain that 
functional conflict is often associated with positive outcomes – such as the identification and 
discussion of alternative perspectives, and the removal of impediments – in order to work 
effectively together. Consequently, because of high levels of functional conflict, parties may 
become overly confident in their partners’ capacity to rectify issues within the relationship, as 
well as excessively reliant on current procedures to do so. Thus, complacency can emerge due 
to firms’ over-confidence that relationship problems and issues will be resolved in a proven 
manner. In addition, the positive outcomes that accompany high levels of functional conflict 
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within a relationship (e.g. improved teamwork, enhanced collaboration, creative friction , etc.) 
can create the belief that current relationship dynamics will be efficient in the future and do not 
need to change. The positive effects of functional conflict can cause a complacent culture to 
surface in the relationship, as parties may be misguided into believing that the relationship will 
always be successful and therefore does not need to change.   
 
Functional conflict and vulnerability 
 
The hypothesis (H27) proposed to explore the relationship between functional conflict and 
vulnerability is supported (p<0,05). In addition, the original sample statistic of -0.332 indicates 
that the relationship between these constructs is negatively correlated. Svensson (2004) 
suggests that vulnerability in a relationship can be influenced by the degree of dependence 
between firms, as well as by how much partners trust each other to act accordingly and make 
appropriate decisions. Functional conflict, however, has the capacity to strengthen relational 
bonds, improve the quality of connections and intensify interactions – which, in turn, can 
possibly reduce feelings of insecurity and vulnerability. Several authors (e.g. Jehn & Mannix, 
2001; Pfajfar et al., 2017; Johnsen & Lacoste, 2016) also infer that functional conflict can 
positively influence relationships, as it can enhance cooperation, stimulate idea generation, 
strengthen feelings of security, as well as increase the level of confidence between partners. 
Therefore, when a partnership is characterised by high levels of functional conflict, parties are 
less likely to feel vulnerable towards each other.  
 
Functional conflict and suspicion  
 
The current study hypothesised from literature that functional conflict can potentially influence 
the level of suspicion in a business relationship (H28). This hypothesis is supported as it 
obtained a p-value of 0.003. The original sample statistic, furthermore, shows that there is a 
negative relationship between functional conflict and suspicion. Anderson and Jap (2003) 
suggest that firms might experience a sense of increased vulnerability out of fear of being 
victimised by their business partners. This fear that others will act opportunistically, or foster 
negative intentions, can result in the onset of suspicion within relationships (Anderson & Jap, 
2003). When parties can’t resolve conflict functionally, they may experience lower levels of 
collaboration and cooperation (Jehn & Mannix, 2001), which can cause firms to become 
suspicious of their partners – especially when they don’t understand certain behaviours or the 
intentions behind actions. On the other hand, functional conflict can reduce the onset of 
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suspicion within business relationships. Functional conflict can enhance understanding between 
partners concerning each other’s needs and behaviours. It can also increase communication 
efficiency and how well partners work together (Johnsen & Lacoste, 2016; Pfajfar et al., 2017). 
Subsequently, functional conflict can reduce suspicion as firms would be less likely to believe 
that their partners have ulterior motives or hidden agendas. Thus, based on existing literature 
and results obtained in the current study, it is clear that there is a negative relationship between 
functional conflict and suspicion. 
 
Dysfunctional conflict and relational myopia  
 
The hypothesis (H29) offered to explore the relationship between dysfunctional conflict and 
relational myopia is not supported (p>0,05). Although it is possible that dysfunctional conflict 
can reduce the onset of relational myopia, it was found, in the particular context of the current 
study, that dysfunctional conflict does not influence the degree of myopic tendencies. Because 
dysfunctional conflict usually entails strong disagreements, underlying emotions and negative 
actions that create frustration and hostility between partners (Pfajfar et al., 2017), it is more 
likely to lead to relationship termination than to affect the level of relational myopia. Unhealthy 
behaviours (i.e. friction, anger and tension) in interactions can disrupt operations and build 
mistrust (Skarmeas, 2006), which can subsequently encourage firms to end the relationship 
immediately rather than affect its view of the partnership. Additionally, a relationship can be 
characterised by high levels of trust, commitment and satisfaction, but still experience 
dysfunctional conflicts (Baker, 2009). While some parties might choose to terminate a 
relationship with high levels of dysfunctional conflict, others may be tolerant of dysfunctional 
behaviour – especially when many positive relationship outcomes are involved. In other words, 
it is possible that dysfunctional conflict does not affect the onset of relational myopia when 
conflicting situations do not impact on important relationship drivers (i.e. trust, commitment, 
satisfaction, etc.). 
 
Dysfunctional conflict and complacency 
 
The current study also hypothesised that there is a relationship between dysfunctional conflict 
and complacency (H30). This hypothesis, however, obtained a p-value of 0.983 and is thus not 
supported. Baker (2009) suggests that complacency can occur within business relationships 
because of strong relational foundations built, over time, on feelings of trust, commitment, 
satisfaction and loyalty. When a partnership becomes characterised by dysfunctional conflict, 
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parties are more likely to exhibit hostility towards one another (Pfajfar et al., 2017), and may 
been more inclined to act in a way that can potentially damage their relationship and partner 
(Skarmeas, 2006). However, as in the case of relational myopia, it is possible that a strong 
relationship can be characterised by periods of dysfunctional conflict, which do not necessarily 
affect the operations of the relationship (Webb & Hogan, 2002). In other words, when a 
partnership becomes governed by a complacent culture, dysfunctional conflict may not affect 
the way business is conducted or the way that the relationship is established – especially if this 
culture emerged over time (Baker, 2009). Thus, although dysfunctional conflict may influence 
the level of complacency in some relationships, it can also have no effect in others. The current 
study found, in its specific context, that dysfunctional conflict does not impact on complacency 
within a business relationship.   
 
Dysfunctional conflict and vulnerability 
 
The hypothesis (H31) presented in this study in order to investigate the relationship between 
dysfunctional conflict and vulnerability is not supported (p<0,05). Dysfunctional conflict often 
entails strong disagreements, underlying emotions, and negative actions that produce frustration 
and hostility between partners (Pfajfar et al., 2017). Although it is possible that dysfunctional 
conflict can cause firms to feel vulnerable towards their partners, this study reports that 
dysfunctional conflict does not influence the onset of vulnerability in the current research 
context. Vulnerability is often considered to be an inherent attribute of relationships, which 
may be due to several factors (Svensson, 2004). For example, parties can start to feel vulnerable 
towards their partners when they are overly dependent on them or have built excessively close 
ties that leaves them feeling exposed. At the beginning of the relationship, parties usually accept 
these vulnerabilities, and some even try to reduce and manage relationship vulnerability through 
contractual agreements. In other words, vulnerability is something that seems to always reside 
under the surface of every relationship and can be managed through open communication and 
relational transparency (Svensson, 2002). Therefore, depending on relationship dynamics, 
dysfunctional conflict may not necessarily influence the onset of vulnerability in business 
relationships.  
 
Dysfunctional conflict and suspicion  
 
The current study hypothesised that there is a relationship between dysfunctional conflict and 
suspicion (H32). Results, however, indicate that H32 is not supported as it obtained a p-value 
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of 0.107. According to several authors (e.g. Baker, 2009; Pfajfar et al., 2017; Skarmeas, 2006) 
dysfunctional conflict can result in decreased trust, commitment and loyalty – which, 
consequently, can cause the disintegration of relational bonds and increase opportunistic 
intentions. Dysfunctional conflict can potentially lead to the appearance of suspicion within a 
business relationship. However, in the specific context of the current study, no association was 
found between dysfunctional conflict and suspicion. As parties differ in terms of perspectives 
and values, they may also interpret situations differently. For example, some may find their 
partners’ actions suspicious during times of conflict, while others may not. Just like 
vulnerability, suspicion is an inherent quality of relationships, and influenced by the parties’ 
own interpretations of situations. Suspicion usually occurs when firms suspect their partners of 
acting with ulterior motives or hidden agendas (Hunter et al., 2011). However, dysfunctional 
conflict does not necessarily entail opportunistic behaviour or hidden agendas. Therefore, 
dysfunctional conflict may not influence the onset of suspicion when parties are not interpreting 
their partners to be acting with hidden agendas or ulterior motives.  
 
Non-coercive power and relational myopia  
 
The current study hypothesised that there is a relationship between non-coercive power and 
relational myopia (H33). Results indicate that H33 is not supported as it obtained a p-value of 
0.737. Based on previous studies relating non-coercive power and its effect on business 
relationships (e.g. Liu et al., 2010; Luo et al., 2011; Hald et al., 2009), it is possible to infer 
that non-coercive power can result in relational myopia – especially when it positively affects 
important relationship building blocks such as trust and commitment. However, the current 
study found, in its specific context, that the use of non-coercive power does not influence the 
onset of relational myopia. A firm’s use of non-coercive power for the purpose of getting a 
partner to act otherwise or bring about change, is usually only successful when the power base 
employed (i.e. expertise, reward, legitimate or information) can generate benefits for the latter. 
In other words, the power bases used to influence a counterparty’s behaviours and decisions 
should be perceived as powerful enough to actually result in a change of behaviour or to have 
them act in a way they would not have otherwise. For example, reward power that offers 
incentives and relationship benefits may encourage parties to act in a certain manner. However, 
when partners perceive the measure employed to exercise non-coercive power with 
indifference, they might be less motivated to react to it. Thus, non-coercive power might not 
lead to relational myopia, as parties might not be motivated to respond to it as expected – which, 
in turn, can mean that non-coercive power may not influence the dynamics of the relationship.  
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Non-coercive power and complacency 
 
The hypothesis (H34) offered to examine the relationship between non-coercive power and 
complacency is supported (p<0,05). In addition, the original sample statistic indicates that there 
is a negative relationship between non-coercive power and complacency. Lund et al. (2015) 
maintain that complacency may surface when involved firms become excessively confident in 
their position in the relationship and overly attached to their partners because of past 
experiences and positive feelings. However, the use of non-coercive power can also result 
increased communication and the sharing of information and knowledge (Jain et al., 2014; Liu 
et al., 2010). Increased information and knowledge sharing can result in the development of 
new ideas regarding how to conduct business, as well as how to govern the relationships (Jain 
et al., 2014). Non-coercive power can also increase communication between partners, which 
would put them in a position to share their thoughts and ideas openly. Thus, although it is 
possible that the “good faith” and benevolent feelings that accompany non-coercive power can 
lead to complacency, the use of non-coercive power can also encourage better communication 
and increase information sharing, which can result in improvements in the relationship and the 
reduction of complacency.  
 
Non-coercive power and vulnerability 
 
The hypothesis (H35) presented to explore the association between non-coercive power and 
vulnerability is supported (p<0,05). Additionally, the original sample statistic reflects a score 
of 0.279, which means non-coercive power and vulnerability are positively correlated. These 
findings agree with existing literature (e.g. Baker, 2009; Svensson, 2004; Jain et al., 2014) that 
infers how the possible use of non-coercive power can result in behaviour that gives rise to 
feelings of vulnerability. The exercise of non-coercive power in business relationship can 
encourage the development of strong relational ties, drawing parties closer to one another. 
Baker (2009) found that, when firms form excessively close ties, they then expose more of 
themselves to their partners, and that they also invest more in the relationship. Consequently, 
when non-coercive power lead to the formation of close relationship ties between firms, it is 
possible that they may experience increased vulnerability. Similar to close personal 
relationships, in which individuals expose and share their deepest darkest secrets, leaving them 
vulnerable towards the actions and behaviour of their partner, business partners often 
experience something similar. In other words, the closer partners become, the more resources 
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and information they share – which, subsequently, make them more vulnerable. Thus, non-
coercive power has the ability to influence the level of vulnerability within a partnership.  
 
Non-coercive power and suspicion  
 
This study also hypothesised that there is a relationship between non-coercive power and 
suspicion (H36). The results indicate a p-value of 0.001 and an original sample statistic of 
0.313. Thus, H36 is supported and there is a positive relationship between non-coercive power 
and suspicion. These findings correspond with existing literature that suggests that non-
coercive power can often be employed as a tool of manipulation and bribery. While non-
coercive power is often associated with positive relationship outcomes (e.g. cooperation, 
satisfaction, trust, etc.), it can also be used to manipulate others and influence them to behave 
in a manner they would not have otherwise (Johnsen & Lacoste, 2016). McCormack and Levin 
(1990) refer to suspicion as a belief that certain messages (i.e. behaviours, decisions, and 
actions) produced in a particular setting by a specific party may be deceptive. More specifically, 
Fein et al. (1990) claim that suspicion within business partnerships generally entail uncertainty 
pertaining partners’ motives, meaning that there is a lack of sureness and confidence concerning 
the intensions of partners. In the case of non-coercive power, when a firm exercises non-
coercive power to change the direction of the relationship, or to influence another to act 
differently, parties might become suspicious of the motives underlying the exercise of non-
coercive power (Abolhasanpour et al., 2011). Therefore, coercive power can influence the onset 
of suspicion within a business partnership when the motives pertaining the use of certain power 
bases are unclear or unknown.  
 
Coercive power and relational myopia  
 
The hypothesis (H37) offered to examine the relationship between coercive power and 
relational myopia is not supported (p>0,05). Although the previous research infers that coercive 
power has the capacity to cause relational myopia (e.g. Baker, 2009; Johnsen & Lacoste, 2016; 
Anderson & Jap, 2005), the current study found no correlation between these constructs. 
Several authors have explored the harmful impact of coercive power on business relationships, 
and most have reported a negative relationship between coercive power and constructive 
relationship outcomes such as satisfaction (Gelderman et al., 2008; Leonidou et al., 2008) and 
cooperation (Ferrer, Santa, Hyland & Bretherton, 2010). According to previous studies (e.g. 
Baker, 2009; Gelderman et al., 2008; Abosag, 2016), it is possible – through the reduction of 
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important relationship drivers – that the onset of relational myopia can be hindered by coercive 
power. In other words, the aggression and tension that usually accompany coercive power, 
would encourage parties to remain vigilant of their relationship and its alternative options. 
However, it is also possible that partners may exercise coercive power through less oblivious 
techniques such as suppression and manipulation (Leonidou et al., 2008). It is possible that 
parties might use suppression and manipulation to force their partners to act in a way they would 
not have otherwise. In some cases, parties might be oblivious to suppressive behaviour and 
manipulation, which could prevent the use of coercive power from affecting relationship 
dynamics and the level of trust and commitment between parties. In other words, coercive 
power may not necessarily influence positive relationship drivers (e.g. trust, commitment, 
satisfaction, etc.), meaning it may not play a role in the onset of relational myopia within a 
business relationship.  
 
Coercive power and complacency 
 
The current study also hypothesised that there is a relationship between coercive power and 
complacency (H38). Results show that H38 obtained a p-value of 0.048 and an original sample 
statistic of 0.204, which indicates that the hypothesis is supported, and that the relevant 
constructs are positively correlated. Several authors (e.g. Abolhasanpour et al., 2011; Johnsen 
& Lacoste, 2016; Leonidou et al., 2008; Jain et al., 2014) maintain that suppression is a key 
component of coercive power, which ultimately causes tension and frustration between 
partners. Jain et al. (2014) infer that, when powerful parties exercise coercive power in order 
force their partners into acting in a certain way, they often use suppressive behaviours. For 
example, firms may use coercive power to force partners to utilise particular processes or 
conduct business in a specific way they deem favourable. Consequently, when firms force their 
partners into conforming and employing their desired methods of operation, relationship 
innovation may decrease, and current procedures will remain unchallenged. This lack of 
innovation and improvement of relationship dynamics and operations can result in the onset of 
complacency.  
 
Coercive power and vulnerability 
 
The hypothesis (H39) that considered the association between coercive power and vulnerability 
is not supported (p>0,05). Although existing literature infers that coercive power can potentially 
lead to feelings of insecurity and vulnerability, the current study found no correlation between 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
233 
 
coercive power and vulnerability within the given context. In order to feel exposed and 
vulnerable, a party must perceive another as a possible threat who might inflict harm if they 
chose to (Svensson, 2004). Thus, even when a party uses coercive power in order to influence 
partners, it might not necessarily result in vulnerability, as the more exposed a party may not 
perceive their partner’s actions or behaviours as threatening. In other words, coercive power 
may not result in the onset of vulnerability within a business relationship due to partners’ 
perception that the exercise of coercive power does not necessarily pose a threat.  
 
Coercive power and suspicion  
 
The hypothesis (H40) offered to explore the relationship between coercive power and suspicion 
is supported (p<0.05). The original sample statistic also indicates that the correlation between 
coercive power and suspicion is positive. These results correspond with existing literature (e.g. 
Yeung et al., 2009; Chung, 2012; Van Weele & Rozemeijer, 2001; Ireland & Webb, 2007; 
Hausman & Johnston, 2010) that suggest coercive power can result in the appearance of 
opportunistic behaviours and intentions, which subsequently can hinder cooperation, 
information sharing, and the development of trust and commitment within a relationship. Thus, 
when coercive power results in detrimental elements, which signifies that a relationship has 
potentially become opportunistic, parties might become fearful of being exploited by their 
partners. Vulnerable firms often experience a lack of confidence in their partner’s credibility or 
feel that their partner is not interested in their wellbeing (Chung, 2012), which can consequently 
result in them becoming suspicious of their partner’s behaviour and intentions. In addition, the 
opportunistic behaviour element underlying the use of coercive power, can result in lower levels 
of trust, commitment and transparency among parties. Hence, coercive power can lead to the 
weakening of relational bonds, the fear of opportunism, as well as a decline in information 
sharing, as parties are more inclined to be suspicious of their partners. 
 
Dependence and relational myopia  
 
The hypothesis (H41) offered to examine the relationship between dependence and relational 
myopia is supported (p<0,05). The original sample statistic also indicates that the relationship 
between dependence and complacency is positively correlated. This corresponds with existing 
literature (see Zhang & Huo, 2013; Jiang et al., 2012; Scheer, Miao & Palmatier, 2015; Schmitz 
et al., 2016) that infer that dependence may positively influence several important relationship 
drivers (e.g. trust, commitment and reciprocal norms) – which, according to Baker (2009), can 
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subsequently lead to the emergence of relational myopia. Heavy dependence within a business 
relationship can signify that partners are highly cooperative and may have strong relational 
bonds and resource ties. Because of the positive outcomes generated through dependence, firms 
may become excessively reliant and overconfident with regards to their partnership with a 
specific party. Hence, due to this intense bond between parties, firms may adopt a myopic 
perspective regarding their relationship, how it is governed, as well as the environment in which 
it operates. Furthermore, several authors (e.g. Cox, Lonsdale, Watson & Qiao, 2003; Lonsdale, 
2001; Narasimhan, Nair, Griffith, Arlbjorn & Bendoly, 2009; Harrison, Beatty, Reynolds & 
Noble, 2012) use the term “lock-in situation” parallel to dependence as they believe that high 
levels of dependence between parties can cause parties to adopt a narrow perspective regarding 
their relationship and environment. This is especially the case when dependence is asymmetric 
and the heavy dependence of one party on another causes the “weaker” party to become locked 
in their relationship (Narasimhan et al., 2009). Thus, it possible that higher levels of dependence 
(symmetric and asymmetric) can result in relational myopia, as partners might become so 
excessively entwined through relational bonds and resource ties, that they neglect alternatives 
and fail to recognise environmental change. 
 
Dependence and complacency 
 
The current study also hypothesised that there is a relationship between dependence and 
complacency (H42). Results obtained indicate that H42 is supported (p-value=0.007) and that 
there is a positive correlation between dependence and complacency. While some researchers 
(Andaleeb, 1992; Heide & John, 1990; Buchanan, 1992) suggest that dependence can result in 
positive outcomes (e.g. mutual adaptations, satisfaction and increased relational performance), 
others (e.g. Cox et al., 2003; Harrison et al., 2012; Schmitz et al., 2016) emphasise the negative 
impact of dependence, such as the loss of strategic flexibility and an imbalance of power among 
partnering firms. On the one hand, heavy dependence can produce enhanced communication, 
information sharing and satisfaction in a relationship, which can allow complacency to arise 
since it usually surfaces when parties become overconfident in the future performance of their 
relationship based on past experiences and successes. On the other hand, high levels of 
dependence can also result in strategic inflexibility and an imbalance of power among parties, 
in which one party has more control over the relationship and its direction. Complacency can 
emerge when parties are unable, or unwilling, to bring about change to the relationship, or when 
one party mainly directs the way business is conducted. Thus, when a relationship is 
characterised by high levels of dependence, complacency can occur due to either the 
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overestimation of the relationship, or the strategic inflexibility to make adaptions and identify 
the need for change.  
 
Dependence and vulnerability  
 
The hypothesis (H43) is not supported (p>0,05). Existing literature suggests that, the more 
dependent the involved parties are, the more of themselves they expose to one another – which 
can ultimately allow vulnerabilities to arise (e.g. Johnsen & Lacoste, 2016; Schmitz et al., 2016; 
Harrison et al., 2012). However, the current study found that the degree of dependence within 
a business relationship does not affect the level of vulnerability that parties experience. One 
possible explanation for this lack of association is that parties often accept and account for 
potential vulnerabilities that might arise in the relationship long before the development of 
dependencies (Buvik & Grønhaug, 2000). In other words, parties may experience feelings of 
insecurity and vulnerability at any point in their relationship, regardless of how dependent they 
are on their partners. Additionally, the form of dependence (i.e. asymmetric versus symmetric) 
may also influence the level of vulnerability within a partnership (Johnsen & Ford, 2002). For 
example, parties who are equally dependent on one another may not experience increased 
vulnerability due to dependencies, as their position in the relationship is symmetric in terms of 
investment. Furthermore, it is also possible that contractual agreements made before the 
establishment of the relationship can specifically protect firms from the negative outcomes of 
asymmetrical dependence, as well as reduce any vulnerabilities that might surface during the 
partnership. Thus, dependence may not necessarily influence the level of vulnerability 
experienced by parties in a relationship.  
 
Dependence and suspicion  
 
The hypothesis (H44) offered to examine the relationship between dependence and suspicion 
is not supported (p>0,05). Partnerships are often considered ubiquitously opportunistic (Weide 
& Heide, 2000), which implies that suspicion is, and always will be, a part of business-to-
business relationships (Baker, 2009). Several authors (e.g. Hawkins et al., 2008; Dong, Liu, Yu 
& Zheng, 2015; Mysen et al., 2011) acknowledge that when a relationship is characterised by 
heavy dependence, parties are more likely to foster opportunistic intentions and agendas – 
which, in turn, can cause partners to become suspicious. However, this study found that there 
is no relationship between dependence and suspicion in the current research context. As echoed 
by Weide and Heide (2000), suspicion is an inherent part of business partnerships and may be 
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influenced by various factors. Although existing literature supports the potential association 
between dependence and suspicion, it is possible that the level of dependence between parties 
has no effect on whether they become suspicious of their partner. The extent to which parties 
are dependent on each other may not affect the onset of suspicion, but the resulting behaviour 
that can potentially occur because of dependence may cause firms to become suspicious. Thus, 
the level of dependence itself may not directly result in suspicion. In addition, as suspicion is 
an inherent attribute of relationships, which surfaces every now and again when parties do not 
act accordingly, it is possible to infer that suspicion is always present to some extent and is not 
necessarily influenced by dependencies between firms. 
Commitment and relational myopia  
 
The current study also hypothesised that there is a relationship between commitment and 
relational myopia (H45). For this hypothesis a p-value smaller than 0,05 was observed and the 
original sample statistic was 0.58 – which indicates that H45 is supported as it confirms a 
significant positive relationship between commitment and relational myopia. This is in line with 
previous findings by Baker (2009), who reported that there is a positive relationship between 
commitment and relational myopia. Baker (2009) suggests that this association between 
commitment and relational myopia can be explained by the good feelings between partners that 
usually accompany the affective component of commitment. Affectively committed parties will 
most likely not seek ways to improve something they believe is already doing well. Thus, when 
firms neglect to critically evaluate their relationship because of the good feelings they associate 
with the partnership, they might become myopic and deem monitoring activities as unnecessary 
(Baker, 2009). Furthermore, normatively committed firms are committed to their relationships 
more out of a sense of duty than from positive effects of the relationship. If a firm is doing 
something out of a sense of obligation, they may lack the incentive to stay abreast on the details 
that govern relationships dynamics and its operating environment (Baker, 2009). In other 
words, when a relationship is characterised by high levels of commitment, relational myopia 
can occur as firms may “blindly” choose to maintain the relationship at all costs – even though 
more attractive alternatives may be available.  
 
Commitment and complacency 
 
The hypothesis (H46) that propose there is a relationship between commitment and 
complacency is supported (p<0.05). However, according to the original sample statistic, the 
relationship between these constructs are negatively correlated. These findings correspond with 
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Baker’s (2009) research, which found that highly committed relationships are prone to 
becoming complacent. The onset of complacency suggests a sort of comfort that may lead 
committed partners to the perpetual acceptance of the status quo (Baker, 2009). In other words, 
when firms experience positive feelings pertaining their relationship, they may not want to 
upset the relationship dynamic by challenging how things are done. Firms may be under the 
impression that the relationship is performing satisfactorily because of the positive feelings 
generated by it and they may therefore have confidence in how the relationship is set up and 
how it operates (Baker, 2009). Although this confidence can be beneficial for relationship 
development, over-confidence can become a problem when environmental changes emerge, 
and the relationship needs to adapt. For example, because of positive past experiences and 
satisfactory performance, a committed firm may develop such an attachment to their relational 
partner that they assume positive results to be a given and therefore do not recognise the need 
for change (Baker, 2009). However, this sort of mentality that a relationship will continue to 
produce desired results and does not need to change, can result in complacent behaviour.  
 
Commitment and vulnerability 
 
The hypothesis (H47) offered to investigate whether commitment can influence the onset of 
vulnerability is not supported (p>0,05). Mesner and Stebe (2004) suggest that, the more 
committed firms become to one another, the more they expose themselves to their relational 
partner, which can lead to increased feelings of insecurity and vulnerability. However, in the 
specific context of the current study, no relationship was found between commitment and 
vulnerability. This is in line with previous findings by Baker (2009), who also reported no 
relationship between these constructs. Baker (2009) proposes that when partners become more 
committed to each other, they often fail to recognise their position in the relationship as 
vulnerable. Firms that recognise their vulnerability are less likely to be highly committed to 
their partners as vulnerability often generates feelings of anxiety and tension (Baker, 2009). In 
other words, parties who feel vulnerable towards their business partners are usually less capable 
of building commitment because of the negative feelings that accompany the recognition of 
vulnerability. Thus, commitment does not affect the level of vulnerability in a relationship – 
especially when parties are not aware of their vulnerable position, or when they choose to not 
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Commitment and suspicion  
 
The hypothesis (H48) offered to examine the relationship between commitment and suspicion 
is not supported (p>0,05). Baker (2009) found that committed firms might not necessarily feel 
vulnerable toward their partners but might become suspicious of their intentions and actions. 
This usually occurs because of events or issues that arose in the relationship and, although 
resolved, may leave parties suspicious their partners’ actions and behaviours (Baker, 2009). 
However, the current study found that commitment does not affect suspicion. Similar to how 
parties may decide not to become committed to another due to vulnerability, it is possible that 
firms might refrain from becoming more committed than needed when they are suspicious of 
their partners. Additionally, when partners are excessively committed to one another and are 
confident in their partners’ integrity and capabilities, they might not exhibit suspicious 
behaviour – even though they might have reason to be suspicious. In other words, parties may 
become blinded by high levels of commitment and subsequently oblivious to any wrongdoing 
of their partners, misguided by their belief that their partners will always act in the best interests 
of the relationship.  
 
9.2.3 Additional results: Significant mediating effects   
 
In addition to the discussion of the main study’s results, some significant mediating effects were 
observed upon testing the conceptual model. In the following section, only the significant 
indirect effects are discussed in order to provide enhanced insight into the onset of specific dark 
side symptoms.  
 
Trust, functional conflict and complacency 
 
The current study found functional conflict to have a mediating effect on the relationship 
between trust and complacency (p=0.004; β=0.123). Baker (2009) reported a direct positive 
relationship between trust and complacency. The aforementioned author suggest that when 
parties form close relational bonds characterised by high levels of trust and commitment, parties 
often become “blinded” by the “good feelings” associated with the relationship and that they, 
subsequently, might neglect to identify the need for change. Anderson and Jap (2005) agree 
with Baker (2009) by inferring that excessive levels of trust can result in complacent behaviour 
within a relationship. When parties misguidedly believe that a previous desirable relationship 
performance will automatically result in future success, and that there is no need for relationship 
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improvement, there is a likelihood that the partnership might become governed by a complacent 
culture (Anderson & Jap, 2005; Baker, 2009). Hence, high levels of trust can result in the onset 
of complacency within a business relationship.  
In addition, functional conflict can also explain why the level of trust can influence the degree 
of complacency. Several researchers (e.g. Morgan & Hunt, 1994; Mishra, 1996; Massey & 
Dawes, 2007; Morris & Cadogan, 2001) reported a positive relationship between trust and 
functional conflict. These aforementioned authors infer that sufficient trust can prevent a hasty 
or premature rupture in relationships (Morris & Cadogan, 2001), as well as foster the retainment 
of confidence in a partner’s reliability and integrity – which can ultimately result in the 
inclination to appropriately resolve issues (Morgan & Hunt, 1994; Anderson & Jap, 2005). 
Thus, higher levels of trust between parties can lead to a higher degree of functional conflict as 
they may be more dedicated to resolving conflict in a manner that allows relationship 
development and positive outcomes.  
When a trusting relationship fosters functional conflict, complacency may be more likely to 
emerge because of the good feelings and positive outcomes generated by functional conflict. In 
other words, when parties experience positive relationship outcomes due to functional conflict, 
they may become blinded by the favourable dynamism of the partnership and believe that the 
relationship will continue to be successful and that there is no need for change (Baker, 2009). 
Therefore, functional conflict can explain why there is a relationship between trust and 
complacency.  
 
Trust, functional conflict and vulnerability  
 
Results obtained in current study reflect a negative indirect effect between trust and 
vulnerability through functional conflict (p=0.012; β=-0.103). When a relationship is 
characterised by lower levels of trust, parties usually have less confidence in their partner’s 
ability to satisfy needs and to act accordingly in order to achieve relationship objectives 
(Anderson & Narus, 1990; Moorman et al., 1993; Abosag et al., 2015). Anderson and Jap 
(2005) also infer that lower trust among parties can limit cooperation and collaboration, as well 
as lead to commitment issues. Consequently, lower levels of trust can allow parties to 
experience insecurity and vulnerability in their partnership as they not trust their partner to have 
their best interests at heart (Svensson, 2004). Hence, the level of trust in a relationship can affect 
the extent to which partners experience vulnerability.  
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Functional conflict can potentially explain this relationship between trust and vulnerability. As 
previously discussed, there is a positive relationship between trust and functional conflict, 
meaning that trust can encourage parties to resolve conflict in a constructive way that produces 
positive outcomes (Morgan & Hunt, 1994). However, the current study also reported a negative 
relationship between functional conflict and vulnerability, which indicates that when parties do 
not manage to resolve conflicting situations functionally, parties may experience heightened 
levels of insecurity and vulnerability (Svensson, 2004). In other words, low levels of trust can 
potentially increase feelings of vulnerability as parties might lack the capacity to solve problems 
and issues in a functional manner. Thus, functional conflict serves a mediator on the 
relationship between trust and vulnerability.   
 
Trust, functional conflict and suspicion 
 
The current study’s generated results also indicate that there is a negative indirect effect 
between trust and suspicion through functional conflict (p=0.038; β=-0.062). According to the 
results of several studies (e.g. Morgan & Hunt, 1994; Svensson, 2001; Mukherjee & Nath, 
2003; Zhou, Liao, Liu & Liao, 2017) that focused on trust in business relationships, it is evident 
that lower levels of trust can result in a lack of certainty regarding a partner’s behaviour and 
intentions. In other words, when there is low trust between partners, firms are less likely to 
understand their partner’s actions, nor to confidently rely on them – which, subsequently, can 
result in raising suspicion (Svensson, 2001; Svensson, 2002; Svensson, 2004). The degree of 
functional conflict within a relationship could possibly explain this negative indirect 
relationship between trust and suspicion.  
Although several studies report a positive relationship between trust and functional conflict, the 
current study found that there is a negative correlation between functional conflict and 
suspicion. Thus, high levels of trust will result in lower levels of suspicion as sufficient trust 
between partners usually result in functional conflict. More specifically, when parties trust one 
another, they are more likely to resolve conflict constructively and in a way that produces 
relationship benefits – such as improved collaboration and cooperation, creative friction, 
enhanced communication, as well as increased knowledge sharing (Skarmeas, 2006). 
Consequently, because of these positive outcomes associated with functional conflict, parties 
are less likely to be suspicious of their partners. Therefore, because of functional conflict that 
result due to high trust between partners, the onset of suspicion within a business relationship 
is less likely to occur. 
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Trust, dependence and relational myopia  
 
Based on the results obtained, there is a positive indirect effect between trust and relational 
myopia through dependence (p=0.041; β=0.033). Baker (2009) found that there is a positive 
relationship between trust and relational myopia. The “good feelings” often associated with 
high levels of trust can result in the adoption of a narrow perspective regarding the relationship 
and its environment (Baker, 2009). In other words, high levels of trust might result in 
overconfidence in relationship dynamics and the belief that partners will continue to be 
trustworthy in the future. Excessive trust can prevent firms from accurately and objectively 
evaluating their current relationship and other alternatives – which might actually be more 
desirable (Baker, 2009; Anderson & Jap, 2005).  
The development of dependencies can possibly explain this relationship between trust and 
relational myopia. When a relationship is characterised by a higher level of trust, parties might 
be more inclined to rely on their partners and to invest in the relationship (Schmitz et al., 2016), 
as well as more encouraged to share resources and information to obtain mutual goals and 
objectives (Morgan & Hunt, 1994). Hence, it is possible that sufficient trust can increase the 
degree of dependence between parties.  
Furthermore, the current study found that there is a direct positive effect between dependence 
and relational myopia, which means that the more firms become reliant on each other to achieve 
certain goals and objectives, the higher the likelihood that they may become myopic in terms 
of the relationship, its environment and how it should be governed. Thus, relational myopia can 
occur within a partnership because of dependencies that accompany high levels of trust. 
 
Trust, commitment and relational myopia 
 
The current study found that commitment also acts as a mediator on the relationship between 
trust and relational myopia, and that there is a positive indirect effect between trust and 
relational myopia through commitment (p=0; β=0.166).  
Baker (2009) reported a positive relationship between trust and relational myopia. As 
previously mentioned, when a partnership is characterised by high levels of trust, firms may 
become overconfident in their partner’s capacity to satisfy needs and act accordingly in order 
to achieve relationship goals and objectives. This overconfidence usually emerges due to “good 
feelings” associated with trusting relationships and the positive outcomes thereof (Anderson & 
Jap, 2005). However, as emphasised by Baker (2009), these good feelings can cause parties to 
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adopt a narrow perspective regarding their relationship, its environment and the way its 
managed.  
The appearance of commitment, as a result of trust between partners, can possibly explain the 
positive correlation between trust and relational myopia. Commitment is defined as a firm’s 
willingness and desire to maintain a relationship and make short-term sacrifices in order to do 
so (Anderson & Weitz, 1992). Thus, when commitment develops as a result of trust (see 
Svensson et al., 2010; Human & Naudé, 2014; Hashim & Tan, 2015), relational myopia can 
appear because of a firm’s willingness and desire to maintain the relationship at all costs. In 
other words, because of the positive impact of trust and commitment on a relationship, parties 
might want to maintain the relationship as they believe it will continue to be desirable in the 
future. Ultimately, they may adopt a narrow perspective pertaining their relationship and its 
environment, assuming the relationship is more favourable than alternative options. Therefore, 
relational myopia can occur due to excessive levels of commitment that emerge because of high 
levels of trust within a business relationship.  
 
Trust, commitment and complacency 
 
The current study’s results reflect that there is a negative indirect effect between trust and 
complacency through commitment (p=0.031; β=-0.051). When a relationship is characterised 
by sufficient trust between partners, commitment will most likely develop – which implies that 
parties are willing to maintain the relationship by making short-term sacrifices (Anderson & 
Weitz, 1992) and forfeiting alternative options (Morgan & Hunt, 1994). In other words, trust 
can result in commitment, which can potentially influence the appearance of complacency 
within a business relationship.  
According to several studies (e.g. Ng, Feldman & Lam, 2010; Heavey Simsek & Fox, 2015), 
commitment can motivate firms to maintain and develop their relationship by ensuring they 
remain innovative, as well as perceptive to changes in their environment. Consequently, 
commitment can possibly prevent the onset of complacency in relationships due to parties’ 
desire to ensure the relationship remains desirable and functional in the future. Thus, high levels 
of trust can prevent the emergence of complacency in a relationship because of high levels of 
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Shared values, functional conflict and complacency 
 
Results obtained in the current study reflect that there is a positive indirect effect between 
shared values and complacency through functional conflict (p=0.018; β=0.082). Morgan and 
Hunt (1994) define shared values as the extent to which parties have beliefs in common about 
which behaviours, goals and policies are important or unimportant appropriate or inappropriate, 
and right or wrong. Thus, a relationship characterised by a substantial amount of shared values 
usually signal that partners have similar perspectives regarding the relationship, its environment 
and how it should be governed.  
Similar mindsets and a shared culture within business relationships can result in higher levels 
of functional conflict as parties may be more inclined to manage and reduce conflict in a manner 
deemed mutually appropriate (Baker, 2009). In other words, because shared values can translate 
into higher compatibility between partners (Yandle & Blythe, 2000), partnering firms would be 
less likely to have intense disagreements and more prone to understand the rationalisation of 
differences that might emerge between them. Therefore, higher levels of shared values between 
parties can result a higher degree of functional conflict within the relationship.  
Furthermore, functional conflict can possibly explain the relationship between shared values 
and complacency. Because of the positive outcomes and constructiveness often associated with 
functional conflict, which is in turn influenced by the amount of shared values, complacency 
might emerge within a partnership. Baker (2009) infers that complacency can stem from 
positive relationship experiences and high levels of favourability, which can be brought on by 
a high degree of functional conflict (Pfajfar et al., 2017).  
Hence, shared values can result in complacency due to the positive outcomes associated with 
functional conflict that manifests due to partners fostering similar perspectives about the 
relationship.  
 
Shared values, functional conflict and vulnerability 
 
The current study reports a negative indirect effect between shared values and vulnerability 
through functional conflict (p=0.026; β=-0.069). As previously mentioned, shared values can 
influence the level of functional conflict, as the degree to which partners have similar 
viewpoints about the relationship and its management can impact on their capacity to positively 
resolve conflict.  
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However, this study’s results reflect that functional conflict can explain the negative 
relationship between shared values and vulnerability: When a relationship is characterised by a 
substantial amount of shared values, higher levels of functional conflict are more likely to 
result, which can subsequently lead to the reduction of vulnerability. Several authors (e.g. Jehn 
& Mannix, 2001; Pfajfar et al., 2017; Johnsen & Lacoste, 2016) suggest that functional conflict 
can positively influence relationships, as it can enhance cooperation, stimulate idea generation, 
strengthen feelings of security, as well as increase the level of confidence of partners in one 
another. In other words, partnerships tend to be stronger and more efficient when characterised 
by functional conflict. Consequently, vulnerabilities and insecurities within a partnership are 
usually less, as functional conflict increases firms’ confidence in their partners’ integrity and 
capacity to satisfy needs.  
Therefore, higher levels of shared values among parties can possibly reduce the onset of 
vulnerability, as partners who have similar values are more likely to resolve conflict effectively 
– which subsequently could reduce feelings of insecurity and vulnerability.  
 
Shared values, non-coercive power and vulnerability 
 
Based on generated results, the current study reports a positive indirect effect between shared 
values and vulnerability through non-coercive power (p=0.034; β=0.054). Baker (2009) infers 
that when a relationship is characterised by a substantial amount of shared values, partners are 
more likely to possess similar beliefs about what behaviours, goals and policies are important 
or unimportant, appropriate or inappropriate, and right or wrong. In other words, shared values 
can express the extent to which business partners might think in the same way or share similar 
beliefs regarding how they conduct themselves in their relationships (Baker, 2009). Shared 
values can generate closer relational ties, as well as enhance the level of trust and commitment 
between parties (Morgan & Hunt, 1994). Thus, it is possible that shared values can impact on 
vulnerability, as closer relational ties might lead to parties feeling overexposed.  
However, the current study found that the use of non-coercive power could explain the 
relationship between shared values and vulnerability: Because of the close nature of a 
relationship characterised by high levels of shared values, parties may choose to use non-
coercive power when they want to influence their partners’ behaviours or decisions (Johnson 
& Lacoste, 2016). Shared values often lead to parties adopting similar outlooks concerning their 
relationship and how to conduct business (Baker, 2009). Therefore, powerful parties will be 
more inclined to use non-coercive measures, rather than an aggressive approach, in order to 
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achieve certain objectives. Furthermore, non-coercive power can enhance teamwork, as well as 
increase trust and commitment (Arend & Wisner, 2005; Jain et al., 2014). Liu et al. (2010) 
maintain that non-coercive power can draw parties closer, as well as influence power dynamics 
within the relationship.  
The use of non-coercive power, inspired by shared values, can therefore lead to parties feeling 
exposed and vulnerable because of the closeness of the relationship, along with the capacity to 
be influenced by trusted partners. Hence, when high levels of shared values encourage the use 
of non-coercive power to influence parties to act in a certain way, partners may start to feel 
highly dependent and exposed because of the closeness of the relationship – which, in turn, can 
leave them feeling vulnerable. 
 
Shared values, non-coercive power and suspicion 
 
The current study’s results reflect a positive indirect effect between shared values and suspicion 
through non-coercive power (p=0.034; β=0.06). Baker (2009) investigated the association 
between shared values and suspicion but found that there is no relationship between these 
constructs.  
This study, however, reports that the use of non-coercive power can possibly explain a positive 
indirect relationship between shared values and suspicion. As previously discussed, non-
coercive power is more likely to be exercised when a relationship is characterised by sufficient 
shared values, since parties might feel more inclined to use positive measures to influence 
partners. However, although the partnership might comprise of close relational ties, sometimes 
the use of non-coercive power may result in suspicion (Johnsen & Lacoste, 2016). For example, 
when a powerful party uses non-coercive power to change the direction of the relationship, or 
to influence another to act differently, partners might become suspicious of the motives 
underlying the exercise of non-coercive power (Abolhasanpour et al., 2011).  
Therefore, the use of non-coercive power, which emerges due to shared values, can explain the 
onset of suspicion within business relationships.  
 
Shared values, commitment and relational myopia 
 
In addition to the positive direct relationship between shared values and commitment reported 
in the current study, results also show a positive indirect relationship between shared values 
and relational myopia through commitment (p=0; original β=0.249). Baker (2009) reported a 
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positive relationship between shared values and relational myopia, inferring that group think 
might occur due to high levels of shared values – which subsequently can lead to the onset of 
relational myopia. The current study, however, found that the development of commitment 
between parties can possibly explain this relationship between shared values and relational 
myopia. When a partnership is characterised by a substantial amount of shared values, parties 
are more likely to think similarly and to share perspectives regarding the relationship (Baker, 
2009). Consequently, shared values can influence the development of commitment, which 
ultimately can result in the onset of relational myopia.  
Positive feelings and beneficial outcomes often associated with commitment, can encourage, 
or “blind”, parties to maintain the relationship – even after it has become inefficient and no 
longer as profitable (Anderson & Jap, 2005). In other words, firms may become myopic in 
terms of their relationship because they believe the relationship to be as profitable and 
successful in the future as it had been in the past. According to Baker (2009), commitment can 
encourage parties to maintain their relationship, as well as enable them from objectively 
monitoring their partnership and its operating environment. Therefore, when high levels of 
shared values lead to the development of commitment, it is more likely that relational myopia 
may occur. 
 
Shared values, commitment and complacency 
 
Results obtained in the current study reflects that there is a negative indirect effect between 
shared values and complacency through commitment (p=0.032; β=-0.076). Baker (2009) 
explored the association between shared values and complacency but found no correlation 
between these constructs. This study, however, reports that the development of commitment 
can potentially explain the indirect relationship between shared values and complacency. 
Several authors (e.g. Morgan & Hunt, 1994; Theron et al., 2008; Phelps & Campbell, 2012) 
report a positive relationship between shared values and relationship commitment. Thus, when 
firms have similar perspectives and think similarly about their partnership, positive relationship 
benefits (e.g. cooperation, collaboration, communication, trust and reciprocal norms) are more 
likely to be generated. Furthermore, Kelman (1961) maintain that parties’ attitudes and 
behaviours are usually also influenced by the extent to which they have similar values. 
Complacency can occur when firms are excessively committed to one another, and they become 
unable to objectively evaluate their relationship. In other words, firms may become so 
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transfixed on the positive feelings generated by the partnership that they neglect to see the need 
to improve, or change (Baker, 2009).  
Hence, the excessive development of commitment, due to a substantial amount of shared values 
between partners, can result in the onset of a complacent culture within business relationships. 
 
Opportunistic behaviour, non-coercive power and complacency 
 
Results obtained in this study indicate that there is a significant negative relationship between 
opportunistic behaviour and complacency through non-coercive power (p=0.45; β=-0.069). 
When parties act opportunistically, they tend to pursue self-interest over mutual interest, which 
can potentially lead to behaviours, attitudes and actions that can damage relationship dynamics, 
as well as leave parties vulnerable to exploitation and deceit (Anderson & Jap, 2005). Because 
complacency usually occurs due to overconfidence in current relationship dynamics and 
operations, as well as overreliance on previous successful ways of conducting business (Baker, 
2009), opportunism has the capacity to disrupt the onset of complacency as it might change a 
partner’s perception of the relationship, or prevent a complacency culture to govern the 
relationship.  
The current study found that the use of non-coercive power can possibly explain this association 
between opportunistic behaviour and complacency. Firms may choose to use forms of non-
coercive power (e.g. reward, expert, legitimate or information) in order to align the 
relationship’s direction and their partner’s behaviour with their own self-interest. Opportunistic 
parties may decide to influence, control, or change their partners’ behaviours in a more positive 
way through the use of non-coercive power (Wang et al., 2015). Consequently, the use of non-
coercive power can reduce the likelihood of complacency as non-coercive power has the 
capacity to effect change in the relationship, its dynamics and direction as well as how it is 
governed (Gelderman et al., 2008). Therefore, non-coercive power can explain the negative 
relationship between opportunistic behaviour and complacency.  
 
Opportunistic behaviour, non-coercive power and vulnerability 
 
A significant positive indirect effect was found between opportunistic behaviour and 
vulnerability through non-coercive power (p=0.004; β=0.087).  
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Non-coercive power has a mediating effect on the relationship between opportunistic behaviour 
and vulnerability. In a business-to-business context, opportunistic behaviour refers to a 
situation in which a firm realises its own gains separately (Conner & Prahalad, 1996), and as a 
result, individual needs are prioritised and pursued over mutual goals and objectives (Abosag 
et al., 2016). Anderson and Jap (2005) maintain that opportunistic behaviour can result in 
behaviours, attitudes and actions that could not only damage relationship dynamics, but also 
leave parties vulnerable to exploitations and deceit. Thus, opportunistic behaviour can result in 
the onset of insecurities and vulnerabilities.  
Results obtained in the current study show that non-coercive power can possibly explain this 
relationship between opportunistic behaviour and vulnerability. Non-coercive power is 
executed through a positive influence and can be used opportunistically to encourage partners 
to act in a way they would not have otherwise in order to achieve self-interest without causing 
frustration or tension. In other words, opportunistic firms may use non-coercive power in order 
to align their partner’s behaviour and the direction of the relationship with their own self-
interest. Furthermore, when parties use non-coercive power in order to achieve their self-
interest, parties might feel more vulnerable towards their partners. In addition, the use of non-
coercive power can promote cooperation and collaboration, as well as strengthen relational 
bonds (Arend & Wisner, 2005; Jain et al., 2014; Dapiran et al., 2003).  
Thus, non-coercive power – even used in pursuit of self-interest – can draw parties closer to 
one another and, consequently, allow them to expose more of themselves, which, in turn, can 
result in higher levels of vulnerability. 
 
Opportunistic behaviour, non-coercive power and suspicion 
 
Based on results obtained in the current study, the relationship between opportunistic behaviour 
and suspicion is mediated by non-coercive power (p=0.025; β=0.098). When firms act 
opportunistically within a business relationship, parties are more likely to be suspicious of their 
partner’s behaviour and intentions, as they believe there to be ulterior motives or hidden 
agendas beneath the surface of their partner’s actions and decisions (Hunter et al., 2011).  
Non-coercive power can possibly explain the onset of suspicion due to opportunistic behaviour 
in business relationships. Johnsen and Lacoste (2016) claim that non-coercive power can be 
used to manipulate others and influence them to behave in a manner they would not have 
otherwise. Firms act opportunistically by using non-coercive power to influence their partner’s 
behaviour in such a way that it promotes their own self-interest. Therefore, when a party uses 
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non-coercive power to change the direction of the relationship, or to influence another to act 
differently in pursuit of self-interest, partners might become suspicious of the motives 
underlying the exercise of non-coercive power (Abolhasanpour et al., 2011).  
In other words, parties might become increasingly suspicious of their partner’s behaviour and 
intentions when they use non-coercive power in order to bring about change that majorly 
benefits one side of the partnership. 
 
Uncertainty, non-coercive power and suspicion 
 
The current study also found that non-coercive power has a mediating effect on the association 
between uncertainty and suspicion. Results show that there is a significant positive relationship 
between uncertainty, non-coercive power and suspicion (p=0.047; β=0.06).  
According to literature, when there is uncertainty in a relationship, parties tend to be less certain 
of their partners’ intentions, behaviours and actions (Eriksson & Sharma, 2003; Ketchen & 
Hult, 2007). Suspicion, on the other hand, has been defined as a dynamic, cognitive, effortful 
state in which a firm, because of uncertainty as to whether a partner may be concealing harmful 
or opportunistic intentions, engages in the active and thoughtful consideration of these motives 
and plausible casual explanations underlying partner behaviour (Hunter et al., 2011).  
While it is possible that uncertainty can directly affect suspicion (see Abosag et al., 2016; 
Baker, 2009), the current study found that non-coercive power can potentially explain the 
relationship between uncertainty and suspicion. When a relationship becomes characterised by 
high levels of uncertainty, parties may use non-coercive power in order to get partners to act in 
a way they would not have otherwise, as they believe these “encouraged” actions and decisions 
will reduce uncertainties (Paulraj & Chen, 2007). Parties may be more prone to exert reward, 
expert, reference or legitimate power in order to cope with relationship uncertainties and 
increase information sharing (Leonidas et al., 2006). However, the exercise of non-coercive 
power in order to reduce uncertainties can, in turn, trigger suspicion. Because opportunistic 
parties often use rewards to influence their partners to act in a way that benefits the self-interest 
of the initial firm (Anderson & Jap, 2005), partners may become suspicious when a relationship 
is characterised by high levels of non-coercive power. Hence, when a powerful party uses non-
coercive power to reduce uncertainty in order to change the direction of the relationship, or 
influence another to act differently, partners might become suspicious of the motives underlying 
the exercise of non-coercive power (Abolhasanpour et al., 2011). Therefore, the use of non-
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coercive power can explain why uncertainty can result in suspicion within business 
relationships.  
 
9.3 THEORETICAL AND MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS 
 
The following section focuses on the theoretical and managerial implications of the current 
study. Theoretical implications are discussed in order to consider the alignment of the 
conceptual model with existing literature, and its potential to contribute to the understanding of 
business-to-business relationships. On the other hand, potential managerial implications are 
discussed in the hope of providing firms with knowledge and insight regarding the phenomenon 
of dark side behaviour in business relationships 
 
9.3.1 Theoretical implications 
 
Over the past decade, more and more research attention has been directed at investigating the 
downside of interfirm relationships (Abosag et al., 2016). While several studies have already 
examined linkages between constructs included in the theoretical framework, the current study 
contributes to literature by, firstly, re-examining these previously researched relationships in a 
different setting and, secondly, exploring novel linkages between established constructs. For 
example, the current study explores the association between the selected behavioural outcomes 
and adopted symptoms of dark side behaviour – which have received very little attention since 
initially introduced by Baker (2009). This study also reconfigures and tests previously reported 
relationships between established constructs. For instance, many studies (e.g. Kang & Jindal, 
2015; Cheng & Sheu, 2012; Claro, Vojnovskis & Ramos, 2018) have found that dysfunctional 
conflict can result in opportunism. The current study, however, explores opportunistic 
behaviour as a possible antecedent of dysfunctional conflict, instead of as an outcome thereof. 
Although several studies (e.g. Baker, 2009; Anderson & Jap, 2005; Abosag et al., 2016; Abosag 
et al., 2015; Villena et al., 2011; Miocevic, 2020; Nguyen et al., 2015) have explored the 
phenomenon of dark side in business-to-business relationships, this study forms part of a very 
small body of research that provides empirically tested frameworks in order to explain the onset 
of dark side behaviour. Many authors have explored the effect of detrimental elements within 
business relationships and how they can potentially harm the dynamics, functionality and 
longevity of those relationships. For example, Bradford et al. (2004) found that dysfunctional 
conflict can impede on the processing of new information, as well as decrease communication 
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and cooperation within a business network. Similarly, Hausman and Johnson (2010) 
investigated the deterioration of partnerships and reported that coercive power can result in 
lower levels of trust and commitment. However, very few studies have examined how inherent 
and seemingly constructive components of relationships can lead to detrimental behaviour. One 
such example is that of Baker’s (2009) research concerning the dark side of relationship 
marketing, in which he examines how positive relational drivers (i.e. trust, commitment, shared 
values and satisfaction) can result in potentially harmful behaviours.  
Drawing from research studies that explore the effect of both positive and negative relational 
factors, the current study proposes and tests a distinctive theoretical model in order to explain 
how a partnership can, over time, become inefficient and undesirable due to inherent attributes 
and components that are natural to most relationships. The framework suggests that the selected 
relationship-shaping antecedents (i.e. trust, shared values, opportunistic behaviour and 
uncertainty) can result in particular “naturally occurring” behavioural outcomes (i.e. conflict, 
power, dependence and commitment), which consequently can lead to symptoms of dark side 
behaviour (i.e. relational myopia, complacency, vulnerability and suspicion).  
Furthermore, quantitative research methods are employed to test the theoretical framework. The 
majority of studies that explore the phenomenon of dark side behaviour in business-to-business 
research are conceptual in nature, and generally do not provide direct empirical evidence as 
support. For example, Anderson and Jap (2005) discussed the dark side of close relationships 
through the examination of case studies, and Johnsen and Lacoste (2016) conducted a 
systematic review of literature to address several detrimental elements of business relationships.  
In the current study, however, structural equation modelling (i.e. PLS-SEM) is used to analyse 
data and test hypotheses. In addition to the assessment of measurement and structural models, 
a new procedure (i.e. PLSpredict) developed by Hair et al. (2019) is employed to determine the 
out-of-sample predictive power. This procedure was therefore used to determine the predictive 
accuracy of the conceptual model. 
 
9.3.2 Managerial implications 
 
The key objective concerning the managerial implications of the current study is to provide 
managers and top executives with knowledge and insight about the dark side of business-to-
business relationships. Every company, a one point or another, engages in a partnership with 
another organisation (e.g. supplier, customer or buyer, service provider, collaborator, etc.) in 
order to achieve a specific goal. By understanding what drives a relationship’s performance, as 
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well as what encourages dark side behaviour, firms can develop a dynamic capability to 
effectively manage their partnerships (Abosag et al., 2016). Similar to how personal 
relationships can cause post-traumatic stress and other psychological harm in individuals, 
business relationships also have the capacity to hurt individual firms and leave them at a 
disadvantage. Therefore, by understanding the importance of continuously evaluating and 
monitoring business relationships, along with its operating environment, organisations can 
protect themselves from harmful situations and inefficiency, as well as better manage their 
partnerships (Abosag et al., 2016).  
The current study therefore aspires to provide companies with a framework that can help them 
understand how dark side behaviour can manifest in relationships, as well as to assist them with 
identifying seemingly natural and positive situations that have the potential, later on, to lead to 
the appearance of detrimental behaviour. More specifically, this study provides managers and 
executives with information regarding potential antecedents of dark side behaviour (i.e., trust, 
shared values, opportunistic behaviour and uncertainty), which if identified and managed early 
on in a partnership can contribute to reducing inherent detrimental business behaviour. For 
example, the management of opportunistic behaviour can prevent negative behavioural 
outcomes (e.g. dysfunctional conflict, coercive power and dependence). Furthermore, the 
framework presented in the current study can also provide managers with insights and 
knowledge needed to identify when a relationship has become inefficiency and undesirable. In 
other words, the emergence of certain behaviours and attitudes in a relationship can result in 
symptoms of dark side behaviour, which indicates that the relationship is not as functional as it 
once was. For example, when a business partnership becomes characterised by simptoms of 
dark side behaviour (i.e., relational myopia, complacency, vulnerability and suspicion), 
managers can use the framework presented in the current study to identify potential behaviours 
that allowed for the manifestation of the dark side. Thus, by providing firms with knowledge 
and insight about the onset of dark side behaviour, they can develop enhanced relationship 
management competencies, as well as make accurate strategic decisions concerning the future 
of their partnerships.  
 
9.4 LIMITATIONS  
 
Because of the specific research design and context, the current study is subject to certain 
limitations. In this section, these constraints or limitations are discussed in terms of 
characteristics pertaining to the design and methodology of the study – which could possibly 
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have influenced the interpretations of the results (Price & Murnan, 2004). Although a manifold 
of limitations can be discussed, the current section emphasises three overheading constraints 
that limit the current study, namely (1) a lack of prior research, (2) conceptual model design 
and (3) sampling method considerations.  
 
9.3.1 Lack of prior research 
 
The citation of previous research constitutes to the formation of a literature review and assists 
the current research in constructing a foundation for understanding the research problem, as 
well as the research objectives of the study (Price & Murnan, 2004). Although various studies 
(e.g. Abosag et al., 2016; Anderson & Jap, 2005; Villena et al., 2011) have explored the dark 
side of business relationships, very few have investigated the phenomenon in terms of 
antecedents, elements and consequences. The objective of the current study is to explore the 
onset and impact of dark side behaviour in partnerships through examining relationship 
dynamics and by identifying potential “symptoms” – which may indicate that the partnership 
has become dark.  
While most of the selected antecedents (i.e. trust, shared values, opportunistic behaviour and 
uncertainty) and behavioural outcomes (i.e. conflict, power, dependence and commitment) have 
been thoroughly researched in the past, the identified symptoms of dark side behaviour (i.e. 
relational myopia, complacency, vulnerability and suspicion), as initially proposed by Baker 
(2009), lack prior research – especially in a business-to-business context. This lack of prior 
research can be perceived as a limitation as it hinders the theoretical development of certain 
constructs.  
In addition, this study also examines new associations between well-researched constructs. 
Although some of the linkages – especially between antecedents and behavioural outcomes – 
have been examined priorly, others have yet to be investigated as conceptualised in the current 
study. The incorporation of novel constructs, along with the configuration of new relationships 
between well-researched constructs, could possibly limit the current study as there is a lack of 
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9.3.2 Conceptual model design 
 
The conceptual model of the current study presents certain limitations to the exploration of the 
dark side of business relationships. Although there are several potential constructs that can be 
used to explain dark side behaviour in partnerships, the current study selected only those 
deemed most relevant according to recommendations throughout literature. Thus, it is plausible 
to infer that there are several other relational factors that can also be considered to be 
antecedents, elements or symptoms of dark side behaviour. The current study, however, only 
focuses on the constructs included in the model and the associations between them. 
Furthermore, the conceptual framework is designed to emphasise the impact of dark side 
behaviour in business relationships, which is illustrated through proposed linkages between 
antecedents (i.e. trust, shared values, opportunistic behaviour and uncertainty), behavioural 
outcomes (i.e. conflict, power, dependence and commitment) and symptoms (i.e. relational 
myopia, complacency, vulnerability and suspicion) of dark side behaviour. Even though these 
linkages or associations were structured according to recommendations throughout literature, 
alternative formulations may exist that could also potentially explain the onset of detrimental 
behaviour in business partnerships. Hence, the current study’s conceptual framework poses 
some limitations as it not an all-inclusive representation of all the possible factors that might 
influence the dark side of business relationships. 
9.3.3 Sampling method considerations 
 
Price and Murnan (2004) emphasise that sample size, along with the unit of analysis, can affect 
the generated results and conclusions of a study. For instance, if a sample is too small, it could 
be perceived as difficult to identify significant relationships from the data collected, as 
statistical tests usually require a larger sample size in order to ensure a reliable representation 
of the population (Price & Murnan, 2004). The current research’s realised sample (n=212) is 
deemed as sufficient, as statistically significant relationships between variables were derived 
from generated results. However, according to Price and Murnan’s (2004) inferences regarding 
sample sizes, it is possible that these findings could have differed if a larger sample had been 
analysed. Although the sample size was deemed sufficient for the purpose of this study, it is 
also characterised as a constraint of the current study as a larger sample size might have 
provided different results.  
Li et al. (2019) suggest that sample plan considerations, such as industry and regional factors, 
can also impact research findings. The data was collected through questionnaires distributed to 
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managers and executives in South Africa, across various industries. In other words, 
convenience and snowball sampling were employed in order to gather data from respondents 
in South Africa – which consequently limits the study in terms of universal applicability. 
According to Zikmund et al. (2013), results and findings can differ when the regional areas 
covered in the sample frame are more diverse.  
Furthermore, this study also adopted a non-industry specific approach to gathering data, as its 
objective is to examine the dark side behaviour in business-to-business relationships in general. 
However, it is perceivable that results and findings would have differed if the study focused on 
a specific industry. Hence, along with the size of the sample, the sample frame of the current 
study also presents certain limitations. 
 
9.5 FUTURE RESEARCH AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
As the phenomenon of dark side behaviour in business relationship still requires much research 
attention, the proceeding section focuses on possible future research avenues and 
recommendations. Besides the recommendation of retesting the conceptual model by using a 
larger sample and a more specific sample frame, future research can include:  
(1) the development of constructs identified as symptoms (i.e. relational myopia, complacency, 
vulnerability and suspicion),  
(2) alternative models to explain the manifestation of dark side behaviour, and  
(3) potential mediators and moderator that can influence the appearance of detrimental attitudes. 
 
9.5.1 Development of symptoms of dark side behaviour in business relationships 
 
Baker (2009) initially proposed the term symptoms to refer to certain harmful behaviours, 
attitudes and perceptions that arise because of detrimental factors in business relationships. He 
maintains that these symptoms can potentially serve as an indication that the partnership is no 
longer as desirable, functional or efficient as it once had been. This set of symptoms includes 
relational myopia, complacency vulnerability and suspicion. Although some of these constructs 
have to some extent been researched in a variety of disciplines (e.g. psychology, organisational 
behaviour, human resource management, and relationship marketing), very few studies have 
examined these symptoms in a business-to-business context. Thus, future research should be 
conducted towards theoretical development and empirical testing of these symptoms of dark 
side behaviour, as a gap exists in the literature concerning these constructs.  
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9.5.2 Alternative models 
 
The current study investigates the associations between antecedents, behaviour outcomes and 
symptoms of the dark side of business relationship, which were identified and selected 
according to recommendations throughout the literature. Future research should aim to explore 
alternative models that can potentially explain the onset of dark side behaviour in business 
partnerships. Over recent years, the negative side of seemingly positive relational elements have 
received increased research attention (e.g. Anderson & Jap, 2005; Abosag et al., 2015; Baker, 
2009). This heightened intertest in how positive relationship drivers can ultimately lead to 
detrimental behaviour, presents researchers with several opportunities for future research. 
Because of the complexity of business relationships, various frameworks should be explored in 
order to understand how, why and when the dark side occurs. Thus, alternative models that 
examine the dark side phenomena in business relationships should be considered and tested. 
 
9.5.3 Potential moderators and mediators  
 
The conceptual framework presented in the current study focuses mainly on examining the 
parallel relationship between antecedents and behavioural outcomes, as well as the direct 
association between the aforementioned behavioural outcomes and symptoms of dark side 
behaviour. Future research should aim to explore potential mediating and moderating variables 
that can contribute to a better understanding of dark side phenomena. As reported and discussed 
in Chapter 8, it is clear that mediation effects do exist and, thus, require more in-depth research. 
Mediation effects can offer more insight regarding the relationship between seemingly positive 
and inherent relationship attributes and intolerable negative behaviours and attitudes. 
Furthermore, future research should also strive to investigate various moderators that can 
explain why dark side behaviour transitions of tolerable to intolerable. Baker (2009), for 
example, examines the moderating effect of time on the relationship between relational 
constructs (i.e. trust, commitment, satisfaction and shared values) and symptoms of dark side 
behaviour (i.e. relational myopia, complacency, vulnerability and suspicion). Results indicate 
that, over time, specific relationship drivers can result in these abovementioned symptoms due 
to relational closeness of partners. Other authors (e.g. Lu, Plewa & Ho, 2016; Wallace, Hunt & 
Richards, 1999; Jarratt & O’Neill, 2002) suggest that organisational culture can also influence 
relationship dynamics and performance. Thus, based on recommendations made throughout 
literature, along with the findings obtained in this research, future studies should incorporate 
potential mediators and moderators of dark side business relationship behaviour.  





The primary objective of this research was to investigate the dark side of business relationships 
by examining the association between antecedents and behavioural outcomes of dark side 
behaviour, as well as the relationship between these outcomes and symptoms that indicate 
partnerships have darken due to the presence of detrimental elements. Significant correlations 
were found between antecedents (i.e. trust, shared values, opportunistic behaviour and 
uncertainty) and behavioural outcomes (i.e. conflict, power, dependence and commitment), and 
several hypotheses concerning the linkages between behavioural outcomes and dark side 
symptoms were supported. Therefore, the current study contributes to the literature and practice 
by offering insights into the dark side of business relationship, and how even seemingly well-
functioning business partnerships can become characterised by detrimental behaviours and 
attitudes. Although there is no such thing as a perfect relationship, calculated efforts and 
continuous vigilance will not only protect individual parties from detriments, but also ensure 
the relationship remains desirable, functional and efficient. 
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11. APPENDIX A 
 
 
SURVEY: BUSINESS-TO-BUSINESS RELATIONSHIP BEHAVIOUR 
 
Dear Respondent  
 
My name is Nina Laubscher and I am currently conducting research in fulfilment of my 
master’s degree at Stellenbosch University’s Department of Business Management. I humbly 
ask that you participate in this research, as your knowledge and expertise will contribute to my 
understanding of business relationships.   
  
I sincerely thank you in advance for your time and effort. Before you fill out the attached 
questionnaire, I ask that you please read through the following important information and sign 
the consent form. 
 
1. PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
My thesis focuses on exploring the negative side of business relationships. I am investigating 
how certain negative aspects that usually appear in every relationship (e.g. conflict, uncertainty, 
excessive dependence and an imbalance of power), can potentially influence business 
relationships to become inefficient and/or undesirable.   
  
2. WHAT WILL BE ASKED OF YOU? 
If you agree to take part in this study, you will be asked to think of a particular business 
relationship between your company and a business partner (e.g. manufacturer, supplier, buyer, 
retailer, service provider, client organisation, etc.) which has been problematic in the past, or is 
currently challenging for your company to do business with. With this in mind, you will be 
asked to answer a series of questions based on your perception and experience. There are no 
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3. POSSIBLE RISKS AND DISCOMFORTS 
As your safety and comfort is of utter importance to us, if at any moment you wish to withdraw 
from participating in the study, you may do so.   
  
4. POSSIBLE BENEFITS TO PARTICIPANTS AND/OR TO THE SOCIETY 
We hope that this research will be able to provide insight into how, why and when certain 
business relationships become negative. In addition, the current research also aims to provide 
managers with insight regarding why it is important to monitor certain behaviours of partner 
organisations, as well as what they should look out for when evaluating the desirability of 
current and potential business relationships.   
 
5. PROTECTION OF YOUR INFORMATION, CONFIDENTIALITY, AND 
IDENTITY 
As the protection of your identity and the information you provide during this study is of high 
priority to us, appropriate measures are in place to ensure complete anonymity and that any 
information provided will be safely guarded. Your answers provided in the questionnaire will 
be solely used for scientific purposes, and only my supervisor and I will have access to the data.  
  
6. PARTICIPATION AND WITHDRAWAL 
You can choose to participate in this study. If you agree to take part in this study, you may 
withdraw at any time without any consequence. You may also refuse to answer any questions 
you don’t want to answer and still remain in the study.   
  
7. RESEARCHERS’ CONTACT INFORMATION 
If you have any questions or concerns about this study, please feel free to contact me, Nina 
Laubscher (17624134@sun.ac.za) and/or my supervisor, Professor Gert Human 
(ghuman@sun.ac.za).  
  
8. RIGHTS OF RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS 
You may withdraw your consent at any time and discontinue participation without penalty.  
You are not waiving any legal claims, rights or remedies because of your participation in this 
research. If you have questions regarding your rights as a participant, contact Ms Maléne 
Fouché [mfouche@sun.ac.za; 021 808 4622] at the Division for Research Development at 
Stellenbosch University  
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DECLARATION OF CONSENT BY THE PARTICIPANT 
 
As the participant I confirm that:  
§ I have read the above information and it is written in a language that I am comfortable with.  
§ I have had a chance to ask questions and all my questions have been answered. 
§ All issues related to privacy, and the confidentiality and use of the information I provide, 
have been explained.  
  
By signing below, I ______________________________ agree to take part in this research 
study, as conducted by Nina Laubscher.  
  
_______________________________________        _____________________  
Signature of Participant                                                Date 
 
DECLARATION BY THE PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR 
 
As the principal investigator, I hereby declare that the information contained in this document 
has been thoroughly explained to the participant. I also declare that the participant has been 
encouraged (and has been given ample time) to ask any questions. In addition, I would like to 
select the following option: 
 
 The conversation with the participant was conducted in a language in which the 
participant is fluent. 
 The conversation with the participant was conducted with the assistance of a 
translator (who has signed a non-disclosure agreement), and this “Consent Form” is 
available to the participant in a language in which the participant is fluent.  
 
 
________________________________________        _____________________      












Please answer the following questions by selecting the most appropriate option.   
 
FIRM CHARACTERISTICS 
Q1 How many employees do your company approximately have? 
10 or less  
11 – 25  
26 – 50  
51 – 250  
251 – 750  
751 – 5000  
5001 or above  
Q2 What is the approximate age (in years) of your company? 
0 - <2  
2 - <5  
5 - <10  
10 - <20  
20 - <50  
50 or more  
RESPONDENT CHARATERISTICS 
Q3 How many years in total have you been employed by your company? 
0 - <2  
2 - <5  
5 - <10  
10 - <20  
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NOTE: When answering Q4 please write down your position in the company. 
 





Q5 Which of the following managerial levels best describe the level of your current 
position? 
Senior management  
Middle management  
Lower management  
Q6 How many years have you been employed in your current position? 
0 - <1  
2 - <5  
5 - <10  
10 or more  
 
SECTION B: RELATIONSHIP WITH A FOCAL BUSINESS PARTNER 
 
IMPORTANT INSTRUCTIONS: 
When answering the following questions, we ask you to think of a particular business 
relationship between your company and a partner (e.g. manufacturer, supplier, buyer, retailer, 
service provider, client organisation, etc.) which has been problematic in the past, or is 
currently problematic. 
Q7 Which of the following are the main reasons for your problems with this 
relationship (select more than one option if needed) 
The partner doesn’t deliver as promised  
The partner doesn’t communicate enough with us  
The partner supports our competitors better than us  
Our personalities clashes  









For the following questioning, please indicate on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 
(strongly agree) to which extent you agree with the following statements: 
 
TRUST 
T1 This partner keeps the promises it makes to us. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
T2 This partner is genuinely concerned that our business 
succeeds. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
T3 This partner considers our welfare as well as its own when 
making important decisions. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
T4 Our partner keeps our best interest in mind. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
COMMITMENT 
C1 The relationship with this partner is something which we are 
very committed to.   
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
C2 The relationship with this partner is very important to our 
business. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
C3 The relationship with this partner is something our business 
intends to maintain. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
C4 The relationship with this partner is something our business 
really cares about. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
OPPORTUNISTIC BEHAVIOUR 
O1 Complete honesty does not pay off when dealing with this 
partner 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Q8 What type of partner is in this problematic relationship? 
Supplier  
Buyer or customer  
Service provider  
Collaborator  
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O2 Sometimes this partner alters the facts slightly in order to get 
what they need. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
O3 This partner sometimes promises to do things and then 
don’t. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
O4 This partner feels that it is appropriate to do anything within 
their means to help further their firm’s own interest. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
SHARED VALUES 
SV1 Our attachment to this partner is primarily based on the 
similarity of our company values. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
SV2 Our company prefers working with this partner because of 
their specific set of values. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
SV3 As our relationship progressed, our company’s values 
have become more similar to this partner’s values. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
SV4 As our relationship progressed, our partner’s values have 
become more similar to our firm’s values. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
RELATIONAL MYOPIA 
RM1 When it comes to our relationship with this partner we 
seldom find new ways of doing things. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
RM2 The relationship we have with this partner has a long-term 
perspective.   
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
RM3 When it comes to our relationship, this partner and us 
conduct business in the same way every time. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
COMPLACENCY 
COM1 Our company is not concerned about future trouble we 
might have with this partner. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
COM2 I do not believe our company will recognise the need to 
change anything in the relationship with this partner. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
COM3 Our company does not continuously seek alternative 
business partners 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
COM4 I do not believe our company would pursue a better partner 
if one was available. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 





V1 This partner can act in a way that will hurt our company. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
V2 This partner can get away with not doing what is expected 
of them in the relationship. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
V3 We are not able to limit this partner’s behaviour, even if it 
might hurt our business. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
SUSPICION 
S1 I do not believe this partner always considers my 
company’s best interest. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
S2 I believe this partner, at times, acts in ways that could be 
harmful to our company. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
S3 I believe this partner, at times, acts in ways that could be 
harmful to our business relationship. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
S4 I believe this partner, at times, takes our partnership for 
granted. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
S5 I believe this partner, at times uses our relationship against 
us for their own gain. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
UNCERTAINTY 
U1 This partner is often surprised by our company’s actions. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
U2 There are many companies similar to this partner in the 
market that can fulfil our current partner’s role. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
U3 We are unsure whether this partner can adapt quickly, 
should our company have to make changes at short notice 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
U4 We cannot accurately predict the performance of this 
partner for the next business cycle. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
DEPENDENCE 
D1 This partner would be difficult to replace with another 
company. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
D2 This partner would be costly to lose. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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D3 We would have to use a lot of resources and time to replace 
this partner. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
POWER 
NP1 This partner expects our compliance because they know 
that we appreciate and admire them. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
NP2 This partner uses their unique competence to make our 
company accept their recommendations. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
NP3 This partner withholds critical information concerning the 
relationship in order to better control our company. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
NP4 Due to the power granted to them by the contract, this 
partner has the upper hand in the relationship. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
CP1 If we fail to comply with this partner’s requests, it results 
in financial and other penalties against our company. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
CP2 If we fail to comply with this partner’s requests, they 
threaten to withdraw from what they originally promised. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
CP3 If we don’t comply with this partner’s demand, they 
withhold important support from our firm 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
CP4 In order to make us submit to their demands, this partner 
threatens to deal with other companies. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
CONFLICT 
FC1 Disagreements with this partner is handled in a friendly 
manner. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
FC2 Disagreements with this partner have improved our 
working relationship 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
FC3 Disagreements with this partner stimulate us to find 
productive solutions to our problems. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
IMPORTANT INSTRUCTIONS: 
Please indicate on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much) to what extent the following 
statements are applicable in regard to the relationship between your company and your 
problematic business partner. 
 




DC1 To what extent is friction present in your relationship with 
your partner? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
DC2 How much anger is present in your relationship with 
partner? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
DC3 To what extent are there opinion clashes in your 
relationship with your partner 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
DC4 To what extent are there emotional tensions in your 
relationship with your partner? 




Thank you so much for taking the time and effort to participate in this study. Your 
participation and contribution of expertise and experience is greatly appreciated 
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